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Abstract   
This thesis examines the role of internal migration as a livelihood strategy in influencing 
food access among rural households. Internal migration has become a key component 
of livelihood strategies for an increasing number of rural households across many 
countries in the developing world. Importantly, unlike earlier periods when migration 
was often viewed as a problem, there is now a growing consensus among academics 
and policy makers on the potential positive effects of migration in reducing poverty and 
promoting sustainable human development. Concurrently, the significance of “food 
security for all” as an important development objective has been rising, particularly 
since the 2007-08 global food crisis. However, the academic and policy discussions on 
these two issues have largely tended to proceed in silos, with little attention devoted to 
the relationship they bear with each other. This thesis attempts to fill this gap in the 
specific context of India, the country with the most underfed people in the world and 
where internal migration has traditionally been central to rural livelihoods. Using a case-
study approach, involving primary survey data collected from an equally representative 
sample of 392 migrant and non-migrant households from the high outmigration district 
of Siwan in western Bihar, this thesis provides empirical household-level insights on the 
interface between migration and food security. Contrary to conventional wisdom that 
posits migration as a household food security strategy only in times of food shortages, 
this thesis argues that the relationship between them is bidirectional. Food insecurity 
can be a critical driver of households’ migration decisions, and subsequent remittances 
can ease household food insecurity. The empirical evidence in this thesis asserts an 
appreciation of three key pathways that shape these forward-backward linkages: i) the 
role of food and livelihood safety nets in influencing households’ food security situation 
and their migration decisions; ii) the extent to which migrants’ remittances are received 
by households and the manner in which they are used; and iii) the ways that migration 
affects gender dynamics within households. The evidence presented in this thesis shows 
that these processes manifest at various levels, and hence produce complex outcomes 
with respect to the migration-food security relationship. In the wake of recent evidence 
on the rising significance of migration in rural livelihood systems in India, and indeed, 
across a number of developing countries, the findings reported in this thesis warrant a 
pressing policy need to better integrate migration in future food policy research and 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Research synopsis  
This research is guided by the pressing policy need to seek insights into the 
mechanisms governing access to food among rural populations of developing 
countries. Food insecurity is a key development challenge facing the world today. 
The Rome Declaration on World Food Security in 1996 and Millennium Summit in 
2000 saw the international community pledging its support and commitment to 
halve, between 1990 and 2015, global levels of undernourishment.1 Despite several 
international, regional and national level initiatives taken in this direction, the most 
recent estimates suggest that during 2011-13, a total number of 842 million people 
suffered from chronic levels of hunger (FAO, 2013b). A large majority of the food 
insecure population resides in the rural areas of the developing world.  
At the global level, enough food is produced to meet the dietary requirements of 
the world’s population adequately. However, not everyone has access to food, 
because people lack resources to either produce food or purchase food from the 
market. More than 70 percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas of the 
developing world (World Bank, 2007), and these populations are highly prone to 
lack of access to sufficient and adequately nutritious food. As access to food is 
mediated by income, an important food policy agenda is to create decent and 
sustainable rural livelihoods (FAO, 2010a). Although a sizable proportion of the rural 
dwellers in much of the developing world still depend on agriculture sector (and 
hence improving agriculture-based livelihoods is considered to be a key to 
enhancing the food security outcomes of the poor rural populations), rural 
livelihood systems exhibit a marked shift away from complete dependence on 
farming. There is a growing body of research evidence suggesting that income from 
the non-farm sources is becoming increasingly central to the lives and livelihoods of 
an increasing number of rural households across the developing world (Barrett, 
Reardon, & Webb, 2001; Ellis, 1998, 2000b; Reardon, Berdegué, & Escobar, 2001; 
                                                        
1 It must be noted that while World Food Summit goal is to reduce by half the number of people 
who are undernourished, Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1 seeks to halve the proportion 
of people who suffer from hunger (FAO, 2010). 
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Rigg, 2006; Scoones, 2009; Shariff & Lanjouw, 2004). However, given the low level 
of economic activity and imperfect labour markets in many rural areas, adequate 
wage income options are often not available throughout the year which compels 
poor households to seek employment opportunities elsewhere.  
Migration constitutes a significant component of livelihood strategies among rural 
households lacking adequate means of income at their place of origin. Rural 
households in developing countries use migration as more than just an income 
generation activity. Migration represents a combined household strategy, aimed at 
livelihood portfolio diversification and risk aversion by households (Stark, 1978, 
1981, 1991; Stark & Levari, 1985). While migration has traditionally been an integral 
part of rural livelihood strategies in most developing countries (Mcdowell & de 
Haan, 1997), recent years have witnessed an unprecedented surge in the mobility 
levels among rural populations. Thus, within livelihood debates, the question as to 
how rural outmigration impacts the livelihood outcomes of poor households has 
assumed significant importance (de Haan, 1999; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; 
Deshingkar & Start, 2003; UNDP, 2009).  
Various forms of population mobility and their impacts on source and destination 
communities have been extensively studied. However, despite food security being a 
global concern, empirical evidence on how migration can influence household food 
security outcomes seems to be scanty in the existing literature. Most of the 
research thus far has invariably focused on the unidirectional relationship between 
the two i.e. food insecurity as a driver of distressed household migration (Corbett, 
1988; Mosse et al., 2002).2 Insufficient attention has been paid on the reverse 
causalities i.e. how migration can affect the food consumption patterns and 
nutritional wellbeing in source destinations. While distress situations may compel 
the entire household to migrate elsewhere, household migration is not a norm. The 
most dominant pattern of rural outmigration involves migration by relatively 
                                                        
2 Corbett’s (1988) analysis of the sequencing of household strategies during famines in Africa 
revealed that food entitlement failures caused distress migration among African households, 
though household undertook migration as a last resort when all other options failed. Another 
study by Moose et al. (2002) observed two contrasting patterns of rural outmigration among 
tribal communities of Western India: i) short-term, short distance migration by young male 
members from the households having slightly better food security situation; and ii) household 
migration among families with least food security. 
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younger males while the other household members stay behind. This pattern of 
migration implies that there are several channels through which migration can have 
a potential bearing on household food and nutritional security. Remittances, 
alteration in household labour composition and resultant changes in time allocation 
for child care and household work, and changes in gender roles are some of the 
important factors that may have a significant impact on the food security outcomes 
of household members (Zezza, Carletto, Davis, & Winters, 2011).3 Recent empirical 
studies using macro-level data have confirmed these links between migration and 
food security (de Brauw, 2011; de Brauw & Mu, 2011; Nguyen & Winters, 2011).4 
However, this research field is still at an infant stage and is currently in need of 
studies which, in addition to the quantitative evidence, provide qualitative insights 
into the complex interactions between livelihoods patterns and household food 
security. In other words, an extended understanding on the role of migrant 
members in contributing to food and nutritional security of the resident group is 
needed that can provide policy inputs to foster the international development 
objectives of promoting livelihood and food security among vulnerable rural 
populations.  
Against this background, this thesis asks how migration as a rural livelihood strategy 
plays a role in influencing rural households’ food security outcomes. Food security is 
a multidimensional concept that involves interplay of three key aspects of food 
availability (which refers to overall supply of food), food access (which asks 
questions around distributional aspects of food, and the ability of households to 
gain access to food by legal means within the prevailing socio-economic 
                                                        
3 Note these are some of the important migration-specific factors that have potential to 
influence household food security outcomes. However, cultural preferences on what to eat and 
what not are also important determinants of household food security. For example, many Hindu 
Brahmins in India do not consume meat owing to religion reasons, which is considered as one of 
the most vital sources of protein and consumed widely by other social groups, such as Muslims 
and Christians, both in India and elsewhere. This means that while remittances may equip the 
Brahmin households with purchasing power to consume meat, this may not necessarily lead to 
these households shifting to meat-based diets; however exposure to other cultures at migration 
destinations may bring about attitudinal shifts in dietary preferences. 
4 These studies attempt to highlight the linkages between migration and nutrition. While 
nutritional outcomes may be influenced by other factors such as disease, food insecurity is one 
of the principal causes of undernourishment and thus a strong link between food and nutrition 
may easily be surmised.  
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environment) and food utilization (which focuses on how wider environmental 
factors, such as disease, affect the conversion of food consumed to allow the body 
to perform its normal functions). The focus of this study is specifically on the food 
access, and accordingly food security in this thesis is defined as the ability of 
households to command access to food. In a broader sense, this research seeks to 
understand, i) whether, and to what extent, food needs act as a driver of household 
migration decisions, ii) and if so, how the act of migration by individual household 
member(s), affects the overall food security of the households, particularly of the 
left-behind populations in the origin villages, and (iii) given that migration often 
triggers fundamental changes in the social and economic relations at the 
community and village levels, to what extent does migration, with its bearing on 
broader village levels dynamics, impact upon the food security of those who stay 
put.  
This research approaches these questions using the conceptual frameworks of 
“entitlements” and “sustainable livelihoods approach” (SLA). With the focus of this 
study being on “food access”, this research conceptualises the issue of food security 
through the lens of entitlements, and then uses SLA to understand the role of 
migration as one of the livelihood strategies in allowing rural households to gain 
access to food. Migration is a complex phenomenon and thus requires a deep 
investigation of the context-specific factors that explain household decision-making. 
The SLA framework provides an important means to understand the non-economic 
attributes embedded in rural livelihood strategies, including socio-economic and 
policy context in their co-produced institutional environments. Through SLA, this 
research attempts to understand and disentangle this under-researched 
relationship between migration and food security. 
Methodologically, this research draws from the primary survey data collected from 
an equally representative sample of 392 migrant and non-migrant households in 
selected villages from one district of rural India which is district of Siwan in the 
eastern Indian state of Bihar. Located in western Bihar, Siwan is among the poorest 
districts of India, facing severe deficiencies in living standards, health, education and 
food security. And work migration has traditionally been an important component 
of local livelihoods, and it is one of the high outmigration districts of Bihar. These 
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considerations guided selection of Siwan as a case study site. Migration from the 
district is largely of less permanent nature involving seasonal and circular moves. In 
order to capture these short-term moves, in this study a migrant household is 
defined as the one with at least one migrant member who has stayed away from his 
usual place of residence for the period of 60 days or more during the last 365 days 
for employment reasons. On the other hand, non-migrant household includes the 
one without any member staying away from the place of usual residence. The 
sample of households with and without migrants was chosen in order to undertake 
a comparative assessment of dynamics and contextual correlates of migration and 
household food security.  
In doing so, this thesis focuses specifically on internal migration. This is aimed to 
correct a bias in the recent literatures. Much of the recent research and debates on 
the development and livelihood impacts of migration has focused more on 
international migration. However, at 740 million (which is also a conservative 
estimate), the number of people moving from one area to another within their own 
country is nearly four times as much as the people migrating across national borders 
(UNDP, 2009, p. 1). It is rather unambiguous that a greater number of rural 
households resort to internal rather than international migration for employment 
reasons, given the importance of distance and relatively higher barriers to 
international mobility. The sheer volume of people moving within national borders 
suggests that the poverty-reducing and development-enhancing potential of the 
remittances from internal migration is no less significant, or perhaps more, than 
those from international migration (Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005, p. 8). It is important 
to note that internal migration can take various spatial forms which mainly include: 
i) intra-district migration (movement away from place of birth/usual residence 
within the district); ii) inter-district migration (migration from one district to another 
within the same state); iii) inter-state migration (movement from one state to 
another within the country). The focus of this thesis is on the all the moves from 
rural areas to other rural and urban regions within and across the state boundaries 
(see Appendix 1). 
The selection of India as a broader research context is guided by the fact that India 
houses the largest pool of chronically undernourished population in the world (FAO, 
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2013b, pp. 42-45) and figures prominently in global debates on food and nutritional 
deprivation. Moreover, the existing development paradox of rising affluence among 
urban and middle-class populations but livelihood stagnation (and even 
deterioration by some measures) among a large proportion of rural population 
makes for an important study. Also, while national statistics and village-level case 
studies on migration reveal a steady expansion in the number of people migrating 
to other towns for employment reasons, suggesting the importance of mobility for 
an increasing number of households (Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; Keshri & 
Bhagat, 2012), the pre-existing research on rural livelihoods does not provide 
answers to what extent migration is helping rural households attain food security in 
Indian context. This research attempts to fill this gap. 
The following discussion contextualises the importance of understanding the 
connections between migration and food security in the case of India, which also 
serves as a justification for undertaking the present study.  
Overview of food (in)security in India 
In India, despite the considerable increases in agricultural production following the 
Green Revolution in the 1970s, a bleak state of food security among a significantly 
huge proportion of its population still remains a challenge to be addressed. The 
adoption of Green Revolution technologies and resultant gains in the levels of food 
production has improved India’s abilities to avert the large-scale recurring famines 
of the past, and in the post-independence era India has emerged as a major net 
exporter of food (in 2012, India became the world’s largest exporter of rice: 
Chandrasekher, 2012). Nevertheless, it is still home to the most number of 
chronically undernourished people in the world. According to the most recent 
statistics by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), during 
2011-13, the number of undernourished people in India was estimated to be 213.8 
million, representing a quarter of the total undernourished people in the world and 
73 percent of the undernourishment burden of the South Asian region (FAO, 2013b, 
pp. 42-44). Thus, “if the undernourished people in India constituted a single 
country, it would be the fifth most populous country in the world” (Pritchard, 
Rammohan, Sekher, Parasuraman, & Choithani, 2014, p. 19). In relative terms, the 
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prevalence of food insecurity in India is worse than many countries in the Sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2013, India was ranked 63 in the Global Hunger Index (GHI) of 78 
highly food insecure countries, a rank which placed the country even below the 
extremely poor and politically highly unstable nations of Niger, Republic of Congo 
and Tanzania (Grebmer et al., 2013, p. 15).  
Chronic food insecurity, which ultimately manifests into poor nutritional and health 
outcomes5 with wider implications on nation’s health and wealth (for example, see 
World Bank, 2006), remains a major public policy challenge in India. Indeed, with 
such a large proportion of the India’s population being food insecure, the country 
faces what is generally viewed as a ‘nutritional emergency’ (Care India, 2012; Dreze, 
2004; UNICEF, 2014). The prevalence of under-nutrition remains stubbornly high 
across the different population groups in India, in particular women and children. 
The anthropometric data from India’s National Family Health Survey (NFHS) showed 
that in 2005-06, 42.5 percent of the all children below the age of five years were 
under-weight (a composite indicator of child malnutrition, reflecting both acute and 
chronic forms of nutritional deprivation) and 69.5 percent of them suffered from 
anaemia, with 40 percent of children having severe anaemia.6 More than one-third 
(35.6 percent) of women of reproductive ages (15-49 years) had the below normal 
Body Mass Index (BMI)7 of 18.5. Additionally, more than half of the women in the 
same age-group were also reported to be anaemic (all data, IIPS & Macro 
International, 2007b).  
Food insecurity and undernourishment of such a magnitude in contemporary India 
persists despite the fact that nation’s granaries bulge with the enough food stocks 
to adequately meet the food needs of the country’s population. Furthermore, in the 
past two decades the Indian economy has grown at remarkable rates. And yet, 
contrary to the international experience, the impact of high economic growth in 
improving the nutritional wellbeing of a large majority of India’s population has 
                                                        
5 Poor nutritional and health outcomes may also be a result of several non-food factors such as 
unfavourable hygiene and sanitation practices and resultant disease environment. However, lack 
of food often amplifies the effect of disease.  
6 Anemia figures quoted from NFHS are for the children aged 6-59 months.  
7 BMI is measured as weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in meters square). In other words, 
BMI= kg/m2.  
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been rather minimal, leading the analysts to describe the country as an “enigma” 
(see the discussion below). Although the answers to this enigma lie in a complex set 
of social, economic and political reasons (some of which will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters), it is clearly the case that the issue of food insecurity in India 
is not about the food production but food access i.e. the ways in which the country’s 
populations, particularly the rural poor with limited means, gain access to food. In 
turn, this is connected with the broader issue of livelihood security. Consistent with 
the approach developed by Pritchard et al. (2014, p. 144), this thesis emphasises 
that the issue of food insecurity in India is “situated in the broader set of livelihood 
circumstances of people” and thus, for the policy to redress the same requires a 
holistic understanding of those livelihood contexts.   
Economic growth and nutrition disconnect  
Following the economic reforms since 1990s, the Indian economy has witnessed 
gargantuan leaps in terms of growth and has moved on to become the second 
fastest growing economy in the world after China. However, the rapid economic 
growth in India has contributed only marginally in improving the food and 
nutritional security outcomes of a large majority of country’s populace (Gillespie & 
Kadiyala, 2012; Gragnolati, Shekar, Das Gupta, Bredenkamp, & Lee, 2005; Headey, 
Chiu, & Kadiyala, 2011).  
Although nutritional outcomes are affected by a range of factors other than a 
country’s level of income, the cross-country evidence suggests that economic 
growth and consequent rise in average incomes are negatively correlated with the 
rates of child under-nutrition. In quantitative terms, it has been observed that for 
most developing countries the decline in the prevalence of child under-nutrition 
tends to be nearly half the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Haddad, Alderman, Appleton, Song, & Yohannes, 2003). Thus, for example, an 
annual per capita GDP growth rate of 5 percent would be expected to be associated 
with a corresponding decline in the prevalence of child under-nutrition by 2.5 
percent annually. However, this relationship is virtually absent in India. Between 
1990 and 2005, the per capita GDP in India grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 
percent, which should ideally have resulted into decline in the childhood under-
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nutrition prevalence by 27 percent during this 15-year period (Gillespie & Kadiyala, 
2012, p. 173) Yet, not only has the pace of decline been sluggish, but recent years 
have witnessed virtual stagnation in the child nutrition outcome indicators in India. 
Between 1992-93 and 1998-99, the percentage of children below three years of age 
who were underweight declined by nearly 6 percentage points – from 52.8 percent 
to 47.1 percent. But in the period between 1998-99 and 2005-06, childhood 
underweight prevalence fell merely by 0.6 percentage points – from 47.1 percent to 
46.5 percent (Pathak & Singh, 2011, pp. 4-5). This rather weak negative correlation 
between economic growth and food security in India has led the country be 
described as an “enigma” (Gillespie & Kadiyala, 2012; Headey et al., 2011; 
Ramalingaswami, Jonsson, & Rohde, 1996). 
Moreover, there is evidence that in the post-reform period, disparities in child 
nutritional outcomes have widened between rich and poor and across the 
geographical regions and states of India (Pathak & Singh, 2011, p. 8). It is also 
important to note that in spite of a rise in average per capita incomes and indeed in 
per capita food availability in the country, the average calorie consumption intake is 
on a constant decline in India since the early 1980s (Deaton & Dreze, 2009). This 
deterioration of nutritional outcomes in the wake of rising affluence has raised 
questions about the ways in which economic growth has apparently bypassed a 
large proportion of the country’s poor population. Indeed, the net worth of India’s 
56 billionaires is estimated to be USD 191.5 billion (Karmali, 2014), accounting for 
approximately 10 percent of the country’s overall GDP.8 But at the same time, in 
2009-10, close to 355 million people were estimated to be living below the official 
poverty line in India (Planning Commission, 2012), a line which is more “akin to a 
starvation line” (Mander, 2012, p. 13). Perhaps no other country in the world offers 
as much a contrast as India where the dire poverty of such a magnitude coexists 
with tremendous wealth. Noting the highly exclusionary nature of India’s economic 
growth, further widening the gap between the rich and poor, Dreze and Sen (2013, 
p. ix) even go to the extent of suggesting “that the growth process [in India] is so 
                                                        
8 According to the World Bank latest estimates, in 2012 India’s GDP stood at USD 1842 billion 
(World Bank, 2014). The same has been used as a denominator to arrive at this figure of 10 
percent. 
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biased, making the country look more and more like islands of California in a sea of 
sub-Saharan Africa” (italics added).  
Rural-urban disparities in the nutritional outcomes 
Nearly 70 percent of India’s population resides in rural areas, which are 
characterised by low levels of income, poor quality of life, and inadequate health 
and educational infrastructure. The relative neglect of rural areas in India’s 
economic development planning is manifested in wide rural-urban disparities in the 
human development indicators of income, education, health and nutrition. 
Moreover, the disregard to the country’s rural areas, and by implication the needs 
of rural populations, seems to have accentuated following the economic reforms 
since the early 1990s which have been highly urban-centric in their distribution of 
benefits. It is, therefore, no surprise that the character and incidence of food 
insecurity and deprivation in India is predominantly rural. The MDG Report 2011 
noted that in South Asia “progress in combating child under-nutrition is bypassing 
the poorest and children are twice as likely to be underweight if they live in rural 
rather than urban areas” (United Nations, 2011, p. 14). Given that India accounts for 
the vast majority of childhood under-nutrition in the South Asian region, this 
observation is broadly reflective of the rural-urban disparities in the food and 
nutrition security outcomes in the country. The NFHS 2005-06 data on the 
nutritional status of children by the place of residence suggest that the prevalence 
of stunting, wasting and underweight among children under five years of age in 
rural areas were 50.7 percent, 20.7 percent and 45.6 percent, respectively. The 
corresponding figures for the children in urban areas were 39.6 percent, 16.9 
percent, 32.7 percent, respectively (Figure 1.1).  
Similarly, there is also a rural-urban divide in terms of the prevalence of under-
nutrition among adults, as measured by the BMI status. Using the NFHS 2005-06 
data, Guha-Khasnobis and James (2010) found that adult under-nutrition among the 
slum populations of eight Indian cities was 23 percent and the corresponding 
proportion for the rural areas of the same Indian states was nearly 40 percent. 
Additionally, even though large-scale famines have become history in India, deaths 
due to starvation and malnutrition continue to be reported even today, particularly 
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among the socially and economically disadvantaged rural populations (Jha, 2002; 
Mander, 2012; Parulkar, 2012). This apparent disconnect between buffer food 
stocks and surging economic growth on one hand and widespread incidence of 
nutritional deprivation on the other, has created the situation where the “right to 
food” has emerged as a new set of foundations to India’s approach to under-
nutrition, as I now discuss. 
Figure 1.1: Prevalence of under-nutrition among children aged under-five years in 
India by place of residence, 2005-06 
 
Source: IIPS and Macro International (2007a, p. 270) (Table 10.1). 
Right to food revolution in India: importance and challenges 
The right to sufficient food has long been recognised in various international 
treaties and instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1976. 
However, in principle, the right to food as a fundamental human right gained 
political significance only since mid-1990s. The second World Food Summit in 1996 
in Rome, Italy, alternatively called the ‘Rome Summit on World Food Security’ which 
saw the participation of heads of the States and their representatives from more 
than 180 countries around the world, marked an important event in this regard. The 
Rome Summit, convened by FAO, occurred against the backdrop of persisting 
widespread hunger even despite an enormous surge in global food production 
levels in the preceding decades achieved through the widespread diffusion of GR 
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technologies. Although this paradox of “hunger amidst plenty” led to a considerable 
rethinking of what constitutes food security which, most importantly, involved a 
shift from a narrow production-orientated approach of food availability to a wider 
conception of food security involving issues such as food access and food utilization 
(I shall have more to say on this later), one of the most important aspects of the 
Rome Summit was the framing of food security through the paradigm of human 
rights. This conceptualisation of food security through a rights-based approach was 
in line with the growing importance of human-centered thinking since the early 
1990s. By placing people at the center of development, rights and entitlements 
were placed at the core of new discourses and metrics (this is reflected in the 
United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) annual Human Development 
Reports, the first of which was published in 1990). The Rome Declaration, thus, 
recognized not only “the right of everyone to be free from hunger” but also the 
“right to have access to safe and nutritious food” (FAO, 1996).  
The Rome Summit marked a significant event in terms of generating a global 
consensus on the right to adequate food. In order to monitor the compliance of the 
member countries on the Summit’s plan of action, in 2000, a Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food was appointed. Later, in 2004, the FAO’s council adopted a set of 
‘Voluntary Guidelines’ to help member countries towards their efforts on the 
progressive realization of the right to food (FAO, 2005). Although the right to food 
still remains a distant reality for close to a billion people who go to bed hungry 
every night (FAO, 2013b), the framing of the food security through the prism of a 
rights-based approach has provided considerable impetus for public action, 
particularly in democratic settings with a strong, and widening, presence of civil 
society. As a result, recent years have witnessed many countries amending their 
constitutions or legal frameworks to incorporate the right to food as a legal right 
accorded to their citizens (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2012), including 
India which, following almost a decade-long debate on the issue, passed a legislative 
mechanism in August 2013 that provided a constitutional stamp to the right to food.  
The origin of this recently passed right to food legislation in India lies in a “writ 
petition” filed in the Indian Supreme Court in April 2001 by the Rajasthan state arm 
of the India’s People Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), an umbrella civil society 
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organisation working on a wide range of human rights issues in the country. The 
petition, officially known as PUCL vs Union of India and Others, Writ Petition [Civil] 
196 of 2001, argued that because the Article 21 in the Directive Principles of Indian 
Constitution enshrined the right to life to the citizens, it was incumbent on the state 
to protect the citizens’ right to food, which was fundamental to right to life. The 
trigger for this petition by the PUCL was a series of hunger and starvation deaths 
around the country, particularly in southern Rajasthan, which suffered from a 
severe drought for three consecutive years from 1999 to 2001. The main victims of 
starvation were the socially and economically marginalised Scheduled Tribe 
populations living in the remote villages in southern Rajasthan. These starvation 
deaths occurred even when India had a reserve foodgrain stock of 50 million 
tonnes, far in excess of the buffer stocks norms of 20 million tonnes (which in any 
case had the broader aim of dealing with crisis situations such as this one). Thus, 
invoking the Article 21, the PUCL sought the intervention of the Supreme Court to 
check this situation when “food stocks reached unprecedented levels while hunger 
in drought-affected areas intensified” (Patnaik, Reddy, & Singh, 2008, p. 6). 
Although this case has not yet been formally concluded, the Indian Supreme Court 
has passed several interim orders directing the federal and state governments in 
India to release foodgrains to the hungry and starving in order to protect their right 
to life. In one such interim order passed on May 02, 2003, the court observed: 
…of utmost importance is to see that food is provided to the aged, infirm, 
disabled, destitute women, destitute men who are in danger of starvation, 
pregnant and lactating women and destitute children, especially in cases 
where they or members of their family do not have sufficient funds to 
provide food for them … In case of famine, there may be shortage of food, 
but here the situation is that amongst plenty there is scarcity... The anxiety 
of the Court is to see that poor and the destitute and the weaker sections 
of the society do not suffer from hunger and starvation. The prevention of 
the same is one of the prime responsibilities of the Government – whether 
Central or the State.         
     (Supreme Court of India, 2003, p. 2)  
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Over the years, the scope of the petition filed by the PUCL, which initially sought 
mainly drought-relief to prevent starvation deaths among the poor communities, 
has expanded significantly. It has expanded to include a range of other issues, the 
most important of which has been the state-provisioning of (free and/or subsidised) 
food for the poor households on a continuous basis in order to deal with the 
problem of chronic malnutrition. Subsequent interim orders of the Supreme Court 
have correspondingly reflected PUCL concerns and directed the Government of 
India to take appropriate actions in this regard including providing free-cooked 
meals to school-going children, food rations for the pregnant and lactating mothers 
and so on (for a lucid account of the Supreme Court’s interim orders on the right to 
food case, see Patnaik et al., 2008).  
The sustained litigation by the PUCL and the Supreme Court’s interventions put 
considerable pressure on the Government of India and in 2010, the incumbent 
ruling coalition led by the Indian National Congress party, carrying on its 2009 
election manifesto promise, announced to implement right to food legislation. 
Intense debates then ensued for approximately two and half years between 2010 
and 2013 over the provisions it ought to contain. The debates revolved mainly 
around two core issues pertaining to i) coverage of the legislation (what proportion 
of population should be provided subsidised food grains) and, ii) delivery 
mechanisms (e.g. food rations versus food coupons/cash transfers). In 2013, the Bill 
was passed by the Indian Parliament and turned into a constitutional act. The 
National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013 provides legal protection against hunger 
and takes a gender-sensitive life-cycle approach to tackling the issue of food 
insecurity in India. The major provisions in the NFSA include providing food and cash 
benefits to pregnant and lactating mothers so that they and their new-borns are 
well-cared for, nutrition benefits for children aged between 6 and 59 months, free 
school meals for children attending schools, and importantly (something which has 
been the source of much debate), 5 kilograms of subsidised food ration per person 
to 67 percent of the country’s population through the existing Public Distribution 
System (PDS) (Government of India, 2013a).  
With such a huge proportion of India’s population lacking access to adequate food, 
the right to food law, no doubt, holds utmost importance. Indeed, a decade earlier, 
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Dreze (2004) argued that pervasive under-nutrition in India seem to have been 
accepted as ‘natural’ with virtually no policy discussion on this aspect of human 
crisis. Seen in this light, the food security law certainly represents a major step 
forward. Yet, however, given the scale and multiple dimensions of food and 
nutrition insecurity in India (which will become clearer as the discussion proceeds), 
the NFSA is only a fraction of what is really needed to tame the problem. Moreover, 
most of the food safety nets, as mentioned above, that the NFSA covers have 
already been in place in India, with some of them such as the PDS existing since as 
early as the late 1960s. Thus, in key ways, the NFSA is a consolidation of the existing 
food safety nets which, although significantly important, remain beset with 
difficulties. For example, there is a wide body of evidence suggesting that vast 
amounts of food grains meant to reach the poor under the PDS get illegally diverted 
along the way (inter alia, Jha & Ramaswamy, 2008; Parikh, 1994; Planning 
Commission, 2005). And media reports abound on the large scale corruption and 
leakages in National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)9, a scheme 
implemented in 2006 which promises 100 days to guaranteed manual labour 
employment to rural household at the legally stipulated wage rate. Nevertheless, 
recent evidence points to signs of improvements in the functioning of these 
schemes, seemingly in part because poor households are now becoming more 
assertive in claiming their entitlements (Dreze & Khera, 2014; Khera, 2011b, 2011c, 
2012, 2014). However, by and large, the state of social provisioning in India 
continues to remain dismal. And it is a peculiar irony of social welfare system in 
India that the safety nets remain more dysfunctional in the poor regions or states 
where they are needed the most (for example, see, inter alia, the discussion in 
Bardhan, 2011; Dreze & Sen, 2013; Khera, 2011c, 2011d).  
In such a situation whereby a large majority of the rural poor is left to fend for 
themselves, insights on the livelihood strategies devised by rural households to gain 
access to adequate food are of significant policy relevance. In particular, this 
research focuses on migration as a rural livelihood strategy for the reasons stated 
below.  
                                                        
9 NREGS emanated from the constitutional act of the same name, National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA). In 2009, it was renamed as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). In this thesis I use the old name, however. 
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Rural outmigration and food security: a pressing need for policy inputs  
In India, the agriculture sector has traditionally been the most important source of 
food and livelihood security for a large majority of the rural populations. Through 
own-account farming or wages obtained from farm work (and more often than not, 
through the combination of both), agriculture has provided an important means to 
meet the income and food needs of the rural dwellers. Although agriculture still 
remains the mainstay of rural populations, employing close to half of India’s total 
labour force, the changes in the pattern of economic growth are rapidly altering 
rural livelihood trajectories in India. There is a continuing decline in share of 
agriculture sector in the national income – from 33 percent of the GDP in 1990-91 
to 15 percent in 2009-10 (Mehrotra, Gandhi, Saha, & Sahoo, 2013, p. 87) – and with 
it, the fortunes of agriculture-based livelihoods. The statistics from the successive 
national Censuses and surveys highlight a gradual shift away from farm-based 
livelihoods, although there are wide regional level variations. At the national level, 
over 7 million people whose main occupation was cultivation quit farming during 
the inter-censal period 1991-2001. This trend accelerated in the following decade, 
with Census 2011 recording 8.6 million fewer main cultivators compared to the 
2001 Census (Registrar General of India, 1991b, 2001c, 2011b). Furthermore, the 
data from India’s National Sample Survey highlights a more rapid change in the 
employment patterns, suggesting that nearly 27 million people withdrew from 
agriculture between 2004-05 and 2011-12, and for the first time in the history of 
independent India the share of agricultural employment has fallen to less than 50 
percent (Mehrotra et al., 2013).  
Although the role of the agriculture sector in economic and human development 
remains highly contested, cross-country evidence across a range of low-income 
countries suggests that compared to the secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy, growth in agriculture has a highly significant impact on reducing the levels 
of rural poverty and food insecurity and raising the consumption levels among the 
poorest segments of the population (inter alia, Christiaensen, Demery, & Kuhl, 
2010; Ligon & Sadoulet, 2008; World Bank, 2007). In India, the remarkable gains in 
the agricultural productivity following the GR in the 1970s not only helped the 
country achieve self-reliance in food production and thwarted the looming 
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possibility of mass hunger, but increased farmers’ incomes, improved wages for the 
agricultural labourers and reduced prices of food, leading to overall decline in 
poverty (on the impact of agriculture on rural poverty reduction in India, see 
Ahluwalia, 1978; Bell & Rich, 1994; Ravallion & Datt, 1996). Subsequently, however, 
agriculture growth had made a far less impressive dent on food insecurity outcomes 
in India (FAO, 2013a; Headey, 2011). Furthermore, the rapidly changing sectoral 
composition of economic growth in India following the economic reforms of early 
1990s, with much of the addition to the national income now emanating from the 
urban-based service sector to the disadvantage of the agricultural activities (as the 
data above shows), has led to a further weakening of role of agriculture in 
improving the food and nutritional well-being of Indian population. Consequently, 
the more recent research has pointed out that there exists an “agriculture-nutrition 
disconnect” in India (Gillespie & Kadiyala, 2012; Headey et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, the recent evidence suggests that in the post economic reform period, the 
urban economic growth has become a more important driver of rural poverty 
reduction compared to pre-reform period when the growth in urban sector had no 
discernable impact on rural poverty reduction, and it was the economic growth in 
rural sector from which both the rural and urban poor benefitted. This is not to 
suggest that growth of rural economy is not important. Indeed, with nearly 70 
percent of India’s population still residing in the countryside, rural economic growth 
holds an important key to improving the living standards of rural poor. At the same 
time the spillover effects of urban growth on rural incomes and employment seem 
to have become increasingly more crucial insofar as rural poverty reduction in the 
post-1990 period is concerned (Cali & Menon, 2009; Datt & Ravallion, 2009; 
Ravallion & Datt, 1996).  
It is important to note that the highly fragmented pattern of agricultural 
landholdings in India implies that most rural households constitute smallholder 
farmers. According to data from the 2011 agriculture Census, 85 percent of 
landholdings in India are less than 2 hectare (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014b, p. 6). 
Furthermore, nearly 42 percent of households in rural India do not own any 
agriculture land (Rawal, 2008, p. 45). These patterns get compounded further by the 
fact that most Indian states officially prevent the renting or leasing of farm land. 
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Thus, for landless and land-poor households of India, wage income has traditionally 
been a central component of household income. However, the low level of 
economic activity with imperfectly operating rural labour markets means that more 
often than not, wage options are often pursued in the distant labour markets. Thus, 
migration has long been an essential component of rural livelihood systems in India.  
The predominant stream of migration in India has involved rural to rural migration 
of labour. The systematic insertion of Green Revolution reforms in the Indo-
Gangetic plains of Punjab and Haryana in northwestern India led agriculture 
labourers from the economically backward regions of eastern Uttar Pradesh and 
Bihar to migrate to these states. In fact, the success of GR in India is largely 
attributed to large-scale migration of these poor labourers. Writing of poor 
labourers from Bihar who migrated to Punjab for agricultural work during this 
period of farm intensification, Singh (1997, p. 518) suggests: “Punjab farmers know 
that green revolution would not have been as green right from the beginning in the 
late 1960s, as it is found today, had there been no use of migrant labour from 
Bihar.” However, the rising stress on the agriculture-based income and livelihoods10 
and urban-centric nature of economic growth is changing the patterns of migration, 
with rural to urban migration rising in significance. During 2007-08, migration to 
urban areas grew at the rate of 3.5 percent while the growth for rural areas was 2.6 
percent (National Sample Survey, 2010, p. 22).11  
An important characteristic of rural-urban migration in India is its seasonal and 
circular nature, which constitutes a significant bulk of migratory movements. It is for 
this reason that rural migrants in India are often described as “nowhere people” 
(Breman, 2010, p. 17). In fact, the embedded seasonality in migration is the reason 
which has kept the levels of urbanisation low in India (de Haan, 1997a, 2002; Kundu, 
2003; Kundu & Saraswati, 2012). The official data agencies, however, barely capture 
the true extent of temporary migrants in India. The estimates derived by Keshri and 
                                                        
10 Between 1995 and 2010, a quarter million farmers committed suicides in India owing to debt 
and distress (Sainath, 2012). And according to the nation-wide survey of 51,770 farm households 
conducted in 2003, 40 percent of the surveyed households indicated that provided the choice, 
they would take up some other profession, with 27 percent out of the 40 percent citing lack of 
profitability as the main reason for this decision (National Sample Survey, 2005). 
11 The rate of migration in the survey report (full reference provided below) is expressed as 
migrants per 1000 population but here it is reported on per 100 people.     
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Bhagat (2012) using National Sample Survey data suggest that temporary migrants 
in India account for nearly 13 million people. Alternative informal estimates, 
however, indicate that between 40 million (Breman, 2010, p. 10) to 100 million 
(Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009, p. 3) people remain on the move for their livelihoods in 
any given year.  
Despite the crucial role played by migration in the lives and livelihoods or the rural 
poor in India, rarely is its significance acknowledged among the policy-making 
communities. The policy neglect partly emanates from the fact that much of the 
rural outmigration characteristically takes the form of seasonal and circular mobility 
and does not fit into the ‘officially structured’ contexts. Contrarily, rural 
outmigration is often viewed by the policy-makers as a sign of distress and often 
evokes misguided images of disruption in the idealised conceptions of sedentary 
rural life (de Haan, 1999; Mcdowell & de Haan, 1997). Not surprisingly, as is the case 
in many developing countries, development policy in India has sought to control the 
flow of rural migrants even though it is rather unambiguous that “migration and 
rural livelihoods are falsely opposed” (Mosse et al., 2002, p. 60). For example, one 
of the primary objectives of the NREGS is to prevent the distress migration from 
rural areas. As briefly discussed above, by the means of guaranteeing 100 days of 
paid employment at legal minimum-wage (or unemployment allowance in lieu if the 
work is not provided), the scheme is of crucial importance to the rural poor. 
However, the research findings reveal that impact of NREGS on reducing rural 
migration has been minimal. For example, a study by Rao (2009) that evaluates the 
impact of NREGS on migration in the two states Andhra Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh found little impact of the job scheme on reducing migration, though 
participation rates in the job scheme varied between the two states. As Breman 
(2010, p. 21) notes: “It is still too early to tell whether MGNREGA will be able to 
stem the tide of circular migrants.”  
A related concern often expressed by scholars in the case of rural-urban migration is 
that most migrant workers get absorbed in the urban informal sector where 
average wages are low, working conditions deplorable and exploitation high, all of 
which does not help improve their (and the households they belong to) social and 
economic position (Breman, 1996, 2010; Srivastava & Sasikumar, 2003). Indeed, this 
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is a valid concern, particularly in the wake of signs of relocation of poverty from 
rural to urban areas (Ruel, Garrett, & Haddad, 2000). However, another pertinent 
question which ought to beg equal attention is “what these households and 
individuals would have done in the absence of the opportunity to migrate” 
(Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005, p. 40). 
The growing importance of migration in the rural livelihood systems of India 
warrants a greater policy attention than it currently receives. Despite the concern 
around migrants’ vulnerabilities associated with urban informal jobs, the research 
evidence across a range of countries, including India, suggests that income from 
migration can provide a route out of poverty (Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005; 
Deshingkar & Start, 2003; DFID, 2007) and potentially contribute to enhanced 
human development outcomes (Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; UNDP, 2009). 
Surprisingly, however, there is very little direct evidence on how migration as a rural 
livelihood strategy impacts food and nutritional security outcomes at household 
level. The lack of research is surprising because the connections between migration 
and food security are very obvious. The prevailing agriculture-nutrition disconnect 
in India warrants a need for a greater understanding of alternative mechanisms that 
may explain the food security outcomes among rural households. Drawing from 
primary field research, this research aims to highlight the often-overlooked 
connections between migration and food security.  
The study area and rationale behind area selection 
As noted earlier, this study contextualises the link between migration and food 
security using a case-study research approach involving the collection of primary 
field-based household survey data from a sample of 392 migrant and non-migrant 
rural households. Although the problem of food insecurity is widespread across the 
different regions of India, it was not possible to undertake fieldwork in the whole of 
India due to time and budget constraints. Moreover, the incidence of food 
insecurity and migration, the two key variables considered in this study, is spatially 
uneven. It is for this reason that this study chose a select set of villages in a single 
district of Siwan in the eastern state of Bihar in India. As noted above, Siwan district 
was chosen as a case study site because of the high rates of food insecurity and 
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outmigration. I describe my methodology and discuss the research context more 
fully in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, however, at this stage it is useful to provide a brief 
background of some of the strategic and statistical considerations which were taken 
into account in selecting Bihar as a broader study site. This brief discussion, thus, 
attempts to highlight how the selection of Bihar aligns with the broader objectives 
of this study.  
India is a huge and diverse country with widespread intra-state and inter-state 
disparities in the levels of economic and human development. The existing patterns 
of migration are largely driven by these regional inequalities. The eight socio-
economically backward states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
Uttar Pradesh, Uttrakhand, Rajasthan and Odisha, commonly referred as 
Empowered Action Group (EAG) states, are among the worst performing large 
states in the country on the human development front, lagging far behind on social, 
economic, demographic, health, and epidemiological transitions compared to other 
states. The EAG states account for approximately 45 percent of India’s population 
(Registrar General of India, 2011d) with a significant majority of population lacking 
conditions of a decent living. And the extent of food and nutritional deprivation is 
also rampant, with all states having alarming levels of undernourishment (Menon, 
Deolalikar, & Bhaskar, 2009).  
On several counts, Bihar can be considered the worst performing of these states. 
Firstly, Bihar has the highest proportion of people living below the official poverty 
line, with more than half (53.3 percent) of the population officially classified as poor 
in 2009-10 (Planning Commission, 2012). Furthermore, it is not just poverty but on 
all the other measures related to education, health, mortality and hunger, most of 
the individual districts (and villages within them) in Bihar constitute “pockets of 
deprivation”. A report that attempts to identify the most backward districts based 
on the human development deprivation indicators finds that 26 out of the 69 such 
districts of India are from Bihar (Debroy & Bhandari, 2003, pp. 49-50).12 Given the 
link between poverty and food insecurity, the state accounts for a huge chunk of 
chronically undernourished people as reflected in the national statistics. Bihar ranks 
                                                        
12 For the details on the methodological aspects of identifying the most backward districts, see 
Debroy and Bhandari (2003, pp. 46-48).  
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15th in the State Hunger Index (SHI)13 of 17 Indian states (Menon, Deolalikar, & 
Bhaskar, 2009).   
Secondly, almost 90 percent of the Bihar’s population resides in rural areas 
(Registrar General of India, 2011b) where lack of gainful employment opportunities 
and persistence of extreme poverty force a large majority of households to migrate 
to other states in search of livelihood. Additionally, out of 38 districts, 31 districts 
are flood prone and 11 districts are drought-prone (Deshingkar, Kumar, Choubey, & 
Kumar, 2009) and thus climatic challenges to agriculture-dependent livelihoods, 
coupled with rural poverty make migration for work an obvious choice for rural 
poor in Bihar. Migration has traditionally been a central component of livelihood 
strategies among rural dwellers of Bihar and some scholars have termed migrants 
from Bihar as “unsettled settlers” (de Haan, 1997a, p. 482), an apparent reference 
also to the circular or temporary nature of migration from Bihar. In fact, such is the 
magnitude of migration and dependence on remittance incomes that the economy 
of Bihar is called as ‘the money order economy’ (Deshingkar et al., 2009).   
The Census 2001 migration data for Bihar reveal that in absolute terms, the state 
witnessed a second highest outflow of people to other states during the inter-censal 
period 1991-2001 with net out-migration accounting for 1.7 million people, only 
after Uttar Pradesh which had 2.7 million net out-migrants (Registrar General of 
India, 2001b).14 However, this absolute number of out-migrants from Uttar Pradesh 
is due to the sheer size of the population of the state, which is almost double than 
that of Bihar. When looked into percentage terms (i.e. percentage of out-migrants 
to total population of the state), outmigration rates for Bihar and Uttar Pradesh 
stand at 2.1 percent and 1.6 percent, implying higher outmigration incidence in the 
former. By controlling the population size, the ‘outmigration rate’ provides a better 
                                                        
13 The SHI is a composite index that takes into account prevalence of calorie undernourishment, 
proportion of underweight children under age 5 years and under-five mortality rate. It is similar 
to the GHI used for cross-country comparison. 
14 It must be noted that that while some data from the most recently concluded population 
Census 2011 is now available, detailed migration tables have not yet been put in the public 
domain. Moreover, as I describe in Chapter 4, when this study was conceptualised during April-
September 2011, no data from the Census 2011 were available and the study had to rely on the 
Census 2001 data which was also used as a basis for the selection of study district (of Siwan) and 
villages within the district. Also, these figures are for the more permanent form of migration and 
do not include the short-term moves which are likely to be far greater in magnitude. 
 25 
measure to gauge the true extent of outmigration scenario. Hence, the selection of 
Bihar over Uttar Pradesh is considered ideal for this study. Also, on the SHI 
mentioned above, Uttar Pradesh fares relatively better (ranks 9th) than Bihar with 
low hunger index value (Menon et al., 2009).  
Given the magnitude of outmigration from Bihar, it is perhaps not surprising that 
studies on rural outmigration from Bihar abound in the literature. Nonetheless, 
significant scope for migration research still remains. As noted by Deshingkar et al. 
(2009, p. 139): “Despite numerous studies of migration in Bihar, aspects of its 
complexity, diversity and impact on different groups of people remain poorly 
understood.” Thus, Bihar provides an appropriate research setting to understand 
the linkages between migration and food security. 
Thesis outline  
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 seeks to contextualise 
the links between migration and food security. The discussion in this Chapter 
suggests that while the recent years have witnessed heightened importance of 
these two issues in the global, regional and national level development policy 
deliberations, there currently exists a huge disconnect between the two, and it also 
dwells on the possible reason for this disconnect. The Chapter also lays out the key 
conceptual framework of “entitlement” and “livelihoods” employed in this study to 
understand the connections between migration and food security. These 
frameworks provide the theoretical and analytical foundations to this research. 
Finally, the Chapter reviews the existing evidence on the type and nature of 
migration, role of migration in rural livelihoods and suggests the possible pathways 
of linkages between migration and food security.  
Chapter 3 discusses the broad dynamics of food insecurity, migration and 
urbanisation in India. Beginning with an overview of the magnitude of the problem 
of food insecurity and undernourishment, the Chapter assesses India’s progress on 
the MDG target of hunger reduction. It then assesses the regional, social, cultural 
dimensions of food insecurity in India. Finally, it evaluates the recent trends in 
country’s rural employment landscape, and the linkages they bear with the patterns 
of migration and urbanisation. This evaluation attempts to understand the shift in 
 26 
the rural livelihood patterns in recent years, with particular attention paid to rural-
urban migration, and implications it may have on household food security in rural 
India. The overarching purpose of this Chapter is to set the scene for the empirical 
analysis that follows of migration-food security nexus, based on the field-research 
findings in the case study district of Siwan.  
Chapter 4 outlines the research methods and methodology used to understand the 
relationship between migration and food security. The Chapter provides a 
description of strategic and statistical considerations adopted to select the study 
district of Siwan, survey villages within this district and sample households within 
the villages, as well as the data collection tools used in this study and the rationale 
behind using them. The Chapter also dwells on the issues of positionality and 
reflexivity in order to put the field research (findings) in perspective. 
Chapter 5 sets out to provide the context of migration from Bihar and Siwan. It first 
places contemporary Bihar in the Indian map of development, and discusses the 
reasons for its backwardness. This discussion contextualises the political economy 
of underdevelopment in Bihar, and also traces the historical origins of state’s 
contemporary problems. Then, it discusses the dynamics of food insecurity and 
migration in Bihar, and the possible linkages they bear with each other. Following 
on from this broad state-level discussion, the final major section of the Chapter, in a 
reverse step-migration (pun intended!), turns attention to the region of western 
Bihar in general and to the case-study district of Siwan in particular. Drawing on the 
historical and contemporary evidence, it provides an overview of the place, people 
and livelihoods in western Bihar, seeks to understand the importance of migration 
in the livelihoods of rural dwellers of the region, and discusses how the lives and 
livelihoods in the region compare and contrast with the ‘immobile-peasant’ 
characterisation of rural populations of the underdeveloped world that has 
dominated the academic and policy discussions. Finally, the Chapter emphasises on 
the two key features of migration from Siwan, namely, 1) circular mobility, and 2) 
male-dominated pattern of migration. The Chapter concludes by pointing out how 
they potentially interact with household food security outcomes, and the detailed 
empirical analysis of these linkages is carried out in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.       
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Chapter 6 assesses the connections between food-based safety nets and migration. 
India operates an extensive set of food-based safety nets to provide food security to 
its most vulnerable citizens, and it would perhaps not be absolutely incorrect to 
state that no discussion on food security is complete without their detailed 
consideration (Pritchard et al., 2014). Moreover, the recently passed Right to Food 
Act (2013) has only increased their significance. Drawing on the field-based 
evidence from Siwan, this Chapter scrutinises, in particular, the three major food-
based safety net programmes namely, 1) PDS, 2) NREGS and, 3) Integrated Child 
Development Scheme (ICDS) in their grounded contexts, and attempts to 
understand their linkages with rural households’ food security situations and 
migration decisions, the two key themes that are at the heart of this thesis. 
Chapter 7 asks whether and how migration by individual members of the household 
influences the food security outcomes of members in the origin villages in Siwan. 
Using a livelihood approach that brings together insights from the macro-level 
changes in India’s economic and employment landscape in the post-reform period, 
and decision-making matrices of rural households at the micro-level, the Chapter 
appraises the changes in rural livelihoods trajectories, and the importance of non-
local, migration incomes for food security of rural households in case-study district. 
In particular, the Chapter discusses the rural-urban, farm-non-farm, linkages that 
circular migration creates through remittances, and how these linkages in turn play 
out to influence food security outcomes of rural households. The Chapter also 
throws light on the role of migration in altering the local land and agrarian relations, 
and how they relate to the food security of the landless and land-poor households, 
and those without any migrant members.  
Following on from this inter-household comparison, Chapter 8 seeks to look within 
the household in order to understand the impacts of migration on intra-household 
power dynamics and relations, and bearing of these impacts on food security 
outcomes in Siwan. As noted earlier, an important feature of labour mobility in large 
parts of the developing world is the male-dominated pattern of migration. Labour 
migration from Siwan (and Bihar more generally), is almost exclusively a male 
pursuit while women stay behind. Thus, the Chapter first sheds light on the 
gendered nature of migration and the factors underlying this pattern. Then, it 
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assesses the impacts on women’s roles and responsibilities in household affairs and 
explores the female autonomy versus responsibility aspects of male migration. 
Thereafter, the Chapter provides evidence on the effects of migration in changing 
traditional familial arrangements. In the end, through the wider lens of gender, the 
interactions of each of these effects with household food security are discussed.   
Finally, Chapter 9 brings together the key insights from each of these chapters, 
extrapolates the findings of case-study based research for their wider policy 
significance, and comments on the future direction of research on the links between 
migration and food security. 
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CHAPTER 2: BRIDGING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN MIGRATION 
AND FOOD SECURITY 
Introduction 
Migration, both internal and international, has become a key component of the 
livelihood strategies of increasing numbers of households in developing countries. 
The flow of migrants’ remittances has expanded significantly over the past decade, 
and is now a major contributor to the national income of several countries (World 
Bank, 2011a, 2013a, 2013b).15 This has promoted a spike in researchers’ and policy 
makers’ attention on the migration-remittance-development nexus. Importantly, 
unlike earlier periods when migration was often viewed as a problem with negative 
implications for development, there is now growing global consensus on its 
potential positive effects, both financial and social (for example, the transfer of 
migrants’ skills and knowledge) (inter alia, Cohen, 2011; Connell & Brown, 
forthcoming; Connell & Conway, 2000; Ghosh, 2006; Gupta, Pattillo, & Wagh, 2009; 
IOM, 2013a). Leading international organisations have therefore lent an 
unequivocal institutional backing to encourage migration in the past few years  
(DFID, 2007; UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2009). More recently, as the global 
development community gears up to set the post-2015 development agenda as a 
successor to MDGs, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has called 
for world leaders to integrate migration in the post-MDG development framework, 
reasoning that “migration is simply too important in scale to be ignored” (IOM, 
2013b, p. 9; also see, IOM, 2013a; 2013c). 
On the other hand is the rising significance of “food security for all” as an important 
development objective. Although the issue of food security has figured as a 
prominent development goal since the mid-1990s, as noted in Chapter 1, its 
significance has grown enormously in the past few years. The spikes in global food 
prices since 2006 stalled the progress on the World Food Summit and MDG goals on 
hunger reduction, and in 2009, for the first time in human history, the number of 
                                                        
15For example, in 2013, international remittance accounted for 48 percent of the GDP of the 
landlocked nation of Tajikistan in Central Asia (World Bank, 2013b).  
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undernourished people crossed a billion people (FAO, 2009). The recent estimates 
suggest that access to adequate food remains a distant reality for nearly 842 million 
people who remain underfed, the large majority of whom reside in the rural areas 
of developing countries (FAO, 2013b, p. 42). The sheer magnitude of hunger has 
warranted calls for effective action on hunger reduction. At the United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, the UN Secretary 
General launched the “Zero Hunger Challenge” calling the member countries to 
work for a future where no one in the world goes to bed hungry (Ford, 2012). And in 
2013, the report of the High-Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda 
called for ending hunger from the face of earth (United Nations, 2013b, pp. 40-41).  
However, as observed by Crush (2013) in an agenda-setting article, the discussions 
on these two issues have largely tended to proceed in silos, with little attention to 
the relationship they bear with each other despite the fact that linkages between 
the two are rather obvious, and there exists “a massive institutional and substantive 
disconnect between these two development agendas” (pp. 61-62). From the 
perspective of this present research (which focuses on understanding the role of 
internal migration as a household livelihood strategy in influencing food security 
outcomes among rural households at the origin, as noted in Chapter 1), the three 
possible reasons for this disconnect, as also highlighted by Crush (2013), are as 
follows.  
First, discussions on the impacts of migration and remittances on poverty alleviation 
and economic development have tended to focus invariably more on the 
international migration than internal migration. For example, for South Asia, the 
region with most underfed people in the world (FAO, 2013b) and where internal 
migration is a central feature of lives and livelihoods, Gardner and Osella (2003, p. 
vi) observed a “resounding silence on internal migration” in the region. This bias 
towards international migration is further augmented in recent years by the efforts 
at systematic compilation of data on international remittances by the World Bank  
(although major gaps still remain: on this, see World Bank, 2011a), which show the 
continually rising flow of the international remittances to developing countries. 
International remittances to developing countries increased from US$ 55 billion in 
1995 to US$ 389 billion in 2012, and current levels of remittances received by 
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developing countries is nearly three times as much as their receipts of official 
development assistance (World Bank, 2013a). The significance of these flows 
notwithstanding, the fact however remains that in addition to the high economic (as 
well as social) costs of migration across national borders, the increasingly selective 
immigration policies, particularly in the more developed countries of the world, 
favouring the educated and the skilled, mean that international migration as an 
option remains beyond the reach of a large majority of rural populations of the 
developing world. It is for this reason that much of the migration tends to occur 
domestically, and much of which is of seasonal and circular nature. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the number of people moving from one area to another within national 
boundaries is estimated at 740 million (which is also a conservative estimate), 
nearly four times as much as the international migrants (estimated at 200 million 
people) (UNDP, 2009, p. 1). Although comparable estimates on the flow of internal 
remittances are hard to come by because of the difficulties in measuring different 
types of migration, particularly the very short moves which account for a bulk of 
movements, the sheer volume of the people moving within national borders 
suggests that the poverty-reducing and development-enhancing potential of 
remittances from internal migration is more significant than the international 
migration (Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005, p. 8). The limited evidence available on the 
significance of domestic remittances also suggests the same. A recent study by 
Mckay and Deshingkar (2014) that utilised data from the nationally representative 
household-based surveys to compare the volume of internal and international 
migrants and remittances in six countries including Bangladesh, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
South Africa, Uganda, Vietnam showed in all countries internal migrants far 
exceeded international migrants in numbers. And although the average size of 
remittances from international migrants to their origin households tended to higher 
than internal migrants, the higher magnitude of domestic migration caused the sum 
total of the internal remittance transfers to exceed that of international receipts; 
and because of the higher initial economic costs of international migration, 
domestic remittances were more likely to be received by poorer households. 
Another study by Castaldo, Deshingkar, and Mckay (2012) in India and Ghana also 
found that in both countries internal migrants and domestic remittances 
outnumbered international migrants and their total receipts, with potentially 
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significant human development impacts. For India, estimates derived by Tumbe 
(2011) from National Sample Survey data showed that in 2007-08, domestic 
transfers in the country amounted to US$10 billion. From the specific perspective of 
the relationship between migration and household food security, internal migration 
is far more important than international migration because in many instances 
migration decisions by the individuals and/or households may be a direct response 
to meeting their food security needs. For example, for rural households engaged in 
small-scale agriculture, and whose already low income and output are subject to 
several shocks, internal migration provides an immediate and crucial strategy to 
cope up the shocks to their income and food security.  
Second, the studies that give attention to migration and food security are often 
guided with concerns around urbanisation. In 2008, for the first time in history, 
more people lived in urban than in rural areas, and the urban population growth is 
expected to rise further in the coming years (UNFPA, 2007). Moreover, as (poor) 
populations move from rural to urban areas in search of employment, there is 
evidence of relocation of poverty and undernourishment from rural to urban areas, 
and this has called for the need to provide the urban populations with adequate 
food and nutrition (Crush, 2013; Ruel et al., 2000). Additionally, the increasing levels 
of urbanisation and peri-urbanisation and growing land demands for commercial 
and residential purpose are placing heavy pressures on rural land, with analysts 
arguing for fresh thinking on the links between livelihoods and food security; urban 
(and peri-urban) agriculture has emerged as one of the important topics within this 
discourse (Lerner & Eakin, 2011; Losada et al., 1998; Mougeot, 2000).  
These are certainly important themes, and they need to be mainstreamed in the 
future migration and food policy agendas. The income and food needs of 
increasingly mobile rural populations at the urban destinations must inescapably 
figure on future urban development agendas. At the same time, it is important to 
note that the burden of chronic hunger and inadequate access to minimum food is 
disproportionately shared by the rural populations. Moreover, in many countries of 
Asia and Africa migration from rural to urban areas is not always a one-time, 
permanent move – far from it. The rural-urban transition in many low-income 
countries remains incomplete, and circular mobility dominates the migration 
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patterns (Breman, 2010; Potts, 2010), which commonly involves migration by one of 
more members of the household, usually males, while the other members stay 
behind (Desai & Banerji, 2008, p. 337). However, in migration studies there has 
been a shift away from researching communities and households in their origin 
places to studying them in their destination areas, and there has been tendency to 
treat migrants as a separate entities in the destinations (Hewage, Kumara, & Rigg, 
2011, p. 203). This assumption ignores, and completely so, the origin-destination 
linkages created by circular forms of migration, and by implication, the food security 
of the household members in the origin. In India (where this research focuses), a 
bulk of labour migration is of seasonal and circular nature (Breman, 2010; 
Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; Srivastava & Sasikumar, 
2003), with migrants making periodic visits to the origin villages, maintaining close 
relations with family and sending remittances home which, as the field evidence 
gathered for this study suggest, are crucial for the food security of members at the 
origin (Chapter7). However, there persists a tendency to view households as located 
in singular space whereas the fact is that rural lives have traditionally been, and are 
becoming increasingly more, stretched across the rural-urban continuum. Thus, 
conceptualisations of households need to move from viewing them as homo-spatial 
units to multi-local/locational ones (Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; Greiner, 2012; 
Schmidt-Kallert, 2009).  
Relatedly, the third reason is the land and agriculture-focused notions of rural 
households at the level of food policy which means that prescriptions to improve 
rural poor’s access to food have invariably tended to focus more on improving local, 
land-based livelihoods. The view that rural households are comprised of members 
who solely depend on farming, although fading, still remains widely prevalent in 
rural development thinking (Rigg, 2006). By extension, the problem of rural food 
insecurity is often viewed as a problem of land and agriculture and the solution, 
therefore, to strengthen food security of rural populace, it is held, lies in improving 
the gains of farm-dependent livelihoods. However, research across a range of 
countries suggests growing diversity of rural livelihoods, with non-farm, non-local, 
migration incomes becoming increasing central to rural lives and livelihoods (Barrett 
et al., 2001; Bryceson, 1997, 2002; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; Deshingkar & 
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Start, 2003; Ellis, 1998, 2000b; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2004; Reardon et al., 2001; 
Rigg, 2006; Shariff & Lanjouw, 2004). Moreover, the recent evidence suggests that 
although agriculture plays an important role in reducing poverty and improving food 
security (by increased farm productivity and incomes), it alone may be insufficient. 
The 2013 State of Food and Agriculture report of the FAO (2013a, p. 27) noted: 
The available evidence shows that agricultural and economic growth is 
effective in sustainably reducing malnutrition in low-income countries 
where many people depend on agriculture, but the impact is slow and may 
not be sufficient. Therefore, additional complementary ways to reduce 
malnutrition are necessary. 
This statement, when viewed in conjunction with other evidence on a shift in 
patterns of rural livelihood in the developing world, would suggest that not only 
income and output from land and agriculture are inadequate for household food 
security but in many cases their viability, and the extent to which they allow the 
rural households to meet their food and nutrition needs, may itself be contingent 
upon the income from non-agricultural sources. 
With the reasons for the disconnect between migration and food security discussed, 
the remainder of the chapter is organised as follow. In the next section, I spell out 
the key conceptual frameworks of “entitlements” and “livelihoods” which provide 
theoretical foundations to link migration and household food security. I then 
provide an overview of different theoretical perspectives on migration, and assert 
the merit of livelihood approach to migration for understanding migration decisions 
and outcomes (food security in this context). In the final section, I discuss three 
pathways of linkages between migration and food security which have much 
significance in understanding the connections between the two more holistically.  
Conceptualising food security through the frameworks of “entitlement” and 
“livelihoods” 
The past two decades have witnessed a significant shift in the way the issue of food 
security has been conceptualised and problematised. Up until 1980, global food 
security discourse predominantly stressed on the volume and stability of food 
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supplies as the only measure to ensuring food security for all. This was largely to the 
dominance of Malthusian perspective in food security research. In his “Essay on the 
Principles of Population”, first published anonymously towards the end of eighteen 
century, Malthus (1798) postulated that population growth always outpaces 
increases in food production (which he termed as “means of subsistence”), and 
when this situation is left unchecked, this will potentially lead to acute food 
shortages. Thus:   
…the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth 
to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a 
geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A 
slight acquaintance with numbers will shew the immensity of the first power 
in comparison of the second.  
        (Malthus, 1798, p. 4) 
Although research by Boserup (1965), based on extensive fieldwork in Africa and 
Asia, showed that high population growth rates (may) stimulate innovative 
agricultural practices through factors, such as, use of improved agro-technologies, 
transition from long-fallow to short-fallow period, and thus boosting overall food 
production (also see, Boserup, 1981), this did not change global preoccupation with 
the issue of food availability. Malthusian concerns continued to be frequently 
echoed by international development agencies through the 1960s and 1970s. The 
food crisis of 1972-74 only served to accentuate these fears. In the aftermath of 
food crisis, the first-ever World Food Summit that took place in Rome in 1974 thus 
conceptualised the problem from the production-oriented perspective, reflected in 
definition of food security adopted in the Summit. Food security was defined as: 
“availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to 
sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in 
production and prices” (FAO, 2003b, p. 27).  
The official policy thinking on food security, however, witnessed a paradigm shift 
following the pioneering work by Amartya Sen in 1981 on the causes of starvation 
and famines. In a marked departure from the dominant, albeit reductionist, thinking 
based around food production, he argued that hunger and starvation are not always 
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caused by food supply shortages, and may persist even in the wake of abundant 
food supplies. Thus, Sen (1981b, p. 1) reasoned:  
Starvation is a characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. 
It is not a characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. While the 
latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many possible causes. 
Whether and how starvation relates to food supply is a matter of factual 
investigation. 
The crux of his argument was that the availability of food does not necessarily 
translate in adequate access of all individuals to food, and one’s ability to 
“command food” is contingent upon her/his position within societal and economic 
structures. Using empirical case studies of four major famines in Great Bengal, India, 
Ethiopia, Sahel and Bangladesh, Sen revealed that factors leading to widespread 
famine conditions in these countries extended beyond the lack of food availability 
and essentially represented entitlement failures, particularly of the vulnerable sub-
populations who were least able to acquire food through any means and hence 
were hardest hit (Sen, 1977, 1981a, 1981b). He contended that the ways in which 
people are connected with society, patterns of ownership, modes of production and 
formal and informal institutional and legal structures determine their ability to gain 
access to food. He expressed these relationships in a wider framework of 
“entitlements” which “refers to the set of alternative commodity bundles that a 
person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that 
he or she faces” (Sen, 1983, p. 754). He argued that the patterns of ownership of 
goods and assets form a chain relationship of legitimacy, with possession of a 
particular asset/good linked with, and legitimising, one’s authority over another 
(Sen, 1981b, pp. 1-2). 
Applied to the analysis of hunger and starvation, it is this chain of relations that 
determine one’s entitlements to food. In order to simplify, Sen (1981b, p. 2) listed 
these entitlements as mainly including, 1) trade entitlement, 2) production-based 
entitlement, 3) own-labour entitlement, and 4) inheritance and transfer 
entitlements. The ownership and possession of assets, or endowment (eg. land, 
labour power, financial resources), determines how these entitlement relations are 
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structured. And it is the interactions of these entitlements, which he termed as 
“exchange entitlement” (p. 3), is what determines one’s ability to command food 
and avoid hunger. In other words, the combination of endowments(s) and exchange 
possibilities together determine a person’s overall entitlement (Sen, 1983, p. 754). 
Hence, given a fixed ownership bundle, a person’s exchange entitlement is 
influenced by several factors. For example, for a wage labourer with no land, his 
ability to command food depends on “whether or not he can find employment, and 
if so for how long and at what wage rate” (Sen, 1981b, pp. 3-4). If he is unable to 
sell his labour power for the time, and at the wage rate, needed to buy adequate 
quantities of food (as often happens in distress situations), he may suffer from food 
insecurity and hunger, even though the actual food supplies may be steady. Put 
simply, Sen’s work warranted attention to the fact that entitlement failures, and not 
food availability (although important), causes hunger; in fact, people may be 
subjected to hunger and starvation even during normal times.16  
At a more immediate level, the empirical merit for viewing food insecurity through 
the prism of entitlement relations was provided by the concurrent evaluations of 
Green Revolution. The widespread diffusion of the Green Revolution since the late 
1960s had boosted global food production levels. Yet, however, its gains were 
widely unevenly distributed among different population segments across 
landholding and income categories (on this, see Lipton & Longhurst, 1989), which, in 
Sen’s nomenclature, varyingly affected their exchange entitlements. A key policy 
prescription emanating from Sen’s approach thus involved expanding people’s 
entitlements, particularly for the economically disadvantaged populations who had 
greater vulnerability to, and indeed faced on a routine basis, entitlement failures 
(Sen, 1983, pp. 755-760; also see, Dreze and Sen, 1989).  
Founded on the principles of social and economic justice, Sen’s subsequent writings 
extended the entitlement analysis in his now widely known “capability approach” 
(inter alia, Sen, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1993, 1999, 2009). The latter provided a 
framework for understanding how the entitlements translated into enhancing the 
capabilities of people. With reference to the example of own-labour entitlement 
                                                        
16 In fact, Sen describes the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 as a boom famine (Sen, 1977, 1981a, 
1981b).  
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above, this meant, for instance, whether or not the (quality of) employment 
(regularity, wages, working conditions etc.) that the person is engaged in allow for 
her/his capability to avoid hunger, and to be well-nourished? The wider significance 
of capability approach was that it distinguished between the means (economic 
growth and prosperity) and ends (welfare of people) of development, and placed 
people at the center of the development. Contrary to the conventional approaches, 
Sen (1999, p. 3), contended that development must ultimately be viewed “as a 
process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy”, and “it requires removal 
of major source of unfreedoms: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation”. I shall not dwell much on 
specificities of this capability approach here (for which refer to Sen's original 
writings cited above; also see, among others, Alkire, 2002; Nussbaum, 2000, 2011; 
Robeyns, 2005). Nonetheless, it is important to note that Sen’s line of analysis 
placed rights and entitlements of people at the core of development discourse, and 
redirected the development policy and practice. This shift in thinking is reflected in 
the adoption of the wider concept of “Human Development”, promoted and 
advanced by the UNDP in its annual Human Development Reports since 1990. The 
UNDP defined development as a process of “enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP, 
1990, p. 1). 
At the level of food policy research and practice, Sen’s line of analysis led to 
reappraisal of the concept of food security.  In 1983, the FAO, in its report entitled, 
World Food Security: A Reappraisal of the Concepts and Approaches, expanded its 
earlier definition and defined food security as: “Ensuring that all people at all times 
have both physical and economic access to the basic food that they need” (FAO, 
1983 cited in FAO, 2006, p. 1). Then, in 1986, the World Bank’s report titled, Poverty 
and Hunger – highly influenced by Sen’s work – categorised food insecurity in 
“chronic” and “transitory” terms and acknowledged that food insecurity (primarily) 
results from the lack of access to food. Thus, the report defined food security as 
“access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life” (World 
Bank, 1986, p. 1). The report explicitly mentioned that the essential elements of 
food security are availability of food and ability to acquire it. The discourse thus 
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shifted from the mere availability of food supply at the national and international 
level to that one of access to food.  
Accompanying this shift was the focus on the importance of food security at the 
individual and household levels. As more research evidence has become available 
on what causes food insecurity, and its wider relationship with individual health and 
wellbeing, there have been more reappraisals of the concept over subsequent 
years. In particular, persistently high levels of undernourishment have also led to a 
widespread recognition that meeting calorific needs does not necessarily result in 
the adequate nutrition required for leading a healthy life. Thus, the concept of food 
security has been widened into a more expansive notion of nutritional security. The 
nutritional status of individuals however is also contingent upon several public 
health issues including safe drinking water, health care and environmental hygiene. 
Also, dietary preferences are based on social and cultural norms about food. For 
instance, consumption of meat in many societies and cultures is common, whereas 
many social and religious groups, such as Hindu Brahmins and Jains in India, do not 
generally eat meat due to religious reasons. In the World Food Summit in 1996, the 
FAO therefore held that a holistic understanding of food security therefore requires 
interplay of three factors. These include: i) adequate availability of food; ii) physical 
and economic access to (socially and culturally acceptable) food; and iii) its effective 
utilisation in terms of bodily absorption of nutrient value of food (FAO, 1996). The 
latest and most acceptable definition of food security of the FAO, first adopted in 
1996, thus puts it as: “Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life” (FAO, 2010b, p. 8).  
Using the notion of entitlements, the focus of this study is on the “access” aspect to 
food, for despite the fact that world produces enough food to meet the food and 
nutritional needs of everyone, inadequate access to food remains stubbornly high. 
As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, as per recent FAO’s (2013b, p. 42) 
estimates, during 2011-13 there were 842 million people globally whose dietary 
energy consumption levels were below the threshold required for the normal bodily   
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Box 2.1: Indicators to measure food insecurity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
The multi-dimensional nature of the concept of food security means that different 
concepts and criteria exist in terms of how food and nutritional security outcomes are 
assessed. These indicators could be clustered in two broad categories. 
i) Anthropometric indicators 
Food and nutritional insecurity signifies intake deficiencies in essential calorie, protein and 
micronutrients, and/or inadequate absorption of food consumed, resulting in weak 
physical and health status. The food and nutritional needs are contingent on person’s age, 
body weight, height, physical activity levels. Additionally, environmental and health factors, 
such as prevalence of infection and disease, are also important determinants of food 
energy needs as they affect the conversion efficiency of food in the body (for instance, an 
individual suffering from diarrhea will likely excrete the food consumed more rapidly than 
those without this condition, and if the energy lost to diarrhea is not replaced, this would 
negatively affect her/his nutritional status). The food and nutritional deficiencies are 
manifested in poor physical growth outcomes, the degree of which depends on the extent 
of deficiencies. These outcomes are measured though different anthropometric indicators 
which commonly include, stunting (short for age), wasting (thin for height) and 
underweight (thin for age) for children, and BMI for adults (WHO, 2010).  
ii) Dietary-energy based indicator  
 
Based on the person’s age, gender, BMI and activity level, the FAO calculates the Minimum 
Dietary Energy Requirements (MDERs), and using data from the national level data on food 
availability and consumption, it provides cross-country estimate of proportion of people 
whose energy intake is lower than their MDER energy threshold, expressed in terms of an 
outcome indicator of “Prevalence of Undernourishment”(PoU) (FAO, 2008).  
However, PoU only measures the energy deficiencies (of macro-nutrients), whereas 
nutritional outcomes are also crucially influenced by consumption of essential 
micronutrients (dietary substances that the body need in small amounts that produce 
several enzymes and hormones for physical and cognitive growth and development). It is 
estimated that nearly 2 billion people in the world (30 percent of global population), 
mainly women and children in the developing world, suffer iron deficiency and are anemic 
(WHO, 2015). Seen this way, the PoU measure of FAO underestimates the actual 
magnitude of undernourishment in the world. At the same time, the sheer number of 
people unable to meet their basic food needs remains staggering.  
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functions, however it is important to note that this number does not include 
populations afflicted by essential micro-nutrient deficiencies (Box 2.1).  
The second key conceptual framework employed in this thesis is the broadly-
defined Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA). Complementing the notion of 
entitlements, the SLA provides a useful framework to assess the different livelihood 
strategies devised by people that either enable or restrict them to meet their 
livelihood goals and aspirations. From the specific perspective of food security is the 
question of how different livelihood strategies pursued by rural households impact 
upon their food security outcomes.  
The concept of SLA officially emerged in rural development thinking in the early 
1990s. It was formally laid out by Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway in an IDS 
discussion paper in 1991. Their working definition specified:  
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and 
access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is 
sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net 
benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short 
and long term. 
     (Chambers and Conway, 1991, p. 6) 
Influenced in many ways, and building on, Sen’s notions of entitlements and 
capabilities, the SLA sought to place the notions of “capability”, “equity”, and 
“sustainability” as the core principles of rural development practice (Chambers and 
Conway, 1991, pp. 3-4). In a marked departure from the earlier economic-centric 
approaches that revolved around “production thinking”, “employment thinking” 
and “poverty-line thinking” (ibid, pp. 2-3), SLA argued for understanding the 
complex rural realities from the perspective of those involved. Building on 
Chamber’s earlier work on “participatory rural appraisal”, in terms of research 
practice SLA challenged the dominant paradigm of “rural development tourism” 
(the tendency of development researchers and policy-makers to understand 
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problems and causes of rural poverty and deprivation through brief visits to 
problem areas and through filling pre-structured quantitative questionnaires: 
Chambers, 1983, pp. 10-12), and stressed that insights on rural problems could 
(only) be gained by understanding the life and livelihood realities of the rural poor. 
It stressed, in particular, on the need for grounded research approaches in order to 
understand the dense social, cultural and institutional contexts within which 
peoples’ lives and livelihoods were situated. 
Within a few years, it was adopted as a key framework by leading international 
development agencies (Solesbury, 2003, p. 6). The wider backdrop for its quick 
adoption was provided by the disappointing results of the top-down approach to 
rural development practice that held sway in 1970s and 1980s. The idea that 
dominated rural development thinking at that time was that virtues of market-
based economy were powerful enough to cure all the ills, and thus the prescriptions 
to tackling rural poverty inevitably involved achieving faster economic growth. By 
the early-1980s, the shortcomings of trickle-down logic of the market-driven policies 
became increasingly apparent. As Sen (1983, p. 754) suggested: “Not merely is it the 
case that economic growth is a means rather than an end, it is also the case that for 
some important ends it is not a very efficient means either.” The extremes of 
poverty, hunger and deprivation persisted at unacceptable levels in too many rural 
regions.17 Indeed, the field of economics, which ruled the roost, began to be 
increasingly seen as narrow and insufficient to provide explanation to rural poverty 
and deprivation. In its annual report in 1979, Sage Foundation, the leading publisher 
and supporter of social science research, lamented: “… the discipline [of economics] 
became progressively more narrow at precisely the moment when the problem 
demanded broader, more political, and social insights…” (cited in Hirschman, 1981, 
p. v). It was in this context that the growth-centered mode of thinking and doing 
development began to be challenged beginning from early 1980s. Important 
                                                        
17 This was also because of the urban bias in resource allocation and investment (Lipton, 1975, 
1977). 
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changes occurred in the field of economic theory, and development economics in 
particular, with Sen, among others, leading the charge. 18 
The SLA’s stress on grounded approaches to understand the contextual and 
institutional correlates of problems of rural poverty and underdevelopment meant 
that although the approach was flexible, the emanating framework of doing rural 
livelihood analysis rested on four-fold strategy. This included, i) charting the socio-
economic and institutional context and policy setting, ii) assessing the resource 
endowments of people or livelihood assets (human, natural, social, physical, and 
financial capital; popularly referred to as ‘five capital framework’ which became 
synonymous with SLA) that shape their livelihood space and possibilities, iii) 
analysing how the livelihood space as shaped by the (five) capitals/assets translated 
in the different livelihood strategies (farm-nonfarm, local-nonlocal), and finally, iv) 
evaluating the impact of the livelihood strategies on the livelihood goals and 
aspirations in well-being outcomes, such as income, food security, health, education 
(Scoones, 1998, pp. 3-5; also see, Pritchard et al., 2014, pp. 9-10). A crucial aspect of 
SLA was that it sought to emphasise on the importance of “non-economic 
attributes” of livelihoods, such as, social relations (eg. caste, kinship, gender) and 
institutions, in mediating people’s access to livelihoods assets and strategies (Ellis, 
2000a, pp. 290-291) that were missing in the earlier economic-centric livelihood 
analysis.  
From the perspective of the discussion in this thesis, a particular significance of SLA 
approach was increased recognition to the diversity of rural livelihood strategies. 
The DFID’s (2001, p. 5) sustainable livelihoods glossary defined livelihood strategies 
as:  
…the range and combination of activities and choices that people make in 
order to achieve their livelihood goals. Livelihood strategies include: how 
people combine their income generating activities; the way in which they 
use their assets; which assets they chose to invest in; and how they manage 
                                                        
18 The importance of development economics declined too. Albert Hirschman, an influential 
economist, even went on to read an obituary of development economics (Hirschman, 1981, pp. 
1-24). While recognising the increasing reductionist nature of development economics in the 
1960s and 1970s, Sen, however, regarded this obituary as rather premature (Sen, 1983).  
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to preserve existing assets and income. Livelihoods are diverse at every 
level, for example, members of a household may live and work in different 
places engaging in various activities, either temporarily or permanently. 
Individuals themselves may rely on a range of different income-generating 
activities at the same time.  
While the diversity of rural livelihood and income streams is not a novel 
phenomenon (Barrett et al., 2001; Ellis, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Scoones, 1998), the 
explicit recognition to livelihood diversity in SLA was crucial in reorienting rural 
development thinking and research. This was because up until the early 1990s, rural 
development policies tended to treat rural households as homogeneous units, 
focusing exclusively on farm related activities for their income and livelihoods (this 
view, as noted earlier, has not completely disappeared from rural development 
thinking). This inevitably meant that the solutions offered to reduce rural poverty 
revolved around land and agriculture (eg. facilitating land access, improving farm 
productivity and output through technology transfers such as irrigation and 
improved seeds, providing farm credit, and so on), whereas livelihoods based on 
land and farming, significant as they may be, represent one of the many livelihood 
avenues; and for land- and asset-poor households (the main focus of development 
interventions) diversification of income and livelihoods provided a means to cope 
up with seasonality and income shocks, and/or improve their livelihood prospects. 
As Ellis (2000a, p. 299) suggests: “Diverse livelihood systems are less vulnerable 
than undiversified ones.” The participatory nature of SLA meant that it stressed on 
involving the actors (rural populations) in setting and addressing their own 
livelihood priorities instead of imposing livelihood choices upon them.   
The SLA categorises livelihoods strategies pursued by rural households in three 
important clusters. These include, i) agricultural intensification/extensification, ii) 
livelihood diversification, and iii) migration. Thus:  
Either you gain more of your livelihood from agriculture (including livestock 
rearing, aquaculture, forestry etc.) through processes of intensification 
(more output per unit area through capital investment or increases in labour 
inputs) or extensification (more land under cultivation), or you diversify to a 
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range of off-farm income earning activities, or you move away and seek a 
livelihood, either temporarily or permanently, elsewhere. Or, more 
commonly, you pursue a combination of strategies together or in sequence. 
        (Scoones, 1998, p. 11). 
As the quote above by Scoones suggests, many rural households combine the 
elements of all three livelihood strategies in order to attain an optimal balance of 
income that helps meet their livelihood outcomes. Also, not only does there exist 
significant overlaps between these livelihood strategies but their highly 
complementary nature means that the gains derived from one could be utilised to 
maximise the returns from the other(s). For instance, agricultural intensification in 
the form of on-farm diversification, with household growing cash crops instead of, 
or in addition to, subsistence agriculture could also fall under the broad domain of 
livelihood diversification, as the latter includes income from both on-farm and non-
farm sources. Also, non-farm and migration income could boost investment 
capabilities of households for agricultural intensification. Indeed, this thesis argues 
that understanding these complementariness of different livelihood strategies 
provide a crucial foundation to understand the food security outcomes of rural 
households more fully.  
That said, this thesis focuses, in particular, on the role of migration as a livelihood 
strategy in influencing the food access among rural households. This is because 
migration forms an important component of livelihood strategies of a large majority 
of resource-poor rural households in the developing countries. Entitlement and SLA 
frameworks hold that livelihood strategies and outcomes are shaped by 
endowment or assets at person’s disposal. This means that for landless and 
landpoor households’ entitlement and access to food crucially depends on their 
ability to find wage income. As Sen (1983, p. 755) suggests: “For most of humanity, 
about the only commodity a person has to sell is labour power, so that the person's 
[food] entitlements depend crucially on his or her ability to find a job, the wage rate 
for that job…” However, as noted in Chapter 1, the imperfect nature of rural labour 
markets compels a large majority of these rural households to seek alternative 
employment in the distant places. Migration is not always a response to distress or 
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lack of employment, and research evidence also suggests that it may represent a 
calculated strategy of rural households to allocate household labour more 
efficiently (Bigsten, 1996) in order to attain a diversified livelihood portfolio and 
reduce income risks (Stark, 1991). More recent evidence points to a growing 
importance of migration in the lives and livelihoods of rural poor households across 
a range of developing countries due to a complex set of distress-push and income-
pull factors (Deshingkar & Anderson, 2004; Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005; UNDP, 
2009). In turn, this implies that migration is also becoming increasingly crucial for 
the rural incomes and food security. However, as the discussion in the later section 
will reveal, although a range of studies across different country and contextual 
settings have highlighted the role of migration in rural livelihood security, the direct 
evidence on whether and how migration helps the rural households to attain food 
security remains scanty in the existing literature.  
In the following section, I discuss the different theoretical perspectives on 
migration. A close scrutiny of different theoretical perspectives suggests that 
migration has often been perceived as problematic by academics and policy-
makers, and rarely is its importance acknowledged from the perspective of rural 
livelihoods.  
Moving beyond the binaries: a livelihood approach to migration  
There is no dearth of literature on migration. Broadly, migration refers to change in 
the usual place of residence on a permanent or semi-permanent basis from one 
geographically or administratively defined boundary to another. Migration can be a 
response to several push and pull factors relating to social, economic, 
environmental, political and cultural conditions and can take several forms from 
international to internal migration, from voluntary to forced migration, from 
permanent to temporary migration and so on.  
Given this multitude of types, motives and reasons, it is no surprise that 
perspectives on migration abound. The present study focuses on domestic labour 
outmigration among rural households, which characteristically takes the form of 
seasonal and circular mobility in which one of more members, usually young male(s) 
(see below), of the household migrate out of the origin villages for part of the year. 
 49 
And although this also involves migration from one rural area to another, more 
recent streams of migration involve heighted importance of rural to urban 
migration in rural households’ livelihood across the developing world, particularly in 
several countries in Asia where urban areas have come to play a more central role 
in economic growth and returns from migration to urban areas have increased 
(Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005, p. 15). The centrality of economic motives in rural 
households’ migration decisions notwithstanding, migration is a complex 
phenomenon and thus requires attention to the various social, cultural and 
institutional factors that both drive migration and shape migration outcomes.  
The dominant economic explanations of rural outmigration have often tended to 
take a single-sided view of what drives migratory decisions. On the one hand, neo-
classical economic models have tended to emphasise the rationality of individual 
actors. The much-cited dual economy model of wage differentials held that labour 
migration from rural to urban areas is a response to the (expected) rural-urban 
wage differentials, with individual migrants responding rationally to (perceived) 
higher urban wages (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969). On the other hand, 
scholars rooted in structuralist and Marxist strands of thought have tended to view 
migration with respect to wider set of political-economic arrangements and modes 
of production. They argue that far from being a rational response to better wages, 
migration at best is the “survival strategy” forced upon the rural poor by the 
capitalist forces and structures which does not improve their lot in the long-run 
(Breman, 1985, 1996, 2010).  
This binary of rational choice versus compulsion is alternatively expressed in the 
literature in terms of structure-agency and push-pull approaches, the latter most 
notably in geography following the Ravenstein’s Laws of Migration (Ravenstein, 
1885, 1889). In rural economies, the common push to migration include factors 
such as poverty, (increasing) population pressures on land, seasonal nature of 
agriculture income, vagaries of environment, such as drought, floods etc., resulting 
in crop failure. On the other hand, the pull of migration often comprises factors 
such as better income and employment opportunities in destinations, reduced 
barriers on mobility (as in the case of relaxing of Hukou System in China that earlier 
controlled rural-urban migration) and the latest advancements in infrastructure and 
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communication networks (Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005). However, there is a very 
narrow line between these push and pull factors, making a clear demarcation 
between them virtually impossible. For instance, labour migration from rural to 
urban areas may be a response to both, crop failure at the place of origin and better 
income-earning opportunities in destination. Indeed, the field research carried out 
for this study also suggests the co-existence of these factors (Chapter 7). Moreover, 
the rural-urban dichotomy has become “obsolete” with increasing expansion of 
peri-urban regions worldwide which “encompass a fragmented mixing of rural and 
urban worlds” (Lerner & Eakin, 2011, p. 311). In turn, this has led to narrowing of 
the gap between push and pull factors even further.  
More recent theoretical developments in migration research include “The New 
Economics of Labour Migration” (NELM) (Stark, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1991; Stark & 
Bloom, 1985; Stark & Levari, 1985). Influentially propounded and advanced by Oded 
Stark, NELM is rooted principally in neo-classical economics. Thus, it views migration 
decisions as being driven by imperfect rural financial, labour and credit markets, 
information asymmetries, and participants’ desires to maximise incomes in the 
wake of these conditions and constraints. Nonetheless, a useful starting point of 
NELM is the recognition that “there is more to labour migration than a response to 
wage differentials. Thus migration in the absence of (meaningful) wage differentials, 
or the absence of migration in the presence of significant wage differentials, does 
not imply irrationality” (Stark, 1991, p. 3). Of particular relevance to the subject 
matter of the present research is that a key feature of NELM is that, unlike the 
earlier individual-centric economistic approaches to migration (eg. Harris & Todaro, 
1970; Todaro, 1969), it places household at the heart of analysis. It views migration 
as a combined household strategy aimed at risk aversion and livelihood portfolio 
diversification. Stark (1991, p. 3) suggests:  
…even though the entities that engage in migration are often individual 
agents, there is more to labour migration than an individualistic optimizing 
behavior. Migration by one person can be due to, fully consistent with, or 
undertaken in pursuit of rational optimizing behavior by another person or 
by a group of persons, such as family. 
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Stark (1991, p. 5) continues: “The family can be considered as a “coalition”, a group 
of players committed by choice to act as one unit vis-à-vis the rest of the world and 
migration by family members can be interpreted as a manifestation of the viability 
of the family.” According to NELM, the geographic dispersion of family members in 
different income activities provides one of the ways through which smallholder 
households in rural areas attain a diverse portfolio of livelihood that enable them to 
minimise income risks from a single source and maximise the insurance. “Migrants 
and their families enter into an inter-temporal contractual arrangement, in which 
the costs and returns are shared by all family members with the rule governing the 
distribution of both spelled out in this implicit contractual arrangement” (ibid, p. 25) 
The household bears the initial costs of migration in the expectation of remittances 
and on their part migrants, in turn, continue to maintain close association with the 
households with the expectation of returns, such as inheritance of land/property in 
the origin. The end result of is that of “both parties being better-off as a result of 
migration since, in this case, an exchange of commitment to share income provides 
co-insurance” (ibid, p. 26). 
The NELM provides an important lens to understand the “economics” of migration 
more holistically, and the present research makes use of the theoretical foundations 
of this approach. At the same time, an obvious limitation of NELM is that it does not 
necessarily address the social, cultural and institutional factors that both drive 
migratory decisions and in turn get shaped by it. In arguing that migration 
represents more than just a response to income differentials, it falls short of 
addressing the non-economic aspects of migration. For example, how do 
households decide on who migrates out and who stays put? Do male and female 
members of the households have the same chance to be chosen as migrants? These 
are particularly pertinent questions. As the discussion below will reveal, in many 
countries of South Asia, a common pattern of rural labour migration involves male 
outflows while the women stay behind. In turn, this pattern of migration impacts on 
the household gender relations, with implications for food security.     
Indeed, none of the approaches described above elucidates the dynamics of 
migration from the perspective of rural livelihoods. As Mosse et al. (2002, pp. 60-61) 
suggest, “a perspective on migration is needed which goes beyond dichotomous  
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Table 2.1: Different theoretical perspectives on migration: a summary 
Perspective       Policy prescription 
 
Dual economy model: Developed around 
1970s to highlight the contradiction of high 
rural to urban migration in the less developed 
countries in spite of positive agriculture 
marginal products and high urban 
unemployment, this model recognised “the 
existence of a politically determined minimum 
urban wage at levels substantially higher than 
agriculture earning” (Harris & Todaro, 1970, p. 
126) as the reason for rural-urban mobility. 
According to the model, migration thus 
represents a response to not real but 
‘expected’ rural-urban wage differentials.   
 
Marxist perspective: According to the Marxist 
perspective, transition from a “rural-agrarian 
to urban-industrial mode of life and work” 
(Breman, 2010, p. 1) is a result of capitalist 
forces pushing people out of agriculture. 
Marxist scholars contend that migration is not 
a rational response to wage-differentials but a 
“survival strategy”. It is forced upon the 
labouring poor to serve the interests of the 
capital, with little or no benefits and/or 
prospects for their upward mobility.  
 
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM): 
The distinguishing feature of the NELM model 
is that places “household” at the centre of 
migration analysis, as opposed to earlier 
individual-centric economic models. 
According to the NELM, migration represents 
a combined household strategy aimed to 
livelihood portfolio diversification and risk 
aversion (Stark, 1991). 
 
Livelihood approach: Livelihood approach to 
migration stresses on understanding the 
importance of social, economic, political and 
cultural contexts within which migration 
occurs. While acknowledging the importance 
of, and weaving the threads from, 
dichotomous migration perspective such as 
push-pull, structure-agency, it argues for 
moving beyond these binaries to be able to 
objectively analyse varied migration outcomes 
across contexts (Mcdowell & de Haan, 1997; 
Mosse et al., 2002). 
 
This model viewed that the impact of higher 
urban wages is offset by the slower growth of 
urban employment which will exacerbate the 
problem of unemployment in the cities, with 
larger consequences for the social and 
political order of the less developed nations. 
The emanating policy prescription, thus, was 
to control migration by making rural areas 
attractive for stay and work.  
 
 
 
 
 
This line of argument sheds important insights 
on the deplorable work and living conditions 
of the unskilled rural out-migrants in the 
developing world. Although it calls for policy 
attention on addressing the structural causes 
of their deprivation, such as regulations 
related to minimum wages and working 
hours, it remains highly sceptical about policy 
action because of the lack of “agency” of the 
poor migrants and in the process, evokes a 
cautionary note on the gains of migration. 
 
Unlike the earlier economistic approaches, 
NELM views migration as a positive process 
which allows households to allocate its labour 
across activities and locations. This act of 
livelihood diversification by the means of 
sending member(s) to other places provides 
an insurance against income shocks from local 
sources. It argues that the overall aim of the 
policy should be to encourage migration. 
 
Livelihood perspective recognises the 
traditional importance of migration in the 
lives and livelihoods of the rural dwellers. It 
argues that there is nothing novel about rural 
outmigration and it has been a central feature 
of rural livelihood strategies since time 
immemorial which has allowed rural 
populations to meet their income and food 
needs during the agriculturally lean cycles. 
The overall policy message is to facilitate 
migration. 
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models of push or pull, structure or agency, urban or rural, and allows labour 
migration to be seen as part of local and diverse livelihood strategies.” (See Table 
2.1 for a summary of different theoretical approaches to migration.) It is for this 
reason that this study uses a livelihood approach to migration.   
The advantage of livelihood approach is that, while weaving together the threads of 
different perspectives, it also stresses the institutional processes and vulnerability 
contexts within which migration occurs. It draws from NELM in terms of placing the 
household as the prime unit of analysis. Livelihood perspectives to migration state 
that migration has traditionally formed an integral part of rural livelihood strategies 
and not necessarily a response to shocks. Furthermore, alongside economic 
motives, it also views migration as a social process structured by the institutional 
and contextual factors such as gender, caste, class, social networks and relations 
which in turn affects these social structures (de Haan, 1999; de Haan, Brock, & 
Coulibaly, 2002; Mcdowell & de Haan, 1997; Mosse et al., 2002). 
Role of migration in rural livelihoods: possible pathways of linkages between 
migration and food security  
In many countries of Asia and Africa, migration forms an integral part of livelihood 
strategies of the rural poor. Rural livelihoods in Indonesia involve a frequent 
engagement of farm families in urban labour markets (Elmhirst, 2002). A 
longitudinal study of 37 villages in Java carried out over the period of 1967-91 found 
that most of the landless rural families in Java have at least one person working 
outside of the village (Collier et al., 1993 cited in Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005, pp. 10-
11). In some parts of India, three out of four households include a migrant 
(Srivastava & Sasikumar, 2003, p. 1). In a study of two villages in Mali, de Haan et al. 
(2002) noted contrasting patterns of migration, with migration in both villages 
nonetheless being a central feature not only of their local economies, but also of 
social networks and relations. While migration has traditionally formed a key 
component of rural livelihood systems, the evidence suggests that in recent years 
the levels of mobility among rural populations have increased significantly 
worldwide (Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005).  
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Given the centrality of migration in rural livelihoods, it is not surprising that the 
relationship between migration and rural development has been of long-standing 
research to academic and policy-making communities. However, in the wake of 
rising rural outmigration levels, the question of the potential role of migration in 
enhancing the rural income and livelihood security and promoting rural 
development assumes even more significance. That said, this relationship is very 
complicated. Thus, while research findings of some studies suggest that the 
selective nature of rural outmigration, often involving young and able-bodied males, 
deprives the rural economies of the already scarce productive human resources 
(Lipton, 1980), others find migration helps households to efficiently allocate their 
labour among activities so as to maximize the household utility (Bigsten, 1996). 
Also, while absence of quality educational facilities in rural areas of many 
developing countries often motivate families to migrate to urban centers to seek 
good education for their children (UNDP, 2009, p. 57) which potentially improves 
household earning prospects, household migration by poor also deprive the 
children of their basic education; for instance, a study on the migrant workers in the 
sugarcane industries in Maharashtra, India found that about two hundred thousand 
children of migrant sugarcane workers are bypassed by the education system, as 
many of them work alongside their parents in the fields, (Minwalla, 2003).19  
For long, skeptical views that rural outmigration to urban towns and cities would 
create stress on urban resources, push urban wages down leading to conflict 
between native and migrant communities, saturate urban labour markets and raise 
unemployment rates and so on dominated the discourses on migration. In the 
academic literature, rural outmigration, more often than not, has been portrayed as 
problematic. For instance, the dual economy model of rural-urban wage 
differentials (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969), cited above, while 
acknowledging the agency of individual migrants, argued against rural to urban 
migration. The main policy prescription thus included: 
                                                        
19 This study was conducted by Neeraj Hetkar from the University of Mumbai, Maharashtra, 
India. The research findings quoted above were obtained from an Indian daily, Times of India 
(full details are provided in the bibliography). 
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…instead of allocating scarce capital funds to urban low cost housing 
projects which would effectively raise urban real incomes and might 
therefore lead to a worsening of the housing problem, governments in less 
developed countries might do better if they devoted these funds to the 
improvement of rural amenities. In effect, the net benefit of bringing "city 
lights" to the countryside might greatly exceed whatever net benefit might 
be derived from luring more peasants to the city by increasing the 
attractiveness of urban living conditions.  
       (Todaro, 1969, p. 147)  
Not surprisingly, development policies in many countries have often tended to 
control the flow of rural-urban migrants (de Haan, 1999). However, as Stark (1991, 
p. 19) suggests: “Good policies should employ effective means to minimize or 
eliminate the few (if any) undesirable consequences, but not eliminate migration 
itself.” 
These considerations have been crucial in reorienting the global development policy 
thinking on migration in recent years. For instance, the World Development Report 
2009 noted: “The policy challenge is not how to keep households from moving, but 
how to keep them from moving for the wrong reasons”(World Bank, 2009, p. 147). 
Moreover, there is compelling evidence that despite the distress-induced nature of 
migration, not only can it provide a safety valve for poor populations but can also 
contribute to sustainable human development for the migrants and origin 
communities. And the international policy-making communities have increasingly 
argued that migration has several positive attributes and that the gains of migration 
far outweigh the losses, albeit varying by skills, resources and social network of the 
migrants (DFID, 2007; UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2009). Recent empirical evidence 
across a range of countries highlights the positive impacts of migration on 
household welfare – income, health status, educational attainments, female 
autonomy and so on.20 
                                                        
20 See the Human Development Report 2009 for the extensive review of literature. 
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However, while various impacts of migration have been extensively researched and 
documented, very little attention has been paid on the relationship between 
migration and food security.21 Nonetheless, the available evidence provides several 
possible pathways of interactions between migration and food security, and it 
points to a two-way relationship between these two phenomena. Thus, while risks 
to food security and local food entitlement failures (eg. poverty, lack of decent 
employment and wages, absence of social protection) often drive household 
migration decisions, the act of migration can in turn improved household ability to 
access food. The predominant pattern of rural outmigration involves circular moves, 
usually undertaken by the male member(s) of the household, as noted earlier. This 
means that through factors such as remittances, changes in gender roles, migration 
has the potential to influence household food security. As noted earlier, my focus is 
on the rural end of the household. Below I identify and discuss at least there direct 
pathways of the linkages between migration and food security which have 
immediate significance, and the three analytical chapters presented in this thesis 
(Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8), based on the field evidence from the case 
study site, also develop around these themes.   
Pathway 1: Entitlement and institutional failures and migration as a critical food 
security strategy  
The studies of household strategies during famines in Africa suggest that the poor 
rural households that face risks to their food security often plan strategically to 
minimise the negative impact of the distress situations, and outmigration of one or 
more of household members has been employed as one of the crucial strategies to 
prevent food entitlement failures (Corbett, 1988). Famines represent an extreme of 
distress, and are caused by, and cause, a collapse of wider set of institutions. 
                                                        
21 The exceptions include recent studies that attempt to link and provide some evidence on the 
interface of migration and food security. See the special issue in Food Policy, volume 35(4), 
published in 2011 (Azzarri & Zezza, 2011; de Brauw, 2011; de Brauw & Mu, 2011; Zezza et al., 
2011), and the recent study by Crush (2013) which has a focus on urban food security. However, 
as noted in Chapter 1, the research on the relationship between migration and food security is 
still at an infant stage and in need of studies that could provide insights on the interactions 
between rural livelihoods patterns and food security.  
 
   
 57 
Although a few countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa have not fully come out of the 
grip of famines (with the most recent famine reported in 2012 in Somalia), they are 
not common phenomena. Indeed, the large-scale famines have largely been 
eradicated in most countries in Asia and Europe (Devereux, 2009).  
Yet, however, persistence of chronic hunger afflicts a sizable chunk of rural 
populations in the developing world, and many more face risks to food entitlement 
failures on a routine basis even during normal times. In many countries in Asia and 
Africa where the local rural institutions (land, labour, financial markets) to manage 
risks to income and food security are absent, rural households, particularly the 
landless and landpoor, often employ migration as a critical food security strategy. 
For example, research by Mosse et al. (2002) among the Bhil tribal villages in three 
western Indian districts in three Indian states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and 
Rajasthan found that food insecurity was one of the important drivers of household 
migration decisions.  
It is important to note that the rising political significance of right to food since the 
1990s, as noted in Chapter 1, has led to many countries pledging to guarantee food 
security to their most vulnerable rural populations through in-kind or income 
support (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2012). There is a wide 
international consensus on the importance of social protection to achieve the 
objective of “food security for all” (HLPE, 2012). The issue of social protection is 
particularly important to understand the relationship between migration and food 
security, particularly in India (where this research focuses) which has recently 
passed a right to food legislation (Government of India, 2013a). If the institutional 
arrangements pertaining to income, livelihood and safety nets are robust, and 
insure the vulnerable rural populations against food entitlement failures and enable 
them to meet their basic food needs, this will have a positive impact on the food 
security of those covered under these nets, and may also reduce the need for the 
individuals and households to employ migration as an alternative risk-reducing 
strategy. Conversely, the failure of these institutions may force the populations to 
employ migration (often distress-induced) as a critical food strategy. Whether and 
to what extent the social safety nets help the rural poor avert the perennial risks to 
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their income and food security, and provide an alternative to migration as a risk-
reducing strategy, are important questions and need empirical investigation.  
In Chapter 6, I engage with these questions. Consistent with the SLA analytical 
framework of charting out the policy and institutional setting, the Chapter expresses 
these themes within the broader frame of role of institutional arrangements 
pertaining to food and livelihood security in influencing migration and food security.  
Pathway 2:  Remittances, land and agriculture and food security  
Migration can also positively influence household food security. The most direct 
impact of migration on household food security outcomes may be felt through the 
remittances sent by migrant members. Income from migration can equip the 
households at the origin with cash that can not only help them prevent the food 
entitlement failures but also enhance the access to food by all household members.  
In addition to providing money to maintain and enhance food consumption levels, 
remittances are found to have significant interactions with household food security 
through their impacts on supporting local livelihoods. In Mexico, remittances sent 
by migrants were found to relieve credit and risk constraints on farm production 
and thus had stimulating effects on farm production and income (Taylor & Wyatt, 
1996). Similarly, a study carried out by Oberai and Singh (1983) in the Ludhiana 
district of Indian state of Punjab, one the Green Revolution frontiers in northwest 
India, found that outmigration of members from farm households led to improved 
land productivity, particularly in the long-run. In contrast to the earlier research 
findings of Lipton (1980) (drawing on multiple village-level studies by Connell, 
Dasgupta, Laishley, & Lipton, 1976) that suggested that investment in productive 
resources was a last priority by rural migrants, as paying-off debts, meeting daily 
needs and conspicuous consumption absorbed most of the village remittances, a 
study of migrant households in rural Egypt found that migrants spent a substantial 
proportion of remittances in productive resources such as housing and agricultural 
land (Adams, 1991). Similarly, de Haan’s (2002) study of migration from the Saran 
district of western Bihar, India also found that migrants invested their savings and 
remittances in land and agriculture in the place of origin. If remittances are 
significant, they can also provide money for the modern farm inputs and agriculture 
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equipments (eg., pesticides, fertilisers, tractors) (Mendola, 2008) which will likely 
improve income gains from household-owned agriculture. These findings suggest 
that apart from the increased farm income, the rise in production also implies that 
food availability for household’s own consumption improves as well which can 
enhance household food security.  
For rural households with small and marginal landholdings (who constitute a bulk of 
farm households in the developing countries: World Bank, 2007), migration of one 
of more members may provide a way to reduce the pressure on land. The problem 
of underemployment in agriculture, commonly referred to in the economics 
literature as disguised employment, characterise the agriculture landscape of most 
low-income countries. In places where rural nonfarm sector does not offer 
adequate employment, which is often the case in many countries in Asia and Africa, 
migration of one of more members often provides a means to allocate the family 
labour among activities in order to maximise returns, as also suggested by NELM 
(Stark, 1978, 1981, 1991). From the perspective of food security, this means that on 
the one hand the remittances add up to the total household earnings, providing 
money to raise household food consumption levels. On the other hand, reduced 
household size as a result of migration by family member(s) may increase the per-
capita availability of food from the land owned. However, this also means loss of 
labour for family agriculture which could either have countervailing effect on food 
production, or change the dynamics of household labour, often involving women 
having to work in farm (see below).  
I explore the migration-remittance-food security nexus in Chapter 7, and compare 
and contrast the food security outcomes of households with or without migrant 
members. 
Pathway 3: Male migration, changes in intra-family power dynamics and gender 
relations and food security  
Mobility levels among women for employment reasons, both within and across the 
national borders, are on the rise, owing to reasons varying from local livelihood 
failures leading to attitudinal shifts towards female migration to more demand-
driven responses to better-paying employment opportunities outside the places of 
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origin. Furthermore, an increasing number of women is now also migrating 
independently, and indeed as the “principal breadwinners” (Martin, 2004; Neetha, 
2004). Notwithstanding this increasing “feminisation of migration”, as more recent 
articulations of the phenomenon put it (United Nations, 2007), in many societies 
social and cultural norms about the role and responsibilities of women still restrict 
the participation of women in the distant labour markets. The clear demarcation of 
the gender based societal roles that exist in many societies, particularly in rural 
regions in much of South Asia, is reflected in the male-dominated pattern of 
migration. Females are confined to agricultural related activities and household 
chores, while men assume more obligations on them in terms of ensuring social and 
financial security to the family members. This single male pattern of migration 
however, carries several implications on the left-behind family members, 
particularly women. Thus far, the research findings on the how women cope with 
male migration and its impacts on the stay-behind women have been mixed. In her 
research on the Sylhet region in northeastern Bangladesh, Gardner (1993, p. 1) 
notes a popular song sung by women which translates as:  
How can I accept that my husband has gone to London? I will fill up a 
suitcase with dried fish / All the mullahs – everyone – have gone to London / 
The land will be empty – what will I do? When my brother goes to London, 
he will give orders at tailor’s / He will make a blouse for me / How can I 
accept that my husband has gone to London?  
Though Gardner’s work focused on the ethnographic constructs of localities in 
terms of images of homeland and abroad and thus goes beyond the subject under 
discussion in this section, the beginning phrase of the song highlights the 
unwillingness of the women to accept migration by their men. On the other hand, in 
the case of male migration from the southern state of Kerala, India to Middle-East 
countries, women are found to aid their sons and husbands in migration (Gulati, 
1987). However, male migration raises a range of issues for the left-behind women 
in terms of role of women in the family, their need for support, dependence and 
protection, their autonomy in social and financial affairs, work burden, all of which 
have implications for the household food security.  
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The persistence of widespread gender inequalities and discrimination is a key 
feature of most of the rural societies in developing nations. Not only women’s say in 
everyday household affairs is minimal, but decisions about their own reproductive 
and sexual health, education, consumption etc. are made by the male members of 
the households. However, findings of several studies reveal that that male migration 
improves the autonomy of women who stay behind with women having greater say 
in the day-to-day household decisions in the absence of their men (Gulati, 1987, 
1993; Hadi, 2001; Paris, Singh, Luis, & Hossain, 2005), and the autonomy effects 
may prevail even after the man’s return (Yabiku, Agadjanian, & Sevoyan, 2010). The 
structure of family plays a critical role with women in the nuclear households 
enjoying more independence than their counterparts in the extended families 
(Desai & Banerji, 2008). The remittances sent by the male migrants often enhance 
women’s standing in the household, improve child education, and boost investment 
for quality health services. A study on the male-migration from Kerala, India to the 
middle-east also observed that remittances received by the left-behind women also 
broadened their vision of managing the household finance matters efficiently, aside 
from its positive impact on the child education and women and child health (Gulati, 
1987). Findings from another study from Nepal showed that as a result of male 
migration, women deepened their engagement in the rural society, though the 
autonomy and empowerment outcomes were not the same for all women, and they 
were, among other things, crucially contingent on, the flow of remittances 
(Maharjan, Bauer, & Knerr, 2012).  
Increased autonomy of women as a result of male migration can produce several 
household welfare impacts. The available research suggests that “as compared to 
men, women are more likely to utilise the resources they control to promote the 
needs of the children in particular and of the family in general” (UNICEF, 2006, p. 
23). When looked from the perspective of household food security, this efficient 
allocation and utilisation of household food resources may enhance the access to 
food of household members, particularly women and children. It may also produce 
more gender-balanced food security outcomes, as it is less likely that women will 
discriminate between boy and girl child during household food allocation.   
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On the other hand, male-only pattern of migration is also found to result in the 
added burden of production and reproduction responsibilities on women. Indeed, 
when remittances are not adequate enough to support the household, women may 
have to assume the role of bread-winner to meet the household needs. Village level 
case studies on labour migration in reveal that absence of men meant that women 
had to take over tasks that were traditionally performed by men in household 
agriculture (Jetley, 1987; Maharjan et al., 2012; Paris et al., 2005). This increasing 
workload on migrants’ wives may also alter the dynamics of family labour, which 
oftentimes demands children having to compensate for the labour of male 
migrants; young children, particularly girls, may be adversely affected by migration 
as they have to bear additional domestic responsibilities and take care of younger 
siblings, which often reduces the chances of girls receiving education (Jetley, 1987; 
Srivastava, 2001; Srivastava & Sasikumar, 2003). In terms of impact of these 
outcomes on household food security, this means that in cases where remittances 
are low, positive impacts of women autonomy may be offset by increasing burden 
of production and reproduction responsibilities. And when women also have to 
assume the role of breadwinner, this may mean less time for child care and child 
health issues, which could have negative impact on household food security 
outcomes, particularly of children. Moreover, and this is important, the 
pervasiveness of gender-based discrimination, particularly in societies with 
patriarchal structures, in accessing various services (eg. agriculture extension 
services, government benefits like cash transfers) may mean that the sheer fact of 
being a women may undermine the total gains of rising women autonomy which 
may adversely affect the food security. 
Using the lens of gender, in Chapter 8, I look within the household to understand 
the impacts of male migration on family power dynamics and gender relations, and 
how they correlate and interact with household food security.  
Conclusion 
The Chapter has attempted to contextualise the linkages between migration and 
food security. Beginning with the discussion on the importance of these themes in 
the global development agenda, the Chapter has argued that there currently exists 
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a huge disconnect between the two despite the obvious and two-way relationship 
between them, discussed the possible reasons for this disconnect, and suggested 
the need to bridge this gulf. The discussion in this Chapter has also attempted to set 
forth the key conceptual and theoretical ideas that underpin this thesis, and guide 
the analytical strategy. With the main focus of this thesis being on food access 
among rural households, this thesis conceptualises the issue of food security 
through the prism of entitlements, and building on the SLA, it argues that a 
livelihood approach to migration provides an important framework to understand 
the linkages between migration and food security. The discussion above makes it 
clear that these frameworks are highly complementary. In the final section, drawing 
the existing evidence from a range of countries, the Chapter has pointed out the 
lack of direct empirical evidence on the relationship between migration and food 
security, and attempted to tease out three important pathways of linkages between 
the two. These include: i) role of institutional arrangements, pertaining to food and 
livelihood safety nets, in influencing household food security outcomes and 
migration decisions; ii) effect of migrants’ remittance on food security of household 
members at the origin; iii) the interaction of gender with household food security 
outcomes. Using the primary, field-based data collected from the case-study district 
of Siwan in western Bihar, India, these linkages are empirically tested in Indian 
context in the later chapters. In the next Chapter, I examine in detail the broad 
dynamics of migration, urbanisation and food (in)security in India in order to 
provide a wider perspective on the patterns of rural livelihoods and their 
significance for food security in the country. 
 
 

 65 
3 DYNAMICS OF FOOD INSECURITY, 
MIGRATION AND URBANISATION IN INDIA 
 

 67 
CHAPTER 3: DYNAMICS OF FOOD INSECURITY, MIGRATION AND 
URBANISATION IN INDIA 
Introduction 
At the global level, India has more undernourished people than any other country in 
the world. During 2011-13, the most recent period for which comparable cross-
country data is available, the number of chronically undernourished people in India 
was estimated to be 213.8 million, representing 17 percent of the India’s total 
population. To put this figure in perspective, the absolute number of people 
suffering from undernourishment in India is only slightly lower than the number of 
undernourished persons in 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa combined.22 Seen in 
percentage terms, this figure is equivalent to approximately a quarter of the world’s 
undernourished and represents 38 percent of the total burden of 
undernourishment in the whole of Asia and 73 percent of the South Asian region. 
Furthermore, a cross-country trend analysis of undernourishment reveals that 
during 1990-92, the baseline period used by the FAO in order to track the progress 
of the countries on the World Food Summit and MDG target on hunger and 
undernourishment, India’s neighbouring countries in the South and South-East Asia 
such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam had 
higher percentage of their population who suffered from hunger. And yet, over the 
years these countries have seen a faster decline in the levels of undernourishment 
than India, despite the fact that Indian economy has performed much better than 
most of these countries. And thus, while India seems off the track to meet the MDG 
target of halving the proportion of the undernourished people by 2015, these South 
and South-East Asian neighbours of India, with the exception of Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan, are within the reach of this goal (all data, FAO, 2013b, pp. 42-44). Clearly, 
the sheer magnitude of the number of undernourished persons in India suggests the 
wider significance of the country from the perspective of global progress on hunger 
reduction. 
                                                        
22 In FAO’s 2013 report, country-wise data is provided for 41 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa but 
the total figure on the number of undernourished people in the region, estimated at 222.7 
million individuals, includes 8 other countries for which separate data is not provided. This 
interpretation is based on the total figure.  
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The aggregate figure on the number of undernourished persons, however, conceals 
several regional and social aspects of the problem. In India, the prevalence of 
undernourishment varies significantly across the different Indian states and rural-
urban areas within the states. Furthermore, there are marked asymmetries in the 
levels of undernourishment among the different social groups, with Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes faring the worst on this front. Indeed, although India 
has been fairly successful in averting the large-scale recurring famines of the past in 
the post-independence era, incidences of deaths due to starvation and child 
malnutrition among the lower caste and tribal communities continue to be reported 
(Jha, 2002; Mander, 2012; Parulkar, 2012) even in the more developed states such 
as Kerala (Manikandan, 2014). Additionally, and this is an important point to 
emphasise, the persistence of widespread gender inequalities in many parts of India 
means that women and girls are more prone to hunger and undernourishment as 
compared to their male counterparts. This has severe implications from the 
perspective of intergenerational transfers of health and nutrition outcomes as ill-
nourished mothers are more likely to have unfavourable pregnancy outcomes, 
passed on through poor childhood nutritional and health outcomes. 
Cutting across these inequalities is the problem of rural-urban disparities in food 
and nutrition security in India. As noted in Chapter 1, the prevalence of food 
insecurity and undernourishment is much higher in rural than urban areas. 
Moreover, the urban-centric nature of economic growth since the early 1990s is 
throwing down a new set of challenges for rural food security. One outcome of 
these processes is growing significance of rural-urban migration for work. However, 
the nature and patterns of urban employment growth, with much of the growth 
created in the informal sector of the urban economy means that labour migration is 
predominantly of circular character, keeping the overall levels of urbanisation 
relatively lower than other countries (de Haan, 1997a, 2002; Kundu, 2003, 2009; 
Kundu & Saraswati, 2012). Not all moves are characterised by the push of rural 
distress however, and the pulls of better urban incomes and improved 
transportation system are also propelling short-term mobility (Deshingkar & 
Anderson, 2004). From the perspective of food security, these processes imply that 
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the sources of rural food security are changing, which requires understanding of 
these changes. 
Against this general background, this Chapter discusses the various facets of 
undernourishment in India. It first establishes India in the global debates on the 
hunger, with particular reference to country’s progress on the MDG goal on hunger. 
Then, it highlights the regional and socio-economic disparities in the hunger and 
undernourishment. In the third major section, the discussion focuses on the 
changing character of rural livelihoods and broad dynamics of migration and 
urbanisation in India. This section also attempts to highlight the rising significance of 
migration within rural livelihood systems in India, and what this would seem to 
imply for rural food security. This discussion on broader trends of rural livelihoods, 
migration and urbanisation aims to set the scene for the empirical household-level 
analysis of linkages between migration and food security that is presented in later 
chapters. The last section concludes.   
Assessing India’s progress on the Millennium Development Goal on hunger 
reduction 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent a blueprint consisting of a set 
of time-bound development goals, agreed by the world nations in September 2000 
at the Millennium Summit held in the United Nation’s headquarters in New York. 
MDGs consist of a total of 8 goals and 21 targets, country-wise progress on which is 
measured through 60 quantitative indicators with the baseline year of 1990 and 
endline year of 2015 (United Nations, 2013a, p. 58). MDG goal 1 was to ‘Eradicate 
Extreme Poverty and Hunger’, and target 2 within this goal was to halve, between 
1990 and 2015, proportion of people who suffered from hunger.23 India, among 
other countries, was signatory to these goals which, while not binding, reflected the 
                                                        
23 Originally, the MDGs consisted of 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators. However, over time 
new targets and indicators have been added. In 2007, a new target, which was to ‘achieve full 
and productive employment and decent work for all’ was added to MDG goal 1. The assessment 
of progress on this new target was first reported in 2008 (United Nations, 2008) and this has 
figured in the annual MDGs reports since then. This has altered the numbering of the targets, 
and in the most recent annual MDGs report, the targets on poverty, decent employment and 
hunger have been reported as 1.A, 1.B and 1.C, respectively (United Nations, 2013a).  
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country’s commitment to broad-based inclusive development alongside the 
economic reforms initiated since early 1990s.  
Poverty is the significant cause of hunger and undernourishment around the world. 
In fact it is this connection that guided the official policy thinking to tie up the MDG 
goal on halving hunger with that of reducing poverty. In other words, the grouping 
of these MDG goals was based on the logic that decline in poverty will have an 
automatic dent on hunger prevalence. In the case of India, the macro-economic 
reforms since early 1990s and ensuing economic growth were believed to set the 
preconditions for reducing poverty and food insecurity in the country. In particular, 
parallels began to be drawn between China and India. Rapid economic growth in 
China since mid-1980s witnessed concomitant improvements in food security. India 
was expected to follow the same path (FAO, 2000). The progress in these two 
countries was considered crucial because, by the sheer size of their population, the 
fate of global progress on hunger, in a broader sense, hinged upon them. However, 
whereas China continued to make progress, the narrative about India changed quite 
dramatically within a few years. As early as 2003, India began to be seen as a 
worrying case. Thus, in its year 2003 edition of the State of Food Insecurity in the 
World (henceforth SoFI), the FAO observed:   
These numbers and trends are dominated by progress and setbacks in a few 
large countries. China alone has reduced the number of hungry people by 58 
million since the [1990] … At the same time, India has shifted into reverse. 
After seeing a decline of 20 million in the number of undernourished 
between 1990-1992 and 1995-1997, the number of hungry people in India 
increased by 19 million over the following four years FAO.    
       (FAO, 2003a, p. 6) 
By the year 2005, India began to be characterised as a “paradox” where economic 
growth did little (or nothing) in the way of improving the food and nutrition security 
outcomes for a large majority of country’s population. The international scepticism 
that India will falter on its MDG goal of hunger reduction grew further with the visit 
to the country in 2005 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Right to Food. 
Using the catch phrase “hunger amidst plenty” (Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
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Food, 2006, p. 5), he raised apprehensions about the country’s ability to honour its 
MDG commitments: 
Despite the progress made in the progressive realisation of the right to food 
in India since independence, the Special Rapporteur is concerned that there 
are signs of regression, particularly amongst the poorest. In monitoring 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Planning 
Commission has noted that India was not currently on track to achieve the 
goals set in relation to malnutrition and undernourishment. 
  (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2006, p. 15) 
This paradoxical narrative of disjuncture between economic growth and food 
security about India continues to be echoed in the global discourse on food security. 
Over the years, India has been slipping behind the reach of MDG goals on hunger. In 
order to quantitatively assess how India has fared on its MDG commitments, it is 
necessary to understand the benchmark indicators used to evaluate the country-
wise progress on MDG goal of hunger. Although undernourishment has various 
facets and thus methodological debates continue on how it should be defined and 
measured, two measures are commonly used. These include:  
i) Proportion of underweight children aged 0-59 months, expressed in terms 
of under-five children whose weight-for-age is minus two standard 
deviations from the median of international reference population.  
ii) Proportion of population who suffer from the dietary energy deficits 
Before assessing the MDG progress of India on reducing the proportion of 
underweight children, it is important to note that there are two other 
anthropometric indicators for assessing child nutrition outcomes. These include: a) 
stunting (expressed as height-for-age) which captures height/growth retardation 
among children with respect to age and is an indicator of chronic malnourishment; 
b) wasting (expressed as weight-for-height) which measures body mass in relation 
to height and represents acute undernourishment. Although these indicators are 
also sometimes used in the United Nations annual MDG reports, prevalence of 
underweight (weight-for-age) is most preferred indicator, for it is a composite 
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measure of stunting and wasting and takes into account both chronic and acute 
forms of childhood malnourishment (IIPS & Macro International, 2007b, pp. 268-
269). Since the Government of India also uses this indicator in its India-MDG 
reports, the same is used here for consistency purpose.  
It must be added that although the MDG target indicator refers to the proportion of 
underweight children in the age-group 0-59 months (or children aged under-five 
years), the MDG indicator in India includes children under-three years of age. This is 
because in the three successive rounds of NFHS (conducted in 1992-93, 1998-99 and 
2005-06, respectively), which is the main source of data on child nutrition 
outcomes, the age group of the children whose height and weight were measured 
varied. The height and weight were measured for children below the age of four 
years in NFHS-I, for children below the age of 3 years in NFHS-II and for children 
below the age of 5 years in NFHS-III. Thus, to ensure consistency over the period, 
children below 3 years are considered (Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implemention, 2014, p. 30). 
Using this measure, the most recent India MDG 2014 report estimates that the 
proportion of under-three underweight children in the country was 52 percent in 
the 1990. Thus, in order to achieve the MDG goal, this should decline to 26 percent 
by 2015. Although the progress on this indicator closely followed the MDG target 
value up until 1998-99, it has virtually stagnated since then. According to the NFHS 
data, in the six-year period between 1992-93 and 1998-99 the proportion of 
underweight children below the age of three years declined by close to 9 percent at 
an average annual rate of 1.5 percent – from 51.5 percent to 42.7 percent. In fact, 
this rate of decline was higher than the average annual expected decline of 1.04 
percent over the 25-year period, from 1990 to 2015. However, the pace of 
improvement in child underweight prevalence witnessed a sharp deceleration 
afterwards, and between 1998-99 and 2005-06, it decreased by merely 2.3 
percentage points. This provided a major setback and put India off track its MDG 
target. Based on these trends, the Government of India projects that by 2015 the 
prevalence of underweight among children below 3 years will come down to 32.85 
percent, missing the MDG target by 6.85 percentage points (Figure 3.1). According 
to the Census 2011, India had approximately 89.01 million children below three 
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years of age (Registrar General of India, 2011h). Thus, in absolute terms, the MDG 
shortfall of close to 7 percent translates into a little more than 6 million children 
remaining underweight.  
Figure 3.1: India’s progress on MDG indicator of the underweight children below the 
age of three years24 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implemention (2014, p. XXVI), Table 4 
in Appendix 6. 
 
There is substantial international evidence on the huge social and economic costs of 
child under-nutrition. The lack of adequate nutrition at the early stages of life leads 
to poor cognitive development, which has wider implications on the productivity in 
adult ages and economic growth as a whole (inter alia, Strauss & Thomas, 1998; 
Thomas & Frankenberg, 2002; UNICEF, 2012; World Bank, 2006). It is estimated that 
more than 200 million children around the world fail to reach their full cognitive 
potential due to inadequate nutrition and health care (Grantham-McGregor et al., 
2007). The economic costs of malnutrition amount to nearly 10 percent of the 
lifetime earnings of the malnourished individuals and the overall losses to the 
                                                        
24 ‘Actual’ figures from 2007 onwards are the projected estimates. According to the Government 
of India’s projections, between 2005-06 and 2014-15 the prevalence of under-three underweight 
children will decline from 40.4 percent to 32.85 percent. This translates into the overall decrease 
of 7.55 percentage points at an average annual decline at the rate of 0.83 percent. This average 
annual rate of change has been linearly distributed for each year since 2007 to obtain the 
‘actual’ curve.  
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national income can be as high as two to three percent of countries’ GDP (World 
Bank, 2006, pp. 1-2). For India, productivity losses due to malnutrition and 
micronutrient deficiencies were estimated to cost the country around $114 billion 
between 2003 and 2012 (World Bank, 2006, p. 26). Not only does child under-
nutrition affect cognitive development but is also a significant predictor of infant 
and child mortality. Poor nutrition weakens the resistance of children to several life-
threatening infectious diseases and thus increases the risks of mortality among 
children (for an extensive review, see Pelletier, 1994). In India, 54 percent of the 
deaths among children below the age of 5 years are attributed to poor nutrition 
(Arnold, Parasuraman, Arokiaswamy, & Kothari, 2009, p. 14). Thus, the failure of 
India to reduce the levels of child nutrition as per its MDG commitments will likely 
have long-lasting impacts on its other development outcomes. This calls for urgent 
and effective policy action to attend to early life needs of children in India. As the 
Chilean Nobel-laureate Gabriela Mistral notes:    
We are guilty of many errors and many faults, but our worst crime is 
abandoning the children, neglecting the foundation of life. Many of the 
things we need can wait. The child cannot. Right now is the time his bones 
are being formed, his blood is being made and his senses are being 
developed. To him we cannot answer "Tomorrow". His name is "Today". 
     (cited in Mamata & Sarada, 2009, p. 14) 
The second indicator related to the proportion of people who suffer from the 
dietary energy deficits has had a rather controversial place in the Indian policy 
scene. In its first-ever MDG country report in the year 2005, it was estimated that at 
the base year of 1990, 62.2 percent of Indian population was undernourished by 
this measure. According to this baseline estimate, the MDG target value of 31.1 
percent was set for the year 2015 (Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implemention, 2005). However, in the subsequent MDG reports published every 
alternative year in 2007, 2009, 2011, and then in 2014, no proper estimates on this 
indicator were provided. The reasons for this are hard to understand as the data on 
the dietary energy consumption for Indian population are collected periodically 
through the countrywide National Sample Surveys. One plausible explanation why 
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this indicator was dropped is that up until 2009, the calorie energy formed the sole 
basis of determining the poverty line in India. The individuals whose per capita daily 
expenditure was lower than what it took to meet the “minimum needs” of 2,400 
and 2,100 calories in rural and urban areas, respectively, were classified as poor 
(Planning Commission, 1979, 1993). However, since the 1980s there has been a 
constant decline in the average calorie consumption across the different incomes 
classes, and both in rural and urban areas, even though poverty has declined and 
incomes have improved over the period (inter alia, Deaton & Dreze, 2009; Patnaik, 
2004; Radhakrishna, 2005; Radhakrishna, Rao, Ravi, & Reddy, 2004; Rao, 2000; Sen, 
2005). The recent evaluation of declining trend of calorie consumption in India for 
the period from 1983 to 2004-05 by Deaton and Dreze (2009) also suggests a 
striking fact that calorie consumption has declined despite the fact that the relative 
prices of food have remained unchanged. There is no single explanation for these 
trends, however, the plausible hypotheses include: i) improved epidemiological and 
health environment improving the conversion-efficiency of food (Deaton & Dreze, 
2009); ii) increasing mechanisation of Indian agriculture as well as shift in the 
workforce structure from farm to non-farm sector, reducing the need for hard 
manual labour, and in turn, the calorie requirements (Deaton & Dreze, 2009; Rao, 
2000); iii) voluntary move away from calorie-dense diets to better-tasting food with 
lesser calories (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011); iv) involuntary reduction in food 
expenditure in order to accommodate the non-food needs, such as increased 
education and heath expenditure (Basu & Basole, 2012; Sen, 2005) and; v) increase 
in out of home eating, the extent of which is not covered in the national surveys 
(Smith, 2015).25 
From the policy standpoint, however, the downward sloping calorie curve is subject 
to being interpreted as a sign of rising incidence of poverty in the country even 
though that may not be the case. In fact, this anomaly was highlighted in the India-
MDG report for the year 2009 which suggested that while India was on track to 
reduce the people living below the poverty line (although this claim remains highly 
contested due to the low cut-off used to estimate the poverty line), the proportion 
                                                        
25 For a useful synthesis of calorie consumption, see Pritchard et al. (2014, pp. 34-39) 
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of population with dietary energy consumption below the norms was on the rise – 
increasing from 64 percent in 1987-88 to 76 percent in 2004-05 (Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implemention, 2009, p. 30).  
Figure 3.2: India’s progress on MDG indicator of the proportion of undernourished 
people26 
 
Source: FAO-SoFI (2013, p. 44) 
 
On the other hand, the FAO, in its annual SoFI reports, provides the cross-country 
estimates on this indicator to assess the progress of world’s nations on the MDG 
goal target on hunger. In these reports, the prevalence of undernourishment is 
measured as a proportion of population whose actual dietary energy consumption 
is lower than the minimum dietary energy requirements (MDERs). The MDER norms 
vary by person’s age, sex, body weight, and level of physical activity and are 
calculated accordingly. Using these MDERs norms, the most recent estimates 
suggest that the proportion of undernourished people in India in the baseline period 
of 1990-92 was 25.5 percent of the total population. By these yardsticks, this should 
come down to 12.75 percent in 2015 if India is to meet its MDG goal. However, 
                                                        
26 In the annual SoFI reports, FAO usually only provides the actual estimates on the proportion of 
undernourished people from the baseline year to the current period (which in SoFI 2013 was 
2011-13). Since the MDG target is to halve the proportion of undernourished people in 2015 
from the baseline figure, the target curve has been plotted using this logic. The purpose here is 
to not assess time trends in divergence but overall progress till date. Therefore, this graph must 
be interpreted in the same light.  
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during 2011-13, the proportion of undernourished people in India stood at 17 
percent of the total population, indicating slow pace of decline (FAO, 2013b, p. 44). 
Given these trends, it is likely that India will fall short of achieving this MDG target 
by the year 2015 (Figure 3.2). 
Additionally, in 2005-06, one-third of the Indian women of childbearing ages (15-49 
years) had below normal BMI (IIPS & Macro International, 2007b, p. 309). The sheer 
magnitude of the undernourishment in India is reflective of the lack of policy 
attention given to attending the basic needs of country’s population. Indeed, a 
decade ago, Dreze (2004, p. 1729) described the country’s nutrition situation as a 
“silent emergency”. Although recent years have witnessed reinvigoration of political 
interest on food and nutrition issues in India, with right to food now recognised as 
the constitutional right, much remains to be done. Moreover, the policy neglect of 
the past will take many years to make up for the current shortfalls. Not only will 
India falter on the MDG target on halving undernourishment, but given that poor 
nutrition has the potential to aggravate other outcomes such as increased risk of 
morbidity and mortality, it is likely that it will severely hamper India’s progress more 
broadly. In fact, there are signs that India will not be able to achieve other MDG 
targets related to infant and child mortality and maternal health (Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implemention, 2014).  
As the global development community gears up to set the post-2015 development 
agenda, food and nutrition security for all has emerged as the prominent goal 
within the wider post-MDG framework (United Nations, 2013b). With India 
accounting for nearly one-sixth of the world’s population, and by recent FAO’s 
estimates published in SoFI-2013, an equal proportion of world’s undernourished 
people (Figure 3.2), India’s progress will be crucial for the global attainment of any 
post-2015 development goal of hunger elimination.  
Social, cultural and regional dimensions of food insecurity and 
undernourishment in India 
The discussion in the preceding sections has attempted to highlight, in a broad 
sense, the overall magnitude of the problem of undernourishment in India. 
However, India is a huge and diverse country with widespread interstate and 
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intrastate disparities, including in food insecurity and undernourishment. Moreover, 
the widespread gender equalities in the country mean that women are more prone 
to food insecurity. Indeed India’s failure to achieve the MDG targets on hunger is, in 
many ways, intimately related to these inequalities. The following discussion, 
therefore, discusses these social, cultural (gender) and regional dimensions of food 
insecurity in India.  
Regional dimensions of food insecurity and deprivation  
Although the overall magnitude of undernourishment remains widespread in India, 
there is a substantial variability in the prevalence of food insecurity and deprivation 
across the different states, districts within states, and villages within districts. The 
past few years have, therefore, witnessed enormous research attention on 
identification of the “geographies of deprivation” in India (inter alia, Bakshi, Chawla, 
& Shah, 2015; Borooah & Dubey, 2007; Chaudhuri & Gupta, 2009; Debroy & 
Bhandari, 2003; Drèze & Khera, 2012).  
At the state-level, the recent mapping of food insecurity by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) provides important insights on the broader regional 
geography of undernourishment in India. Similar to GHI, IFPRI’s assessment uses the 
SHI – a composite indicator that measures the performance of individual Indian 
states on three interlinked indicators of proportion of population with inadequate 
calorie intake, proportion of underweight children below the age of 5 years, and 
under-five mortality rate – to map the prevalence and severity of hunger in 17 large 
states of India. These states account for 95 percent of the country’s total 
population. The SHI assigns equal weights to all three indicators, and based on their 
average score, ranks the states into 5 categories that reflect the severity of hunger. 
These include i) low (score of below 5), ii) moderate (5 to 9.9), iii) serious (10 to 
19.9), iv) alarming (20 to 29.9), and iv) extremely alarming (30 and more). The 
standardisation of indicators (and criteria) in SHI with those used in GHI is useful, for 
not only does it provide an inter-state comparison of hunger but also allow 
comparison of Indian states with other countries in the world (Menon et al., 2009). 
Based on SHI values, Figure 3.3 presents the state-wise prevalence of 
undernourishment in India. As is evident from the data in the map, not a single state   
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Figure 3.3: State-wise prevalence of undernourishment in India according to State 
Hunger Index 
 
Source: Own map using data from Menon et al. (2009) 
falls in either ‘low’ or ‘moderate’ hunger category. Furthermore, barring four states 
of Punjab, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Assam that are in ‘serious’ category, the 
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remaining have ‘alarming’ levels of hunger, with situation in Madhya Pradesh in 
central India being ‘extremely alarming’.  
It is important to note that the overall high scores for most Indian states are largely 
because of the high prevalence of child underweight (Menon et al., 2009, p. 18). 
Despite this, a clear pattern of relative disadvantage emerges. In particular, the 
bottom four states (with SHI scores of above 25) include Madhya Pradesh, 
Jharkhand, Bihar and Chhattisgarh. These Indian states are among the most 
economically backward states, and form part of the undivided BIMARU states. 
(BIMARU is a Hindi acronym which means ‘morbid’, and was originally derived from 
the first letters of the four most socio-economically and demographically backward 
states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh; in 2000 Jharkhand 
and Chhattisgarh were carved out of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh respectively, and 
included as independent states in the Indian union. Later the state of Orissa was 
also added to the list and the acronym became BIMAROU. As noted in Chapter 1, 
these states are the priority states and are thus also known as EAG states.) In a 
recent exercise by Planning Commission that ranked the districts and sub-districts 
(or district blocks) of the country in order of their backwardness, 35 of 50 most 
backward districts were from these four states (and the number increased to 47 
districts when the adjacent states of Odisha, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were 
included) (Bakshi et al., 2015, see Annexure A). With the exception of Bihar, all 
these states have a significantly large proportion of Scheduled Tribe (Advasi) 
populations who, having suffered a historical neglect, remain extremely 
marginalised. Indeed the Planning Commission study quoted above finds a strong 
correlation between concentration of tribal population and backwardsness of the 
region (Bakshi et al., 2015, pp. 48-50).27 The reasons for the backwardsness of Bihar, 
the broader case-study setting for the present study, are somewhat different and lie 
                                                        
27 To rank the districts and sub-district in order of their backwardness, the authors used 
population Census 2011 data on seven indicators. These indicators included: i) agriculture 
workers as a proportion of total workers; ii) female literacy rate; iii) households without access 
to electricity; iv) households without drinking water and sanitary latrine within premises; v) 
households without access to banking facility; vi) percentage of Scheduled Caste population; and 
vii) percentage of Scheduled Tribe population. Given the availability of data at the sub-district 
levels, these indicators best captured three components of backwardness, including economic 
development, human development and infrastructure development. These indicators were 
assigned equal weights to compute the ranking  (Bakshi et al., 2015, pp. 46-48). 
 81 
in the slew of problems including the burden of faulty colonial land settlement and 
revenue policies, historical caste-based inequalities in land and asset ownership 
(also a perennial cause of tensions and occasional violence), high demographic 
pressures and governace deficits (inter alia, Mukherji & Mukherji, 2012; Sharma, 
2005; Singh & Stern, 2013; I discuss the reasons for Bihar's backwardness in details 
in Chapter 5).  
Seen in international perspective, India ranked 66th out of the 88 developing and 
least developed countries of the world on GHI index for 2008.28 And the hunger 
index scores of all bottom four states are comparable to some of the worst 
performing countries in the world. Thus, the severity of hunger in the worst 
performing state of Madhya Pradesh is greater than Chad (ranked 81 in the GHI), 
Mali (ranked 73 in GHI) outperforms Bihar and Jharkhand, and Chattisgarh is below 
Mozambique which is ranked 72 in GHI (Menon et al., 2009, p. 18, Table 4).  
The SHI index is useful in that it points to the high inter-state disparities in the 
prevalence and severity of hunger in India. However, the prevalence of hunger and 
deprivation also varies across the different districts within the state. Indeed, 
pockets of backwardness and deprivation exist even in India’s most developed 
states. As the Planning Commission study by Bakshi et al. (2015, p. 46) found: “…the 
remarkable characteristic of regional disparities in India is the presence of backward 
areas even within states that have grown faster and are at relatively high income 
levels on average.” In terms of hunger, the authors noted:  
Intrastate disparities are not just in terms of income, but also non-income 
indicators such as hunger… India’s richest states include some of our 
“hungriest” districts. These include East Godavari, Khammam and 
Mahbubnagar in Andhra Pradesh, Fatehabad and Hissar in Haryana, 
Gulbarga in Karnataka, Malappuram, Palakkad, Thiruvananthapuram and 
Thrissur in Kerala and Kolhapur, Ratnagiri, Satara and Sindhudurg in 
                                                        
28 Note that since the GHI was first published in 2006, it has been annually updated. The most 
recent GHI is available for 2014. However, because the India-specific SHI has been, at the time of 
writing, published only once in 2008, rankings from GHI 2008 are used here for cross-country 
comparison. 
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Maharashtra. This is also true of other indicators such as infant mortality 
and literacy. 
       (Bakshi et al., 2015, p. 46) 
The undivided BIMAROU belt states (including Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh), 
however, remain the bigger problem zone in terms of hunger and deprivation. 
Indeed, in a recent district-wise mapping of rural food insecurity in India by World 
Food Programme (WFP) and Institute of Human Development (IHD), India, seven of 
the eight states in which this exercise was performed were from the BIMAROU 
group, suggesting their significance (WFP & IHD, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d; 
2009a, 2009b, 2010).29 Indeed, 89 of the 100 most backward districts identified by 
Bakshi et al. (2015) are also from the undivided BIMAROU states. A similar 
assessment by Drèze and Khera (2012) on the district-wise patterns of human and 
child deprivation using two composite measures of Human Development Index 
(HDI) and Achievement of Babies and Children (ABC) Index also finds the similar 
patterns of deprivation, with most of the districts in the seven states falling in the 
bottom and second bottom quintile of the HDI and ABC indices.30 
It is also important to note that some of the districts within the BIMAROU group are 
intensely backward and most hunger prone regions of India. In particular, the 
Kalahandi-Balangir-Koraput (KBK) region of eastern Indian state of Odisha, and 
Baran district in Rajasthan, are the places where hunger and starvation deaths, 
particularly among the lower backward caste and tribal communities, continue to 
be reported (Banik, 2007; Dutta, 2014; Mishra, 2010; Nayar, 2014). The low caste 
and tribal status makes these communities even more vulnerable to the hunger and 
starvation, an issue to which I now turn.  
                                                        
29 The other state was Maharashtra. On the other hand, this was not done in Uttrakhand, a state 
which was carved out of Uttar Pradesh in 2000.  
30 HDI index measures the average performance in three indicators of income, education and 
health. District-level HDI index computed by Drèze and Khera (2012) uses three indicators. These 
include: i) child mortality; ii) adult female literacy; and iii) standard of living (p. 43). ABC index 
uses four indicators of child survival and well-being that include: i) probability of surviving until 
age five; ii) proportion of children fully immunised in the age group of 12-23 months; iii) 
proportion of children aged 12-35 months who are not underweight; and iv) female literacy rate 
in the 10-14 age group (p. 44). 
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Social correlates of poverty and food insecurity  
In India, remarkable disparities exist in the levels of food and nutritional deprivation 
across different social groups. In particular, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 
populations face a disproportionately higher burden of hunger and 
undernourishment. Although Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been 
accorded special status in the Indian constitution and the post-independence 
development planning in India has sought to uplift their social and economic 
standing, a significantly large majority of them continue to be at the lowest rung of 
economy and society. Poverty, hunger, illiteracy and landlessness among Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes remain exceptionally high (Planning Commission, 
2013). Indeed, to bridge this gap, the Government of India operates several social 
support programmes such as income support in the forms of pensions, scholarships 
for children etc. However, their implementation on the ground remains ineffective. 
By the virtue of their low social and economic status, they often lack the voice and 
representation to claim what is rightfully owed to them and are cheated frequently 
(I discuss this in Chapter 6 based on my field research findings in rural Bihar).  
Table 3.1: Percent of undernourished children and adults by social groups in India, 
2005-06 
Social groups 
Under-nutrition among children 
aged 0-59 months1 
Under-nutrition 
among adults aged 15-
49 years2 
Stunted Wasted Under-weight 
Women 
with 
BMI>18.5 
Men with 
BMI> 18.5 
Scheduled Tribe 53.9 27.6 54.5 46.6 41.3 
Scheduled Caste 53.9 21.0 47.9 41.1 39.1 
Other Backward Caste 48.8 20.0 43.2 35.7 34.6 
Other 40.7 16.3 33.7 29.4 28.9 
Source: IIPS and Macro International (2007b, pp. 270, 304-306). 
1Children with height-for-age, weight-for-height and weight-for-age two standard 
deviation below the median of WHO international reference population. 
2BMI is measured as weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in meters) square (or, 
BMI = kg/m2).  
 
Table 3.1 presents the NFHS data on the differentials in the nutritional status among 
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under-five children and women and men aged between 15 and 49 by social groups 
in India. Although the prevalence of under-nutrition remains high among all the 
social groups, compared to ‘other’ castes (a residual category comprising all non-
backward caste groups), a significantly higher proportion of children, women and 
men belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe groups are undernourished. 
For example, at 55 percent, the proportion of under-five underweight children 
among Scheduled Tribes is 20 percent higher compared to other groups. Similarly, 
47 percent of Scheduled Tribes women of childbearing ages have a below normal 
BMI of 18.5 whereas the corresponding proportion of the women in the other 
category is 29 percent which is 17 percent lower than the former.  
The NFHS’s categorisation of social groups in India, useful as it may be in 
understanding the health and nutrition disparities across the different social groups 
in broad terms, does not however provide insights into the within caste and tribe 
inequalities in the levels of nutritional deprivation. Indeed, within Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, some communities are more disadvantaged than others. As 
an example, one such caste group is Mushahars who live in the parts of backward 
Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Known as the ‘rat eaters’, Mushahars are 
undoubtedly one of the most resourceless and disadvantaged caste groups in India. 
In an important book that brings together the stories of persistence of hunger and 
destitution among the most marginalised communities in India, Mander (2012) 
provides a gut-wrenching narrative on the life circumstances of the Mushahars 
living in eastern Uttar Pradesh and argues that hunger is an inseparable part of their 
lives which they have come to embrace it as their life-long companion. The children 
in the Mushahar households are taught to live without food from the early ages. 
Citing his conversation with the Mushahar womenfolk who told him what they do 
when their children cry for food, Mander (2012, p. 6) notes: 
It is difficult for us to bear their weeping. When the wailing of infants gets 
too much, we lace our fingertips with tobacco or natural intoxicants and give 
our fingers to the babies to suck. We give them cannabis or khaina (local 
tobacco for chewing) or cheap country liquor. It helps them sleep even with 
nothing in their stomachs. If they are small, we sometimes beat them until 
they sleep. But as they grow older, we try to teach them how to live with 
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hunger. We tell them this lesson will equip them for a lifetime. Because we 
know that hunger will always be with them. It’ll be their companion for the 
rest of their lives. 
Similarly, the Sahariya tribe in the Baran district of Rajasthan is another case. Since 
2002, the tribe has witnessed a wave of deaths among children due to starvation 
and undernourishment (Dreze & Khera, 2014; Dutta, 2014; Nayar, 2014). Reporting 
on the severity of undernourishment among Sahariya children in a recent piece in a 
popular Indian daily, Dutta (2014) described the situation of these tribal children as 
follows: 
Two-and-a-half-year-old Prince Sahariya cries uncontrollably as his 
grandmother Shanti tries to make him stand but gives up as his weak and 
spindly legs refuse to cooperate. “Hamara Prince bahut kamzor hai” [my 
grandson Prince is severely undernourished], the doting grandmother offers 
apologetically, having brought him to the community health centre in 
Shahabad block in Baran district, Rajasthan… There are 18 other children 
with Prince in the 12-bed malnutrition ward, most exhibiting signs of severe 
malnutrition – from bloated stomachs to stunted growth. Without adequate 
medical staff, the health centre clearly has more than its fair share of young 
patients it can look after. Some children have even been accommodated in 
the entrance gallery, where they are being given nourishing food 
supplements to get them back on their feet. It’s a scene that repeats itself 
across other health centres in the district, their malnourished children’s 
wards filled to capacity, and then some more. 
Not surprisingly, nutritional and health deficits remain a perennial feature of the 
lives of a majority of India’s socially disadvantaged communities, stretching from 
one generation to another. In addition to the categories of caste and tribe, the 
other social markers of vulnerability to hunger include factors such as old age, 
widowhood, and gender. And when combined with low socio-economic status, 
these factors can further exacerbate one’s proneness to poverty and food insecurity 
(Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4: An old, widow woman from lower caste: multiple layers of vulnerabilities  
 
Source: Picture taken during fieldwork in Siwan. 
 
Gender and food insecurity  
The aggregate caste and class differentials in food and nutrition deprivation need a 
further assessment by within-class gender categories. Within the household, 
differentials in food and nutritional outcomes of men and women can and often do 
exist. In many parts of the world the weak social and economic status of women 
often makes them more vulnerable to food insecurity. Indeed the evidence suggests 
that women are overrepresented among the food insecure people (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013). Although these differences may be in part due to the 
varying biological needs of men and women, more often than not they reflect the 
societal construction of gender and varying bargaining position of different sexes 
within the household (Sen, 1987).  
The pervasive gender inequalities in India mean that the issue of sex differentials in 
food and nutrition has particular relevance in the Indian context. A range of studies 
have pointed out that the widespread persistence of son preference, particularly in 
the northern part of India, often manifests into intra-household distribution of food 
favouring males over females, and it has been invoked as the possible reason for 
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explaining relative survival disadvantage of females vis-à-vis males (Bardhan, 1974; 
Das Gupta, 1987; Miller, 1981; Sen, 1987, 1990; Sen & Sengupta, 1983).  
However the relationship between gender, undernourishment and excessive female 
mortality often take differentiated and complex forms and is influenced by a range 
of other intersecting variables such as level of household wealth, landholdings and 
inheritance rights and cultural norms around the participation of women in the 
economic activities and their economic worth vis-à-vis men and so on. For example, 
in her study in rural Punjab, a state with strong son preference and excessively 
skewed sex ratios in favour of males, Das Gupta (1987) found that while girls fared 
worse than boys in the allocation of expenditure on food, clothing and health care, 
there were differentials across the households by landholding status (a proxy of 
household wealth in rural India) and girl children among landless households fared 
worse than the households with land (pp. 86-88). In other words, even though the 
girls got a disproportionate share in household wealth vis-à-vis boys in overall 
terms, the bigger resource pie worked to the advantage of the girls in the intra-
family distribution of resources. As Bardhan (1974, p. 1301) suggests: “Where there 
is more food to go around in the family, the female may have better chances.” On 
the other hand, other researchers suggest that because the patriarchal norms 
related to intergenerational land transfers favour men over women, the landed 
families may have an added pressure to favour sons over daughters to inherit 
property (Kishor, 1993, p. 249; Miller, 1981). Using the nationally representative 
NFHS-III survey data, Arokiasamy and Goli (2012, p. 89) found that the likelihood of 
women having an ultrasound test (sought mainly for sex-determination and female 
foeticide), induced abortion as well as female child mortality increased with the 
increase in size of landholding. Indeed, the sex ratios are much more masculine in 
Punjab, a state with higher average landholding sizes and per capita incomes 
compared with other states. As Das Gupta (1987, p. 89) also noted: 
…female children may be neglected because their parents are poor, and, 
faced with difficult choices in allocating resources among their children, they 
give priority to children of the preferred sex. This does not tally, however, 
with the fact that the marked regional differences within India in sex ratio 
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imbalances in no way correspond to regional differences in per capita 
income. 
Similarly, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) also found these discrepancies between 
micro and macro level data on the linkages between wealth and sex differentials in 
child survival rates. While their analysis of the household-level data involving 1331 
rural households suggested that increase in household wealth positively influenced 
the survival prospects of girls, the district level data on landholding showed quite 
opposite results; female children relative to males were higher in districts where a 
greater proportion of population was landless. 
These contrasting findings make it difficult to ascertain the extent to which gender-
based discrimination in intra-household allocation of food leads to excessive female 
mortality. Indeed some researchers have questioned this claim. Drawing on the 
primary survey data on anthropometrics of children belonging to Uttar Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu - two culturally diverse states with different gender norms – who lived 
in a slum in Delhi, Basu (1993) found no clear gendered pattern of 
undernourishment. The author argued that attributing gender imbalances in food 
distribution to survival disadvantage of female children is a hastily arrived 
conclusion, and is often a product of an assumption that “if women do badly on one 
count, they must do badly on all other counts as well” (p. 35). Another study by 
Griffiths, Matthews, and Hinde (2002) on child under-nutrition (under five children) 
in the three states of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh found no 
differences by gender in underweight prevalence (weight for age z scores) by 
gender. However, as Udry (1997), Rose (1999), and Maitra and Rammohan (2011) 
have suggested, the failures to statistically unpack the gendered basis of 
undernourishment could be due to the fact that gender-based discrimination is 
manifested in higher mortality rates among girls during infancy, and that for 
surviving girls, there are no substantive gender differences.  
Although whether or not treatment differentials in the intra-household allocation of 
food between boys and girls exist in India, there is no dispute, and much evidence, 
that female undernourishment has substantial intergenerational costs. When the 
undernourished women reach their reproductive ages, as mothers, they are likely to 
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bear the ill-nourished children. Indeed it has been invoked as one of the possible 
explanation for the South Asian enigma – the fact that the region fares worse on 
child nutritional outcomes than the Sub-Saharan Africa which has considerably 
higher levels of poverty and deprivation than the former (Ramalingaswami et al., 
1996). Over the period, other countries in the region, such as Bangladesh, have 
improved their position on the gender-based indicators much faster than India 
(Dreze & Sen, 2013). Indeed, gender inequalities are more pervasive in India than 
most countries in the South Asia, and on the United Nations Gender Inequality 
Index 2014, India fared worse than all countries in the region, except Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (UNDP, 2014, pp. 172-175). And India’s laggard performance vis-à-vis 
other South Asian countries on curbing the widespread gender inequalities mean 
that over the period the South Asian enigma has become increasingly more of an 
Indian enigma.   
Agrarian stress, changing rural livelihood trajectories and dynamics of 
migration and urbanisation in India 
Accompanying these inequalities is another important issue – and one that cuts 
across these dimensions – of rural-urban disparities in food insecurity and 
undernourishment. As noted in Chapter 1, the problem of food insecurity in India is 
characteristically rural in nature. One important driver of this is the progressive 
fragmentation of landholdings over this same period. Between 1970-71 and 2010-
11, the average landholding size in the country declined by more than half – from 
2.28 hectare to 1.15 hectare (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014b, p. 14). These 
developments have profound implications for the rural livelihood systems, and by 
implication, for the food security of the rural populations. Indeed, the recent 
research by IFPRI has suggested that there exists an agriculture-nutrition disconnect 
in India (Gillespie & Kadiyala, 2012; Headey, 2011; Headey et al., 2011).  
Not surprisingly, these processes are leading to restructuring of rural livelihood 
trajectories. As a consequence of the stress on the farm-dependent livelihoods, the 
significance of work migration, mainly to urban areas, has grown over the period. 
The national population Census data on employment trends provides some 
evidence in the regard, though recent trends remain confusing.  
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Using the data from the last two decennial population Censuses conducted in 2001 
and 2011, Table 3.2 shows the number of main and marginal cultivators and 
agricultural labourers in rural India. The Indian Census enumerates the population in 
the two main employment categories of main and marginal workers, based on their 
duration of work. The ‘main workers’ are defined as those who worked for a period 
of 180 days or more in the year preceding the Census enumeration. And as a 
residual category, the workers enumerated as ‘marginal workers’ are those who 
worked for less than 180 days in the past year. These workers are then classified by 
the type of employment activity, such as cultivators, agricultural labourers, 
household industry workers, and so on (Registrar General of India, 2011a).31  
Table 3.2: Cultivators and agricultural labourers in rural India, 2001-2011 
Census year 
Cultivators Agricultural labourers 
Main Marginal Main Marginal 
2001 101,345,252 23,374,495 60,517,788 41,913,430 
2011 92,737,696 22,230,802 80,958,300 56,036,151 
Absolute change during 
2001-2011 -8,607,556 -1,143,693 20,440,512 14,122,721 
% change during 2001-
2011 -9.28 -5.14 25.25 25.20 
Source: Registrar General of India (2001c, 2011b). The decadal %age change 
calculations are my own.  
The analysis of this data suggests that during this inter-censal period the main 
cultivators declined by over 8.60 million and marginal cultivators decreased by 1.14 
million. In percentage terms, the decline in the main cultivators was of over 9 
percent, and marginal cultivators declined by 5 percent (Table 3.2). The data from 
                                                        
31 It is important to note that while this classification of workers in the Census provides a good 
measure to assess the broader occupational structure in the country, because it enumerates 
each person in a single category it does not fully capture the occupational diversity for each 
individual. For example, the workers who report their main occupation as agricultural labourers 
may work in non-farm activities, either within or outside their village, for part of the year but 
Census does not capture their ancillary add-on activities. 
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the National Sample Survey suggest even more profound shift. According to this 
data, between 2004-05 and 2011-12, workers engaged in farming declined by 27 
million (Mehrotra et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, the Census data also shows that in the past decade the number 
of agricultural workers increased steeply by over 20 million in the main worker 
category and 14 million in the marginal category – an increase of over 25 percent in 
both categories. This increase in the agricultural labourers in rural India is rather 
puzzling. It does not reconcile with the evidence on shrinking of agriculture-
dependent livelihoods. Thus while there were over 8.5 million less main cultivators 
in 2011 compared to 2001 which would generally be expected to be associated with 
decline in agricultural employment opportunities for the landless and land-poor 
populations, the number of main agricultural labourers has increased by more than 
twice as much. This increase could plausibly be explained by two inter-linked 
reasons.  
Firstly, it is perhaps the case that increasing land fragmentation and the 
concomitant decline in the average landholding sizes is pushing the land-poor rural 
households to supplement their agricultural income by allocating household labour 
in wage work on others’ land locally. Secondly, it may be that with the decline in 
land sizes, cultivator households are moving away from direct farming, and leasing it 
out to the landless and land-poor households for sharecropping farming. The 
household survey data collected for the present study confirms the intensification 
of land leasing and sharecropping arrangements in the case study district of Siwan 
(Chapter 7). At all-India level too, there is evidence that land-leasing in Indian 
agriculture has increased over the period which has given rise to a new category of 
farm households in rural India, labelled as “non-cultivating peasant households” 
(NCPHs). Using the nationally-representative National Sample Survey data, a recent 
study by Vijay (2012) estimates that between 1981 and 2002, the proportion of 
NCPHs doubled, and they now account for around 20 percent of rural households in 
India (p. 40). Although Census definition classifies an agricultural labourer as “a 
person who works on land owned by another person for cash or in-kind wages, with 
no right of lease or contract on land on which she/he works” (Registrar General of 
India, 2011a), the informal nature of much of the land leasing arrangements in India 
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means that Census enumeration is inadequately equipped to capture the nuances 
of these arrangements. It is, therefore, not inconceivable (and perhaps likely) that 
sharecropper farmers are classified as agricultural labourers in the Census. This also 
means that those who are leasing out land to pursue non-farm jobs are not 
classified as cultivators anymore, as they are no longer engaged in direct farming, 
and hence the drop in the number of cultivators.32 In any case, the decline in the 
number of cultivators and a surge in the agricultural workers points to rising 
pressure on the agriculture-dependent livelihoods. 
An expected manifestation of these developments in the country’s rural 
employment landscape would be the rise in rural-urban migration for employment. 
Do national statistics indicate increasing levels of rural-urban mobility? At the 
outset, it is important to note that in India labour migration among the rural poor 
characteristically takes the form of seasonal and circular mobility, and the national-
level data are ill-equipped to capture these flows in their entirety. The two major 
sources migration data at the national level include the decennial population 
Census, and the quinquennial rounds of National Sample Surveys. However, they 
usually cover the long-term movements, and severely under-estimate the 
temporary migration flows (Breman, 1996, 2010; Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; 
Deshingkar & Start, 2003).33 Nonetheless, the findings from the recently concluded 
population Census suggest a significant rise in the urban population growth in India 
over the last decade compared to previous decades. Whether or to what extent this 
can be attributed to the rural-urban migration is a question that deserves attention.  
In an insightful analysis of urbanisation trends in India, a recent study by Bhagat 
(2012) shows that for the first time since independence, population increase in 
urban India was higher than rural areas of the country (p. 27). However, the urban 
                                                        
32 It must be noted that these emerging land-labour dynamics may have positive impact on the 
food security of the land-less and land-poor households, as by allowing access to land, land-
leasing may reduce the dependence of poor household on market purchase of food and, in turn, 
protect them from the food price volatility that has characterised the global food markets over 
the recent years. I discuss this empirically in the specific context of case study district of Siwan in 
Chapter 7. 
33 More recent survey rounds of National Sample Surveys (55th and 64th rounds, conducted 
respectively in 1999-2000 and 2007-08) have, however, attempted to capture the extent of 
short-term migration in India.    
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population growth is not just the product of rural-urban migration but several other 
factors as well. The four important components of urban population growth include: 
i) natural increase (births minus deaths); ii) rural to urban migration; iii) 
classification of rural areas as urban towns;34 and iv) changes in jurisdictional and 
municipal boundaries. Of all these factors, the natural increase has always played 
the most significant role in urban population growth in India (Bhagat, 2012; Bhagat 
& Mohanty, 2009). 
Figure 3.5: Trends in urban population size and urban growth, 1951-2011 
 
Source: Bhagat (2012, p. 28; Table 21).  
Note that the annual exponential growth rates are based on the decadal Census 
data, with 1951 as the starting period. Thus, the annual growth rate of 2.34 percent 
in 1961 refers to the growth rate during 1951-61, 3.24 percent in 1971 for the 
decade of 1961-71, and so on.  
 
                                                        
34 Based on the pre-determined definition, the Census classifies areas as either rural or urban. 
Since 1981, the definition of “urban” followed in the Census include the following criteria, a) All 
places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified town area committee, 
etc.; b) All other places which satisfied the following criteria:  
i) A minimum population of 5,000; ii) At least 75 per cent of the male main working population 
engaged in non- agricultural pursuits; and iii) A density of population of at least 400 persons per 
sq. km (Registrar General of India, 2011e, p. 1). 
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Figure 3.5 shows the trends in urban population growth from 1951 to 2011, and 
Table 3.3 present the population growth in rural and urban areas during the recent 
inter-censal period. As is evident from the data, the total urban population has 
grown steadily since 1951, and in 2011 it accounted for 377 million people. When 
the long-term urbanisation trends are compared with the data on population size 
and growth rate in rural and urban areas pertaining to the most recent inter-censal 
period of 2001-11, important findings emerge.   
Table 3.3: Population size, distribution and growth by rural-urban residence in India, 
2001-2011  
Census year Rural Urban 
2001 742,490,639 286,119,689 
2011 833,463,448 377,106,125 
Population increase during 2001-2011 90,972,809 90,986,436 
Average annual exponential growth rate 
during 2001-2011 (%) 1.16 2.76 
Source: Registrar General of India (2001c, 2011f). The growth rate calculations are 
my own.  
 
Thus, between 2001 and 2011, urban population increased from 286 million to 377 
million, whereas the population in rural areas grew from 742 million to 833 million. 
Although this difference in the population increase between rural and urban areas 
may not appear much (90.98 million in urban areas versus 90.97 million in rural 
areas) (Table 3.3), it is very significant when considering the fact that in the 
preceding decade (1991-2001), rural population increased by 113 million, whereas 
urban population grew by 68 million people (Registrar General of India, 1991, 
2001c). It is important to note that 2011 Census data also suggests that there has 
been a reversal of trend of declining urbanisation growth of the last three decade of 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The annual exponential rate of urban population was 3.79 
percent during 1971-81 (the highest since 1951-61), which declined to 3.09 percent 
in 1981-91, and then further to 2.75 percent in 1991-2001. However, during the 
past decade, the average annual exponential population growth rate was 2.76 
percent, thus reversing the past trend (Figure 3.5). Importantly, this annual 
exponential growth rate of urban population was also more than double than that 
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of rural population growth. This is despite the fact that natural increase in 
population (births minus deaths), which, as noted earlier, has always played the 
most dominant role in urban population growth (Bhagat, 2012; Bhagat & Mohanty, 
2009), was slower in urban than rural areas. The data from Sample Registration 
System show that in 2001, the natural growth of population in rural India was 17.3 
persons/1000 population which declined to 15.9 persons/ 1000 people in 2011, a 
decline of 1.4 persons/1000 population in 10-year period. Whereas the natural 
increase in urban population was 14.4 persons/1000 population in 2001 which 
reduced to 12.2 persons/1000 people in 2011, a drop of 2.4 persons which is almost 
double that of rural population (Registrar General of India, 2001e, 2011g). In the 
context of falling fertility, the pace of which is faster in urban than in rural areas, 
does this phenomenal rise in the urban population growth in the past decade 
indicate the rising rates of rural-urban migration?   
The decomposition of incremental urban population by the relative contribution of 
its components by Bhagat (2012) suggests that of the 91 million people added to 
urban population during 2001-11, 43.8 percent (39.9 million) was from natural 
increase (of initial population plus inter-censal migrants), 20.6 percent (18.7 million) 
from the net rural-urban migration, and the remainder 35.6 percent (32.3 million) 
was contributed by the net rural-urban classification. This latter factor contributed 
most significantly to the reversal of trend of deceleration in urban population 
growth that characterised India’s urbanisation story in the previous decades. Thus, 
whereas during 1991-2001, net rural-urban classification contributed 21.5 percent 
(14.5 million) to the total urban population growth, its share jumped dramatically to 
35.6 percent (32.3 million) during 2001-11 (all data, Bhagat, 2012, p. 32, Table 5). 
Indeed, the increase in the number of urban towns during the last decade was 
greater than the last century; during 1901-2001 the urban towns increased by 2541 
in all, whereas during 2001-11 a total number of 2774 new towns were added 
(Kundu, 2011, p. 15). The absolute share of net rural-urban migration in urban 
population growth also increased from 14.2 million during 1991-2001 to 18.7 million 
during 2001-11 (adding 4.5 million in total), though in percentage terms the share 
declined moderately; it was 20.8 percent during the previous decade, and 20.6 
percent during 2001-11 (Bhagat, 2012, p. 32). In a nutshell, the evaluation of recent 
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migration and urbanisation trends in India suggests that while the urban population 
growth has accelerated in the recent decade, the share of rural-urban migration in 
urbanisation has moderately slowed.  
The population Census data, however, captures the more permanent form of 
migration and severely underestimates the short-term mobility, as noted earlier. 
There is evidence that rural livelihoods are becoming increasingly multi-locational, 
and seasonal and circular migration has grown in recent years (Deshingkar & 
Anderson, 2004; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009). Recent estimates by Tumbe (2011) 
from National Sample Survey data show that between 1993 and 2007-08, 
household dependency on remittances, as measured by the proportion of 
remittance-receiving households, increased significantly in India. In particular, 
significance of domestic remittances rose considerably, and in 2007-08, the internal 
domestic transfers amounted to US$10 billion; and 30 percent of all household 
expenditure among the remittance-receiving households (estimated at 10 percent 
of all rural households in India) was financed by the remittances from migrants to 
their families. The rising significance of migration incomes can also be surmised 
from the data in Table 3.2 on the decline in cultivators and surge in agricultural 
labouers. In particular, the addition of 14.1 million agricultural labourers in the 
marginal category (those worked for less than 6 months in the year preceding 
Census enumeration) in the last decade warrants attention. It would perhaps not be 
absolutely incorrect to state that a majority of these workers engaged in 
supplementary income activities to make up for the employment deficits in farm 
sector for the remainder of the year. And although the employment in rural non-
farm sector has also grown in recent years (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013) acting as a 
buffer, urban areas have become more crucial in the overall framework of economy 
and job creation. Furthermore, the dominance of push factors notwithstanding, the 
more recent streams of temporary migration also involves new pulls, such as better 
urban incomes and improvements in infrastructure and communication networks 
(Deshingkar & Anderson, 2004; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009). Using the recent 
round of National Sample Survey 2007-08 that sought to capture temporary 
migration, Keshri and Bhagat (2012) estimate short-term migrants to be around 13 
million in India. Other informal estimates peg the number of people on the move in 
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any given year as between 40 million (Breman, 2010, p. 10) and 100 million 
(Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009, p. 3). Indeed, as noted earlier, circular migration has 
dominated the mobility streams in India since the beginning of twentieth century, 
and is an important reason which has kept the overall levels of urbanisation low in 
the country (de Haan, 1997a, 2002; Kundu, 2003, 2009; Kundu & Saraswati, 2012). 
Thus, the decline in the relative share of net rural-urban migration in Indian 
urbanization during the past decade, on the other hand, may be indicative of rising 
circular migration.  
The reasons for high circular labour mobility are highly complex, however, based on 
the available evidence and literature there are three main explanations for this. 
Firstly, the economic development trajectory in India has prevented more 
permanent form of mobility. The structural transformation in India is characterised 
as “stunted” (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013). In particular, while the informal sector 
already accounts for a vast majority of employment in India (more than 90 percent), 
in the period following the liberalisation reform most of the jobs have been created 
in this sector of the economy. The estimates derived by the National Commission 
for Enterprise in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) based on National Sample Survey 
data suggested that out of the total increase in employment from 397 million to 457 
million between 1999-2000 and 2004- 05, informal employment increased by 61 
million (from 362 million to 423 million). In contrast, employment in the organised 
sector witnessed a marginally negative decline, from 35 million to 34.9 million 
during the same period (NCEUS, 2007, p. 4). Urban employment in the lower 
echelons of the economy, which employs the poor and unskilled populations, has 
been almost exclusively in the informal sector. This has augmented circular mobility, 
for precariousness is one of the principal features of informal sector (Breman, 1985, 
1996, 2007, 2010). It must be noted that even the urban incomes from informal jobs 
are often higher than the rural wages. Indeed, the urban informal employment still 
provides a valuable means of employment to a vast majority of poor and unskilled 
populations to make up for the livelihood deficits they face in the rural areas. 
Moreover, more recent evidence shows increase in the regular/wage salaried 
employment as opposed to causal employment (Mehrotra et al., 2013, p. 88).  
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The second issue pertains to the exclusive nature of Indian urbanisation in the post-
reform. According to (Kundu, 2003, p. 3085), the low rates of permanent rural-
urban migration are because of the changing urban milieu which has become 
increasing hostile for rural-urban migrants. The new urban governance agenda, 
involving increasing privatisation of land and civic amenities and consequent 
increase in the cost of living in urban areas, is what has prohibited the rural 
populations to settle in the urban areas on a more permanent basis and slowed 
down the tempo of urbanisation. On the top of it is the increasing hostility of the 
urban residents to accept the rural poor in urban areas. For instance, in Mumbai, 
many citizen groups and resident organisations, such as Bombay First, CitiSpace, 
Khar Residents Association, Association of Clean and Green Chembur, have active 
and vociferous campaigns against the street hawkers, most of whom are migrants 
from the poorer Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (Balakrishnan, 2003; 
Choithani, 2009).  
These structural fissures that have come to charactersise the contemporary Indian 
economy notwithstanding, a range of individual and social and cultural reasons also 
explain the low rates of permanent rural-urban migration. As explored in the work 
of Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009), the local, caste-based networks in rural India 
play an important role in restricting the permanent mobility. The permanent change 
in residence implies less frequent interactions with natal villages and community. 
However, the absence of either comparable or more efficient insurance 
mechanisms acts as an incentive for the rural populations to stick to these networks 
for social insurance. This is particularly significant in the context of increasing 
employment informalisation in India, as noted earlier. Secondly, the social and 
cultural conventions in India pose restrictions on female mobility for work. In 
particular, in much of north India, labour migration is an exclusive preserve of men 
while the women stay in the origin place. In turn, this provides an incentive for men 
to return (Chapter 5 and Chapter 8). 
Conclusion  
This Chapter has highlighted the broad dynamics of food insecurity, migration and 
urbanisation in India. Beginning with the assessment of country’s progress on the 
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MDG goal target of hunger and undernourishment, the discussion has pointed out 
that India’s performance has been highly dismal on this front. Undernourishment 
remains highly pervasiveness in India, and the rapid economic growth over the past 
two decades has not made any significant dent in curbing the levels of hunger, as 
experienced in other countries, such as China. Indeed, India’s experience has been 
crucial in triggering a shift in the official policy thinking that earlier rested on the 
assumption that economic growth will lead to an automatic decline in hunger and 
food insecurity. This shift in stance is reflected in FAO’s SoFI-2012 which bore the 
subtitle that read as “economic growth is necessary but not a sufficient to 
accelerate reduction of hunger and malnutrition” (FAO, 2012). For the economic 
growth to reduce undernourishment, it has to be inclusive and pro-poor which is far 
from true in the case of India. As the assessment of the factors underpinning India’s 
laggard performance in reducing undernourishment has shown, the faltering 
progress of India in meeting the MDG goal on hunger is, in many ways, linked to the 
uneven distribution of benefits of economic growth across the lines of geography 
and socio-cultural groups, mainly including the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribe populations and women. The states in the undivided BIMARU belt still remain 
economically backward vis-à-vis other Indian states, with most districts in these 
states having poor showing on food insecurity and key human development 
indicators; the impact of economic growth on improving the living standards of the 
country’s marginalised social groups has been extremely slow; and the subjugated 
position of women within the household has resulted in continuation of poor 
nutritional outcomes in an intergenerational fashion.   
In the final major section, the Chapter has pointed out that the problem of food 
insecurity in India is largely rural in nature. Moreover, the changing contours of the 
economic growth over the recent period, in which the overall significance of 
agriculture as a source of livelihood and food security has declined, is changing the 
sources of food security. Rural-urban migration for work is becoming increasingly 
significant in the lives and livelihoods of an increasing number of India’s rural 
dwellers. An evaluation of the recent urbanisation trends, however, indicate low 
levels of permanent migration to urban areas, and increased circular mobility 
because of the growth in the urban informal employment, changes in urban 
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governance including factors such as the privatisation of basic civic amenities. The 
low incomes from the urban informal sector jobs and prohibitively high costs of 
living in the cities have kept the labour migration flows circular. These processes 
have also has led to urbanisation becoming more exclusionary in nature. At the 
same time, it is also true that urban informal sector provides a refuge to the millions 
of migrants who come to cities for work; without it, the migrants and their families 
at the origin would be much worse off.  
This begs the question of whether and how migration relates to household food 
security outcomes, the main objective of this research. In the next two chapters 
(Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), I outline the methodology and provide the research 
context before presenting my empirical findings on the linkages between migration 
and food security.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Introduction 
Systematic evidence on the connections between migration and household food 
security remains scarce in the Indian context. In the three analytical chapters that 
follow, an attempt is made to tease out the interdependencies between these two 
variables. However, beforehand, this Chapter provides an overview of the methods 
and materials used to generate these insights. As noted earlier, this research uses 
the case-study approach, primarily involving data collected through household 
surveys of 392 rural households, including 197 migrant households and 195 non-
migrant households. In this study, a migrant household was defined as one with at 
least one migrant member who stayed away from his usual place of residence for 
employment reasons for the period of 60 days or more during the last 365 days 
(Appendix 1). Households were strategically selected from 10 villages of the western 
district of Siwan in Bihar. The selection of Siwan district, villages within this district 
and households within the villages was done on the basis of strategic and scientific 
considerations, as the discussion in the later section of this Chapter reveals. 
Primarily, this selection involved using key migration and food security indicators.  
Additionally, two other research methods were used in the study. These were: i) 
key-informant interviews with the members of the local village councils, known as 
Gram Panchayats (GPs), and other village residents, who were deemed to possess 
knowledge on village affairs; and ii) unstructured interviews with migrant members 
(a total of 10 migrants were interviewed) of the rural households at their 
destination places (where they were working at the time of interview). The village 
household surveys and key-informant interviews were conducted during April-May 
2012 and interviews with migrants were carried out in June 2012. Following a little 
more than a year of analysis of the household survey data, the case study villages 
were visited again (during September-October 2013) to obtain more qualitative 
data.  
With this brief overview, this Chapter discusses each method of data collection 
separately and what they sought to achieve for the purpose of this study. Firstly, 
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however, I address the sampling design and discuss the considerations and steps 
involved in selecting the case-study district, study villages and sample households as 
well as the individual migrants belonging to the surveyed migrant households. Key 
definitions of concepts used in the methodology (for example, migrant and non-
migrant households), food security indicators, survey reference period etc. are 
discussed in Appendix 1.   
Sampling design for household surveys  
As has been noted earlier, migration has traditionally been a central component of 
livelihood strategies of rural households of Bihar. However, currently there are 38 
districts, 534 sub-districts (called ‘blocks’ in local parlance) and more than 44,000 
(revenue) villages in which the state’s over 100-million people reside (Government 
of Bihar, 2014e). Given the scope of this PhD research, covering this vast geography 
in its entirety was obviously not possible and thus the study required devising a 
sampling strategy which allowed the main objective of this research to be fulfilled. 
Since the study focused on rural households, a three-stage sampling procedure was 
adopted to select the household sample which is described as follows: 
District selection 
The first stage of the sampling involved narrowing the geographic focus down to a 
single district within Bihar. The selection of study district was guided by the logic of 
choosing a district with a high incidence of inter-state outmigration. Using the 
Indian Census 2001 data on migration35, the district-wise outmigration rates were 
calculated for the all the districts of Bihar. The Census D-series, which is migration 
data series, provides data on both the inflow and outflow of migrants till the district 
                                                        
35 When this study was conceptualised in the year 2011, data from the most recent decennial 
population Census of India, conducted also in 2011, was still being compiled and thus was not 
available in the public domain. Hence, the migration statistics pertaining to 2001 were used. It is 
important to note that although some data pertaining to the 2011 Census is made now made 
available to the public for research and analysis purposes, detailed migration data tables have 
not yet been released. Given the complexity of the migration flows, it usually takes a longtime to 
compile the migration tables. For example, migration data pertaining to 1991 population Census 
was released only in 1997 (Bhagat, 2005, p. 9). 
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level. This data was used to compute the district-wise outmigration rates for Bihar.36 
The outmigration rate was computed by dividing the ‘total number of outmigrants’ 
from the district to the ‘total district population’. It is important to note that 
although this study focused on rural outmigration, the outmigration was calculated 
for the districts as a whole and not by rural-urban residence separately. This was 
done considering the fact that most of the 38 districts of Bihar had less than 10 
percent of the population living in urban areas and thus the combined rural-urban 
district-level figures on outmigration were largely reflective of the rural 
outmigration scenario. According to these computations from the Census 2001 
statistics, the southeastern district of Munger had the highest outmigration rate, 
with 5.2 percent of the total population classified as inter-state migrants in 2001.  
However, this district is one of 106 districts of India affected by the left-wing 
extremism37 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013) and due to the safety reasons, in 
accordance with the safety protocols of the Human Ethics Research Committee at 
the University of Sydney, Munger District was not selected. Instead, the western 
district of Siwan in Bihar (Figure 4.1), which had the second highest inter-state 
outmigration rate of 4.9 percent, was chosen as a case-study site. Consistent with 
the overall levels of urbanisation in Bihar, 94 percent of Siwan population lived in 
rural areas in 2001 (all data, Registrar General of India, 2001b).  
  
                                                        
36 Note that because the Census data provides in-migration and outmigration from each of over 
600 districts, these computations are rather cumbersome and require tallying in-migration and 
out-migration figures from all these districts. (Other categories include male/female, and rural-
urban.) 
37 The phenomenon of left-wing extremism in India is considered as a serious security threat to 
the country. It is premised on the indifference of the political class to the plight of India’s most 
disadvantaged groups, mainly the tribal populations of the country. The extreme-left movement 
in India seeks to overthrow the current rule which it considers unjust and consequently, the 
instances of violent clashes between extreme-left foot soldiers, known as Naxalites or Maoists 
and India’s security forces are not uncommon. The left-wing extremism prevails in several parts 
of India in varying degree and parts of Bihar, particularly the southern part of the state which 
also includes Munger, is also affected by it. Recently, in the first phase of independent India’s 
16th general elections conducted in 91 constituencies on April 10, 2014, the Maoists ambushed 
the security force personnel in Munger district, killing two government soldiers (The Hindu, 
2014).  
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 Figure 4.1: The case-study district of Siwan, Bihar 
 
 Source: Own work. 
 Note: The borders of this map do not purport to be the official borders of India. 
Selection of villages 
Since this study focuses on rural households, the second stage of sample selection 
involved the selection of villages within the study district. According to Census 2001, 
the district of Siwan had 1438 villages (Registrar General of India, 2001c). Out of this 
gigantic number, 10 villages spread across 9 blocks were chosen. The selection of 
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villages was undertaken randomly (as discussed below), however, of beneficial 
relevance to this study, these 10 villages provided large within-district geographic 
heterogeneity for the household sample finally selected.  
In broad terms, the selection of villages in Siwan was based on the pattern of 
migration from the district. A living standard survey conducted in the states of Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar in 1998 by the World Bank revealed that 95 percent of labour 
migrants from Bihar were males (cited in Deshingkar et al., 2009, p. 142).  Given the 
male dominated pattern of migration in Bihar, it was considered pertinent to use 
the sex ratio for the population aged 6 years and above (hereafter SR6+) as a 
parameter to choose the villages using the Census 2001 data. The SR6+ in this study 
was computed as number of females aged 6 years and above per 1000 males of the 
same age group [or, SR6+ = 1000 x (Females6+ / Males6+)]. The SR6+ was used 
considering the fact that population under the age of 6 years is not exposed to 
labour migration. (Taking the sex ratio of population aged 10 years and above would 
have been ideal, however, the village-level Indian Census data do not provide single 
year age-returns and thus data constraints did not permit the same.) 
The use of SR6+ was guided by the fact that villages having high SR6+ (more females 
than males) will likely have high outmigration rates. Thus, as per the statistics all the 
villages were sorted out in descending order of SR6+, from highest to a lowest 
minimum of 1000 females per 1000 males.38 This SR6+ cap of 1000 provided a list of 
1061 villages. However, the number of households varied significantly from one 
village to another – from 1 household in Mirzapur village of Raghunathpur Block 39 in 
the south-west of Siwan to 2220 households in Sarari village of Goriakothi Block 
located in the north-eastern part of the district. Hence out of these 1061 villages, all 
the villages with less than 200 households were removed. This was done to facilitate 
                                                        
38 In almost all countries, sex ratio at birth tends to be biologically slightly skewed in favour of 
men over women. In other words, males tend to outnumber females at birth. Although this sex 
ratio at birth varies, it has generally been observed that for every 100 female births, there are 
105 male births (or 1000 female births per 1050 male births). However, this gap in the sex ratio 
tends to equalize at the advanced age groups with women having higher survivorship rates than 
men, all other things being equal (see, inter alia, Anderson & Ray, 2010; Sen, 1992; Visaria, 1967; 
Waldron, 1976, 1983). And since this study uses the sex ratio of population aged 6 years and 
above, SR6+ should ideally be close to 1000 and hence the same is assumed.  
39 Three villages of the same name i.e. Mirzapur within the Raghunathpur Block were recorded in 
the Census 2001 data, which had different household and population sizes.  
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the selection of sample households from fewer large villages rather than going 
around the whole district which would have been too time-consuming for this PhD 
research. With the help of this household-number filter, a total number of 497 
villages was obtained. These 497 villages were assigned numeric codes in 
descending order of the SR6+ and 10 villages were finally chosen using a random 
number selection process.40 The list of villages chosen is provided in the Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: List of sample villages in Siwan, Bihar   
S. No. Block Name Village Name 
No of 
Households 
in the 
village 
Total 
Population 
of the 
village 
Village SR6+ 
[1000*(F0-6/M0-6)] 
1 Maharajganj Chak Mahmuda 208 1407 1170 
2 Barharia Jagarnathpur 203 1370 1154 
3 Siswan Gayaspur 1138 7866 1153 
4 Basantpur Kanhauli 425 2884 1137 
5 Daraundha Satjora 383 2696 1136 
6 Hussainganj Baghauni 403 3033 1121 
7 Hasanpura Gay Ghat 638 4557 1096 
8 Goriakothi Karanpura 255 1701 1073 
9 Maharajganj Gaur 248 1613 1071 
10 Darauli Punak Buzurg 304 2334 1071 
Source: Primary Census Abstract for Bihar, 2011 (Registrar General of India, 2001c). 
Note: The villages are arranged by high to low sex ratio order. 
It is important to note that SR is not just affected by migration alone, but also by a 
wide range of socio-cultural factors. Indeed SR serves as an important parameter to 
assess the overall status of women in the society. This is particularly relevant in 
India. As already noted in Chapter 3, a number of studies have highlighted that the 
phenomenon of strong son-preference, particularly among the Hindu caste groups 
                                                        
40 For this purpose, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences software was used.   
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in the northern India, often manifests into household distribution of resources, such 
as food and health care, discriminating against females, and it has been invoked as a 
possible reason for skewed sex ratio in favour of males (Das Gupta, 1987; Miller, 
1981; Sen, 1987, 1990; Sen & Sengupta, 1983). Son preference is deeply entrenched 
in the rural society in Siwan, and indeed in Bihar as a whole. In terms of the 
methodology employed in this thesis, this means that in the presence of widespread 
discrimination against the females, female-male sex ratio at parity and above point 
to the importance of migration. Indeed, this was the overall logic for choosing the 
villages with SR6+ of 1000 or above.41 
Selection of households  
The selection of surveyed households in the study villages involved two major 
stages which included: i) determining a sample size of number of households to be 
interviewed; and ii) identifying the households to be included in this study.  
Sample size determination 
With the list of 10 villages finally selected on the basis of sex ratio and number of 
households, the third stage was to select the households. Following the district 
selection (described above), a sample size of 400 households was statistically 
determined to be adequate for this study. While the identification and selection of 
case-study sites, both district and villages, was done on the basis of indicators of 
migration (as the main objective of this study is to understand the impact of 
migration on food security), the number of households to be interviewed was 
arrived at using the data on the prevalence of food insecurity, the second key (and 
main dependent) variable, in the district. The prevalence of underweight among 
children below the age of 6 years, as estimated by India’s District Level Household 
Survey (DLHS) II, 2002-04, was used as a proxy indicator for food insecurity. 
                                                        
41 Note that the sex ratios among tribal populations of India tend not to be as heavily skewed in 
favour of males as those among Hindu caste groups. Thus, by the same taken, a sex ratio of 
closer to parity in villages with a high concentration of tribal populations would not necessarily 
indicate a high incidence of outmigration. It is only when the sex ratio in favour of females is 
higher than parity that migration becomes important. This does not, however, apply to study 
villages as almost 80 percent of the households in the surveys were Hindus.  
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Matching this with other appropriate indicators helped to scientifically determine 
the sample size of the households to be included in this study. The sample size was 
arrived with the standard error (expressed as α below) of 10 percent which means 
that the differences in the estimates obtained from the sample of households are 
likely to be within the 10 percent range (positive/negative) of the characteristics of 
the true or whole population. The formula with which the sample size was 
determined is as follows:  
n =    z2 * p * q * m * d  
        (α * p)2 * Average HH size * Proportion of under 6 children 
where, 
n = sample size 
z = 1.96 (95 percent confidence co-efficient)  
m = 1.1 (non-response adjustment or 10 percent oversampling for non-response) 
p = 55.8 (proportion of underweight children below 6 years of age in Siwan district, 
as estimated by DLHS II, 2002-04).42 
q = 1 – p  
d = 1.701 (child underweight design effect43, as used in NFHS III, 2005-06)  
                                                        
42 This figure on the underweight prevalence among children refers to the children in the age 
group of 0 to 71 months whose weight for age was minus two standard deviation below the 
growth standards developed by the National Centre for Health Statistics’ (NCHS), alternatively 
known as the NCHS/WHO growth standards. For the district level figures on under-weight 
prevalence among children (as well as the methodology used to arrive on these figures), see the 
national nutrition report based on the DLHS 2002-04 survey by Ladu Singh, Bhat, Ram, and 
Paswan (2006). It should also be noted that a more recent round of DLHS survey was conducted 
in 2007-08. However, it did not collect information on the child nutritional indicators. 
43 The design effect refers to the standard error arising from a given sampling design (in this case, 
sampling design opted for this study) to the standard error that would result if a simple random 
sample had been used (IIPS & Macro International, 2007a, Appendix C, p. 1). The NFHS-III has 
calculated design effect for different variables and in determining the sample size for this study, 
the design effect value for under-weight children below the age of 5 years, as calculated by 
NFHS-III, was assumed (for the design effect values for different variables, see IIPS & Macro 
International, 2007a, Appendix D, pp. 25-29)  
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α = 0.1 (10 percent significance level) 
Average household size = 7.1 person (computed using the 2001 Indian Census data 
on ‘total population of Siwan district’ and ‘total number of the household in Siwan’. 
The formula used is: 
Average household size =   Total population of the study area 
       Total number of households in the study area  
Proportion of under 6 children = 20.25 percent (calculated using 2001 Indian Census 
data for Siwan district on the number of ‘children aged 6 years or below in Siwan’ 
and ‘total population of Siwan’. The formula used is:  
Proportion of under 6 children =         Total children below 6 years in study area 
Total population of the study area 
Putting the corresponding values of factors, we get:  
n = (1.96)2 * .558 * .442 * 1.1 * 1.701 = 396 households 
       (0.1 * .558)2 * 7.1 * 0.2025 
Hence, the total sample size for this study was taken as 400 households, with an 
equal representation of migrant and non-migrant households. It must be mentioned 
that the sample size of 400 households also includes the non-response rate of 10 
percent. This means that interviews with a sample of approximately 360 households 
would satisfy the study objectives to be adequately fulfilled. However, in total 392 
surveys were conducted, a response rate of 98 percent which was 8 percent higher 
than expected. 
After the sample size for the household surveys was determined, the next step 
required ascertaining which households from the case-study villages should be 
interviewed. Preliminary visits in the study villages suggested that even though the 
villages varied in terms of number of households and population size, as is evident 
from the Census data presented in Table 4.1, they represented a homogenous 
group insofar as some of the characteristics relevant to this study were concerned. 
For example, all the villages had defunct infrastructure such as roads, transport, 
electricity (electrical poles in the villages generated some future hope!) and the 
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government-operated food and livelihood safety net programmes were 
dysfunctional. Secondly, though agriculture was the main source of local livelihoods, 
most households possessed unusually small landholdings and thus depended on 
either local or migratory or a combination of local as well as distant, non-farm 
sources to supplement household incomes.44 At the individual level, migration was 
highly gender segregated, with the vast majority of migrants being males.45 Given 
this homogeneity, it was considered that a uniform sample of 40 households, 
including 20 migrant and 20 non-migrant households, from each of the 10 case-
study villages would be drawn, given a total sample size of 400 households. 
It is important to note that even though scientific sample selection methods form a 
key component of the overall research methodology employed in this study, this 
thesis does not attempt at mere quantification. The aim of this study is not to 
generate statistics on, say, the extent of migration or the prevalence of food 
insecurity in Siwan (for which ‘Probability Proportion to Size’ (PPS) method is 
probably better suited: Deaton, 1997). Rather, this research seeks to understand 
the links between migration and food security using empirical data. A uniform 
sample design served this purpose well. One advantage of this uniform design was 
that it also helped to obtain in-depth qualitative narratives on households’ food 
security situation and migration decisions from each of the villages in a balanced 
manner, which, in turn, lent methodological merit to this study. As the analytical 
chapters will show, the statistical data obtained through household surveys is used 
in conjunction with the qualitative insights collected through the same household 
surveys, and numerous other informal discussions. By its very nature, the PPS 
method would have given more weight to larger villages for eventual household 
sample. In effect, this would have meant spending more time in bigger villages at 
the expense of smaller units which were equally important in terms of qualitative 
data. In any case, the quality and representativeness of the survey estimates is also 
                                                        
44 The household survey data captures this fragmented pattern of agriculture landholdings in 
Siwan. More than 80 percent of the surveyed households had landholding sizes of less than one 
acre. 
45 All the sample migrant households in this survey had male migrant members. Village-level 
investigations, however, revealed that there were a few exceptions to this broad pattern in 
which female members of the households joined their male counterparts, though due to the 
preponderance of the households with male migrants, the latter did not form part of the sample.  
 113 
contingent upon a range of non-sampling errors (e.g. errors arising because of 
respondents’ ability to comprehend the survey question, errors during data 
processing) and because of this, some commentators have raised questions on the 
absolute value of probability sampling (Ward, 1983). As for the household selection 
in villages of varied size, larger villages were segmented into smaller units through 
mapping and house-listing exercise, to which I now turn. 
Mapping and house-listing  
Data from the Census 2001 provided information on the number of households in 
each of the selected villages, however, information on whether or not the 
households had member(s) who engaged in work migration was not available in the 
Census data. Thus, in order to select the survey sample of 40 households from each 
of the case-study villages, the migration status of the household needed to be 
ascertained beforehand. To do this, a mapping and house-listing exercise, similar to 
the one carried out in India’s NFHS and DLHS, was performed (for example, see the 
mapping and houselisting manual for DLHS-III by IIPS, 2007). This exercise involved 
three steps to select the household survey sample which is described as follows:  
a) Segmentation of villages into smaller units  
Firstly, as is evident from the Table 4.1 above, the 10 case-study villages had 4205 
households in total in 2001 (and the number of households at the time of survey 
was much greater, given the present study was conducted more than 10 years after 
Census 2001). Understandably, it was not possible to go door-to-door to ascertain 
the migration status of all households in the case-study villages for sample 
selection. Therefore, villages with more than 300 households were segmented in 
smaller units with each of the segment typically comprising of between 100 and 150 
households. The segmentation criterion of 300 households was guided by the fact 
that from each village, irrespective of the number of households, two segments 
were to be included in the sample frame. This meant that there needed to be at 
least three segments to choose two from and with the segment size pegged at 100 
to 150 households, this arithmetic suited the methodological plan. This 
segmentation process followed already existent natural boundaries or demarcations 
in the village so long as each segment yielded a size of 100 to 150 households. This 
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included, for example, hamlets of households from different social/caste group 
(Yadav hamlet and/or Dalit hamlet etc.) or households living on two/opposite sides 
of common village property such as temple/mosque or village school. In cases 
where such already existent demarcations did not satisfy the segment size norms, 
small segments were merged into large ones. This was done to have a large enough 
sample universe to choose the sample of households from. This exercise was done 
in 7 of the 10 case-study villages.46  
The main aim of the village segmentation was to provide an organising rationale for 
selection of the household sample from the bigger universe of households scattered 
across a large geographical area47, but in a manner that yielded an unbiased and 
representative sample. The settlement patterns in the Indian villages are often 
based on caste i.e. members of one caste tend to live close to each other and rural 
Bihar is no exception to this norm. Although high population densities and resultant 
pressures on land in most parts of Bihar48 often blur these caste-based settlement 
patterns, they are still prominently visible. In the case-study villages in Siwan, in 
particular the households belonging to low caste groups (Scheduled 
Caste/Scheduled Tribe) were found to be living on the village margins, and in some 
villages they lived in areas which were quite cut-off from the village.49 The 
segmentation process took care to include these disparate settlements in the 
sample universe. In other words, all households, irrespective of their caste, had an 
equal chance of being selected for the household sample.  
                                                        
46 In addition to the 6 villages that had more than 300 households as per Census 2001 data (Table 
4.1), it was found during field visits that Gaur village in Maharajganj also had more than 300 
households and therefore segments were created in this village as well.  
47 Although high population densities in Siwan (and for that matter, in the whole of Bihar 
compared to national average) means that most villages in the district have quite dense 
population settlement patterns, the ways in which local village classification works makes the 
matters complicated from the perspective of selecting the sample at times. For example, it is not 
uncommon to find a few households of say village A, settled as far as 2-3 kilometres away in a 
completely different village B, and yet officially classified as part of village A.  
48 As per Census 2011 data, among all Indian states (except a few geographically smaller Union 
Territories) Bihar had the highest population density of 1102 persons per square kilometer 
(Registrar General of India, 2011d, p. 140).  
49 In many case-study villages, the smaller hamlets were named after the caste of the inhabitants 
of that hamlet. For instance, Bansfor Tola (hamlet of the Bansfors caste), Harijan Tola (hamlet of 
the members of Scheduled Caste) and so on.  
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Clearly, the number of segments created in each of the 7 case-study villages varied, 
depending on the number of households in the village. For example, in the large 
village of Gayaspur, 10 segments were made as against just 4 segments in Gaur.  
However, as noted above, irrespective of number of segments, two segments from 
each village which had between 100 and 150 households each, were selected from 
each case-study village using the random selection procedure (see the 
Segmentation Particulars Form: Appendix 2). On average, this provided a sample 
frame of about 230 households from each village, from which the sample of 40 
households was to be drawn. 
Figure 4.2 depicts a specimen segmentation map of Baghauni village (these rough 
maps were created for all the study villages). As can be seen, five segments were 
created in the village and segment 1 and segment 3, comprising 140 and 110 
households respectively, were selected. Information on the basic characteristics of 
all the households residing in these selected segments was obtained through house-
listing, an exercise which aimed to ascertain the migration status of the households 
which I now describe.  
Figure 4.2: Segmentation map of sample village Baghauni of Hussainganj Block, 
Siwan 
 
Source: Own work. 
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b) Identifying the migration status of the households through house-listing 
As noted earlier, the Census 2001 data used to select the villages did not provide 
any information on the migration status of the households. In order to obtain this 
information, an identification schedule, referred to as household listing form in the 
survey, was administered to the households in the sample villages, or the two 
selected village segments where segmentation was done. The household listing 
schedule collected information on the type of building structure (residential or non-
residential), number of households living in each structure, name of the head of the 
household, whether the household had any member who engaged in employment 
migration during the past year (reference period for this study is discussed in 
Appendix 1) and if yes, how many members undertook migration. Besides, since this 
study focused on internal migration, information was also sought on the whether 
the member(s) migrated within or outside the country (Household Listing Form: 
Appendix 2).  
All the structures (and the households living within each structure) in the sample 
villages or selected segments were assigned a number for identification and, 
simultaneous to house-listing, rough households maps were prepared. The main 
objective behind preparing these household maps was to help locate the selected 
households and thus, avoid the non-sampling errors of wrong inclusion and 
exclusion.  
Figure 4.3 is a specimen household map of the same Baghauni village which shows 
that location of all structures in the selected segment 1 and segment 3 of Baghauni 
village (see Figure 4.2 and related discussion above). Although named as a 
household map, Figure 4.3 shows the building structures within which households 
were located as in many cases there were two or more households residing in one 
structure. This is consistent with usual mapping rules.  
The house-listing exercise also provided a means to double-check the validity of the 
segmentation process. Given that village segments were created to facilitate 
sampling for this study and there was no official count on the number of households 
in the segments, this number represented a best guess estimate which was arrived 
based on the conversations with the GP representatives and senior villagers aware 
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of the village geography, as well as quick tours of the study villages. But the house-
listing provided an actual count of the number of households with which the 
segmentation count could be tallied. And it was found that in all villages the rough 
count of households in the village segments matched quite closely with the real 
count done through house-listing.50  
Figure 4.3: Household map of sample village Baghauni of Hussainganj Block, Siwan 
 
Source: Own work. 
 
Selecting the households for surveys using systematic circular sampling  
The identification particulars obtained through house-listing provided information 
on whether or not households had member(s) who undertook migration for 
employment reasons. Following the house-listing, the last step required choosing a 
sample of 20 migrant and 20 non-migrant households from every one of the 
villages/village segments. For this, systematic circular sampling with a random start 
procedure was used.  
                                                        
50 For example, according to the guesstimates, segment 1 and segment 3 in Baghuani village had 
140 and 110 households, respectively. And the house-listing revealed that the actual number of 
households was 112 in segment 1 and 143 in segment 3 (Figure 4.2). And the number of 
structures in segment 1 and segment 3 were 95 and 110 respectively (Figure 4.3).  
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The house-listing provided, on an average, a sample universe of 230 residential 
households in each village, which included both the households with and without 
migrant members, from which a sample of 20 migrant and 20 non-migrant 
households was drawn. It is important to note that from the list of residential 
households, migrant and non-migrant households were separated and the sample 
of migrant and non-migrant household was drawn, using the procedure described 
below, from their respective lists.  
The procedure for systematic circular sampling but with a random start (the ways 
these households were selected) is as described as follows: 
- Suppose N is the total number of residential households listed in a case-
study village and the number of households to be sampled is 20, then the 
sampling interval I = N/20. 
- Afterwards, a random number, expressed as R, between I and N was 
selected.  
- The target sample of 20 households, thus, is the household numbers, R, R+I, 
R+2*I, R+3*I…R+19*I (as noted above, the households were assigned a 
number; see Household Listing Form: Appendix 3).  
An example may help clarify things better.  
- The number of migrant households listed in Baghauni village was 127 
households. Thus, N=127 
- To obtain sampling interval, divide N by target sample 20. Thus, I=127/20 = 6 
(fraction of 0.35 is rounded off). 
- Take the random (start) number as 88.  
- Using this procedure, the sample selected for the surveys would include 
household numbers, 88, 88+6=94, 88+12=100, 88+18=106, 88+24=112, 
88+30=118, 88+36=124, 88+42=130 or 130-127=3, 88+48=136 or 136-
127=9, 88+54=142 or 142-127=15, 88+60=148 or 148-127=21…88+102=190 
or 190-127=63, 88+108=196 or 196-127=69, 88+114=202 or 202-127=75. 
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Note that if the selected random number leads to a household number being 
greater than N, then N is subtracted from the household number. The same is done 
in the example of Baghauni village above.  
Thus, the households selected through this procedure were approached for the 
survey. From the target sample of 200 migrant and 200 non-migrant households, 
interviews were conducted with 197 migrant and 195 non-migrant households, 
leading to an overall response rate of 98 percent. The mapping and house-listing 
was carried out in January-February, 2012 and the household surveys were 
conducted during April-May, 2012.   
Sample selection of migrants  
Although the principal focus of this study was on the migration origin areas i.e. the 
selected villages in Siwan District, an attempt was also made to understand the 
linkages between migration origin and destination places by interviewing the 
migrants belonging to the sample migrant households in Siwan at the destination 
areas. For this purpose, 20 unstructured interviews with migrants, equivalent to 10 
percent of migrant household sample, were planned. However, interviews with only 
10 migrants could be conducted due to the difficulties in tracing the migrants at 
their current destinations.  
This was undertaken as follows. The village-level household survey questionnaires 
included a section which, among other things, obtained information on the socio-
demographic characteristics, income, occupation and work destination of the 
migrant member(s) of the surveyed households. Upon the completion of the 
household surveys, survey participants from migrant households in the study 
villages were informed that another leg of this study involved interviews with the 
migrant members and were asked if they would be willing to provide the contact 
details of the migrant members for further rounds of interview. Close to half (100) 
of the migrant households agreed to share the contact details, however, as it turned 
out, the information possessed by the rural resident members on the whereabouts 
of their migrant counterparts was quite patchy and they did not know much beyond 
the name of city or town in which the migrant members lived. Nonetheless, most 
households had the mobile numbers of their migrant members (which was not 
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entirely surprising given that in 2012 mobile subscribers in India were estimated to 
be approximately 894 millions: Jeffrey & Doron, 2013, p. 7), which they willingly 
shared, though quite naturally, they left the decision to take part in the interviews 
on them (on what information was sought about migrants through the household 
surveys, see Part 29 in the Household Survey Questionnaire: Appendix 4). 
These migrant members were contacted on their mobile phones in the presence of 
their family from the study villages. They were informed of the nature and 
objectives of the study, and were asked if they wished to be part of the study. Upon 
talking to their family members, who in many cases included their wives, most of 
the migrants agreed to be contacted for the interviews. However, analysis of the 
information on migrants’ current place of destination revealed that they were 
spread all over India, from the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north to Kerala in 
the south. Thus, owing to logistical considerations, the National Capital Region (or 
NCR which includes Delhi and parts of states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh), which 
emerged as the most-favoured migration destination in the household surveys (75 
migrants out of the total of 280), was identified as the area for interviews with 
migrants.51 However, several difficulties arose in tracing the migrants for the 
interviews. Firstly, many migrants with whom we had spoken earlier could not be 
contacted again, as they had, it seemed, changed their mobile numbers. Secondly, 
the fieldwork was carried out in the month of June 2012 which coincided with the 
wedding season in Siwan and many migrants had also gone back to their respective 
villages, Thus, owing to these problems, in the end, interviews with only 10 migrants 
could be carried out.  
One might question the logistical pragmatism in the selection of migrants and argue 
that choosing migrants from the most-favoured destination (i.e. NCR) may prevent 
the study to capture the heterogeneity of migrants’ lives. Although some common 
aspects were indeed same for the people working at same destination, the events 
and episodes that shaped migratory behaviour as well as the outcomes of migration 
varied significantly from one individual to another. In that sense, each migrant 
constituted a unique and mutually exclusive part of the sample. Moreover, the main 
                                                        
51 These 75 migrants were in five districts of NCR region which included: i) Delhi; ii) Faridabad; iii) 
Ghaziabad; iv) Noida; and v) Gurgaon.  
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purpose of interviews with migrants was to better understand the connections 
between migration origin and destination place and the bearing of such 
connections, if any, on rural food security, which did not require following strict 
sampling criteria and procedures.  
Data collection tools 
As noted above, this study used a mixed method data collection approach which 
involved: i) household surveys; ii) key-informant interviews with village leader; and 
iii) unstructured interviews with migrants. The following section provides brief 
information on the each method of data collection separately and what they sought 
to achieve for the purpose of this study.  
Household surveys 
These household surveys were carried out using a structured questionnaire (which 
was pilot-tested and revised before it was administered). These questionnaires 
were usually administered on the ‘head of the household’ (male or female) or in the 
absence of household head, on any other household member (male/female) aged 
18 years and above who was deemed knowledgeable of household, with prior 
informed consent. The household questionnaire had three broad sections.  
The first section contained a similar set of questions for migrant and non-migrant 
households in order to draw a comparison of household food security by migration 
status and other correlates, similar and/or different, of food security/insecurity 
between both types of households. This involved collection of information on 
variables such as, 
i) Social and demographic characteristics of sample household members 
i.e. information on caste, class, education level, age, marital status and 
so on 
ii) Social and economic conditions of the household i.e. type of house, 
source of drinking water, sanitation facilities within the premises etc. 
iii) Household economics, i.e. household income and consumption patterns, 
assets base of household, savings and investments, debt burden, main 
 122 
economic activity of the household as well as occupation of the each 
members of the household, size of agricultural land holding, if any  
iv) Food security situation of the household such as food consumption 
patterns of household members, diversity of diets and strategies devised 
in times of food scarcity 
v) Eligibility and access to different government-run food and livelihood 
security schemes such as PDS, MGNREGA, ICDS 
vi) Subjective assessment of aspects of personal well-being etc. (see Part 1-
17 in the Household Survey Questionnaire: Appendix 4). 
The second section of household questionnaire collected information on the 
migrant members working away from home. In total, information on 280 migrants 
belonging to 197 migrant households was collected which included,  
i) Socio-demographic information about migrant member(s) such as age, 
sex, level of education  
ii) Current work destination and duration of stay at the current work 
destination 
iii) Income and occupation at current work destination 
iv) Patterns of remittances, amount of remittances, mode of remittances, 
use of remittances by the household 
v) Type of migration (seasonal, circular, permanent), number of trips to the 
origin village in the past year and reasons for these trips etc. (see Part 
18-20 in the Household Survey Questionnaire: Appendix 4). 
As has been noted earlier, the predominant pattern of migration from Siwan (and 
indeed from Bihar as a whole) involves single-male migration which has the 
potential to alter, and quite profoundly so, the intra-household gender dynamics 
relating to management and control of household affairs. As these outcomes have 
implications for household food security, the third section of the questionnaire was 
administered on the left-behind wives of the migrants to understand ‘greater 
female autonomy versus greater responsibility’ hypotheses of migration effects and 
how they influence food security of household members. In other words, the 
women-only section of the questionnaire sought to understand the changes in 
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gender roles, if any, as a result of migration and how they interplay with household 
food security (see Part 21-28 in the Household Survey Questionnaire: Appendix 4).  
It must be mentioned that this section was administered on the left-behind wives of 
the migrant members, if migrants were married. Since this interview with left-
behind women was an extension of the interview with migrant households, the 
selection of left-behind wives did not involve any sampling as migrant households 
were already selected through the sampling procedure described above. Thus, 
following the household interview with migrant households, the left-behind wives 
of the married migrants were approached for the interview, if they were available, 
with the prior oral consent also of the household head or senior female member if 
the household under question involved joint/extended household. Only one left-
behind wife was interviewed from each migrant household and in cases where 
household had more than one married migrant member, attempt was made to 
select the youngest female for the interview. In total, interviews with 144 left-
behind women were carried out. 
Key informant interviews 
The key informant method is used extensively in social research. This approach is 
particularly useful for village level studies and has been employed by social sciences 
researchers to understand the broader village-level dynamics. A key-informant 
refers to any person in the study area who can provide useful information about the 
community under investigation. The key-informants are often strategically chosen 
based on their long-experience and knowledge about the study area and they 
include, in most cases if not all, influential people of the community. This strategic 
selection also provides researchers a gateway to study population and helps in 
rapport-building with the community (for a useful description of key informant 
technique, see, inter alia, Gilchrist, 1992; Marshall, 1996; Tremblay, 1982).  
One of the objectives of this study was to understand if institutional arrangements 
pertaining to food and livelihood security had any impact on migration. Thus, the 
key informants in this study mainly comprised of the members of GPs. In India, GPs 
have been entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the village-level social 
and economic development programmes and thus, maintain records about the 
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social-economic conditions of all the members of the village. GPs play an important 
role in identifying the households living below the poverty line in the villages who 
then are provided benefits under different government welfare schemes relating to 
universal education, food security, primary health, employment guarantee etc. 
Through largely unstructured interviews with the members of GPs, including the GP 
president (or ‘Mukhiya’ as s/he is known in local parlance), qualitative information 
on functioning of government welfare schemes and local-level implementation 
challenges was collected which helped understand livelihood and food security 
situations of the resident households in the study villages better.  
Unstructured interviews with migrants 
Although the main focus of this study was the rural communities at place of origin, 
an attempt was also made to understand the perspectives of migrants at the 
destination. Indeed, understanding the complexity of migration decisions and 
outcomes necessitates an appreciation of links between origin and destination. As 
Connell et al. (1976, p. 3), in their widely cited study on migration from rural areas 
in the developing countries, suggested: “Motivations, conditions and options in 
communities of origin and of destination have to be looked at together.” For this 
purpose, unstructured interviews with 10 migrants at their place of destination 
(which was NCR, as mentioned above) were carried out. 
The unstructured interview is a qualitative research technique used to elicit 
information on the social and behavioural realities from the perspective of 
respondents. As the name suggests, this method of data collection follows no 
predefined set or structure of questions and involves an informal conversation 
between the researcher and respondent(s) on the subject matter under 
investigation. Also often known in the literature as in-depth interview or informal 
conversation, unstructured interviews allow researchers to obtain in-depth 
information about the life events of the informants that have shaped their current 
behavior (see, inter alia, Burgess, 1982; Fontana & Frey, 2005; Kumar, 2005).  
Migration decisions and outcomes are shaped by a complex mix of social, economic, 
cultural, political and contextual factors which make informants’ narratives and 
perspectives crucially important. This is precisely the reason why unstructured 
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interviews provide a more effective tool to understand, from the viewpoint of 
respondents, the complexity of migration decisions and outcomes. Moreover, these 
interviews with migrants were conducted to complement the rural surveys which 
provided a methodological merit to the study.   
These unstructured interviews with migrants generated information on their life 
histories, about the factors and events that shaped their decisions to migrate, on 
the dichotomy of choice versus compulsion migration, on their living and working 
conditions, on their food consumption patterns, on their access to welfare 
entitlements at the place of destination and so on. An interview guide, which 
contained a check-list of issues was used as an aid memoir (interview guide is 
attached as Appendix 5).   
In a nutshell, this research uses scientific sampling methods and a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques in order to generate a 
holistic understanding of migration-food security relationship at the household level 
(see Figure 4.4 for a snapshot of research methodology).  
Figure 4.4: Snapshot of research methodology  
Source: Own work. 
Positionality, reflexivity, and insider/outsider in field research: reflecting on 
fieldwork experiences 
In the past two decades, social sciences researchers, particularly those practicing 
qualitative research methods, such as anthropologists, sociologists and human 
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geographers, have increasingly called for reflexive exploration of researchers’ own 
positionality and identity vis-à-vis their participants in the knowledge generated 
through field-based research (inter alia, England, 1995; Mcdowell, 1992a, 1992b; 
Merriam et al., 2001; Rose 1997). The focus on “reflexive notion of knowledge” 
(Mcdowell, 1992, p. 399) emanates from the widespread acknowledgement that all 
knowledge is situational in that the production of knowledge takes places “in 
specific circumstances and that those circumstances shape it in some way” (Rose 
1997, p. 305). And therefore the ethics of participatory research warrant that the 
researchers be self-reflexive about their research contexts as well as how the 
different attributes of their own identity such as race, social class, gender, and caste 
position them vis-à-vis the “researched” either as “insiders” or “outsiders”, and how 
these in turn affect the process of knowledge creation. The reflexive examination of 
the situational and contextual realties of knowledge production process in social 
epistemology serves to inform the research study, and put the research findings in 
perspective. Given that the present study uses a mixed-method approach, 
generating insights from qualitative research methods, such as in-depth narratives 
and key informant interviews, in conjunction with quantitative household survey 
data, I consider it pertinent to briefly discuss the issues of my positionality and 
identity. In particular, I draw on my fieldwork experiences in order to reflect on how 
my own background and markers of my social and economic identity vis-à-vis my 
survey participants resonated with the notions of insider and outsider, how I 
navigated and negotiated these features during the field research, and how these in 
turn influenced the process of knowledge production.  
It is important to note that emphasis in social research on the issues of positionality 
and reflexivity has led to intense theoretical debates around the issues of 
representation (whether the researchers’ backgrounds sufficiently allow them to 
represent their participants) and the disconnect between universities’ institutional 
codes of conduct for ethical research and field realities of participatory research. It 
is not possible for me to dwell on the theoretical dimensions of these debates in 
details here (for a useful account on these issues, see, inter alia, Banks et al., 2013; 
Nagar, 2002; Nagar and Ali, 2003; Sultana, 2007), and therefore what follows is a 
brief reflection on the practical aspects of the process of conducting ethically 
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participatory field research in Siwan, Bihar. From the perspective of present 
research, I briefly reflect on two key issues that I believe have significance for this 
research. These include: i) my status as an insider/outsider in the field setting; ii) 
cross-gender nature of research (given that I was a male and research also involved 
interviews with left-behind wives of migrants).  
Insider or outsider or in-between? Negotiating a position in the fieldwork  
Focusing on first of these issues, conducting research in Siwan raised several 
dilemmatic questions on relational aspects of fieldwork, and my hybrid identity of a 
native Indian pursuing PhD research degree from an Australian university at the 
time of fieldwork left me to ponder even more on whether or not I qualified to be 
an “insider”. Although I had lived a major part of my life in India, returned to do 
fieldwork in the country in less than a year of moving to Australia for doctoral 
studies, and, as things stood, intended to return to the country to pursue teaching 
and research career soon after my doctoral research, by no means these factors 
alone qualified me to be an insider. For one, I grew up in the capital city of Jaipur in 
Rajasthan in northwest India (and later moved to Mumbai for higher studies), and 
my fieldwork district of Siwan, Bihar was markedly different in terms of culture and 
language; I certainly did not know beforehand the local language of my case-study 
district. Second, all my field sites were rural villages, which were quite different 
from the urban environment that I had known most of my life (Jaipur and Mumbai). 
Third, and most importantly, after a few visits to my study villages at the preliminary 
stage of the fieldwork (during mapping-listing), I became acutely aware of my socio-
economic privileges vis-à-vis my (potential) individual and household research 
participants. Indeed, carrying out field research on the issue of food (in)security 
inevitably meant that many of the study participants did not have the material 
conditions to be food secure throughout the year, and these material inequalities 
separated me from my study participants.  
And yet there were commonalities that allowed me to bridge some of these gaps 
and negotiate a space within the communities of research and I became more 
accepted over time. These commonalities included nationality and Hindi language 
(which almost all of my survey participants understood and spoke). I was not strictly 
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Desi, but a Hindustani bhai, as one of my respondents put it. I also had two local 
field assistants who helped me to come closer to my research communities. 
Additionally, my previous experience of doing fieldwork in the rural villages of 
Rajasthan, and my attempts to speak local Bhojpuri language which often gave 
chuckles to my research participants, came handy for me to be able to blend in. In 
regards to the latter, much to my surprise my broken Bhojpuri proved to be a useful 
tool to build rapport with the communities I was researching! My fluency in 
Bhojpuri was restricted to a few everyday greetings. And yet, picking up from how 
my field assistants spoke with the locals, I tried to challenge my own skills and 
converse with local in their own language. While this act did not mean that I was 
ever perceived as an insider (it would have been immature on my part to assume 
that), I believe this allowed me to at least shed the tag of an outsider; I was an “in-
between”. (I must confess though that I remain unsure of whether it was because 
the locals perceived my attempt to speak Bhojpuri as genuine or the humour it 
generated that the lack of language skills ironically became my advantage.) Indeed 
the simple act of greeting people in Bhojpuri with rauva ki bhani (which translates 
as how are you?) enabled me to fit in. Despite being able to negotiate a space within 
the community, two issues are worth nothing. 
Firstly, because my study design involved using both quantitative and qualitative 
data collection techniques, this mixed method approach, while useful to generate a 
holistic understanding of individual and household level dynamics of migration-food 
security nexus, was not without problems. In the survey villages, the individual and 
household-level qualitative data was often simultaneously collected while 
administering the survey questionnaire. While the village-walks during the mapping 
and listing exercise meant that I became a familiar face in the study villages, strict 
sampling criteria at times caused suspicions among the households not included in 
the final survey sample. Indeed an issue that I frequently encountered during the 
rural surveys was that whereas a sample of 40 selected households was drawn for 
the survey, many other households in the study villages seemed to want to 
participate in the survey. This apparent inclination was due to the perception 
among the households that we were government officials and the surveyed families 
will later be rewarded with welfare benefits. This was a dangerous perception with 
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implications for the quality of survey data. In one of the study villages, where one of 
the two segments selected happened to be the Hindu-dominated part of the village, 
a Muslim clergyman from the local mosque suspected us of being biased and 
surveying only the Hindus so that they could all be entitled to benefits which, 
according to him, were to follow. He remarked: “All the Muslims have been 
removed from the list.” However, it was clarified that this study was an academic 
exercise with no links to government benefits whatsoever, and where confusion 
persisted people were informed wholly the nature and objectives of the study.  
Secondly, adhering to the research ethics requirements of the USyD in rural Siwan 
at times acted as a barrier to be closer to the study participants. While in general 
there was excitement and curiosity among the locals about a graduate student from 
an Australian university doing field research in their villages, some of the USyD’s 
ethics requirements, such as taking a “written” informed consent before beginning 
with the interview distanced some people in the beginning as they thought that I 
could use their signature against them for matters such as transferring their land 
and assets away from them. (The written component of the informed consent was 
later dropped in view of fieldwork realities.) While implementation of such 
institutional formalities did not hamper the process of fieldwork and knowledge 
creation as such, this meant that I had to devise ways through which I could meet 
the ethics requirements as well as build rapport and trust among the research 
participants. For example, one of the ways I achieved the balancing equation to 
resolve this issue was by attending village meeting and camps where I got an 
opportunity to interact with village locals across the social and economic strata.  
Reflecting on cross-gender research  
As noted earlier, my fieldwork also involved interviews with the left-behind wives of 
migrant members, and with me being a male researcher this cross-gender 
component of the study warrants some self-reflexivity on my part on the relational 
aspect of my field research. This is because gender often exerts great influence on 
the negotiation of fieldwork relations. As Warren (1998) succinctly put it: “all 
knowledge is gendered” (cited in Mckeganey and Bloor, 1991, p. 195). And 
therefore an appreciation of fieldwork negotiations mediated through gender can 
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enable field researchers to pay greater attention to situational realties of where 
gender can confer advantage or disadvantage in field data collection. For example, 
Brandes (1992), a male anthropologist who carried out his fieldwork in Andalusia in 
Southern Spain on women, reported that operation of strict gender norms and 
sexual boundaries meant that he could gain access to women participants through 
their husbands. Drawing on their experiences from three research projects on the 
impact of cross-gender relations in field research, Mckeganey and Bloor (1991), two 
male researchers, noted that in their fieldwork with their female participants they 
faced constraints on physical access to space.  
While designing my study and inserting the cross-gender component in the 
research, on many occasions I wondered whether my gender would allow me to 
negotiate fieldwork relations with my female respondents in order for me to be able 
to explore the intra-household gender dynamics of migration and food security 
effectively. My apprehensions grew further because my reading and understanding 
of Bihar was that of a place where social and cultural norms imposed greater 
restrictions on the interaction of females with outside males. Moreover, I was a 30-
year-old single man and all my respondents were married women. However, when I 
arrived in the field I found that the fieldwork realties were different from my in-
office thinking of gender relations in my case study sites. While gender certainly 
established some boundaries in the way I interacted with the left-behind wives of 
migrants, it conflated with several other factors, such as age, caste, family structure, 
economic status of the women respondents. I faced greater constraints in talking to 
young women living in joint families, particularly when their in-laws were present in 
the house, as compared to middle-aged women from nuclear households. The 
women from poor, lower caste households opened up to me more on personal 
questions, such as how they felt about the husbands spending a large part of the 
year away from them compared to those from better-off, upper caste families. 
Some women called their female friends and neighbours, and talked to me only in 
their presence. In other words, gender interacted with other social and economic 
categories, however, my prior awareness of role of gender in the process field 
research relations helped me to understand, and deal with, the dynamics of cross-
gender research. As Galam, (2015, p. 5) suggests: “… appreciation of the role played 
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by gender in fieldwork relations engenders a dynamic perspective of how gender 
interacts with other social and cultural categories and factors germane to the 
research.”  
I was obviously conscious of not crossing the boundaries and so I avoided asking any 
questions of intimate nature. In any case, the main objective of this cross-gender 
part of the study was to understand the intra-household power relations of 
migration-food security relationship and did not warrant invading the more private 
parts of their lives. Moreover, depending on the age of my female respondents, I 
assured them that they are like my “sister” or “mother”, and it helped me bond with 
them well. In overall terms, while my gender posed obvious constraints in that I 
could not talk to them as openly as a female researcher could/would have (for 
instance, on sexual matters, given the prolonged absence of their husbands), the 
non-sensitive nature of the cross-gender part of my research allowed me to 
understand the gender dynamics of migration-food nexus as holistically as possible. 
I hope the findings presented in Chapter 8 will give the same sense.  
Conclusion  
This Chapter has discussed the methods and materials used in this study to generate 
concrete empirical-based understanding of the linkages between migration and 
food security. To this end, this study focuses on a strategically selected and 
statistically representative sample of 392 rural households, spread across 10 villages 
of Siwan district in western Bihar. While the principal method employed in this 
study is household-based surveys, the overall approach of this study is to use a 
mixed-method approach in order to also take cues from the in-depth narratives of 
households’ migrant members, key informant interviews with senior villagers and 
observations made during field investigations on the relationship between 
migration and food security. The selection of Siwan as a case-study site was done on 
the basis of Indian Census 2001 data on migration which establish it as one of the 
high outmigration districts of Bihar. Moreover, a close scrutiny of the historical 
records suggests that rural populations of the Siwan district, and, indeed, Bihar as a 
whole, have historically been highly mobile, consideration which also informed the 
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selection of Siwan. Drawing on historical and contemporary evidence, in the next 
Chapter I discuss the context and drivers of migration from Siwan and Bihar.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION: BIHAR AND SIWAN IN 
PERSPECTIVE  
Introduction 
Despite the fact that migration has traditionally been an integral part of lives and 
livelihoods of rural communities in much of the developing world, all too often rural 
populations have suffered from the image of being immobile in the academic and 
policy discourse around rural development. This static image of rural societies is, in 
part, the result of “rural-equates-agriculture” paradigm of thinking which, although 
fading, still remains prevalent (Rigg, 2006). This notion of an immobile peasantry, 
however, is an unwarranted assumption (Bryceson, 1997), and with some risk of 
oversimplification, a myth. The inherently cyclical nature of agricultural work means 
that rural populations go through cycles of peak and lean seasons. In places where 
rural labour markets do not provide enough opportunities for non-agricultural 
income diversification throughout the year, which is often the case in most, if not 
all, countries of Asia and Africa, many households have traditionally employed 
migration as one of the livelihood diversification strategies to meet their income 
needs outside of the busy agriculture period. As de Haan (1999, p. 7) suggests, 
“population movement [represents] the norm rather than the exception.”  
Positing the significance of migration in rural livelihoods is important, for it enables 
viewing rural livelihood systems as “dynamic”, comprising not just of farm-based 
activities but also a wide array of local and extra-local non-farm occupations. From 
the perspective of food security, this implies that in addition to land-based 
livelihoods, the issue of rural food security, or insecurity, has always been closely 
connected with access to, and gains from, the non-farm, migration incomes. In fact, 
in many instances the extent to which land facilitates household’s food security 
needs is contingent upon the extent of income from non-farm sources (Owusu, 
Abdulai, & Abdul-Rahman, 2011; Reardon, 1997).  
The Indian state of Bihar, the geographic focus of this study, is a case in point where 
a large majority of rural households have traditionally engaged in non-farm 
livelihood diversification to meet their income and food needs. Located in the Indo-
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Gangetic plains, the state is endowed with highly fertile soil and abundant water 
sources. However, persistently high population densities have almost always 
counterbalanced the capacity of rural land and resources to allow the region’s 
inhabitants to adequately meet their food security needs. In particular, population 
densities in the western part of Bihar, where the case-study district of Siwan is 
located, have been much higher than most other places in the country (O'Malley, 
1930; Yang, 1979, 1989). In the absence of local non-agricultural employment 
options, migration has always been central to the incomes and livelihoods of rural 
dwellers of this region. The historical significance of migration in western Bihar was 
also one of the important reasons for selecting Siwan district as a case-study site, in 
addition to the other strategic considerations (adopted for this purpose), as 
described in Chapter 4. 
The traditional importance of migration from Bihar notwithstanding, the social, 
economic and infrastructural realties in India have changed dramatically over time. 
The market reforms of the 1990s are reshaping the very process of migration all 
over the country (Deshingkar & Anderson, 2004; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009). 
New patterns and streams of migration are fast evolving; for example, rural-urban 
migration is gaining significance relative to rural-rural migration. By combining 
historical evidence with household survey data collected for the present study in 
Siwan, I shall discuss some of these changes in the later sections of the Chapter.  
It is important to note that in addition to high population pressures on land, Bihar as 
a whole has remained an economically backward region throughout the past two 
centuries. This has created heavy reliance on migration incomes among the rural 
communities of the state. In fact, continued lack of gainful opportunities at home 
seems to have created a “culture of migration” in rural Bihar. The economic decline 
of Bihar began during British rule and continued throughout much of the post-
independence period. Faulty economic policies during the British Raj, political 
indifference of federal government towards the development needs of the state in 
much of the post-independence period, and a slew of internal problems including 
the virtual absence of governance and order between 1990 and 2005, have 
undermined the economic development of Bihar (Mukherji & Mukherji, 2012). 
More importantly, market reforms initiated in India since early 1990s largely 
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bypassed Bihar until recently. Thus although outmigration from Bihar has been 
historically widespread, village-level studies indicate that the incidence of migration 
from Bihar increased further in 1990s (Karan, 2003; Sharma, 2005), a period which 
otherwise marks the watershed of Indian economy.  
Against this background, this Chapter aims to set out the research context as a 
precursor to the household-level analysis of relationship between migration and 
food security. Firstly, I provide an overview of Bihar’s economy and society and 
place it in the Indian map of development. Secondly, I will attempt to briefly trace 
the reasons for Bihar’s current backwardness and its relationship with high rates of 
outmigration from the state. I then discuss the food security situation across 
different districts of Bihar and how this correlates with district-wise migration. 
Finally, I will situate my case-study district of Siwan within Bihar and provide a brief 
profile of place, people and livelihoods in the district. For the discussion in this 
Chapter, I combine the secondary data with some of the household survey data 
collected from Siwan.  
A geography of deprivation: Bihar on the Indian map of development  
A vast stretch of fertile alluvial land forming part of the Indo-Gangetic plain, the 
eastern Indian state of Bihar is considered as one of the most backward states in the 
country. The state is characterised by excessively high population pressures, an 
underdeveloped and weak economy, the highest proportion of population lacking 
access to bare minimum living standards and dysfunctional education and health 
care infrastructure.  Social inequalities along the lines of caste and gender, although 
by no means unique to Bihar, take a particularly potent form in the state.  
Lagging far behind in demographic transition vis-à-vis most other Indian states, 
Bihar is affected by high population growth rates. The third largest Indian state in 
terms of population size, in 2011 Bihar had a total population of over 100 million 
people, accounting for nearly 9 percent of India’s total population. Seen in 
international perspective, if Bihar were to be a country of its own, it would rank the 
twelfth biggest in the world in terms of population size (United Nations, 2013c, pp. 
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51-55).52 During the most recent inter-censal period between 2001 and 2011, the 
population in Bihar increased by 25 percent. Although this represents a marginal 
decline from the decadal population growth rate of 28.6 percent during 1991-2001, 
population increase in Bihar was still higher than the national average of 17.6 
percent. A predominantly agrarian society, close to 90 percent of Bihar’s population 
lives in rural areas. It is important to note that even though the urban population in 
Bihar grew at a faster rate during 2001-2011, the levels of urbanisation barely 
moved upwards, indicating intensification of pressure on rural land and resources 
(Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Population size, growth and distribution  
 
Place of 
enumeration 
Total Population 
2011 
Urban population 
(%age) 
Inter-censal 
change during 
2001-11 
(%) 
 Rural Urban 2001 2011 Rural Urban 
Bihar 92341436 11758016 10.46 11.29 24.25 35.43 
India 833087662 377105760 27.82 31.16 12.20 31.80 
Source: Registrar General of India (2001c, 2011b) 
With an economy characterised by little exposure to the urban manufacturing and 
service sectors (notwithstanding their growing importance in recent years) and a 
dearth of rural non-farm activities (Jha, 2006), agriculture remains the primary 
source of local livelihood for a large proportion of Bihar’s population. Indeed, by the 
virtue of its location, the state is naturally endowed with highly fertile soil and 
abundant ground water resources. Several tributaries of the river Ganges including 
Mahananda, Kosi, Ghaghara and Gandhak flow through the different parts of the 
Bihar plain, making it one of the most fertile in the country. The real agricultural 
potential of the state, however, remains far from being adequately realised which 
has prevented any meaningful decline in poverty and deprivation in the state. This 
situation is best described in the report of the Task Force on Bihar’s Agriculture 
which terms the Bihar plain a “rich State inhabited by poor people” (Government of 
                                                        
52 Comparison based on country-wise population statistics published by the United Nations 
Population Division in the 2012 revision of World Population Prospects. See bibliography section 
for fuller details.  
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India, 2008, p. 11). Bihar has one of the lowest rates of agricultural productivity in 
the country (Government of India, 2008, pp. 18-19; Joshi, Tripathi, & Gautam, 
2012). Fragmented landholding patterns owing largely to high population pressures, 
lack of irrigation facilities, and poor credit and extension services to farmers have 
impeded the achievement of the state’s agricultural potential. Additionally, the 
large number of rivers also means that recurrent floods remain a perennial problem 
affecting lives and livelihoods dependent on agriculture in the state (Pritchard and 
Thielemans, 2014). Bihar plain is among the most flood-prone areas of India, with 
31 out of 38 districts of the state classified as flood-prone (Deshingkar et al., 2009). 
The most recent calamitous floods in the state in 2008 from the Kosi river, 
considered the Hwang Ho of Bihar (Ahmad, 1961, p. 265), took approximately 500 
lives (a further of 3500 people were missing after the floods) and rendered 2,73,000 
acres of arable cropland fallow (Government of Bihar, 2008).  
Until recently, Bihar suffered from a long spell of poor governance and economic 
stagnation, with each reinforcing the other. Prior to 2007, the state consistently 
ranked as among the slowest growing regions of India (Basu, 2013; Sharma, 2013).  
While some of the factors for Bihar’s laggard economic growth related to internal 
problems such as governance deficits (see below), it also suffered from several 
discriminatory economic policies from the federal government. For example, the 
Green Revolution, which brought about great economic prosperity in the 
northwestern states of Punjab and Haryana, largely bypassed Bihar even though the 
state seemed no less suited for it. The slow economic growth in the wake of rising 
demographic pressures has had a regressive impact on living standards. The living 
standards in the state remain low and incidence of poverty and deprivation high. In 
2008-09, the per capita income in the state barely amounted to INR 13,728 
(approximately US$ 275), representing one-third of India’s average per capita 
income (Government of Bihar, 2014b). Furthermore, in 2009-10, 53.5 percent of 
Bihar’s population lived below the official poverty line, as against the national 
average of 29.8 percent (Planning Commission, 2012). The state ranks the lowest in 
terms of literacy, with 36 percent of the population enumerated as completely 
illiterate in 2011; in comparison the literacy rate in the best performing state 
(Kerala) is 94 percent (Registrar General of India, 2011i, p. 110). Poverty and 
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deprivation take a particularly severe form in rural areas where much of the Bihar’s 
population lives, as noted earlier. This is also reflective of the highly unbalanced 
nature of state’s economy, hinging excessively on the rural end in the absence of 
any significant opportunities in the urban sector.  
The accumulated damage of decades of slow economic growth in Bihar also acted 
as a detriment for the state to reap the benefits of market reforms initiated in India 
since the early 1990s. Following the liberalisation of its economy, India has 
registered impressive economic growth and has become one of the fastest growing 
economies of the world. Although the distributional aspects of increasing wealth in 
India remain troubling, as alluded to in Chapter 1, the faster economic growth rates 
are, nevertheless, associated with overall poverty decline in India (Deaton & Dreze, 
2002). However, economic growth and poverty decline have hardly been uniform 
across Indian states and exhibit a regionally diverse pattern. Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that the new growth trajectory in India has resulted in a widening of 
regional inequalities in income and living standards. Findings of several studies 
indicate that the average incomes across Indian states have tended to diverge in the 
post reform period, with the income growth positively associated with the initial per 
capita levels of income of the states. The Indian states with better human and 
capital resources and infrastructure have been able to attract more investments and 
grow faster in the post-reform period (inter alia, Dasgupta, Maiti, Mukherjee, 
Sarkar, & Chakrabarti, 2000; Kurian, 2000; Rao, Shand, & Kalirajan, 1999; Sachs, 
Bajpai, & Ramiah, 2002). 
With Bihar sorely lacking in human capital and physical infrastructure, it is not 
surprising that the state slipped further behind most Indian states. The per capita 
income in Bihar, which was close to 60 percent of the Indian average during the 
1960s, declined to nearly 40 percent in 1993-94 and further to approximately 30 
percent in 2003-04 (Institute of Human Development, 2010, p. 1). In fact, in the first 
few years of market reforms, Bihar’s economy contracted. Between 1992-93 and 
1998-99, Bihar’s per capita income grew at (negative) –0.2 percent per year, 
whereas annual per capita income growth in Gujarat, for example, was 7.8 percent 
(Sachs et al., 2002, p. 33). Although Bihar’s economy has shown signs of revival in 
recent years, with economic growth in the state during 2007-12 being one of the 
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highest among all Indian states (Government of Bihar, 2014b), its impact on poverty 
and living standards is still quite muted. The state still occupies the lowest rank on 
several key indicators of social and economic development.  
Table 5.2: Trends in human development in India: an inter-state comparison of 15 
major states  
  1981 1991 2001 2007-08 
  HDI 
Value 
HDI 
Rank 
HDI 
Value 
HDI 
Rank 
HDI 
Value 
HDI 
Rank 
HDI 
Value 
HDI 
Rank 
Andhra Pradesh 0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416 10 0.473 9 
Assam 0.272 10 0.348 10 0.386 14 0.444 10 
Bihar 0.237 15 0.308 15 0.367 15 0.367 14 
Gujarat 0.360 4 0.431 6 0.479 6 0.527 6 
Haryana 0.360 5 0.443 5 0.509 5 0.552 5 
Karnataka 0.346 6 0.412 7 0.478 7 0.519 7 
Kerala 0.500 1 0.591 1 0.638 1 0.790 1 
Madhya Pradesh 0.245 14 0.328 13 0.394 12 0.375 13 
Maharashtra 0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4 0.572 3 
Orissa 0.267 11 0.345 12 0.404 11 0.362 15 
Punjab 0.411 2 0.475 2 0.537 2 0.605 2 
Rajasthan 0.256 12 0.347 11 0.424 9 0.434 11 
Tamil Nadu 0.343 7 0.466 3 0.531 3 0.570 4 
Uttar Pradesh 0.255 13 0.314 14 0.388 13 0.380 12 
West Bengal 0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8 0.492 8 
Source: National Human Development Report (HDR), 2001, p. 25 (for 1981, 1991 
and 2001) and India HDR 2011, p. 24 (for 2007-08) 
 
Table 5.2 presents HDI for 15 major Indian states from 1981 to 2007-08. The HDI 
index is a summary measure which assesses average performance in the three 
interrelated dimensions of education, health and standard of living. As is evident, 
most states have witnessed improvement in the HDI value over the period, 
suggesting improvements in human development indicators.53 It is important to 
note that there is hardly any change in the HDI rankings of states throughout the 
                                                        
53 On the other hand, between 2001 and 2007-08, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh 
witnessed a decline in their HDI scores while Bihar's HDI remained stagnant. 
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whole period and Bihar, although having witnessed some improvements in HDI 
values, has consistently occupied either the lowest or second lowest HDI rank 
among all major states.54  
From civilisational cornerstone to development curse: the decline of Bihar 
It is important to note that Bihar was not always one of the backward states of 
India. In fact, it once represented an economically, socially and cultural advanced 
region of country and indeed one of the cornerstones of Indian civilisation. Seat of 
the first all-India Empire, the Mauryan dynasty, some commentators have argued 
that in many ways “the history of ancient India [was] the history of ancient Bihar” 
(Thapar, 1966 cited in Mukherji & Mukherji, 2012, p. 2). The world’s oldest 
university, Nalanda, was set up in Bihar which for centuries served as a center of 
knowledge and learning. Buddhism flourished in the state before it spread more 
widely in the countries of East and South-east Asia. Furthermore, some of the 
earliest challenges to traditional hierarchies of caste and gender in India originated 
in Bihar (Sen, 2013, pp. 3-5). However, beginning from the late eighteenth century 
when the state came under British rule, Bihar declined in rank and clout. The fall of 
Bihar’s fortunes continued throughout much of the post-independence period, so 
much so that it came to be viewed as a ‘basket case’ in the Indian development 
discourse. It is perhaps not so much of a coincidence that the acronym BIMARU (as 
noted in Chapter 3, BIMARU is a Hindi word meaning ‘sick’ or ‘morbid’ which is used 
to describe the backward north-Indian states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Uttar Pradesh) begins with Bihar.55 There are many reasons for why Bihar slid 
down to occupy the bottom ranks among all Indian states. In the following section, I 
offer some of the explanations.  
                                                        
54 In HDR 2001, the HDI ranking of 15 states is provided whereas in HDI 2011, 23 states were 
ranked on their HDR performance. To ensure consistency and to elicit time trends, this table 
does not include the ranking of eight new states reported in the HDR 2011 for the period 2007-
08 and therefore, the HDI ranking of the states reported in this table varies from the report. 
Consistent with the usual procedure, the ranking of the states for 2007-08 reported here is 
nonetheless arrived at based on the HDI value of the respective states.  
55 The acronym BIMARU was coined by Indian demographer Ashish Bose in 1980s to classify the 
states which were socially, economically and demographically the most backward in the country. 
Distinguishing Bihar in the BIMARU group states in one of his later papers, he commented that 
“Bihar is a picture of anarchy” (Bose, 2000, p. 1699). 
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Permanent Settlement and its fallouts  
Much of the current backwardness of Bihar could be traced back to the faulty 
economic policies imposed by the British Raj which continue to impede its 
development even till today. In particular, a great deal of the state’s malaise can be 
attributed to the land revenue extracting system of Permanent Settlement 
introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 1793, which “sowed the seeds of Bihar’s decline” 
(Kumar, 2014). Under the British rule, Bihar (or for that matter, the entire eastern 
region of the Indian sub-continent) already received a disproportionately lower 
share of public investment in agriculture infrastructure compared to, say, the 
northwestern state of Punjab where the British made investments to restore and 
improve the canal systems for irrigation purposes (Timberg, 1982, p. 476; for a 
detailed account of canal irrigation in British India, see Stone, 1984). The Permanent 
Settlement fixed the amount of taxes that the Zamindars – big landlords who 
controlled land and collected rents from cultivators – needed to pay to the British 
government. Unlike the Ryotwari System followed in the Madras and Bombay 
provinces, in which revenues were linked with agricultural output, this change in the 
tax system aggravated the woes of the discriminatory investment policies of the Raj. 
The Permanent Settlement, which was introduced against the backdrop of falling 
agricultural production in India, was intended to incentivise the Zamindars to invest 
in land, as any additional revenues coming to Zamindars from the land added after 
1793 were not liable to be taxed. This also meant that the British government’s 
taxes were now not to be affected by the variability in agricultural production on 
account of environmental vagaries such as droughts and, more importantly, floods. 
In other words, while agricultural production was still subject to vagaries of climate, 
the taxes became shock-proof (Banerjee & Iyer, 2005; Mukherji & Mukherji, 2012).  
In the period of 30 years (between 1764 and 1793-94) before Permanent 
Settlement was implemented, the tax revenues in Bihar had already increased by 
300 percent (Dutt, 1960 cited in Bhaduri, 1976, p. 45). Fixing of rents without due 
regard to the harvest conditions produced quite disastrous outcomes; it weakened 
Bihar’s agriculture system and gave rise to new inequalities in land ownership. Far 
from encouraging investment in land, many Zamindars, particularly smaller ones, 
defaulted while the others resorted to passing on the increased tax demand to the 
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small peasants. The rural populations at the bottom of the social and economic 
strata were worst affected; their poverty and food insecurity increased. As Mukherji 
and Mukherji (2012, p. 18) recount: “The impoverishment of farmers and tillers 
continued throughout; small landowners sold out, farm labor became indentured, 
and the dismal situation of the already poor was made worse.” The big Zamindars 
who largely belonged to the Hindu high castes of Brahmin, Rajput, Bhumihar and 
Kayastha appropriated more land, although a greater proportion of these high caste 
Hindus were also landless or became so along with other backward classes. In many 
places, men from upper caste Zamindari families who lost their land migrated out in 
search of employment and took up manual labour jobs (de Haan, 2002, pp. 119-
120) which were hitherto prohibited under the caste hierarchies.  
In many districts of Bihar, the pauperisation of the peasant underclass (comprising 
the large majority of the state’s socially backward caste groups without access to 
land: Chakravarti, 2001; Sharma, 2005) was to the extent where they were unable 
to meet even their food needs. Added to this were recurrent famines. For example, 
the district of Saran in western Bihar (of which Siwan was earlier a part; see the 
discussion below) experienced five famines between 1770 and 1897 (O'Malley, 
1930, p. 69). And while no large-scale famines have occurred in post-independent 
India, Bihar was one of the two states (the other being Maharashtra) which 
experienced a severe famine in 1966-67 affecting 34 million people in the state 
(Brass, 1986, p. 247). In many cases, the incidence of migration was intimately 
connected with food shortages, and oftentimes, income from seasonal migration by 
household member(s), usually males, provided the only source to ensure the food 
security of the household.  
The Permanent Settlement debilitated Bihar’s agricultural economy, on which the 
fortunes of a large majority of Bihari population directly depended. It also resulted 
in an even more exploitative agrarian structure leading to widening of inequalities in 
landownership. In the post-independent years, efforts to remedy the colonial legacy 
of an inequitable agrarian structure through land redistribution policies in the state 
have remained beset with difficulties. Although Bihar was the first state in 
independent India to officially abolish the Zamindari System in 1950 (Sharma, 1995, 
p. 2593), this didn’t translate into improved access to land among the very poor, 
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particularly those belonging to the traditionally disadvantaged Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes.  
However, following the abolition of the Zamindari system, social formation of 
agrarian relations based around caste did witness some change. Although the end 
of Zamindari led to a mass eviction of sharecroppers and tenant cultivators who 
were the actual tillers of the land, big landlords from the high castes also saw their 
landholdings diminish. A new class of landlords belonging to the upper-middle caste 
groups such as Kurmi, Koeri and Yadavs (officially categorised as Backward Castes in 
contemporary Bihar) emerged. Mostly these were small and middle peasants who 
were able to consolidate their landholdings and position in society in the midst of 
Zamindari reforms (Sharma, 2005; Wilson, 1999).  
Notwithstanding this shift in agrarian relations, land control still remained the 
prerogative of the upper castes. More importantly, the situation of the communities 
at the bottom of social strata did not change, as noted above. The rural underclass 
including small peasants, sharecropper farmers and landless labourers (the large 
majority of the state’s population: Sharma, 2005) saw their fortunes only 
deteriorate. Those who worked as farm labourers continued to be under-paid or not 
paid at all. Poor peasants whose incomes were so low to meet even the bare 
minimum consumption needs resorted to borrowing from the big landlords and 
entered into relationships of “informal bondage” (Prasad, 1975, p. 931). Their social 
oppression, including sexual abuse of women, at the hand of landowning 
communities continued unabated (Sharma, 2005, p. 964).   
This continuous oppression of the least privileged by the landowning elites provided 
an imperative for peasant mobilisation. They organised under several peasant and 
agricultural labour organisations such as Mazdoor Kisan Sangarhsh Samiti 
(Committee for Peasants’ and Workers’ Rights) and Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha 
(Bihar State Peasant Union) that emerged to represent their interests. By the late 
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1960s, a radical ground-level politics, known as the Naxalite movement, began to 
challenge the existing order.56  
The Naxalite movement operated outside the purview of the constitutional 
framework of democracy, as it perceived the state not only to have ignored the 
plight of lower caste but also viewed it as being responsible for further abetting and 
accentuating the feudal structures. Although the movement had a broad objective 
of addressing the historical oppression of the lower castes in all dimensions 
including, for example, sexual exploitation of women, it was intimately connected 
with the issue of inequalities in land ownership. After all, control over land was the 
reason why the upper castes were able to rule.  
These peasant movements provided confidence and hope to the oppressed classes 
to regain their place and dignity in the society. However, these hopes were soon 
dashed. Worried about the threat peasant resistance and mobilisation posed to the 
order of the day, the landowning elites, allegedly in connivance with the state 
apparatus, formed private armies and launched attacks on the oppressed masses. 
Peasant resistance was met with what Sushmita (2014, p. 41) terms as “politics of 
massacres”. According to official estimates, in Bihar, between 1976 and 2001, the 
upper caste militia and police killed nearly 700 people belonging to Dalit and lower-
backward caste groups (Sushmita, 2014, p. 41). The most notorious of these 
landlord armies is Ranvir Sena, a militia of upper caste Bhumihar landlords. Formed 
in 1995, Ranvir Sena allegedly perpetrated 29 massacres between 1995 and 2005, in 
which 287 people from the backward lower castes were killed. In an incident that 
shocked the nation, on December 01, 1997 the members of Ranvir Sena massacred 
61 people, including 27 women and 16 children, from the lower backwards castes, 
mostly Dalits, in Laxamanpur Bathe village of Arwal district in Central Bihar 
(Mahaprashasta, 2013).  
                                                        
56 The Naxalite movement first originated in 1967 in Naxalbari village in West Bengal, in response 
to the attack on a tribal farmer by the local landlords who tried to prevent him to farm on the 
land for which he had obtained judicial orders to farm (Kujur, 2008, p. 2). Later, the movement 
spread to other parts of India. Currently, 106 districts of India are identified to be affected by 
Naxalism (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013).  
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The repression of the land and wage rights of the rural underclass by violent means 
instilled in them feelings of fear and insecurity. These continue to affect their 
everyday lives. Because the political and bureaucratic apparatus is largely 
dominated by the representation of the landowning communities, they have 
managed to prevent, to the extent possible, attempts that have sought to change 
the existing order (Chakravarti, 2001). Although Bihar has undergone a major 
transformation in recent years, particularly after the election of new government in 
2005, remnants of feudalism still remain widely prevalent in the state. Rural 
populations at the bottom of the societal structure continue to be deprived of their 
rights. Following the election of the new government, the state constituted a Land 
Reforms Commission under the chairmanship of D Bandyopadhyay, a former Indian 
Administrative Service official who was instrumental in the land reforms of West 
Bengal (a state which also carried a comparable colonial legacy of inequitable and 
exploitative land-tenure: Banerjee & Iyer, 2005). The Bandyopadhyay Commission, 
after a detailed study, submitted its report in 2008. However, its recommendations 
have not yet been implemented due to lobbying by the upper-caste landlords 
(Bandyopadhyay, 2008, 2009). In 2010, the Indian media reported that the newly 
elected Chief Minister of state, Nitish Kumar (who is widely credited for the state’s 
revival in recent years), was warned by an upper-caste leader of his own political 
party, Prabhunath Singh, that passing a law that sought to protect sharecroppers’ 
rights would push the state to the brink of civil war (Deccan Herald, 2010).  
These class-caste tensions in the agrarian landscape of Bihar have had a huge 
impact on the development of the state in the post-independence period. Though it 
has been more than 65 years since the British Raj ended, the deep scars left by the 
Permanent Settlement continue to affect the society and economy of Bihar (for 
more on Permanent Settlement in Bihar, its fallouts and legacy, see, inter alia, 
Banerjee & Iyer, 2005; Bhaduri, 1976; Das, 1983; Mukherji & Mukherji, 2012; 
Sharma, 1995, 2005). 
Discriminatory treatment by federal government  
If the faulty policies of the British government were responsible for pushing Bihar on 
the margins, the troubles of this eastern state were only compounded by the 
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political indifference of, and even discrimination by, the federal government in 
much of the post-independence period. The disadvantage of Bihar was magnified, 
firstly, by the federal government’s Freight Equalisation Policy of 1948 which 
remained in place until 1993. In order to promote industrial growth in all the 
regions of the country, this policy subsidised the transportation costs of raw 
materials such as iron ore and minerals. In other words, the inputs for industrial 
development were to cost the same everywhere in India. Before the bifurcation of 
the state in 2000 into Bihar and Jharkhand (the southern part of the Bihar was 
carved out to create the state of Jharkhand), Bihar was rich in natural resources and 
minerals. However, with the Freight Equalisation Policy, there was no incentive to 
set up industries in Bihar which prevented industrial development in the state. This 
obliterated what might have been a source of competitive advantage for Bihar vis-à-
vis other states (Singh and Stern, 2013, pp. xxi-xxii). With the agricultural sector 
already battling with the burden of high population growth rates and increasing 
class-caste tensions, this proved to be a double curse for Bihar.  
On the other hand, despite the Indian planning vision of balanced regional 
development, supposedly in which investments in underdeveloped regions have 
repeatedly figured as a development priority 57 , for the most part after 
independence Bihar has received inadequate fiscal transfers from the Central pool. 
For nearly a decade and half following independence (up until 1961), allocation of 
resources from the Center to States followed “no definite formula” (Planning 
Commission, 1997, p. 2) and the funds allocated were at the discretion of the 
government at the helm. Although the formulae for fund allocations have 
subsequently been improved, Bihar has got a disproportionately lower investment 
vis-à-vis many other Indian states. Guruswamy, Baitha, and Mohanty (2013) 
compare the economic experience of Bihar and Punjab (one of the most developed 
Indian states) within the wider context of regional inequalities in India. They show 
that in 1965, the average per capita income in Punjab was Rs. 562 (US$ 11), which 
                                                        
57For example, the second five-year plan (1956-61) document noted: “In any comprehensive 
plan of development, it is axiomatic that the special needs of the less developed areas should 
receive due attention … as development proceeds and large resources become available for 
investment, the stress of development programmes should be on extending the benefits of 
investments to underdeveloped regions”(Planning Commission, 1956).  
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was only 1.7 times higher than Bihar’s INR 332 (US$ 6.5). By 2001, Punjab’s per 
capita income of INR 25,048 (US$ 500) was five times than that of Bihar’s INR 5,466 
(US$ 110). This widening income gap between the two states, the authors argue, is 
directly attributed to the differentials in public investment by the federal 
government, with Punjab growing faster because of higher public investment (pp. 1-
2). They estimate that over the 10 five-year plans (1951-56 to 2002-07), whereas 
Punjab received Rs. 9742.19 crores (US$ 1.94 billion) more than the projected 
allocation, Bihar got Rs. 77,161.5 crores (US$ 15.4 billion) less than what it should 
have received (p. 18, Table 14). Furthermore, the additional allocation for Punjab 
does not factor in the huge investments in agricultural and irrigation facilities on 
which the success of India’s Green Revolution rested. 
Internal governance deficits  
Added to this discriminatory treatment by the Central government was the 
ineffective and corrupt political and bureaucratic administration that came to 
characterise Bihar since 1990. In that year, the Rashtriya Janata Dal party, headed 
by Lalu Prasad, formed government. With its focus on narrow individual political 
gains rather than the development of the state, the Rashtriya Janata Dal rule (which 
lasted three terms, from 1990 to 2005) pushed Bihar farther behind the 
development curve vis-à-vis other Indian states. Under the garb of progressive 
politics for the backward classes, Lalu Prasad often played a tactic of divisive 
sectarian politics centered around religion and caste.58 More importantly, it is 
during this time that Bihar went into the mode of lawlessness; crime (murders, 
ransom kidnapping, dacoities, rapes) and corruption increased substantially and the 
criminals and corrupt officers enjoyed political patronage. In fact, crime, corruption 
and lawlessness became synonymous with Bihar. As Sinha (2011, p. 227) writes: 
“When a daylight robbery or rape took place in Bengaluru, city residents would 
scream, ‘This is not Karnataka. This is Bihar.’” The money that came for 
development projects was siphoned off by the corrupt political and bureaucratic 
                                                        
58 To Prasad’s credit, the Janta Dal rule did have some positive impact on the emancipation of 
the Backward Castes. For instance, Witsoe (2013, p. 43) notes: “While Lalu systematically 
destabilised the institutions of governance and state-directed development, I suggest that this 
also catalysed a meaningful, although partial empowerment of lower caste” (cited in Desai, 
2013, p. 70).  
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apparatus, and no efforts were directed to improve the already deficient physical or 
human capital base. Kidnapping of rich industrialists by goons was so widespread 
that many of them fled to other parts of the country. Indeed, the governance 
deficits in Bihar were so acute that the state came to be known as Jungle Raj. In an 
article in The New York Times, Polgreen (2010) notes: 
Criminals could count on the police for protection, not prosecution. 
Highwaymen ruled the shredded roads and kidnapping was one of the 
state’s most profitable businesses. Violence raged between Muslims and 
Hindus, between upper castes and lower castes. Its economy, peopled by 
impoverished subsistence farmers struggling through alternating floods and 
droughts, shriveled. Its government, led by politicians who used divisive 
identity politics to entrench their rule, was so corrupt that it required a 
newly coined phrase: the Jungle Raj. 
Migration and food security in Bihar 
These conditions produced a climate of social and economic insecurity whereby a 
large proportion of the Bihari population was left with few livelihood options other 
than to migrate out of the state. Although some streams of work-related 
outmigration from Bihar were already well established as early as the late 
nineteenth-century (for example, migration to jute-mills in Kolkata and adjoining 
areas: Sen, 1999), in the 1990s the overall trend intensified.59 Heightened pressures 
to migrate were closely related to acute food shortages in Bihar. The state’s 
agriculture sector, already operating under intense population pressure60, stagnated 
and its capacities to ensure income and food security to the Bihari population 
                                                        
59 For example, a follow-up study in the six villages of three districts of Gopalganj, Madhubani 
and Purnea in north Bihar found that between 1982-83 and 1999-00, the incidence of migration 
in the study villages doubled. In 1982-83, 27.69 percent of households reported having one of 
more members working outside the village for work and this proportion increased to 48.63 of all 
households in 1999-2000 (Karan, 2003, pp. 112-113; also see Sharma, 2005). Of course, not all 
migration was a result of the distress situation at home and many people also responded to the 
better-employment opportunities that emerged in other parts of India but Bihar, after the 
advent of market reforms in early 1990s. 
60 Population growth rates in Bihar have been much higher than most states in the country. In 
2011, 35 out of 38 districts in Bihar state had a population size of more than a million people 
(Registrar General of India, 2011c). 
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dwindled. The food-based safety net programmes such as the PDS, were marred by 
huge problems of corruption.  
Notwithstanding the political reinvigoration and higher economic growth of recent 
years, a rampant incidence of food insecurity persists in the state. Although food 
insecurity in India as a whole remains high, the situation in Bihar is even worse. A 
comparison of hunger and undernourishment in 17 Indian states by the IFPRI61 puts 
food insecurity situation in Bihar as ‘alarming’. The state ranks 15th out of 17 states, 
only ahead of two other highly food-insecure states (Jharkhand and Madhya 
Pradesh). Seen in an international perspective, Bihar’s rank in hunger index is lower 
than many extremely poor countries in the Sub-Saharan African region such as Mali, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda  (Menon et al., 2009, pp. 11-19).  
Figure 5.1: District-wise prevalence of food insecurity in rural Bihar according to the 
Food Security Outcome Index 
Source: Own work using data from WFP-IHD’s Food Security Atlas of Rural Bihar, 
2009 (Table 3.2, p. 27). 
Almost half of the 38 districts in the state currently suffer from food insecurity in 
varying degrees. Figure 5.1 presents the district-wise picture of undernourishment 
                                                        
61 This uses the SHI (similar to IFPRI’s GHI) which takes into account three indicators of  i) calorie 
undernourishment, ii) prevalence of underweight among under-five children, and iii) under-five 
mortality rate. 
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prevalence in rural Bihar using the Food Security Outcome Index (FSOI), as reported 
in the Food Security Atlas of Rural Bihar, 2009.62 It is worth noting that food 
deprivation is largely concentrated in the northern part of Bihar (mostly in the areas 
above where the Ganges naturally divides the state into two unequal halves of 
north and south Bihar), which is relatively more backward than the southern part, 
though there some clear outliers (WFP-IHD, 2009, pp. 26-30).  
Although there are no recent estimates of household-level food insecurity for the 
state as a whole, in 1999-2000 it was estimated that nearly a quarter of all 
households in Bihar did not ‘get enough food all-year round’, with this proportion 
increasing to 45 percent among landless households and 65 percent among 
households whose primary occupation was local agricultural labour (Sharma et al., 
2000 cited in WFP-IHD, 2009, pp. 36-37). The household survey data collected for 
this study in 2012 on the ‘regularity of eating’ of 2286 individuals from 392 
households in Siwan suggested that 22 percent of individual members consumed 
‘two or less meals a day’ during the month preceding the survey. This proportion 
increased to 26 percent among households with no land, compared with 15 percent 
of households who owned an acre or more of land.63 
Does migration contribute to improving food security situation at the household-
level in Bihar, where a large proportion of households simply do not have access to 
enough land and the rural and urban non-farm sectors remain characterised by a 
dearth of income and employment opportunities?  
                                                        
62 The FSOI is a composite measure of food insecurity which measures food deprivation using 
two key indicators of underweight among under-five children and under-five mortality rate (data 
on calorie undernourishment, used in the SHI, are not available at district-level, though the 
methodology of both indices is different too). Based on these parameters, the different districts 
are classified into five categories of i) food secure, ii) moderately secure, iii) moderately insecure, 
iv) severely insecure and, v) extremely insecure (the index values of district range from 0 to 1, 
with low value corresponding to high food deprivation). 
63 To avoid recall lapse, the reference period on ‘regularity of eating’ (data for which was 
collected for each household member) was kept to a month preceding the survey. It must be 
noted that there were other food-consumption related questions which were administered 
through the survey and they all varied in reference period which followed the principle of ‘ease 
of recall’. For example, data on different food items consumed by the household (dietary 
diversity) had an even shorter period of 7 days preceding the survey.   
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At the district-level, there is evidence to suggest that migration is positively 
associated with food security. Figure 5.2 presents the inter-state outmigration rates 
(migrants as a proportion of total district population) for the districts of Bihar using 
the Indian Census 2001 data on migration. In total, 1.7 million people migrated from 
Bihar to other Indian states in the decade preceding 2001 (Registrar General of 
India, 2001a, p. 14).64 It is important to note that this Census data on migration does 
not take into account short-term migration which is a more dominant form of 
labour mobility from the state and severely underestimates the magnitude of 
migration (Breman, 2010; de Haan, 2002; Deshingkar et al., 2009; Karan, 2003). This 
also means that assessments based on Census migration data are likely to 
underestimate the overall impacts of migration. Yet, however, district-wise 
outmigration rates, in general, show a positive association with the food security 
situation in the district, as measured by FSOI (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.2: Inter-state outmigration rates for the districts of Bihar65 
 
Source: Own work using data Indian Census 2001 data on migration(Registrar 
General of India, 2001b) (Migration tables: D series). 
 
                                                        
64 The inter-state outmigration here refers to migration from Bihar to places (village, towns, 
cities) in other parts of India during the inter-censal period of 1991-2001. 
65 Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 do not include include Arwal district which became 38th district of 
Bihar in August 2001 when it was carved out from Jehanabad. 
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The broad picture that emerges from this map (Figure 5.2) suggests that the districts 
that have low outmigration are also the ones concentrated mainly in the northern 
part of Bihar, where food deprivation in high. As noted above, northern Bihar is 
relatively more economically laggard than the southern region and the low rates of 
livelihood diversification in the form of migration to distant places, it seems, goes 
some way in explaining the poor food security outcomes. For example, the districts 
of Araria, Supaul, Purnia, Saharasa in the north-east have low migration rate and 
low FSOI. On the other hand, the districts of Siwan, Saran, Gopalganj, Patna, 
Nalanda, Nawada have a relatively greater proportion of migrants and better food 
security scores. 
Figure 5.3: Scatter plot with estimated linearity curve on association between 
outmigration rate and Food Security Outcome Index for the districts of Bihar 
 
 
Indeed, the outmigration rate and food security have a reasonably strong 
statistically positive association. Figure 5.3 depicts this using the scatter plot with 
estimated linearity curve of association between these two variables. The adjusted 
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R2 value of 0.263, although not able to explain all the variation in FSOI values across 
districts given that several other factors also influence child underweight and child 
mortality (variables which FSOI uses), seems reasonably well fitted still.  
The results of linear regression estimates on the association between food security 
and outmigration are presented in Table 5.3. The results of both unstandardized 
coefficients and standardized coefficients reveal that food security and the 
proportion of migrants in the districts of Bihar are positively correlated, with the 
standardized coefficients showing much stronger association. In statistical terms, 
this suggests that one-unit change in the outmigration rates is positively associated 
with five-unit change in FSOI. The results are statistically significant with the p value 
<0.001 and t-test value of 3.67.  
Table 5.3: Linear regression estimates on the association between outmigration rate 
and FSOI for the districts of Bihar  
Model Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% 
confidence 
interval for B 
 Beta Std. Error Beta   
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) .478 .028  17.312 .000 .422 .535 
District 
outmigration 
rate 
 
.40 
 
.011 
 
.528 
 
3.676 
 
.001 
 
.018 
 
.062 
 
Case-study district: a brief profile of Siwan 
My field-research focused on the district of Siwan in western Bihar. As described in 
Chapter 4, this district was chosen because it exhibited a high rate of outmigration. 
Siwan came into existence as a separate district in 1972, prior to which it was one of 
the three sub-divisions of the larger district of Saran (the other two sub-divisions 
being Chapra – the then administrative headquarters of Saran – and Gopalganj). The 
district of Siwan, which translates into “border” in local-language Bhojpuri – an 
apparent reference to its erstwhile geographic location when it formed the 
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southern border of Greater Nepal – is one of the most densely populated districts of 
Bihar. 66  
In 2011, Siwan had a total population of 3.14 million people in a total land area of 
just 2,200 square kilometers (Government of Bihar, 2014a). To put these figures in 
perspective, there are nearly 400 more people on per square kilometer of land in 
Siwan than the state average of Bihar, a figure which, in itself, is higher than the 
average population density of India as a whole. And the data over the longer period 
highlights that this density gap (Siwan vis-à-vis Bihar and India) has only increased 
over the years (Table 5.4). The level of urbanisation in Siwan remains unusually low, 
with close to 95 percent of the population currently living in the rural areas. Though 
quite characteristic of Bihar – and, indeed of most under-developed countries – this 
combination of high population density and low urbanisation makes it one of the 
poorest districts of India.  
Table 5.4: Population density in Siwan, Bihar and India, 1981-2011 
Year Siwan Bihar India 
1981 801 402 216 
1991 978 685 267 
2001 1223 881 325 
2011 1495 1102 382 
Source(s): Registrar General of India (1981); Registrar General of India (2011c); 
Government of Bihar (2014e) 
The district has been identified as one of the 69 most backward districts of India 
facing acute deficits in living standards, food security, education and health care 
outcomes (Debroy & Bhandari, 2003). In 2009-10, annual per capita GDP for Siwan 
was estimated to be INR 8,111, which was 7 times less than the capital district of 
Patna’s GDDP of INR 55, 539 (Government of Bihar, 2013). Severely deprived of any 
major industrial activity, with no big private enterprises or public sector 
undertakings operating in Siwan, in 2011-12 the district had only 3,885 registered 
                                                        
66 Although no longer is Siwan part of Nepal, the locals still signify the same Bhojpuri meaning of 
Siwan by loosely referring to the internal border the district shares with the other Bhojpuri-
speaking districts of “Deoria” in its west and “Balia” in its south of the neighbouring state of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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micro and small enterprises employing 13,120 workers, including own-family 
members67; of which close to one-third (1246 units) were agro-based enterprises. 
However, the year-wise trends for the past quarter century in the number of micro 
and small enterprises registered and employment generated in the district show a 
decline, from 162 registered units employing 730 workers in 1984-85 to 65 units 
generating employment for 291 workers in 2010-12 (all data, MSME Development 
Institute, 2012, pp. 11-12). In Siwan, basic physical infrastructure such as roads and 
electricity is sorely lacking which has also, among other things, prevented any 
industrial development. Furthermore, the traditional forms of livelihoods such as 
pottery, brass work and embroidery, for which the district was once famous (Yang, 
1998), have also gradually disappeared.  
The local livelihoods in Siwan are heavily reliant on agriculture, with more than 60 
percent of the district’s population working as either own-account cultivators or 
agricultural labourers (Registrar General of India, 2011b). However, as is the 
broader case of Bihar, the nano-size of agriculture landholdings implies that for the 
large majority of rural dwellers, farming provides, at best, a subsistence option and 
not an income source. Furthermore, exponentially rising population pressures have 
further undermined the capacities of agriculture-based livelihoods to enable the 
district’s inhabitants to adequately meet their income and food needs. Already 
meagre in size, the average landholding size in Bihar has declined by half – from 
0.75 hectare in 1995-06 to 0.39 hectare in 2010-11 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014a). 
Although similar time-series data is not available at the district level, the cross-
sectional survey data collected for this study from 392 households in Siwan shows 
that the average landholding size of the 265 households who owned any farm land 
was a little less than 0.25 hectare.  
Poverty coupled with lack of gainful employment opportunities in Siwan means that 
a large majority of the district’s population depends on wage income options 
pursued in distant labour markets, usually outside the state. Although outmigration 
has been a key historical feature of the rural livelihood systems of Siwan (and 
                                                        
67 The evaluation report of the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) 
Development Institute, cited above, does not clarify if the workers involved included family 
members. However, given most small-scale enterprises in India are family-run units, it is a 
reasonable assumption. 
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indeed of Bihar in general), the significance of migration has increased over time. 
Not only is a greater number of rural dwellers seeking work outside but migration is 
also becoming of longer duration, unlike the earlier predominant pattern of 
seasonal mobility that occurred in agriculturally-lean seasons. It is also important to 
note that while much of the migration from Siwan tends to take place within the 
national boundaries, the district also has a high rate of international migration, 
involving mainly the unskilled and semi-skilled workers migrating to countries in the 
Middle East. Indeed, in some villages, almost every household has at least one 
member abroad (I discuss this issue in more details in Chapter 7). Though distress-
conditions at home remains an important migration pull, the decision-making 
matrices of households are complex and include, among other things, calculated 
strategies by households to spread income risks and accumulate savings. Below I 
attempt to place migration within the livelihood strategies of Siwani dwellers. 
Drawing from the history of migration from the district, I highlight the nature and 
patterns of migration from the districts and some of the changes in mobility 
patterns and streams.   
Rural livelihoods and culture of migration in Siwan: mobility in the past and 
present 
A key-feature of Siwan district throughout the past century and a half (as far as 
Census records are available) has been high demographic pressures on land (Table 
5.4). Colonial records suggest that since the first synchronous population Census of 
1881, the former district of Saran was consistently ranked as one of the most 
densely populated district of India, and within Saran, Siwan subdivision had the 
highest population density (O'Malley, 1930, p. 36; Yang, 1989). The high population 
pressures in western Bihar have meant that the region has historically lacked the 
ability to support its people. Furthermore, Saran’s proneness to natural calamities, 
especially floods but also droughts, added to the woes. Harvest failures were not 
uncommon, leaving people starved and dead. Since Saran came under colonial rule 
in the late-eighteenth century, the region witnessed five severe famines in 1769-70, 
1783, 1866, 1874 and 1897 (O'Malley, 1930, p. 69). The famine of 1769-70 is 
considered to be the most severe one since, in some areas of the region, it wiped 
out 50 percent of the total population (Yang, 1989, pp. 31-32). Nonetheless, the 
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agricultural land under cultivation in the Saran region as a whole was evenly 
distributed among three harvests of the year including aghani, bhadoi and rabi 
crops 68  which provided some protection against famines and recurrent food 
shortages. Famines occurred only when two of the three harvests failed. Siwan sub-
division, however, did not enjoy this buffer as it had a proportionally larger 
agricultural land dependent on the single aghani winter crop of rice (O'Malley, 
1930) and thus was among the most food scarcity-prone divisions of the district.  
The implementation of Permanent Settlement had wreaked havoc across the 
different regions of Bihar; agricultural production in the state suffered a blow and 
local livelihoods were disrupted, affecting, in particular, the class of small peasants 
and agricultural labourers. Because of its high demographic pressures on land, 
agricultural stagnation affected Saran District worse than virtually all other districts 
in Bihar, and at the beginning of twentieth century, it became “the first district [of] 
Bihar to reach the point at which it [could] no longer support an increase in its 
population in moderate comfort from the produce of the soil” (Fremantle, 1906 
cited in Yang, 1979, pp. 47-48). Poverty and food insecurity among the rural 
underclass increased and they resorted to work migration in large numbers. 
However, migration was not just restricted to the poor but involved people from all 
socio-economic strata. Although the Zamindari system meant that control over land 
determined one’s power and position in society, and hence, migrating out implied 
loss of land and status, intense pressure associated with land-based livelihoods 
meant that many people in the region did not mind deserting their land parcels. In 
any case, the average land sizes were too small and the region was characterised by 
“petty zamindars" (Hagen & Yang, 1976, p. 77). As Yang (1989, p. 182) writes: 
Under the British Raj, when control of land became a fundamental source 
of power, wealth and status, flight became far less promising as alternative 
to the raiyats [peasants]. Its continuance … therefore, highlights the intense 
pressures on peasants in Saran’s agrarian system. 
                                                        
68 Aghani was the winter crop harvested in the months of November-December, which included 
mainly rice and sugarcane. Bhadoi was harvested in the autumn season (August-September) and 
the crops grown included millet, rice, maura rice, corn and indigo. And rabi crop mainly included 
wheat and pulses, harvested in spring months of March and April (O'Malley, 1930; Yang, 1989) 
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Such was the extent of out-migration from Saran that in 1891, it was described as 
“one of the greatest emigrating districts in Bengal” (Bourdillon, 1898, cited in Yang, 
1979, p. 41).69 In total, there were 364,315 Sarani migrants enumerated outside the 
district in 1891 (Yang, 1979, pp. 41-42). While many families from the region left 
their land and migrated permanently to other places, mobility from Saran was 
largely of seasonal and circular nature which was connected closely with the local 
agricultural calendar and occurred outside the peak agricultural period. Yang (1979) 
characterises the seasonal migrant from Saran as an “optimizing peasant migrant” 
(p. 50) and suggests that seasonal migration was a deliberate strategy of the rural 
peasant populations of Saran which provided them an effective means to 
supplement their agricultural incomes without incurring the potential costs (such as 
leaving behind the established life and family) that permanent migration involved. 
This pattern of migration has continued even after the end of British Raj (de Haan, 
2002), though migration is now occurring for longer durations (see below). Another 
defining character of migration from the region has been that it has tended to be 
predominantly single-male migration, because social and cultural norms regarding 
the role of women pose restrictions on their mobility. As noted in Chapter 4, all the 
migrants in my study sample were males. Based on my interviews with male 
migrants and left-behind women, I will show in the later section of this Chapter, 
that this explains, to some extent, the circular nature of migration from Siwan. 
Though migration was largely a result of distress conditions at home, not all moves, 
however, represented push migration. Many people simply responded to better 
work opportunities in order to improve their standards of living. Migration did, no 
doubt, involve huge risks and Saranis willingly took onto them. In fact, the colonial 
administrators viewed the Bhojpuri-speaking population of Saran as distinctly 
different from the rest of Bihar when it came to their readiness to migrate. To quote 
Sidney Steward O’Malley, who served as the Collector of Bengal during the colonial 
rule:  
The Bhojpuri speaking country is inhabited by a people of curiously 
different from the other who speak Bihari dialects. They form one of the 
                                                        
69 Up until 1912, Bihar formed part of the Bengal Presidency. 
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fighting nations of Hindustan. An alert and active nationality, with few 
scruples and considerable abilities, dearly loving a fight for fighting’s sake, 
they have spread all over Aryan India, each man ready to carve his fortune 
out of any opportunity that may present itself. They have in former times 
furnished a rich mine of recruitment to Hindustani army and on the other 
hand they took a prominent part in the mutiny of 1857. As fond as Irishman 
of a stick, the long boned stalwart Bhojpuri with his staff in his hand, is a 
familiar object striding over the fields far from his home. Thousands of 
them have emigrated to British colonies and have returned rich men; every 
year still larger numbers wander over Northern Bengal and seek 
employment either honestly as palki-bearers or otherwise as dacoits. The 
larger Bengal land-holders each keep a posse of these men, euphemistically 
termed Darwans [Doorkeepers] to keep his tenants in order.  
        (O'Malley, 1930, p. 41) 
Although there were numerous streams of migration from the region, including to 
the far-flung British colonies in South-East Asia and Fiji in the South-Pacific, much of 
the migration from western Bihar in the pre-independence era was to the 
neighboring districts of Bengal, mainly Calcutta (now Kolkata). Following the 
development of the jute industry and railways in West Bengal towards the end of 
nineteenth century, many labourers from Bihar migrated there to work in the jute 
mills or as coolies at the railway stations. The greater variety of employment in 
Calcutta and its neighbouring towns resulted into local labour shortages in the jute 
mills and migrants from the poorer regions of Bihar and Orissa provided an easy 
source to fill this gap. As Sen (1999, p. 26), in her study of the jute industry in 
Bengal, writes:  
It is then not surprising that [jute] mills experienced periodic shortages of 
labour when they depended on local sources. Their problems were solved 
by the long-distance migrants. From the mid-eighteenth century, Bengal 
had begun to draw labour from Orissa and Bihar. 
Jute mills supported a large number of migrants from Bihar and other eastern 
provinces. Saran district, of which Siwan formed a part, topped the chart in terms of 
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the number of seasonal migrants coming to Calcutta to work in the mills (Sen, 1999, 
p. 27). However, the jute industry, which had already begun to stagnate by the late 
1920s in some parts of West Bengal, hit a ‘tipping point’ around late 1960s and 
employment opportunities in sector dwindled (de Haan, 1997b, p. 920). 
The employment stagnation in the jute industry of West Bengal occurred 
contemporaneously with the advent of Green Revolution reforms in the 
northwestern states of Punjab and Haryana. These latter events generated massive 
agriculture employment in these states. The streams of migration from Bihar thus 
shifted to these northwestern states and a large number of people from Bihar 
migrated as agricultural labourers. A study carried out by Singh (1995) in 1980-81 in 
two in-migration districts of Punjab (Ludhiana and Hoshiarpur) found that seasonal 
migrants from the north Bihar districts of Munger, Saharsa, Darbhanga, 
Muzzafarpur and Samastipur numbered between 2,00,000 and 5,00,000 workers. It 
must be noted that seasonal migration from Bihar to Punjab occurred even during 
the decade of 1980-90, the period marked by Sikh-militancy, of which several 
migrant labourers were also the victims. Singh (1997, p. 519) notes: “The flux of 
migrant labour from Bihar could never be deterred by the bullets of Sikh 'militants' 
despite their massacre during the turbulent period of 1981-91.”  
Although there are no independent studies that track the migrant flows from Siwan 
to Punjab for agricultural work, personal histories of several current migrants 
confirmed that Punjab was one of their favoured work destinations. Many migrants 
also reported working in the knitting industry in the Ludhiana district of Punjab. 
Migration for farm work to Punjab and Haryana remained a predominant stream of 
migration from Bihar up until early-1990s when agricultural productivity began to 
taper off, leading to an eventual reduction in demand for agricultural labour. 
The high incidence of poverty and lack of productive employment opportunities in 
Bihar continue to be major ‘push’ factors of migration from the state. However, 
more recent waves of migration involve new ‘pull’ motives and destinations. The 
rising incidence of rural-urban inequalities in India has resulted in a greater number 
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of rural dwellers now migrating to urban areas for work.70 Although rural-rural 
migration still remains strong, migration to urban areas is growing at a much faster 
rate. As noted in Chapter 1, the National Sample Survey data suggest that during 
2007-08, migration to urban areas grew at the rate of 3.5 percent as against 2.6 
percent to rural areas (National Sample Survey, 2010, p. 22).  
The household survey data collected for the present study on the current work 
destinations of migrants from Siwan suggests that most moved to urban areas. Only 
two out of 280 migrants worked as agricultural labourers and their average monthly 
income of Rs. 4,000 was the lowest among all the other occupational groups. In 
terms of urban work destinations, although migrants from Siwan were spread out 
across different parts of India, migration was found to be highly concentrated into 
the Tier 1 cities that dominate the Indian economy.  
Figure 5.4 shows the major migration destinations from Siwan during 2011-12, as 
reported by their household members at origin village. With the total migrants 
numbering 280, a “major migration destination” is defined here as a place where 
there were 15 or more migrants from Siwan. In total, 161 migrants (65.4 percent) 
were reported to working in just seven cities. The National Capital of Delhi had the 
highest number of Siwani migrants (51 migrants), followed by the age-old 
destination of Kolkata (26 migrants). Other migration destinations included 
Bangalore (20 migrants), Pune (16 migrants), Mumbai (16 migrants), Faridabad (16 
migrants) and Surat (15 migrants). Labour migration to Pune, Faridabad, Bangalore 
and Delhi is connected with the increasing real estate activities in these cities as 
most of the migrants were reported to be engaged in the construction sector.  
Most migrants belonging to the sample household were engaged in casual work and 
lacked secure employment tenure. Yet, unlike the earlier pattern of short-term 
migration which mostly coincided with the agricultural cycle at the origin, the 
                                                        
70 There is evidence that rural-urban income and wage gaps in India, although always persistent, 
have widened in the post- liberalisation period. Real agricultural wages in the 1990s grew at an 
average rate of 2.5 percent, half of the average annual growth rate of 5 percent in the 1980s, 
whereas annual urban incomes grew more rapidly more rapidly during the 1990s (Deaton & 
Dreze, 2002). However, even the lower growth of the real agricultural wages are associated with 
rural poverty decline in India (Deaton & Dreze, 2002, pp. 3737-3738).  
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household survey data suggest that a large number of Siwani households now have 
members who are spending more time away from the village for work.  
 Figure 5.4: Major migration destinations from Siwan, 2011-12 
 
 Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
 Note: The borders of this map do not purport to be the official borders of India. 
 
Figure 5.5 presents the distribution of migrant households by their members’ 
duration spent away from the village for work during 2011-12. Out of 197 migrant 
households, members of 178 households spent 7 months or more outside the 
village for work, and 139 households reported that their migrant members were 
away for 10 months or more during the past year. This, of course, does not mean 
that migrants did not make visits back home. With the exception of 41 out of 280 
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migrants, all migrants returned home in the past year, with close to half of the them 
(134 migrants) visiting home two times or more.   
Figure 5.5: Distribution of surveyed migrant households by migrant members’ 
duration of stay away from village, 2011-12 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
My fieldwork suggested that not all migrants, particularly those working in 
construction industry as masons or helpers, were able to find work on a regular 
basis. Nonetheless, in general, the average wages in the cities were more than the 
wages in the villages which allowed most migrants to save and remit money home 
even after accounting for expenses at destinations such as rent, electricity and food. 
In many cases, the motivation to migrate in itself was deeply connected by the 
prospects of savings that migration allowed. For example, a migrant respondent, 
whom I met in the origin village, told me:  
It is not impossible to get work here [in the village]. While I may not get 
work all year round but work irregularity hangs on my head everywhere. But 
if I work in the village, I know I cannot save even a single penny. Saving is 
impossible from the little everyday earning here, whereas I am able to save 
working outside the village. At least, my children do not ask for pocket 
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money when I am away and you know how hard it is to refuse money to 
your children.   
Though the longer duration spent away from home is driven by a complex mix of 
push and pull factors which vary from one household to another, it is also indicative 
of the increasing significance of migration in the livelihood systems of rural 
households in Siwan. That said, much of the migration from Siwan is still circular. 
Consistent with de Haan’s (1999, 2002) findings in Saran District, my fieldwork 
suggested that most migrants in Siwan returned home to visit their families and 
friends, albeit they now spent less time in the village than what the earlier research 
seemed to suggest. With migrants now spending more time away from home in 
non-farm activities, it seems that the dual “optimizing peasant migrant” character of 
rural dwellers from western Bihar, as suggested by Yang (1979, p. 50), is gradually 
weakening. On the other hand, however, most migrants tended to invest their 
savings in household-owned land and agriculture in the origin village which in turn 
allowed them to maintain their peasant identities. This carries important 
implications for food security, particularly in places of origin. How circular migration 
provides a potential pathway to influence household food security is discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
Another defining feature of migration from Siwan is that it is almost exclusively 
undertaken by the male members of the household while the women stay behind. It 
is striking to note this single-male pattern of migration has continued throughout 
the past century, as reflected in the higher number of females than males in the 
district. Based on the Population Census data, Table 5.5 presents the general sex 
ratio (females/1000 males) of Siwan and Bihar from 1901 to 2001. As is evident, the 
number of females in Siwan has consistently outnumbered males throughout the 
past century, while the sex ratio in Bihar began to decline after 1961 though 1931 
marks an exception.  
In 2001, the sex ratio for India as a whole stood at 933 females on every 1000 males 
(Registrar General of India, 2001d), a shortfall of roughly 70 females per 1000 males 
from the biological norm (Anderson & Ray, 2010, p. 1262). A range of studies have 
highlighted that the imbalance in sex ratio in India is due to the strong son 
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preference in the country which manifests itself into widespread treatment 
differentials and discrimination against girls in matters such as health care, food and 
nutrition and education, with the overall negative effect on survivorship of the 
females (inter alia, Bardhan, 1974; Boserup, 1970; Das Gupta, 1987, 2005; Miller, 
1981; Sen, 1990, 1992).  
Table 5.5: Sex ratio (females/1000 males) in Siwan and Bihar, 1901-2001  
Year Bihar Siwan 
1901 1061 1199 
1911 1051 1151 
1921 1020 1066 
1931 995 1038 
1941 1002 1082 
1951 1000 1118 
1961 1005 1154 
1971 957 1076 
1981 948 1070 
1991 907 1017 
2001 921 1033 
Source: Government of Bihar (2014d)  
Seen in comparative perspective, in 2011 Siwan district had 100 more females per 
1000 males compared to the sex ratio of India. This imbalance in the favour of 
women is not because of any absence of son preference in Siwan. It is deeply and 
rigidly entrenched in rural society in Siwan. The emanating difference owes largely 
to the effects of single-male migration outflows from the district which, in turn, are 
guided by the social and cultural conventions posing restricting on the participation 
of women in distant labour markets. Not only do the societal norms prohibit the 
women to take up employment outside the village but the possibility of women 
joining their husbands at their destination places is also considered socially 
unacceptable. In regards to the latter, while many migrants indicated that they 
found it economically unviable to bring their wives along, and economic reasons 
also figured prominently in the responses of migrants’ left-behind wives surveyed at 
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the origin, this is not the only explanation. During my fieldwork, many respondents 
alluded to the disruptions it can cause to the functioning of the households. For 
example, Ahmad (name changed), a migrant I interviewed, told me that when his 
daughter developed a major health problem, he decided to seek her treatment in 
Delhi, as it had better health care infrastructure and services than Siwan. He 
brought his wife along to take care of the daughter so that he could continue to 
work and pay for his daughter’s health expenses. The treatment required making 
periodic visits to the hospital and lasted around a year. When the treatment finally 
finished and the hospital visits were no longer required, Ahmad went to drop his 
wife and daughter back to the village. Upon their return, however, his mother 
separated his family from the joint household as she viewed Ahmad’s decision to 
take his wife along to the city did not involve any consideration that his wife is 
supposed to take care of his mother in her old age. In fact, interviews with many of 
the left-behind wives revealed a puzzling dichotomous response. When the stay-put 
wives of the migrants were asked that if given a chance, would they like to stay with 
their husband at their place of destination, many women expressed a strong desire 
to live with their husband; at the same time, they wanted their daughter-in-laws to 
stay in the village and take care of them. Equally importantly, some wives of the 
migrants also informed me that they wanted to live in the village and take care of 
the family elders and children, from which they appeared to derive their sense of 
self-worth (I discuss the factors underlying male-only pattern of migration in more 
details in Chapter 8). This provided a reason for the males to return home and 
explains, to some extent, the circularity of migration.  
Male-only migration seems to also trigger fundamental changes in power relations 
at the household-level. Absence of male members seems to be resulting into 
women assuming more proactive role in the household affairs, in matters financial 
and otherwise, which also has the potential to affect household food security. 
Whether and how this correlates with food security is explored in details in Chapter 
8. It is rather surprising that despite male-migration being the norm in most 
countries in the developing world, research evidence is scarce on how the resultant 
changing household gender dynamics may impact food security within the 
household.  
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Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided a broad overview of the economy and society of Bihar. 
The discussion above has highlighted that a combined effect of discriminatory 
economic and investment policies, social tensions along the lines of caste and 
governance failures has led the state to slide down from the commanding heights of 
Indian civilisation to a “basket case of irrelevance” (Singh and Stern, 2013, p. xvii). 
Decades of economic stagnation in the wake of high population pressures has 
produced a climate whereby migration has become an inseparable part of rural 
households of the state.  
This Chapter has also shown that mobility in Siwan (and in western Bihar in general) 
has been much more pronounced than the popular rural-equates-agriculture 
paradigm of thinking seems to suggest. It is worth noting that though the streams 
and duration of migration have undergone changes over the years, two central 
characteristics of mobility from western Bihar remain largely intact. This includes, i) 
circular nature of migration, and ii) male-dominated migration. These patterns of 
migration imply that there are two key pathways through which migration may have 
a potential bearing on household food security: firstly, the linkages that circular 
migration creates between rural-urban economies through remittances; secondly, 
through the changes triggered by single-male pattern of migration at the household 
level, with household responsibilities and decision-making falling invariably more on 
the women in the absence of the men. In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, I discuss the 
ways in which these relationships between migration patterns and food security 
play out. In the next Chapter, however, I address the connections between the 
institutional arrangements pertaining to the food and livelihood security in rural 
Bihar and migration.  
The analysis of the government-run food and livelihood programmes in Bihar is 
timely. As noted above, following the election of new state government in 2005, a 
range of governance reforms has been initiated to revive the state. Indeed, some 
positive signs are already visible. The state of law and order has improved 
remarkably and no longer is Bihar in the grip of Jungle Raj. The growth rate of 
Bihar’s economy has also surged, growing at an average rate of 12 percent during 
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2007-13 (Government of Bihar, 2014b). The arena of food and livelihood safety 
schemes has not been left untouched by these reforms to improve the food security 
of rural poor. These governance reforms have led to claims on the decreasing 
incidence of migration from the state.71 Drawing from the household survey data 
collected from Siwan, I examine these claims in the next Chapter. 
 
                                                        
71 In 2012, the Chief Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, was quoted by national media as saying that 
as a result of development reforms, including the operations of social safety nets of PDS and 
NREGS, initiated under his premiership since 2005, the overall incidence of migration from the 
state has declined and the farmers and entrepreneurs in other parts of the country complained 
of labour shortages (The Hindu, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 6: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN FOOD SAFETY NETS AND 
MIGRATION  
Introduction 
A key issue facing a large majority of India’s vulnerable rural populations is their 
inability to avail the benefits of state-assisted social protection schemes. Although 
public expenditure on social protection in India remains notoriously low compared 
to many other countries at similar stages of economic development (Dreze & Sen, 
2013), numerous public assistance programmes – both in-kind and cash-income 
support – currently exist with the purpose of providing some form of social 
protection to the poor and vulnerable.72 Because of the exclusionary nature of 
economic growth in India in the post-liberalisation period, the cause of 
strengthening social protection has been given further impetus in recent years. This 
has been reflected in the dominant narrative of “inclusive development” (Planning 
Commission, 2006, 2008) that has come to characterise social and economic 
development policy thinking in India in the past decade. Social protection forms an 
integral feature of this broad-based vision of development trajectory.  
With India having among the worst food and nutritional indicators in the world, not 
coincidentally, a major thrust of social protection policy in recent years has been on 
food-based safety nets, particularly for rural populations. It is important to note that 
while the country has a long-history of running an extensive set of food-based 
safety nets (for example, in its current form as a social safety net the PDS that 
provides subsidised food rations to poor families has been in place since the late 
1960s)73, unlike previous times, policy considerations of food security are now 
based on the recognition of the constitutional “right to food”. A landmark event in 
                                                        
72 According to the India Human Development Survey 2005 data, some 13 percent of all Indian 
households received direct income supplements from the government (Desai et al., 2010, p. 17). 
73 The history of PDS dates back to pre-independent India. The British first started the PDS in 
1939 as a wartime rationing measure in select regions of India. The food shortages of mid-sixties 
highlighted the importance of continuing and strengthening the programme, and in late 1960s it 
was extended to whole of India (Swaminathan, 2002, p. 2). And while the PDS has undergone 
changes in its design and scope during the recent years, it remains an important food-based 
safety net scheme. 
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this regard is the passage in 2013 of the right to food law (NFSA 2013) that 
enshrines the constitutional right to food for poor and vulnerable population groups 
(Government of India, 2013a). Thus, no longer is food security a matter of public 
policy discretion; instead, the state is now legally obligated to ensure that the 
minimum food needs of the poor and vulnerable are met (Pritchard et al., 2014, p. 
114).  
The three major food-based safety net programmes in India are the Public 
Distribution System (PDS), National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) 
and the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS). The aim of this Chapter is to 
review these interventions and ask how they interact with household food security 
and migration, the two core social processes at the heart of this thesis. 
The Chapter argues that notwithstanding the importance of these policy initiatives, 
the current state of these schemes in India is plagued by huge problems of 
maladministration, corruption and leakages, thereby effectively preventing 
vulnerable rural populations from reaping their benefits. These inefficiencies 
provide a strong imperative for the rural poor to devise their own livelihood security 
mechanisms.   
Migration can be viewed as one of the most important of these livelihood 
strategies. Rural India is characterised by a preponderance of smallholder 
households whose already low farm output and income are subject to adverse 
shocks from erratic monsoon and several crop diseases (for example, see 
Townsend, 1994). Such rural households, whose local livelihoods are subject to 
recurrent and transitory shocks and to whom social protection may not always be 
available, may seek to spread and mitigate income risks by geographic dispersion of 
their members across different economic activities. As noted in Chapter 2, this is 
one of the central premises of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
(Stark, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985). According to NELM, risk-aversion is identified as 
a central determinant of migration decisions of rural households. A key starting 
point of NELM is that in many developing countries, because of weak formal and 
informal institutional mechanisms (for example, financial, credit and labour 
markets), small-farmer households have strong incentives to send one of more 
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members to distant urban locations to achieve a livelihood portfolio that lowers 
income risks. In other words, migration provides a risk-reducing and insurance-
maximising strategy to rural households to allocate household labour more 
efficiently in order to achieve a diversified livelihood portfolio (Stark, 1978, 1981, 
1991; Stark & Levari, 1985).  
The entwined themes of migration and social protection have particular relevance 
in contemporary Bihar. As noted in Chapter 1, the administration of social welfare 
schemes is ironically the weakest in poor states and regions which need it the most 
(Bardhan, 2011, p. 39). Bihar remains among most economically backward states of 
India, notwithstanding the high economic growth in the state in recent years. The 
high incidence of poverty coupled with lack of gainful livelihood options in the state 
implies that safety nets such as PDS, NREGS and ICDS represent crucial means of 
delivering food security to its most vulnerable citizens. At the same time, grounded 
realities of the functioning of these schemes suggest that they are riddled with 
massive corruption and maladministration. Notwithstanding the “culture of 
migration” from the state, involving moves that are not necessarily caused by 
livelihood distress, it is reasonable to expect that the incidence of migration from 
the state would have been much less in the presence of effectively functioning 
social safety nets. 
Against this background, this Chapter critically assesses the three food-based safety 
nets of PDS, NREGS and ICDS, drawing primarily on the field-evidence collected from 
Siwan. In each case, while an overview of the scheme at the national level is 
provided, the focus is invariably centered more on Bihar. Placing the importance of 
these institutional arrangements in the lives of disadvantaged rural populations of 
Bihar, I highlight the wide discrepancies that currently exist between the design, 
attributes and intentions of these programmes and their on-ground 
implementation, ultimately leaving the rural poor to devise their own strategies to 
meet their food security needs.  
Public Distribution System 
The Public Distribution System (PDS) is the largest permanent public welfare 
programme operated by the Government of India (Svedberg, 2012, p. 53). A 
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producer-cum-consumer subsidy programme, the PDS serves the dual purpose of 
protecting farmers as well as poor and vulnerable households. Under the PDS, the 
Government procures foodgrains (mainly wheat and rice) from the farmers at a 
Minimum Support Price (MSP) thereby preventing them from market fluctuations. 
(The MSP is often higher from the market price which also acts as an incentive for 
farmers to produce.) Then, through a vast network of approximately half-a-million 
government-licenced Fair Price Shops (FPS) the PDS provides foodgrains at 
subsidised prices to the poor in order to help them meet their minimum calorie 
requirements.   
Until 1992, the scope of PDS was universal. Given the poverty-alleviation mandate 
of the programme and high transaction costs of subsidising the non-poor (Parikh, 
1994; Radhakrishna, Subbarao, Indrakant, & Ravi, 1997), the scheme was 
transformed, firstly in 1992 into the Revamped Public Distribution System (to reach 
out to the poor and vulnerable population segments located in geographically 
isolated and climate-prone regions) and then, in 1997, into the Targeted Public 
Distribution System (TDPS), which used economic status of the households to assess 
their eligibility for PDS benefits. Under the TDPS (currently in operation, though the 
common acronym PDS is still widely used), households are classified in accordance 
with a set of socio-economic parameters and provided with a ration card on this 
basis. Across India, the three core PDS card categories are Above Poverty Line (APL), 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) (poorest of the poor). 
Originally, the changes implemented through the TDPS classified households into 
APL and BPL groups. The AAY was started in 2000, with the aim of addressing the 
problem of hunger among the poorest BPL households. As per the last updated 
estimates by the Central government, there are 40.9 million BPL households, 24.3 
million AAY households and 115 million APL households (Government of India, 
2013b, p. 23). Following the changes introduced in 1997, the BPL and Antyodaya 
households are provided with subsidised foodgrains while the central subsidies for 
APL households have been done away with (Khera, 2011a, 2011b).  
Although PDS is a centrally-sponsored scheme, independent Indian states enjoy 
considerable degrees of autonomy in programme management. By and large, the 
role of the central government ends at pegging the number of poor in each state, 
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according to which food grain allocations are made. However, states can expend 
additional resources to widen the coverage, entitlement levels and range of 
commodities offered to beneficiaries. Consequently, wide differentials in PDS 
eligibility rules exist across the states. For example, while most states have set 
inclusion-exclusion criteria for PDS eligibility, the Southern state of Tamil Nadu has a 
universal PDS covering all households (Khera, 2011b).  
In Bihar’s case, the state government has sought to implement the PDS under 
conditions of dire poverty and chronic under-funding from the Centre. Bihar 
remains extremely backward, with 53.3 percent of its population classified as poor 
in 2009-10 (Planning Commission, 2012). The deep-rooted incidence of poverty in 
Bihar implies heavy reliance on PDS allocations throughout the state. However, the 
state has estimated that Central government PDS disbursements fall well below 
their needs. In the Economic Survey 2011-12, the Government of Bihar listed 13.5 
million households as BPL and a further 2.5 million households as Antyodaya 
whereas the Central government allocated Bihar with food grains of 35kg/month for 
only 6.52 million households (Government of Bihar, 2012). To make up for this 
shortfall, the State has allocated BPL households with (only) 25kg of food grains per 
month. (Antyodaya households are nominally provisioned with 35kg monthly.) 
Notwithstanding this reduced allocation to the large cohort of BPL households in 
the state, the Government of Bihar is still required to incur ancillary expenditure on 
the PDS. The PDS in Bihar also provides a monthly allocation of 2.75 litres of 
subsidised kerosene to all households, irrespective of their ration card status (Table 
6.1).  
The household survey sample in Siwan consisted of 167 BPL households, 159 APL 
households and 24 Antyodaya households.74 Table 6.2 presents the background 
characteristics of the study sample by their PDS ration card status. By caste status, 
about 60 percent of the households in both the Antyodaya and BPL card categories 
were members of Scheduled Castes/Tribes (SC/ST) and Extremely Backward Castes 
                                                        
74 Out of the total survey sample of 392 households, 42 households (10.7% of the sample) did not 
have ration card of any kind and hence, they have been excluded from this analysis. 
 
 178 
(EBC). However, of the households with an APL card, only 37.4 percent were SC/ST 
or EBC.  
Table 6.1: Number of beneficiary households, PDS commodities and entitlements by 
PDS card category, Bihar 
Type of household 
Number of 
household 
(in million) 
Monthly PDS Entitlements 
Wheat 
(kg). 
(Rupees) 
Rice 
(kg.) 
(Rupees) 
Kerosene 
(litre) 
(Rupees) 
Antyodaya 2.5 14 (3) 
21 
(2) 
2.75 
(12.82 to 13.71) 
Below poverty line 13.5 10 (6.78) 
15 
(5.22) 
2.75 
(12.82 to 13.71) 
Above poverty line 2.975 n.a. n.a. 2.75 (12.82 to 13.71) 
Source: Compiled from Economic Survey of Bihar, 2011-12, p. 229  
Table 6.2 also displays the close association between card status on the one hand, 
and poverty and deprivation on the other. This is starkly apparent with regards to 
the key socio-economic indicators of literacy, dwelling type, Monthly Per Capita 
Expenditure (MPCE) and landholding status. Nevertheless, reflective of the dire 
state of material circumstances in the survey area, close to half of the APL 
households had consumption expenditure levels lower than the official poverty line.  
This is consistent with the evidence from other studies that suggest that transition 
from universal to targeted PDS in 1997, which hinged on the logic of targeting the 
poor better, on the contrary, has come at the expense of exclusion of a significant 
bulk of deserving poor from PDS while including the better-off households in its 
ambit (inter alia, Dreze & Khera, 2010; Hirway, 2003; Khera, 2008; Planning 
Commission, 2005; Ram, Mohanty, & Ram, 2009; Sahu & Mahamallik, 2011; 
Swaminathan & Misra, 2001).  
  
                                                        
75 There is no official data on the number of APL households in Bihar and this figure is arrived at 
by subtracting the BPL and Antyodaya households from the total number of households in Bihar, 
which, in Census 2011, were enumerated to be 18.9 million (Registrar General of India, 2011b). 
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Table 6.2: Background characteristics of surveyed households by PDS card category 
  
Antyodaya BPL APL 
Average household size (In persons) 5.21 5.65 6.33 
Female respondents  58.3 46.7 45.9 
Illiterate respondents 79.2 59.3 55.1 
Caste of the household    
Forward Caste 0.0 7.8 10.1 
Backward Caste 41.7 32.3 52.8 
Extremely Backward Caste 45.8 33.5 20.8 
Scheduled Caste & Schedule Tribe 12.5 26.3 16.4 
Type of house occupied    
Kutcha 16.7 25.7 13.8 
Semi-pucca 66.7 41.3 31.4 
Pucca 16.7 32.9 54.7 
Land and livestock ownership and migratory labour 
Landless households 62.5 36.5 17.6 
Households with less than 1 acre land 100.0 85.8 81.7 
Household who own any livestock 54.2 66.5 69.8 
Households with one of more members 
working outside the village 50.0 41.9 55.3 
Consumption expenditure and poverty    
Average MPCE (in Rs) 623 838 996 
Household with MPCE below poverty line1 70.8 59.3 49.7 
Total number of households (n) 
(%age) 
24  
(6.9%) 
167  
(47.7%) 
159  
(45.4%) 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. All data in percentage terms 
unless specified otherwise. 
1MPCE = Monthly Per Capita Expenditure. The Planning Commission’s recent 
revision of state-specific poverty lines for 2009-10, based on Tendulkar committee’s 
estimates, pegs the rural poverty line in Bihar at Rs. 655.6. The same has been 
applied to this survey data to estimate consumption poverty. 
This problem persists at a large scale in rural Bihar where disadvantaged segments 
of the population often find it hard to press their claims on PDS eligibility due to 
powerful social hierarchies of caste and class. During my fieldwork in Siwan, a senior 
villager, aware of the BPL enumeration process, told me:  
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People who have pukka houses, two-three acres of land, whose members 
are in stable jobs (some even in government jobs), have BPL cards. On the 
other hand, there are families left out whose stoves do not burn the day 
they do not find work. 
Disappointed with the way BPL cards are distributed, another villager sarcastically 
suggested, “I thought we were poor but it seems all the landlord families belonging 
to high-caste Rajput are poorer than us. After all, they all have a BPL card whereas 
we do not.” 
The severity of this problem from the perspective of the role of the PDS in 
improving the food security of vulnerable households is reflected in the data on 
household food insecurity. Table 6.3 depicts various indicators of self-reported food 
insecurity by type of PDS card held by the household. The surveyed households 
were asked a range of questions to assess if at any time during the year preceding 
the survey they faced food shortages. The data in Table 6.3 refers to the proportion 
of households who reported having faced food inadequacy and food unavailability 
at least once in the past year.  
A few points from data in Table 6.3 need consideration. First, while the percentage 
of APL households reporting food inadequacy and food unavailability is almost half 
as that of BPL and Antyodaya households across most self-reported food insecurity 
parameters, a considerable proportion of APL households remain food insecure. 
Second, lack of dietary diversity appears to be a major problem among both BPL/ 
Antyodaya and APL cardholders. More than 60 percent of BPL/Antyodaya 
households and 30 percent of APL households reported having meals without 
vegetables and having meals that did not have the basic combination of cereals, 
pulses and vegetables. Village-based observation revealed that the day-to-day diets 
of many households comprised only of rice and a potato-based meal of some form. 
Third, coping strategies were diverse and sometimes extreme (including selling 
valuable household assets like jewellery, and engaging in distress-induced 
migration).  
Furthermore, irrespective of the householder card status, the PDS in Bihar is 
afflicted by woeful delivery inefficiencies. The PDS in Bihar has historically been  
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Table 6.3: Household food security by PDS card category 
  
BPL & 
Antyodaya 
(%) 
APL 
(%) 
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations) 
Household ate meals without vegetables 60.2 31.4 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS 38.2 - 
Household members consumed single meal a day 17.3 16.4 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, 
vegetables) were not available 61.3 30.8 
If household members got less food than the amount to 
satiate hunger 50.3 27.7 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations) 
Household borrowed money from friends and/or relatives 
to buy food 22.5 16.4 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money 
lenders or lifted ration on credit to acquire food 40.3 17.6 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy 
food 1.6 0.6 
Someone in the household out-migrated for work 18.3 15.1 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than usual) 59.2 28.9 
Total number of households (n) 191 159 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
riddled with huge problems of pilferage and leakage. A nationwide performance 
evaluation of the scheme by the Planning Commission estimated that 75% of PDS 
food grains did not reach the intended beneficiaries in Bihar, compared to the 
national average of 57% (Planning Commission, 2005). Comparable National Sample 
Survey data analysed by Khera (2012) suggested that in the same year (2004-05), 
91% of the PDS food grains in Bihar were diverted from their eligible recipients. Five 
years later, in 2009-10, while most major states had improved their PDS 
performance (the incidence of grain diversion in Chhattisgarh, for example, fell from 
52% to 10% between 2004-05 and 2009-10), the progress in Bihar was much slower, 
and in 2009-10, 75% of the PDS food grains in Bihar still failed to reach their 
intended beneficiaries (Khera, 2012). The FPS-beneficiary interface is the core site 
where PDS leakage occurs. The Planning Commission (2005, p. ix) calculated 
(conservatively) that more than 50% of food grain diversion in Bihar occurs at the 
FPS level.  
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These contexts have framed extensive attempts to reform the PDS in Bihar. The 
election of a new Government in 2005 is widely interpreted as heralding an 
opportunity for dramatic institutional reforms within the state. It is certainly the 
case that since 2005 there have been wide-ranging governance reforms in Bihar 
(Singh & Stern, 2013; Sinha, 2011) and the arena of food-based safety nets has not 
been untouched by it. To contain corruption and illegal diversion of food grains 
from the PDS, in 2007, the then Chief Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, introduced a 
system of PDS coupons as a transparency measure. The system is supposed to 
operate as follows. Every beneficiary household is provided with 12 coupons 
annually for wheat, rice and kerosene which specify their entitlements and the price 
they have to pay for each commodity. Coupons are distributed through village 
camps, organised by the local GP under the monitoring and surveillance of officials 
from the Block Development Office (the process of coupon distribution is video-
recorded). Every month, beneficiary households redeem one coupon each against 
each of the specified PDS commodities at a local FPS (beneficiaries can ostensibly 
choose the FPS they use). Then, the FPS owner forwards coupons to the 
Block/District level authorities in order to get the next month’s supplies. Given 
much of the PDS leakages are found to occur at the FPS level (Planning Commission, 
2005), a guiding principle behind the introduction of the coupons scheme was that 
by tying the next month’s supply of PDS commodities to coupons, it was considered 
that coupons would prevent the FPS owners selling the PDS supplies in the open 
market as they would now need to have the requisite coupons to claim their stock.  
The coupons system represents a well-intentioned reform attempt to prevent the 
corruption and pilferage in PDS. However, findings from the household survey in 
Siwan reveal that they have hardly changed the grounded realities of the PDS 
operation. Maladministration and rent-seeking remains widespread and ubiquitous. 
In the household survey, information was collected from respondents on their PDS 
coupon use during the three months (January-March 2012) preceding the survey. 
The survey results on coupon use are presented in Table 6.4. Only 10.5 percent of 
BPL and Antyodaya households reported that they had successfully used coupons to 
acquire food grains in each of the past three months, and just 1 percent (a mere 
two out of 191 BPL and Antyodaya households) reported getting their full food grain 
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entitlements. The reason why the surveyed households were unable to obtain their 
PDS ration on the regular basis was because of maladministration at various layers 
of PDS governance.  
Table 6.4: Functioning of PDS ration coupons: a summary  
 BPL and 
Antyodaya 
households 
(%) 
APL 
households  
(%) 
Household received food grains in each month in the 
past three months preceding the survey* 
10.5 n.a. 
Household received kerosene in each month in the past 
three months preceding the survey* 
58.1 82.4 
Reason 1: Household couldn't utilise all PDS coupons 48.2 9.5 
Reason 2: FPS owner asked for more coupons  59.7 22.8 
Both reasons  26.2 6.3 
Total households (n) 191 159 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
*The reference period for this study was April 2011 to March 2012 (Appendix 1). 
Since these surveys were conducted in April-May 2012, the three preceding months 
here refer to January, February and March 2012. 
 
Almost 50 percent of the BPL and Antyodaya households (92 households) reported 
that they could not use all their PDS food coupons during the past 12 months 
because of PDS maladministration. Among these households, 33 percent reported 
that they could not use the coupons because they were distributed after their 
validity had ended (some households even stated that coupons were provided to 
them as long as 6 months after they expired). Another prominent reason for coupon 
underutilisation was that the FPS owner turned away the beneficiaries on account 
of insufficient stock, with 52 percent of the households reporting this reason. While 
some of the FPSs genuinely faced shortages in the supply from the higher end of 
PDS supply chain, on occasions these claims were bogus. According to informal 
testimonies from a number of village stakeholders, it was still common for many FPS 
owners to sell PDS grain on the open market, thus creating induced shortages for 
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legitimate beneficiaries. In these situations, it was often the case that FPS owners 
demanded beneficiaries use more than one coupon to obtain their ration 
entitlement.  
The propensity for FPS owners to demand additional coupons from beneficiaries 
was a widespread problem. As indicated in Table 6.4, 59.7 percent (114 households) 
of the 191 BPL and Antyodaya households in the sample were asked to provide 
more than one coupon for a month’s ration supplies. Out of this, 109 households 
provided food grain coupons for two months or more, including 15 households who 
provided 3 months coupons, in order to receive just one month’s ration. 
These shortcomings of the coupon system are reflected in the PDS allocations 
obtained by the beneficiaries. To assess the operational efficiency of PDS at the 
household level, Figure 6.1 presents the average ‘purchase-entitlement ratio’ (PER) 
for the past three months for foodgrains and kerosene. The PER is the proportion of 
full entitlement obtained by beneficiary households (Khera, 2011b, p. 40).   
Figure 6.1: Average PDS purchase-entitlement ratio for the past three months 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
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A rather confounding finding emerges from the PER data for food and non-food 
items. As displayed in Figure 6.1, while the PER for food grains for both Antyodaya 
and BPL household is extremely low, 30 percent and 39 percent respectively, the 
PER for kerosene is relatively high. While it is higher still for APL households (who 
are relatively better-off, as data in Table 6.2 above suggests), the overall impression 
from the PER data is that cardholding status does not exert a huge influence on 
kerosene allocations (also see Table 6.4 above). This highlights a considerably higher 
incidence of pilferage/leakage in food grains than for kerosene. What is especially 
striking about this is that discussion with FPS owners in the case study villages 
revealed that the price differential between PDS-subsidised and open market 
kerosene was greater than that for food grains, hence suggesting (ceteris paribus) 
that kerosene would be a more profitable item to pilfer than food grains.76 
A likely explanation for the differing PERs between food grains and kerosene is the 
fact that the allocations of these two items are connected to quite different local 
politics. With kerosene, APL households have a direct stake in the efficiency of the 
PDS system. Through the interlocked village-based networks of caste and influence, 
this stake translates into strong pressures on FPS owners to ensure high allocations. 
The qualitative evidence gathered during the field work supports this observation. 
In most of the study villages, FPS owners tended to class and caste allegiances that 
were separate from those of beneficiaries. This might also be the case in much of 
rural Bihar. Bihar has more than one-third of India’s most backward districts (26 out 
of 69) (Debroy & Bhandari, 2003). In these pockets of deprivation, Antyodaya and 
BPL beneficiaries are often ill-equipped to understand or assert their rights, and for 
FPS owners, ignorance and disempowerment represent avenues for exploitation. To 
quote a respondent from one of the surveyed village, operating a FPS:  
…is a profitable business. The dealer here makes a lot of money by selling 
the grain in the open market, so much so that when his son was elected as a 
                                                        
76 In some areas of India, a low PER for food grains is indicative of low quality which encourages 
households to not take up their PDS rations (Khera, 2011b, p. 40). However in the survey villages, 
this process is extremely unlikely because of the extreme poverty of most Antyodaya and BPL 
households. 
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ward member of the GP, he had to ask him to leave that job to retain the 
license as you can’t have a PDS shop license if anyone from your family is an 
elected member of GP. And believe me, he didn’t want to lose out on a 
goldmine of grain.  
The fieldwork, however, also revealed that while culprits, the positions of the FPS 
owners are connected, in turn, to wider anomalies in the operation of the PDS in 
Bihar. For example, in one of the sample villages, when the villagers united to 
demand from the FPS owner their full ration entitlements, he got his license 
transferred to another village nearby because the bribes he was compelled to pay 
to the higher authorities in the PDS chain meant that distributing actual 
entitlements was not possible if he were to stay in the business. A GP Mukhiya very 
candidly suggested:  
“All the dealers [FPS owners] have to pay bribes to higher authorities to 
keep themselves in the business. It’s not the dealer’s fault. He cannot 
possibly pay from his own pocket. These bribes then are ultimately passed 
on to the PDS beneficiaries.”  
Most of the FPS owners informed me that each 50kg bag of wheat and rice obtained 
from PDS depots typically weighs around 44-46kg. Furthermore, FPS owners alleged 
they did not receive adequate compensation for the costs of transporting rations 
from depots to village ration stores. Nevertheless, as the survey data indicate, 
where local circumstances contrive in ways that give greater scope for FPS owners 
to exploit their powers, this will occur with greater abandon and those most in need 
of the PDS will suffer most. 
Clearly, these findings reveal that the problem of PDS governance run deep through 
the various layers of administration, with the overall effect being that they prevent 
deserving poor households from benefiting from this important safety net.   
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme  
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is a public works, social 
safety net programme which emanated from the constitutional act of the same 
name, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), passed by the Indian 
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Parliament in 2005. The scheme was first implemented on 02 February 2006 in the 
200 poorest districts of India, and later extended to the whole nation on 01 April 
2008 (Dreze, 2011, p. 14). The main aim of NREGS is to enhance the livelihood 
security of rural households in the country, while also creating productive assets in 
rural areas. It is premised on the principle of a legal right to work and provides a 
constitutional guarantee of at least 100 days of wage employment per year to every 
rural household who demands this. The NREGS provisions stipulate that the 
employment is to be provided within 15 days of a household submitting its 
application for work (upon which they are provided with a job card). In the event of 
failure to provide employment within this period, the applicants are entitled to 
receive the daily unemployment allowance in lieu from the relevant state 
government. Aiming also at the financial empowerment of rural women, upon its 
inception, NREGS envisaged having women constituting one-third of total 
beneficiaries (Government of India, 2005). The projects undertaken through NREGS 
include, inter alia, rural connectivity through road building, water conservation and 
irrigation, community land development, and social forestry, with the overall 
purpose of creating common assets at the village level. The administration of the 
scheme is highly decentralised, with GPs being the principal planning and 
implementation authorities. The GPs are responsible for identifying suitable projects 
and reviewing their progress and they also act as intermediaries between the 
beneficiaries and the higher echelons of bureaucratic apparatus.  
It is important to note that like PDS, public works programmes as a means to 
redistribute income and enhance the livelihood security of the vulnerable rural 
populations have a rather long history in India. For instance, in early 1970s the state 
of Maharashtra in western India implemented the Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(EGS). The EGS was implemented in the context of severe drought in the state from 
1970 to 1973 which disrupted lives and livelihoods of between 15 and 30 million 
rural dwellers in the state. Between 1970s and 1980s, the EGS is estimated to have 
provided employment to nearly 5 million people on a daily basis. Although the EGS 
also operated in the framework of judicial right to employment, NREGS takes the 
idea of right to work even further to address other important social objectives, such 
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as reducing caste and gender disparities (Bagchi, 2005; Dreze & Sen, 2013, pp. 191-
201; Subramanian, 1975). 
As per the latest official statistics, in 2013-14 the total government expenditure on 
the scheme amounted to INR 40837.92 crores (approximately US$ 60 billion) 
generating 220 crores (2.2 billion) person-days of employment. During the same 
period, 47.8 million households worked under the NREGS, of which more than one-
third (39 percent) belonged to Scheduled Castes (10.9 million) and Scheduled Tribes 
(7.7 million). About half (53 percent) of the NREGS beneficiaries were women in 
terms of their share in total person-days of employment (all data, Ministry of Rural 
Development, 2014; also see Table 6.5 below).77  
Although NREGS is a rural employment programme, it holds crucial significance for 
rural food security. Most of the beneficiaries of the scheme belong to socially and 
economically marginalised sections of the population (Dreze, 2011; Dreze & Oldiges, 
2011), who often lack the physical and financial resources to meet their food and 
nutrition needs all-year round. In fact, the genesis of the NREGS was closely 
connected with heightened concerns around persistently high levels of food 
insecurity and under-nutrition in rural India. The scheme was implemented in a 
context when the sustained economic growth for nearly a decade and a half had 
failed to bring about significant improvements in the living standards in rural areas. 
Contrarily, the first few years of economic reforms were characterised by the rising 
rural distress in many parts of India. While the 1990s, the first decade of rapid 
economic reforms, were in general characterised by the phenomenon of “jobless 
growth” (faster economic growth associated with low employment elasticity: 
Bhattacharya & Sakthivel, 2004), deceleration in the growth of employment and 
wages in the rural areas was sharper. Agricultural growth more than halved from an 
average of 3.2 percent a year observed between 1980 and 1996-97 to 1.5 percent 
per annum subsequently (Planning Commission, 2006, p. 5) which had a detrimental 
effect on the growth of rural employment. The two large rounds of National Sample 
Survey suggested that the overall rural employment grew at an average rate of 
merely 0.6 percent a year between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 (Patnaik, 2005, p. 203). 
                                                        
77 The expenditure data is up to the 30 July, 2014 whereas the employment statistics pertain to 
the financial year 2013-14 i.e. from April 2013 to March 2014.  
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Furthermore, the sluggish growth of the farm sector meant that poor households 
dependent on agricultural wage work saw their fortunes deteriorate further. 
Unemployment among farm labour households increased from 9.5 percent in 1993-
94 to 15.3 percent in 1999-2000 (Planning Commission, 2008, p. 63). Added to this 
was the drought of 2002. Measured as the third largest drought in India in the past 
100 years (Bhat, 2006), the Indian drought of 2002 intensified the rural livelihood 
and food security crisis. Numerous cases of hunger and starvation deaths among 
rural households were reported in many parts of the country around this time (Jha, 
2002), and distress migration characterised the rural landscape of many Indian 
states. This occurred amidst the climate of overall faster economic growth. These 
events disillusioned the then popular belief of “shining India” (a slogan of the then 
ruling coalition, National Democratic Alliance, led by the Bhartiya Janata Party) and 
triggered a rethinking around the need to initiate effective income redistribution 
measures. A strong civil society action around the right to food and more broadly, 
right to life, which had already gained significant momentum by then (for example, 
PUCL petition in the Indian Supreme Court seeking government’s intervention to 
prevent starvation deaths in Rajasthan by initiating drought-relief measures, as 
noted in Chapter 1), furthered the cause of NREGS. In key ways, the implementation 
of NREGS was thus tied to the politics of food security in India. Indeed, by providing 
an assured wage employment for 100 days a year, the scheme envisaged to i) 
provide the poor households with a livelihood option that would boost their income 
and consumption levels and food security, ii) reduce the incidence of distress 
migration from rural areas, iii) and by the means of job and asset creation, have a 
multiplier effect on rural economy.   
NREGS has been instrumental in galvanising a politics in which the rights and 
entitlements of the rural poor have acquired greater significance. Nevertheless, the 
extent to which the programme has met its desired objectives appears quite mixed. 
Several implementation issues such as irregularity of work availability, delayed 
payment of wages to beneficiaries, and issuance of bogus job cards, resulting in 
misappropriation of wage payments, beset the effective functioning of the scheme 
(see, inter alia, Dreze & Khera, 2014; Ministry of Rural Development, 2012; also see 
contributrions in Khera, 2011). The performance outcomes of NREGS vary markedly, 
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depending on the choice of indicators used. Important from the perspective of the 
current discussion is the fact that the performance of the scheme is not wholly 
uniform and exhibits great regional variation across the states, an issue connected 
with uneven state-based governance (Dreze & Oldiges, 2011; Dutta, Murgai, 
Ravallion, & de Walle, 2012a, 2012b; Pritchard et al., 2014). 
Using the most recent official data for the year 2013-14, Table 6.5 presents some 
summary indicators of NREGS performance for 20 major Indian states. It is apparent 
that the states rank differently on the different outcome indicators. Given NREGS is 
essentially a demand-driven programme, the proportion of rural households 
demanding work and the proportion of those availing work under the scheme 
provide crucial parameters to evaluate the importance of the scheme from the 
perspective of rural livelihood security. When looked at in terms of the importance 
of the scheme, a sad irony of NREGS performance is that the demand for work as 
well as the participation of rural households in the scheme appears relatively 
weaker in some of the most economically backward Indian states. In particular, the 
backward northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Madhya Pradesh 
(in 2009-10, half of the 278 million people living below the official poverty in rural 
areas in india were from these four states: Planning Commission, 2012) contributed 
less than a quarter of the rural households who demanded work during 2013-14. 
Furthermore, a mere 10 percent of households were able to complete 100 days of 
work at the national level; and the northern states have person-days employment 
per household even below the national figure. 
These current shortfalls in the provisioning of NREGS employment notwithstanding, 
trends in the functioning of the scheme suggest (significant) improvements over 
time. In 2006-07, the first year of NREGS implementation, the person-days 
employment generated through the scheme was merely 17 days per rural 
households at the all-India level (Dreze & Oldiges, 2011). The current figure of 46 
days is nearly three-times as much. Additionally the available evidence suggests 
that, through its direct and indirect benefits, NREGS seems to be gradually 
transforming the contemporary social and economic landscape of rural India, with 
overall positive impacts particularly on the lives of disadvantaged sections of the 
rural populations.  
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Table 6.5: Some summary indicators of NREGS performance for selected Indian states, 2013-14 
Source: Calculated from the official data posted by Ministry of Rural Development on NREGS public data portal (http://nrega.nic.in).   
Note: All figures pertain to the Indian financial year of 2013-14. The first two columns are calculated using Indian Census 2011 data on total number 
of rural households. 
State 
% share rural 
households who 
demanded work 
under NREGS 
% share of rural 
households who 
worked under  
NREGS 
Total person-days 
of employment per 
employed 
household 
Share of employment in total person-
days (%age) 
%age of 
households 
completing 100 
days of work SCs STs Women 
Andhra Pradesh 46.3 42.1 50 23.2 14.6 58.6 12.4 
Assam 24.4 23.3 24 6.4 16.1 24.7 1.2 
Bihar 14.1 12.2 42 28.8 2.1 35.0 6.0 
Chhattisgarh 63.0 57.6 52 8.9 39.8 48.5 13.8 
Gujarat 9.5 8.5 40 7.6 41.0 44.0 5.1 
Haryana 11.9 10.7 36 48.5 0.0 41.7 4.3 
Himachal Pradesh 43.6 41.1 52 28.4 7.4 62.5 10.3 
Jammu & Kashmir 45.9 42.3 51 5.7 15.1 23.1 10.2 
Jharkhand 25.8 24.1 38 12.9 37.1 31.9 6.0 
Karnataka 24.0 18.3 50 15.9 7.9 46.6 8.1 
Kerala 40.5 36.7 57 15.7 2.7 93.4 26.7 
Madhya Pradesh 28.5 26.2 42 17.8 30.9 42.6 6.0 
Maharashtra 9.5 8.6 45 9.6 18.9 43.7 10.7 
Odisha 23.4 21.1 42 16.4 40.8 33.6 9.2 
Punjab 13.5 12.3 33 76.9 0.0 52.7 3.0 
Rajasthan 41.6 38.1 51 19.8 26.2 67.8 12.3 
Tamil Nadu 66.2 65.8 59 29.6 1.3 83.9 14.7 
Uttar Pradesh 21.4 19.4 35 33.1 1.0 22.2 3.2 
Uttarakhand 28.4 27.9 42 18.6 2.6 44.9 7.0 
West Bengal 46.6 44.3 37 33.0 9.5 35.5 4.6 
India 30.7 28.4 46 22.6 17.3 52.8 9.7 
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Firstly, that nearly half of the NREGS participants come from the traditionally 
marginalised groups of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is significant in itself. 
Secondly, the scheme seems to be playing a crucial role in attracting women from 
poor households to join the labour force (inter alia, Dreze & Oldiges, 2011; Dreze & 
Sen, 2013; Dutta et al., 2012a; Khera & Nayak, 2009). As is evident from Table 6.5 
above, in 2013-14 half of the total employment went to women. Moreover, there 
are no overall differentials in the wages of men and women working in NREGS and 
the wages of women working in the scheme are much higher than in other casual 
work (Azam, 2012; Dutta et al., 2012b; Jandu, 2008). Given the well-established role 
of economic independence of women in enhancing their bargaining position within 
the household (for example, see Boserup, 1970; Sen, 1987), NREGS seems to 
represent an important tool towards curbing gender inequalities. 
Thirdly, Dreze and Sen (2013) note that by guaranteeing a statutory minimum wage, 
NREGS has positively altered wage relations in rural areas, particularly for unskilled 
casual labour and women. Between 2005-06 and 2010-11, the real wages of rural 
labourers grew at an average annual rate of 1.82 percent for men and 3.83 percent 
for women, which was substantially higher compared with the annual growth rate 
of real wages of merely 0.01 percent for men and –0.05 percent for women in the 
pre-NREGS period (between 2000-01 and 2005-06). Furthermore, the annual 
growth rate of real wages of unskilled labourers increased even faster at 3.98 
percent and 4.34 percent for men and women respectively (p. 202). Given that 
NREGS-participants generally belong to socially and economically fragile groups, this 
could be viewed as enhancement of the income and livelihood security of poor rural 
households. Indeed, the evaluations of household-level impacts of NREGS highlight 
the positive impacts of the scheme. For example, a study by Ravi and Engler (2009), 
which uses a baseline survey data of 1066 households supplemented with a 
subsequent panel of 320 households in a single (Medak) district of state of Andhra 
Pradesh, found that participation in the scheme was associated with enhanced 
household welfare. They found that the two most significant household welfare 
impacts of NREGS were that the programme i) improved household food security, as 
reflected in increases in household expenditure on food, and ii) decreased the level 
of emotional distress and anxiety among participating households. (For an extensive 
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review of literature on the impacts of NREGS, see Ministry of Rural Development, 
2012; also see the contributions in Khera, 2011.)  
The extent to which these positive attributes of the schemes are realised, however, 
varies widely across the states depending upon how successfully the programme is 
implemented on the ground. That there is a strong geographical dimension to the 
scheme’s performance is evident from the data in Table 6.5 above. In many places 
NREGS remains utterly dysfunctional, which acts against rural households joining 
the programme, thereby undermining its effectiveness. My case study-district of 
Siwan is one such place. Drawing from the field-research evidence, I now discuss the 
on-ground functioning of NREGS in Siwan. 
In general, Bihar fares rather poorly on most official data parameters of NREGS 
performance (Table 6.5). Furthermore, independent assessments of NREGS in the 
state paint an even more dismal picture. For example, a performance audit 
conducted in 100 extremely backward villages spread across 10 districts of Bihar 
which covered a sample of 2500 households revealed that in the six years (2006-11) 
of NREGS implementation: i) the scheme completely bypassed 17 of the 100 villages 
during the entire period; ii) 36 percent (892 households) of the sample households 
across all villages did not receive even a single day of work under the scheme; iii) 
the actual average annual employment was merely 5 days per household per year; 
iv) 73 percent of the wage component was completely misappropriated; and v) the 
combined effect of these anomalies was that of the total amount of Rs. 8189 crore 
(US$ 1.3 billion) spent on the scheme during 2006-11, nearly 6000 crores (US$ 0.97 
billion, or 73 percent of the total spending) was fraudulently malversated (Rai, 
2012). However, the functioning of the scheme is not uniform across the different 
districts of the state (Government of Bihar, 2014b, p. 223; also see Table A-5.28 and 
Table A-5.29, pp. 272-74), and villages within the districts.  
In my case-study district of Siwan, the small agricultural landholdings and a dearth 
of non-farm livelihood options (Chapter 5) meant that wage-employment under 
NREGS was vitally important, and indeed was perceived so by many landless and 
land-poor households. My fieldwork, however, suggested the on-ground 
implementation of the scheme was extremely weak, with the overall effect being 
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that it did not constitute a significant livelihood component of a large majority of 
rural households. Poor governance and maladministration in the programme 
provided a disincentive for households to seek work under the scheme. The survey 
data collected from rural Siwan indicates that of the 47 households who reported 
having a NREGS job card, 46 worked under the scheme during the past year (2011-
12), a participation rate of nearly 100 percent among those who had a job card. 
However, the overall outreach of the programme seemed insignificant when looked 
at in terms of the total sample of rural household surveyed. Only 11.7 percent of 
the total sample of 392 households worked under NREGS during 2011-12. This 
figure comes close to the official data on rural households’ work participation rate 
of 12.2 for Bihar (Table 6.5) and 7.2 percent for Siwan (Ministry of Rural 
Development, 2014).78 
Table 6.6 presents the socio-economic characteristics of sample NREGS participating 
households. It is worthwhile to note that three-quarters of the participating 
households had either Antyodaya or BPL PDS card; the average MPCE of these 
households was 34 percent lower than non-participant households79; and close to 
half of the households who worked under NREGS had a low food diversity score. 
This is consistent with the evidence at the national level that a significant majority 
of NREGS participants usually belong to poor socio-economic groups. However, as 
noted before, with only 12 percent of the total rural households participating in it, 
the overall work participation in the scheme was very limited. The reasons why the 
scheme has not been able to provide an effective source of livelihood for a large 
majority of rural households are rooted in its implementation.   
                                                        
78 The work participation for Siwan is arrived at by dividing the official NREGS figure on the 
cumulative number of households provided employment under the scheme (36499 households) 
up until the financial year of 2013-14 by the total rural households in Siwan District (507055 
households), as enumerated in Census 2011 (Ministry of Rural Development, 2014; Registrar 
General of India, 2011). Also, because of the sample design, it might be the case that the job 
cardholder households are under-represented in the present study. The household sample 
selection was done on the basis of migration status of the households and whether or not 
household participated in NREGS was not the consideration. Nonetheless, the overall household 
work participation rate of this survey matches closely with official figures for the district, 
pointing to the representativeness of household survey sample.  
79 Note that the higher number of households in this category may partly be responsible for the 
higher average MPCE. 
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Table 6.6: Socio-economic profile of NREGS-participating households in Siwan, 
2011-12  
Characteristics of NREGS participating households  Number of Households (%) 
Caste   
Forward caste 0 (0.0%) 
Backward caste 34 (73.9%) 
Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe 12 (26.1%) 
PDS card1  
Antyodaya/Below poverty line  34 (73.9%) 
Above poverty line  9 (19.6%) 
Migration status  
Migrant households 18 (39.1%) 
Non-migrant households 28 (60.9%) 
Economic status2  
Average MPCE of NREGS participating households (In Rs.) 686 
Average MPCE of non-participating households (In Rs.) 906 
NREGS-participating households with MPCE below the 
poverty line 29 (63.0%) 
Food diversity index3  
Low 21 (45.7%) 
Medium  15 (32.6%) 
High 10 (21.7%) 
Total number of households who worked under NREGS  
(%age of total sample) 
46  
(11.7%) 
Total household sample (n) 392 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
1Three households did not have any PDS card and hence the total here may not add 
up to 46 households. 2MPCE = Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure. Same 
MPCE cut-off used for poverty as described in Table 6.2. 3Food diversity index is 
computed using the Principal Component Analysis of 30 food items that households 
reported consuming in a week preceding the survey. Depending on the number of 
food items consumed, rank scores were generated and households were divided 
into three equal rank tertiles of low, medium and high (see the discussion in 
Appendix 1; and for the list of the 30 items used for computing food diversity index, 
see Appendix 6).  
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In the survey, nearly a quarter of the sample (100 households) reported that they 
have asked for NREGS job cards but have not been given. On the other hand, most 
of those households who held cards and worked under the scheme reported facing 
multiple issues. Firstly, work under the scheme was highly unpredictable and none 
of the NREGS participating households was provided with 100 days of work. Only 
nine households were able to avail more than 60 days of employment in the past 
year (Figure 6.2).  
Figure 6.2: Distribution of NREGS-participating households by person-days of 
employment availed in the past year, 2011-12   
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Irregularity and uncertainty of work were common complaints which discouraged 
rural households from seeking employment under the scheme. To quote one of the 
respondents: 
Work under NREGS is never regularly available. There is hardly two-three 
days of work in a month. Moreover, we are unsure when we will get work. 
The Government launches many schemes and then stops them. In such a 
situation of uncertainty, we cannot rely on NREGS if we are to survive.   
This quote calls attention to the problem, identified by Dutta et al. (2012b), that 
NREGS’ effectiveness must be assessed against considerations of forgone 
28
9 9
Up to 30 days 31 to 60 days 61 days or more
Employment per household in a year 
n = 46
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employment and income by recipients. In Siwan, uncertainty of employment under 
the scheme meant that many households, particularly those who had other 
occupational choices available, found NREGS employment less lucrative.  
Some households did not, however, have a choice (of occupational diversity) but 
had to depend, and significantly so, on NREGS. For example, a 60+ years old widow 
whose son died young and daughter divorced at an early age and on whose 
shoulders now bore the responsibility of feeding seven people (an unmarried 
daughter, son’s widowed wife, divorced daughter and their four children), as 
cultural norms did not permit participation of young women of the household in 
wage work, had little choice but to rely on NREGS employment. However, she too 
complained of inadequate workdays allotted to her. In her words: “I get 14 days of 
work in a year and earn in total Rs. 2000. Why cannot the government provide me 
with more work?”   
The lower than mandated person-days of employment actually provided to 
households is often the result of malpractices of the rent-seekers. In one of the case 
study villages, for example, many respondents complained that machines such as 
‘backhoe loaders’ were used for road digging work and then, bogus attendances 
were registered on beneficiaries cards and money claimed. This defeated the very 
logic of the scheme. In the words of a respondent:  
If a job requires 30 days of work from 10 labourers, the machine does it in 
five days or less with just one operator. That is not the end of it. Our job 
cards are taken and though I cannot read but people tell me that my 
attendance is registered too. The only thing missing is the payment.  
Secondly, many households who worked under NREGS reported long delays in 
payment of their wages, with some households not receiving their wages for as long 
as six months after the work. A few households even reported that they were 
waiting for their wages for the work they did in 2010-11, a year preceding the 
reference period of this survey. One such NREGS worker who was not paid for two 
years of work bitterly told me: 
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My dues for 84 days of work have not been paid to me. And I am not the 
only one around here. There are many workers whose outstanding dues 
have not been cleared. But people here are too scared to complain to higher 
authorities because we fear that whatever little we earn from NREGS will be 
snatched away from us. For now, we are making do with the hope of getting 
our wages someday.    
While payment delays were a widespread problem, the extent of delays varied 
widely across the case-study villages, and indeed often from one worker to another 
within the same village. Even though the rent-seekers often manipulated and 
undermined the entitlement franchise of poor workers by fraudulent means, my 
fieldwork also revealed that NREGS at the same time provided a tool in the hands of 
the rural poor to understand their rights and entitlements better than before. When 
asked from the old widow worker (mentioned earlier) whether she faced any 
problems in wage payments, she replied in a firm, albeit cynical, tone: “I toil under 
scorching heat, watering the plants. And even if they don’t pay me the money that I 
deserve for my work, will they not rot in the hell?” The bargaining power of the 
poor vis-à-vis actors at the higher echelons, however, is still weaker which prevents 
any meaningful assertion of their rights.  
Finally, in terms of the impact of NREGS in reducing out-migration and improving 
food security of rural households – the two key objectives of the scheme as well as 
the main themes of the present research – the evidence from Siwan suggests that 
NREGS has not made any significant dent on both counts in the district. The job 
cardholder households were asked if any of their members who were earlier 
working outside the village returned to work in NREGS. Only two households replied 
in the affirmative. NREGS wages were certainly higher than the wages earned locally 
from farm and non-farm causal work. However, as Dreze and Khera (2014) also 
note, long delays in payment diminished the real value of NREGS employment. 
Furthermore, not only were migration incomes higher but remittances also 
provided a steady source of income for migrant households. The participation of 
migrant households in the scheme was contingent on the number of adult 
members, usually males, present in the household, and if timing of NREGS work did 
not coincide with the other farm work in the village. The latter applied to the non-
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migrant households as well. Even though the wages offered by agricultural work 
were significantly lower, households tended to view them as more certain than 
NREGS wages. As regards to gender, barring women from the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, most viewed manual labour jobs offered under NREGS (other 
than plantation work) as “culturally inappropriate” and instead preferred to work as 
agricultural labourers at a daily wage rate of Rs. 50 (US$ 1) that was nearly one-third 
of NREGS wage of Rs. 144 (US$ 3). 
Figure 6.3: Perceptions of NREGS-participating households on the impact of the 
scheme in improving food security 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
As far as NREGS’s impact on improving the food security situation of the households 
is concerned, four out of the 46 households perceived that the wage-income from 
the scheme provided a vitally important source to meet their food needs, and a 
further 14 households said that even though the scheme did not directly affect their 
food security, it had made life easier for them. Notwithstanding the massive 
operational inefficiencies, the fact that nearly 40 percent of the surveyed NREGS 
participant households perceived the scheme in positive terms highlights its 
relevance for poor households. At the same time, NREGS had no perceptible impact 
4
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wouldn't have enough to eat
Neither of this
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Without NREGS 
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life easier for us
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on the food security of 60 percent of the households who undertook work in the 
programme (Figure 6.3).  
In conclusion, because of the multiple issues (described above) that beset the 
effective functioning of NREGS in Siwan (which presumably applies to most, if not 
all, districts in Bihar) and act as deterrents for households to accrue its benefits in a 
meaningful sense, many rural households also seemed to be becoming increasingly 
indifferent to the scheme. Having interviewed a number of local NREGS 
stakeholders including the elected representatives of village councils, Block 
Development Officers, NREGS Programme Officers, and most importantly, 
numerous rural households and NREGS workers themselves (including those who 
did not form part of the household sample), I came to the conclusion that although 
there appeared some signs of rural poor pressing hard to make their rightful claims, 
their pleas often went unheard. By virtue of their low socio-economic status, the 
power equation was so negatively skewed against them that they were unable to 
turn things around. In overall terms, real benefits of the scheme for the poor thus 
seemed quite muted. It is in this context that many households are increasingly 
detaching themselves from NREGS work. On the other hand, those who are unable 
to access other gainful employment options, locally or outside the village, continue 
to stick with it in the hope that things will change some day. 
Integrated Child Development Scheme  
The final important food-based safety net is the Integrated Child Development 
Scheme (ICDS). Launched in 1975, ICDS is a crucial intervention that seeks to 
address nutrition and health deficiencies among children in their formative years, 
with an overall aim of the programme being achievement of healthy childhood 
development outcomes. Unlike PDS and NREGS, which are both aimed at generating 
benefits for poor households, the ICDS specifically targets children below the age of 
six years and pregnant and lactating mothers. (More recently, the programme has 
involved in its ambit adolescent girls.) The scheme operates through a nationwide 
network of 1.33 million ICDS centres, popularly known as Aaganwadis (Ministry of 
Women and Child Development, 2014). The term Aaganwadi means “courtyard” in 
Hindi and originated from the idea that effective early child care could be provided 
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through low-cost local projects with minimal infrastructure such as home courtyards 
(Pritchard et al., 2014, p. 117). The Aaganwadis form part of the broader public 
health infrastructure in India. The current norms for Aaganwadis provide for setting 
up one centre on the population of between 400 and 800 people (Ministry of 
Women and Child Development, 2014). Each Aaganwadi usually includes two staff 
members of “Sevika” (centre in-charge) and her assistant called “Sahayika”. The 
services provided to eligible women and children through the Aaganwadis include, i) 
supplementary nutrition, ii) immunisation and health check-ups, iii) pre-school 
education for children between 3 and 6 years of age, and iv) nutrition and health 
education to expectant and lactating mothers. At the village (or urban ward) level, 
the Child Development Programme Officer (CDPO) is responsible for monitoring of 
Aaganwadis.  
Although the ICDS provides various (nutrition-related) health services for women 
and children, as stated above, provision of free supplementary nutrition to the 
target women and children forms a crucial component of the programme from the 
perspective of overall focus of this thesis. It must be added that providing free food 
was not originally as integral a feature of ICDS and the focus was more on the non-
food aspects of the child nutrition and development (Ghosh, 2006). However, with 
cases of malnutrition deaths among children due to lack of food surfacing from time 
to time in many parts of the country (Jha, 2002; Mander, 2012; Manikandan, 2014; 
Nayar, 2014; Parulkar, 2012), direct provisioning of food for children has acquired a 
greater political significance concerning the right to food and child rights (see the 
various Supreme Court Interim Orders since 2001: Right to Food Campaign, 2014). 
Indeed, the recently passed right to food legislation (NFSA 2013) that provides 
constitutional guarantee to right to food, as noted in Chapter 1, also includes 
provision of free food for children as well as women (Government of India, 2013a, 
pp. 3-4). The following discussion thus focuses more on this food provisioning 
aspect of ICDS based on the fieldwork in Siwan. However, in discussing the 
operational aspects of the programme I shall also provide some general discussion 
on the broad features of the scheme.  
Under the programme, children aged 6 to 36 months and pregnant and lactating 
mothers are provided with a certain quantity of take-home food rations per month 
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(entitlement norms vary across states), and children aged between 3 and 6 years 
are provided with a cooked meal for 6 days a week in the Aaganwadi where they 
also receive pre-school education. The programme is estimated to cover 75 million 
children under the age of 6 years and 16.7 million women of child-bearing ages 
(Planning Commission, 2011b). Several studies have documented the positive 
impact of ICDS benefits on nutritional status of children (for example, Avsm, Gandhi, 
Tandon, & Krishnamurthy, 1995; Tandon, 1989). However, like PDS and NREGS, the 
impact of ICDS varies across states depending on the financial and implementation 
capacities of the relevant state government (Gragnolati, Bredenkamp, Das Gupta, 
Lee, & Shekar, 2006).  
Although ICDS is largely a federally-funded scheme, with the Central government 
bearing 90 percent of the total programme cost, the supplementary nutrition 
component of the programme is funded 50:50 between the Center and each State 
(except in the seven north-eastern states where the same 90:10 format applies) 
(Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2014). The budgetary arrangements 
imply that varying financial capacities of the individual states play an important role 
in explaining the differential impacts of the programmes on child food and nutrition 
outcomes across states.  
In many ways, Bihar suffers from severe deficits both in terms of budgetary 
capabilities and operational efficiency. In 2012-13, there were 91,677 operational 
Aaganwadis covering all the 38 districts and 534 blocks of the state. The total ICDS 
budget of the Central Government for Bihar was Rs. 1393.30 crores (US$ 253 million 
roughly), and the state was provided with 82 percent (Rs. 1148.01 crores, or US$ 
208 million) of these total sanctioned funds. The actual spending in that year on 
ICDS was Rs. 1063.29 crores (US$ 193.3 million). Compared to previous years, the 
funds received and utilised on ICDS by the Government of Bihar are indeed 
significantly higher (for ICDS funds received and utilised by Bihar in 2003-04 and 
2004-04, for example, see Nandini & Saxena, 2006). Indeed, when looked at in 
aggregate terms, these are no mean figures. However, in terms of the funds per 
Aaganwadis and after factoring in the number of beneficiaries and their monthly 
entitlements, the ICDS appears to be chronically under-funded in the state. While 
the average monthly budget of Central Government per Aaganwadi in Bihar was Rs. 
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12,656 (US$ 230) (and there does not seem any spending from the state’s own 
exchequer on ICDS in 2012-13, as reported in Bihar Government’s Economic Survey, 
2013-14), each Aaganwadi Centre actually receives a monthly lump sum amount of 
Rs. 10,950 (US$ 200) (Table 6.7).  
Table 6.7: A snapshot of ICDS finances in Bihar, 2012-13  
  
Number of Aaganwadi Centers (ACs) 91746 
Overall budget versus actual spending Amount (Crore Rs.)  
Total annual budget  1393.30 
Total funds released by Central Government  1148. 01 
Actual spending 1063.29 
Budget versus actual spending per Aaganwadi  Amount  (Rs.) 
Average annual budget per AC (total budget/number of ACs)  151868 
Average monthly budget per AC (total budget/number of ACs x 12) 12656 
Actual money provided per Aaganwadi per month1  10950 
Source: Compiled from the Economic Survey of Bihar, 2013-14, p. 187 (Table 5.14) 
1This figure is based on interviews with Aaganwadi Sahayikas and Sevikas during 
fieldwork in Siwan.   
From this amount, the Aaganwadis are mandated to provide i) a monthly take home 
ration of 3 kilograms rice and 1.5 kilograms of pulses each to 16 pregnant and 
lactating mothers, ii) a monthly take home ration of 2.5 kilograms rice and 1.25 
kilograms of pulses each to 28 children identified as malnourished, and 4 kilograms 
rice and 2 kilograms of pulses each to 12 severely malnourished children, iii) 
morning refreshments/breakfast and hot-cooked lunch for six days a week to 40 
children aged between 3 and 6 years who attend Aaganwadi for pre-school 
education attending, and iii) cooked lunch to three adolescent children aged 
between 11 and 18 years (based on field work in Siwan; also see Government of 
Bihar, 2014b). 
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Simple arithmetic suggests that the amount of Rs. 10,950 is inadequate for the 
Aaganwadi workers to honour these commitments. Indeed, this was a common 
complaint of Sevikas and Sahayika interviewed across all the case-study villages in 
Siwan. Yet the scheme operated. For most Aaganwadi women workers, the scheme 
provided a sole source of income and with it, self-esteem. Many of the ICDS centres 
I visited were operated from Sevikas’ own homes without government paying any 
rent. Many workers stick with the job and offer their premises in the hope that the 
government will make these jobs permanent and they will be provided with tenure 
security and benefits that accompany it. However, and not surprisingly, the on-
ground working of the scheme, from the perspective of beneficiaries, is hardly 
without problems. Not all problems are because of the practices of Sevikas or 
Sahayikas.  
The household survey data revealed that of the total 170 households who were 
eligible for the ICDS benefits in 2011-12 across all case-study villages (those with 
children aged between 6 and 72 months and/or pregnant and lactating mothers), 37 
percent (63 households) did not receive any supplementary nutrition benefits under 
the scheme. It must be added that the cap on the number of beneficiaries per 
Aaganwadi means that the Sevikas are supposed to screen the households and 
provide benefits to only those with low socio-economic status; mothers and 
children are monitored for their anthropometric status and those who are 
undernourished are provided with nutrition benefits. This means-test aspect of the 
scheme has received surprisingly little attention in the academic and policy 
discussion compared to other food safety net programmes such as the PDS (for a 
useful synthesis of arguments on universal versus targeted PDS, see Pritchard et al., 
2014, pp. 120-126). Notwithstanding the low population norms for setting up 
Aaganwadis, as indicated above, this could exclude a large majority of households 
where women and children are in genuine need of supplementary food benefits. 
Indeed, the survey results suggest that of 63 households who did not receive ICDS 
benefits, only 6 households opted out of choice. In other instances, the deserving 
poor households from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were largely 
untouched by the scheme because the Aaganwadis were often distant from their 
settlements (also see Avsm et al., 1995, p. 126). Moreover, caste-based 
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discrimination meant that, more often than not, children from these low-caste 
groups were not allowed to enter the Aaganwadi premises. To quote a women 
respondent from the surveyed household: “The children are often chased away by 
the Aaganwadi Madam. But when there is a checking, she comes home and takes 
our children to the Centre.” 
Furthermore, hardly any of those 107 households who reported receiving ICDS 
benefits received them regularly, or for the entire duration (usually women get take 
home rations from the time of pregnancy till 6 months after child birth, after which 
the take-home food entitlements get transferred to children up until they are 3 
years old). The ICDS beneficiaries in the 107 households included 56 members 
(women and children below 3 years) who were entitled for monthly take home 
rations and 89 children aged between 3 and 6 years who received meals with pre-
school education at the Aaganwadi (a few households had both women and child 
beneficiaries). In all the study villages, the distribution of take-home ration to 
eligible members was highly errant and often occurred before the monitoring visits 
of senior District, State or Central government officials. Furthermore, the only sub-
district (block)-level CDPO that I was able to interview (see the discussion below) 
was of the view that the idea that providing take-home ration every month to 
undernourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers would improve their 
nutritional status was wrongheaded. In her words: 
The monthly take-home ration for combating nutritional deficiencies among 
women and children is a big failure. Because most beneficiaries come from 
poor households, the ration given to women and children is often consumed 
by the entire household. It makes sense for the poor households, for it 
translates into households not having to buy ration for a day or two in a 
month. But that is not what take-home ration aims at. 
One aspect of ICDS that seemed to be working relatively better was the meals 
provided to children who attended Aaganwadis. In the survey, the information was 
collected on whether or not the Aaganwadi-attending child(ren) of the household 
got their breakfast and hot-cooked lunch meals for each of the past six days.  
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Figure 6.4 presents the distribution of these children. Out of the 89 children from 
107 households, 80 reported going to the Aaganwadi regularly for the food, if not 
necessarily for pre-school education. Most respondents reported that children were 
provided with something to eat at least once a day, as the data suggest. However, 
oftentimes the meals provided to children were inadequate and different from the 
prescribed norms. In none of the case-study villages did the frequency of cooked 
meals served to children exceed three days a week, effectively implying that these 
meals were provided for only half of the mandated 25 days a month (Government 
of Bihar, 2014c).  
Figure 6.4: Percentage of children provided meals at the Aaganwadi in the past 
week  
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12  
Indeed, many Aaganwadi workers suggested that watertight budgets did not allow 
them to serve hot-cooked lunches every day, nor were they ever able to provide 
two meals on all days of the month. The breakfast refreshments of the children 
routinely included two sugary biscuits as against the official instructions to provide 
seasonal fruits (my interviews revealed that there was also an issue of lack of 
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even though they did/could not necessarily follow them as strictly). The demands 
placed on Aaganwadis often exceeded their financial capacities. It is striking to note 
that the daily official budget provided to each Aaganwadi for the breakfast of 40 
children is Rs. 22 (40 cents),80 hardly enough to buy five apples, or 22 pieces of 
carrots but not 40.  
Additionally, there were frequent complaints that from the monthly budget amount 
of Rs. 10,950, many CDPOs took a monthly cut of between Rs. 1000 and 2000 from 
each Aaganwadi Centre. The Aaganwadi workers did not openly say this, fearing 
action against them, but they did allude to it. Indeed, failures to pay bribes often 
resulted in more monitoring visits to the Aaganwadi by the CDPO. During my 
repeated visits to the Block Development Offices (concerning the case-study 
villages: Table 4.1 in Chapter 4) which house CDPOs offices, I could only meet one of 
the nine CDPOs during their official working time. Each time I was told that by their 
office staff that the field-oriented nature of their work required them to stay in the 
villages for monitoring of the Aaganwadi. However, in an interview with one of 
Block Development Officers, he suggested: “They say fieldwork but are often at 
their home resting.” It is worthwhile to note that each CDPO usually has anywhere 
between 35 and 100 centres under their watch. This meant that collective bribes 
from Aaganwadi Centres were often more than their official salary. Of course, this 
does not imply that Aaganwadi workers were not at fault but their positions were 
often connected with the authorities in the higher rung.  
In a nutshell, there is no dispute that the programmatic objective of ICDS to improve 
the food and nutrition security of women and children through supplementary 
nutrition is well intended. Indeed, evidence suggests that in many states with well-
functioning Aaganwadis, ICDS is helping women and children to meet their food and 
nutrition needs. The southern state of Tamil Nadu has been a leading example of 
running a successful nutritious meal programme for children at Aaganwadis 
(Rajivan, 2006). More recently, as part of the noon meal programme at the 
Aaganwadis, the state has also started providing one egg every alternative day to 
children aged between 3 and 6 years in order to improve their nutritional status and 
                                                        
80 Based on interviews with several Aaganwadi Sevikas and Sahayikas, and the block-level CDPO 
(quoted above), conducted during January-May, 2012. 
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achieve better pre-school educational outcomes (The Hindu, 2013). On the other 
hand, the operational realities of ICDS in Bihar, as revealed from the field research 
in Siwan, appear starkly different. Budget deficits coupled with maladministration of 
the scheme make ICDS a weak engine to spur improvements in nutritional 
outcomes of children. Indeed, although ICDS has been in operation in the country 
for more than 35 years, India has among the worst levels of child and maternal 
nutrition in the world. This research has attempted to highlight some of the 
systematic issues with the scheme. Unless these issues are fixed, ICDS will continue 
to underachieve upon its objectives.  
Conclusion  
This Chapter has provided an assessment of the food and livelihood safety nets in 
Bihar, based primarily on the fieldwork in Siwan District. The persistently high 
incidence of poverty in Bihar means that the state-assisted safety net programmes 
hold vital significance in the lives of vulnerable rural populations. At the same time, 
they are affected by woeful delivery failures. The evidence presented above 
suggests that PDS, NREGS and ICDS are all plagued by severe maladministration and 
corruption. The operational inefficiencies in these schemes severely undermine 
their effectiveness to be able make significant contributions towards the food 
security needs of rural poor.  
That corruption is endemic in most social protection schemes in Bihar is not a secret 
– far from it. It is encouraging to note the signs of a political will to revamp the dire 
state of social provisioning in the state in recent years. The coupon reforms in PDS, 
for instance, reflect this tendency. There are other important non-state, citizen 
initiatives as well. In Siwan, for instance, a newly-commenced popular community 
radio called “Radio Snehi” has a programme which, based on people’s complaints, 
attempts to name and shame the corrupt officials. In one of the prank-playing show 
formats, Snehi’s Radio Jockey, R. K. Rana, makes phone calls to the village-level 
providers of social services such as Aaganwadi Sevikas, School Headmasters etc., 
and pretends to be a monitoring officer from the Central/State government. The 
usual conversation that follows is that he has received complaints that the 
concerned official is not dispensing his duties as mandated. Not surprisingly, prank 
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calls by Rana wreak havoc until he reveals his true identity. What is striking is that 
many officials, unaware of prank at first, admit to the wrongdoings (of not 
honouring their duties well), and vouch to not repeat the mistakes in the future. The 
significance of such initiatives notwithstanding, solutions to curb the corruption to 
bring about a meaningful change are yet to emerge.  
Positing this issue in terms of India’s landmark right to food legislation (NFSA 2013), 
the corruption and rent-seeking in the food-based safety nets pose a significant 
challenge to the effective realisation of this right. One manifestation of this, as 
echoed by Chatterjee (2004, p. 38), albeit in a slightly different context, is that 
“most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously and only then ambiguously and 
contextually rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution” (cited 
in Witsoe, 2012, p. 53).  
This is not to say that these safety net programmes are not important. The 
importance of these schemes in the lives of resource-poor households was all too 
apparent from the village-level observations and interviews carried out with them. 
Consistent with the arguments of Dreze and Sen (2013, p. 212), this Chapter does 
not intend to suggest that leaving poor people on their own is a good policy. 
Instead, the overall argument pursued here is that the current institutional 
arrangements on social safety nets in Bihar (and in some other states of India) do 
not provide a robust food security anchor for a large majority of rural populations. 
My research findings from Siwan are in sync with evidence from other parts of the 
state. For example, reporting the findings of a longitudinal study that traces the 
development contrasts in two socially and economically heterogeneous villages in 
North Bihar over three decades (since 1980), Datta, Rodgers, Rodgers, and Singh 
(2014, p. 1198) note:   
In both villages, state social policies, previously notable mainly by their 
absence or ineffectiveness, are now increasingly visible… But this progress in 
social policy did not seem to be an important source of the differences in 
development path between the two villages.    
In Siwan, the inefficiencies in the social protection nets leave little option for a large 
majority of rural poor households but to fend for themselves. However, dejected as 
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they may be with the current state of social provisioning, the rural poor do not 
appear to be passive actors. They devise multiple strategies to mitigate risks to their 
income and food security. The weak capacity of the land-based livelihoods and the 
underdeveloped state of rural non-farm sector means that migration figures as an 
important strategy within the rural livelihood systems in Siwan. While migration, in 
large part, represents a response to the broader livelihood deficits that characterise 
the life worlds of a large majority of the rural dwellers in the district, the inadequacy 
of social protection aggravate their vulnerability further to income and food 
insecurity and provides a strong incentive for migration. The complex dynamics of 
household decision-making matrices make it difficult to precisely decompose the 
relative effects of lack of proper social protection in guiding households’ migration 
decisions. However, it is certainly the case that the incidence of migration would 
have been much less in the presence of effectively functioning social safety nets.  
Ironically, however, migration appears to further deprive many of the poor 
households to access these social safety nets. This occurs mainly through two ways. 
Firstly, the predominantly single male nature of migration from Siwan means that 
most households have their adult men outside the village for a major part of the 
year. And the cultural norms restricting the participation of women in the affairs 
outside the household often result in left-behind women finding it hard to register 
their claims over their entitlements; those who do are often unheard and 
manipulated. In the case of PDS, for instance, a migrant respondent who had an 
ailing daughter (and another one died when she was two-and-half-year old due to 
jaundice) told me:  
I have asked our Mukhiya [GP Chairperson] several times to get our family a 
BPL ration card. He always says that when the cards are distributed next, he 
will consider our request. Many families in the village have been issued new 
BPL cards but we have not gotten ours. I always stay away from the village 
to earn money and my wife cannot run after these things. A monthly food 
ration from the government would mean that I can spend some money on 
my daughter’s treatment.  
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Secondly, the local authorities in-charge of administering the safety nets often 
regard households with migrant members as having steady income streams, and 
thus, consider them ineligible for the benefits of these schemes. My interviews with 
various village-level stakeholders pointed to this tendency. The household survey 
data also capture these dynamics. The data suggest that whereas the average 
percentage share of government benefits (including the ones not covered in this 
Chapter such as pensions, scholarships etc.) in household income was 4 percent for 
non-migrant households, it was less than half (1.9 percent) for the households with 
migrants.  
Thus, while the dire state of social protection acts as an incentive for migration, the 
act of migration also appears to result in the exclusion of rural households from the 
safety net benefits. However, it is equally pertinent to invert the equation and ask 
whether and how migration helps rural households to cope up with perennial 
conditions of economic distress to meet their income and food security needs. My 
fieldwork suggests that while the economic circumstances of many households still 
remain dire, without migration incomes most of the surveyed households would be 
worse off. Furthermore, in cases where remittances are significant they also enable 
households to improve their overall economic standing. The positive impacts of 
migration are perhaps most pronounced on household food security, and regardless 
of the background circumstances of the households, migration does seem to 
translate into improving households’ access to food. In the next Chapter, I discuss 
the role of migration and remittances in influencing food security among rural 
households.  
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CHAPTER 7: MIGRATION, REMITTANCES, LAND AND HOUSEHOLD 
FOOD SECURITY 
Introduction 
The development experience of most countries in the world suggests that economic 
growth is accompanied by structural transformation. As economies advance, the 
share of population chiefly dependent on agriculture declines. However the 
outcomes of this structural transformation on rural and urban economies and 
societies are far from uniform, and depend on the ways in which “the complexity of 
national diversity asserts itself” (Timmer, 2007, p. 4).  
The Indian experience of structural transformation appears peculiar. The market 
reforms from the mid-1980s (though beginning in earnest only in the 1990s) put the 
Indian economy on the path of higher growth and are associated with increased 
overall prosperity (Panagariya, 2004). This has been accompanied by a structural 
shift in which the non-agricultural sector vis-à-vis the agricultural sector and urban 
vis-à-vis rural areas have gained significance in terms of their shares in national 
income. However, changes in employment patterns have not followed at an 
expected pace. The rural-urban transition is far from complete, and nearly 70 
percent of country’s population still live in the countryside. And despite the fast-
growing non-agricultural sector of the economy, the share of labour in agriculture 
has declined at a slower rate than the contemporary experience of other Asian 
countries suggest. The source of this apparent contradiction lies in the fact that 
much of the economic growth of the recent past is accounted for by more capital 
and skill intensive business and services sectors (Datt & Ravallion, 2009; Kotwal, 
Ramaswami, & Wadhwa, 2011), constraining the opportunities for the poor and 
unskilled populations to alter their livelihood pathways more fully.  
The “stunted” nature of India’s structural transformation notwithstanding 
(Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013), the fundamental shifts that have characterised the 
Indian economy over the past three decades are rapidly altering rural livelihood 
trajectories in the country. Although agriculture still remains the single-largest 
employment provider, the relative importance of agriculture as a primary source of 
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income and food security has weakened. Agriculture workers declined by 27 million 
between 2004-05 and 2011-12, with nearly half (13 million) of this decline occurring 
between 2009-10 and 2011-12, hence producing, for the first time in the history of 
independent India, an absolute decline in the agriculture workforce (Mehrotra et 
al., 2013, p. 88). On the other hand, while the recent growth trajectory in India has 
tended to favour capital and skill intensive sectors, the nonfarm sectors that are 
also intensive in unskilled labour such as construction and unorganised 
manufacturing have also grown during the same period, leading to a rise in 
aggregate demand for labour in these sectors (Datt & Ravallion, 2009). Importantly, 
although the significance of the rural nonfarm sector has increased, the urban-
centric nature of economic growth in the recent past, with much of the addition to 
national income now emanating from urban areas (Planning Commission, 2011a, p. 
378), means that urban areas have assumed more significance in the overall 
framework of economy and job creation. Indeed, it is the spillover effects of urban 
growth on rural incomes and employment that seem to have become increasingly 
more crucial for rural poverty reduction in recent years (Datt & Ravallion, 2009; 
World Bank, 2011b).  
This Chapter asks what implications these broad changes have in shaping household 
livelihood pathways, and how they correlate with household food security. In 
alignment with the broad objective of this research, the focus here is on the ways in 
which migration as a livelihood strategy affects household food security in the case 
study district of Siwan. Needless to say that the impact of these national, macro-
level changes is unlikely to be uniform across and within different states of India, 
possibly varying even from one village to another, and thus they necessitate a place-
based contextualisation and understanding. These changes, however, have 
particular relevance for Siwan (and Bihar more generally). In Siwan, rural-urban 
linkages, although never absent due to the long-history of migration, have assumed 
greater significance in recent years and are fundamentally altering social and 
economic relations at the village and household level with direct implications for 
household food security. The decreasing returns from agriculture-based livelihoods 
suggest increased importance of migration incomes for rural livelihoods. Yet 
however, the precariousness and uncertainty of urban jobs and a complex mix of 
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socio-cultural reasons mean that migrants continue to maintain close relations with 
their origin villages; they invest their earnings and remittances in the origin villages. 
In turn this implies that rural land and resources continue to play a vital role in 
households’ incomes and food security. At the same time, the capacity of rural land 
and agriculture to meet household food security needs is becoming increasingly 
contingent on urban remittances. In other words, complex interactions between 
rural and urban economies exist at the household level, which warrant examination 
to understand more fully the food security outcomes of migration. However, not all 
households are involved in migration and it is important to understand the factors 
shaping migration decisions and how those households without migrants fare 
compared with migrant households. The sub-sample of non-migrant households 
allows this comparison.     
This Chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I explore the decision-
making matrices of households in terms of whether livelihood diversification occurs 
locally or at a distance. Secondly, I discuss whether there are differential gains from 
diversification within the rural and urban sector. I then explore the type of linkages 
that migration creates between rural and urban economies, and how they relate to 
food security at the household level in Siwan. In particular, my focus will be to 
highlight whether and how remittances correlate with household food security. In 
the final major section, my attention then turns to the village-level changes in land 
and agrarian relations and their significance for food security.  
Who migrates, who stays and why? Conditions, intentions and motivations to 
migrate and stay put  
As noted in Chapter 5, the economic landscape of rural Siwan is marked by the 
notable absence of gainful employment opportunities. Average landholdings are 
exceptionally small, and the cash-income generating potential of land and farming is 
very limited. Moreover, despite some growth in rural nonfarm employment in 
recent years, the rural nonfarm sector remains highly underdeveloped still; the jobs 
in this sector are errant and less remunerative. The few regular, better-salaried non-
agricultural jobs, particularly in the social service sector run by the government 
(such as teachers, doctors, clerks, health workers etc.), presuppose a certain level of 
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education and skills which most poor households do not possess, and are thus 
cornered by the socially and economically better-off groups, mainly upper castes.81 
Additionally, while the return to normalcy of law and order and the high growth 
rates of the Bihar economy after the election of new state government since 2005 
has led to more rural poor commuting daily to the District and Block headquarters 
to work in activities such as vending and hawking, rickshaw pulling, picking up 
labouring duties in construction work etc., local labour supply far exceeds the work 
demand and employment availability. As a result, a considerable proportion of rural 
households engage in long-distance, interstate migration. The survey data show 
that out of the 280 migrants belonging to 197 migrant households, only three 
migrants worked in other districts within Bihar. Much of the interstate outmigration 
from the district is to the Tier 1 Indian cities which dominate the country’s economy 
(Figure 5.5 in Chapter 5). 
Table 7.1 presents the socio-economic characteristics of surveyed households in 
Siwan by migration status. The data suggest minimal differences in the propensity 
to migrate across most socio-economic variables, with the notable exception of 
household type. Nuclear households were much more likely not to include one or 
more migrants, when compared with joint households. 
My fieldwork however also points to important new developments in household 
composition in rural India. At one level, it is not surprising that joint families with 
more members provided a migration-facilitating structure. In these cases, it has 
traditionally been the case that remittance incomes were jointly shared, with the 
left-behind wives and children of migrants looked after by the stay-put members, 
mainly the elderly parents. However, this is no longer always the case. From 
interviews with households, I also found some evidence of an increased reluctance 
of migrant individuals, and their wives, to share the remittances with the less 
productive stay-put members of the households. In turn, this is leading to increasing 
intra-household tensions over cash management, which is impacting on family 
structure. The upshot is that many migrants are separating themselves from joint 
                                                        
81 Though positive discrimination policy of reserving a quota of jobs has somewhat reduced this 
imbalance it is the better-off within the lower caste groups that have an edge. Equally, a 
considerable proportion of resource-less upper caste households also find it difficult to access 
these jobs. 
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households. New types of familial arrangements are fast emerging which could 
aptly be characterised as the ones where the roof is shared but income and financial 
responsibilities are separated (I discuss this in Chapter 8).  
A second issue, evident in Table 7.1, is the association between income and wealth 
on the one hand, and propensity to migrate on the other. My survey data suggest 
that migrant households fared relatively better than non-migrant households on 
measures of economic well-being. The average Monthly Per Capita Income (MPCI) 
and Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (MPCE) among households with 
migrant members was approximately 30 percent more than their non-migrant 
counterparts; 66 percent of the non-migrant households had MPCE below the state 
poverty line as compared to 47.7 percent of the migrant households; a higher 
proportion of migrants lived in pucca (concrete) houses than non-migrant 
counterparts. However, these data reflect post-migration economic outcomes, and 
alone cannot be used to infer pre-migration differentiated propensities to migrate. 
Thus, whereas previous studies have pointed out that poorest households are often 
least able to migrate because of their inability to bear the initial costs of migration 
(Connell et al., 1976), which in turn increases intra-village inequality among the 
households (Lipton, 1980), my field research in Siwan does not suggest that the 
initial economic position of the household is a major explanatory variable for 
migration. Interviews with households revealed that while many faced difficulties in 
financing the initial costs of migration, this did not deter migration among the 
poorest. For example, a wife of one migrant informed me that for her husband’s 
first trip to the city 10 years ago, they mortgaged her silver anklets to borrow 
money from the local moneylender. Similarly, other households borrowed money 
from their relatives and friends to send their members to the cities; in turn having a 
member in the city enhanced the creditworthiness of migrant households who were 
able to borrow money in months when migrants did not send remittances. In any 
case, the high incidence of poverty in Siwan (as the data in Table 7.1 also suggest) 
meant that economic constraints to migration applied almost equally to all 
households.  
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Table 7.1: Background characteristics of surveyed households by migration status  
  Migrant 
household 
Non-migrant 
household 
Household size (in person)1   
Average household size  7.3 5.7 
Average number of persons aged 20 to 50 years  2.9 2.1 
Average number of males aged 20 to 50 years  1.6 1.0 
Religion of the household    
Hindu 77.7 79.5 
Muslim 22.3 20.5 
Caste of the household    
Forward Caste 7.1 7.7 
Backward Caste 46.7 40.4 
Extremely Backward Caste 28.4 28.7 
Scheduled Caste/Tribe 17.8 23.1 
Type of household    
Nuclear 47.2 74.4 
Joint/Extended 52.8 25.6 
Type of house occupied   
Kutcha 16.2 24.1 
Semi-pucca 37.1 38.5 
Pucca 46.7 37.4 
Agricultural land ownership   
Landless households 33.0 31.8 
Households with less than half acre land 66.7 67.7 
Households with less than 1 acre land 83.3 85.7 
Average land size (in acre) 0.65 0.58 
Income and expenditure   
Average monthly per capita income (in Rs.) 970 654 
Average monthly per capita expenditure (in Rs.) 1021 735 
Household with MPCE below poverty line2 47.7 66.2 
Total number of households (n) 197 195 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. All data in percentage terms, 
unless specified differently. 
1Includes migrant members. 2MPCE = Monthly Per Capita Expenditure. Same MPCE 
cut-off used to estimate consumption poverty as described in Table 6.2 and Table 
6.6 above. 
Like their rural counterparts, most migrants worked in casual jobs in the urban 
informal sector. However the average migration incomes were higher than the local 
earnings, which allowed households with migrants to fare better economically than 
their non-migrant counterparts. The survey data suggest that the average annual 
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income of households with one or more migrant member from remittances alone 
was Rs. 43,563, which was slightly higher than the total annual income of Rs. 43,507 
among non-migrant households, and households with primary dependence on 
remittances as a source of income had higher incomes and expenditure as 
compared to the household who chiefly depended on local farm and nonfarm 
incomes (see Table 7.2 and Figure 7.8 below).  
This is further corroborated by the data on the duration of migration. Most 
households reported that their migrant members had been going to the cities for 
work for a long time. Of the 280 migrants, 85.7 percent had at least two years and 
more of migration history, with 64 percent (197 migrants) having a duration of stay 
away since first migration as five years or more. The higher urban incomes and the 
savings they allowed meant that it is the repeated trips to the city for a few years 
that affected these income differentials between migrants and non-migrant 
households.    
Furthermore, it is important to note that the incidence of migration did not vary 
much by mutually inter-linked categories of landholding size and caste, two key 
predictors of poverty and migration in India. Evidence from large-scale surveys and 
village studies suggests that in many parts of India it is generally the landless and 
land-poor communities of lower castes who partake in unskilled seasonal/circular 
migration (Breman, 1996, 2010; Keshri & Bhagat, 2012; Mosse et al., 2002; 
Srivastava & Sasikumar, 2003). However, my survey data on caste composition of 
the household sample suggests that there were no significant differences in the 
proportion of migrant and non-migrant households by the caste status, and 
migrants came from all castes. Studies from other parts of Bihar also suggests the 
same (Karan, 2003; Sharma, 1997). However, the gains of migration varied, with 
households from upper castes faring slightly better than the lower caste households 
in Siwan. Indeed, colonial records of migration from western Bihar indicate that 
migration was widespread across different caste groups (de Haan, 1997a, 1997b, 
2002; Hagen & Yang, 1976; Yang, 1979, 1989). My fieldwork suggests that the long 
history of migration from the western Bihar region has further loosened the caste 
basis of migration over time. In fact, while the landless and land-poor communities 
belonging to lower castes have traditionally relied more on the income from menial 
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jobs elsewhere (de Haan, 2002) in addition to the wages (both cash and in-kind) 
from local farm labour, in recent years the incidence of migration has increased 
among the upper castes. Following the abolition of Zamindari system and related, 
albeit partial, land reforms carried out in Bihar in the post-independence period, the 
land loss among the upper castes has been greater. Further diminishing the capacity 
of land-based livelihoods has been the continuous fragmentation of landholdings 
due to high population pressures. Village-studies from other parts of Bihar suggest 
that landholdings of upper castes have reached a point where farming no longer 
provides a viable income option (Sharma, 2005, p. 965). By reducing the wage 
income opportunities locally, this has also propelled migration among the 
traditionally disadvantaged communities of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and 
Extremely Backward Caste groups. The exceptions included the lower caste 
communities of Bansfor and Mushahar (two traditionally marginalised caste groups 
in Bihar) who did not show a high migration propensity from the case study villages 
(see below).82  
Personal histories of many lower castes households in Siwan revealed that many 
had members who earlier worked as ‘attached labourers’ in the fields of Forward 
Caste landowners. However this is no longer the case; in none of the 10 case-study 
villages was the incidence of labour bondage reported.83 The cross-sectional nature 
of the survey bars a quantitative assessment of the magnitude of the attached 
labour that prevailed before in case study villages in Siwan. Nonetheless, 
longitudinal studies from other parts of Bihar confirm that attached labour no 
longer characterises agrarian and land relations in Bihar. Reporting the findings of a 
longitudinal study that traces the changes in social-economic relations in two 
contrasting villages in north Bihar over 30-year period, Datta et al. (2014, p. 1199) 
                                                        
82 It should be noted that the propensity to migrate among different social groups is not the 
same across the different regions of the state. For instance, in their study of migration in six 
districts of Bihar, Deshingkar, Kumar, Chobey, and Kumar (2006, p. 18) found high rates of 
seasonal migration among Mushahars of Nalanda district who mainly migrated to neighbouring 
states of Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal to work in the brick kilns for 6-7 months a year. 
83 In one of the case-study villages, a woman respondent from the lower caste reported that 
when she demanded higher farm wages from the local landlords they threatened to kill her and 
her family. In reality, however this did not happen. The respondent reported that she now 
commuted to another village during the peak agricultural seasons where she got the daily wage 
of Rs. 150 (US$ 3), three-times as much as she got locally.   
 223 
found that between 1981 and 2009, both ‘attached labour’ and ‘pure landlords’ 
disappeared in the two villages. In the case of Siwan, the progressive reduction in 
the already meagre size of landholdings has weakened the erstwhile feudal 
relations. Moreover the caste basis of land ownership has also progressively 
eroded, as noted above. In the sample of 392 households, while the incidence of 
landlessness was lower and average land size higher among the Forward Castes and 
Backward Castes than the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Extremely 
Backward Castes, the differences were not significant; across the sample most 
landed households had average landholdings of less than an acre (Figure 7.22). At 
the same time, the gradual erosion of the caste basis of land ownership is leading to 
new land dynamics whereby the erstwhile landowning communities are leasing out 
their land to pursue more remunerative non-local, nonfarm livelihoods in the cities. 
How these land relations have a bearing on food security of the land-poor 
households is discussed in the later section of this Chapter.  
At this stage, however, it is important to note that the motivations to migrate as 
well as well as to stay put in the village were complex. In the case of migrant 
households, although economic reasons figured prominently in most, and almost 
exclusively in many, households’ migration decisions, they conflated with several 
other motivations such as personal desires of migrants’ to experience the outside 
world. That said, connections with family and village at place of origin remained 
strong and most migrants showed a strong leaning toward village life.  
To most households long-distance migration to urban areas inevitably provided the 
route to make up for livelihood deficits in the origin villages. The predominance of 
push induced by unemployment notwithstanding, higher urban incomes also 
provided the pull motives to many households. In fact in myriad instances the 
classic push and pull dichotomy was often obscured as the responses of most 
respondents often reflected a combination of the distress-push and income-pull 
factors. During my interviews with migrants at places of destination, a common 
response to the question of the migration trigger that “we-don’t-have-much-
employment-available-there [in the village]” often followed, at times in the same 
breath, that “incomes-here-are-much-better”. In other words, the escape from the 
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economic drudgery in the village often coincided with the inherent desire among 
migrants to better themselves.  
Furthermore, and this is important, there was a great degree of differentiation in 
the ways in which different migrants and households perceived and pursued the 
economic gains of migration. To some households, often the very poor with no land 
and other assets in their places of origin, migration served the immediate goal of 
meeting food consumption needs. For Ahmed (name changed) and his family, for 
instance: 
I often wonder what would happen if I did not come and work here. My 
family would die of starvation… My daughter died two and half years ago 
when she was just two and half years old. She had jaundice and I asked my 
wife if I should come back so that we could see a good doctor for her but 
she told me not to. Few days later, she called me to inform that my 
daughter is no more and I must come now. If I had gone earlier, she could 
have been saved. But I could only go to bury her. I do not blame my wife 
either, as she probably thought that me not earning for a month (or may be 
longer) and thus not sending money home would have killed her anyway.  
For others, migration provided a way to save and accumulate money for longer-
term goals such as dowry (for daughters’ wedding), via the mechanism of buying a 
piece of land (interviews with a few migrants revealed that they bought land when 
their daughter(s) were growing up, and sold later to meet dowry demands). Thus, to 
quote another migrant respondent: 
My family’s day-to-day expenses are provided by the cash income from the 
milk we sell. But selling milk can never pay for my daughter’s marriage. So 
the money that I earn here is used for bigger expenditure… whatever I have 
been able to do is from the money I earn here. I married two daughters, 
spent money on my parents’ treatment and funeral, and am now educating 
my younger children. 
In a handful of other cases, work migration, although occurring due to distress 
circumstances at home, and with the broad purpose of maximising household 
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welfare, also coalesced with individual migrants’ desire to experience the outside 
world away from the watchful eyes of family and village elders. Seen this way, 
mobility also provided an avenue for partial individualisation of migrant members’ 
lives. Personal narratives of such migrants revealed that they often combined broad 
household goals with their own aspirations, though the former was almost always 
more important than the latter. To quote another migrant: 
My father did not have much and so I had to start working even before I hit 
puberty. But I wanted to move out of the village and experience the outside 
world. I was always curious to meet and interact with people from other 
regions and cultures. But I had to earn some money to support my 
aspirations, and more importantly, I had my family to support too. So I 
started working outside but now I realise that I have been away from the 
village and my family forever.   
The lack of gainful employment opportunities in Siwan notwithstanding, most of the 
migrants that I interviewed were of the view that while they could find work in and 
around the village, migration allowed savings that local work did not. Indeed, saving 
was the single biggest reason reported by the migrants. For example, Bhim (name 
changed), who worked as a carpenter in Faridabad, Haryana, told me:   
I know here in the village I can earn as much money as I make staying 500 
miles away from home. But I will not ever be able to save single penny here, 
whereas in Faridabad I save between Rs. 4000 and Rs. 5000 every month. 
This money helps my family when they need it. What is the point of earning 
and not saving anyway?  
Not all migrants (and the households they belonged to) were able to improve their 
economic standing over time in any significant manner (e.g. Ahmed’s case above). 
Most migrants worked in the urban informal sector and thus had precarious jobs. 
Indeed it is one of the important reasons why migration from this region (or from 
Bihar as a whole) has remained circular, as well as intergenerational in nature with 
old members in the household passing the baton to the younger members of 
employable age. However, it is also true that without migration the rural 
populations of western Bihar would be much worse off. Furthermore, as I discuss 
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below, remittances are playing an (increasingly) important role in the lives and 
livelihoods of Siwani dwellers. From the specific perspective of food security, while 
food security circumstances were dire across the survey sample, having a member 
outside was invariably associated with improved access to food and dietary 
diversity.  
On the other hand, decisions by some respondents not to migrate were not because 
they were any better-off and thus did not have any need. Nor, in most cases, did 
they lack the information and networks. In all the 10 case study villages the ubiquity 
of migration (and its circular nature) meant that information on work availability, 
destinations and wages flowed quickly, and the long history of migration from the 
region meant that networks were well established. Yet, many households stayed in 
the village. This was because, firstly, as noted above, a larger proportion of non-
migrant households came from nuclear families, and had lower average family sizes.  
For instance, Munni Lal, a 45-year-old man from Kushwaha community (cultivator 
caste) who combined cash incomes from farming and sharecropping with 
repairing/fixing irrigation pumps, told me: “I wanted to go and work in the city but I 
could not do it because I was alone. But when my son grows up, I want him to go 
and live in one of the big cities.” Households with fewer members found it difficult 
for someone to move out. Secondly, attachment with village life, local networks and 
agricultural land kept several households embedded in the village economy and 
society.  
Thirdly, some of the surveyed non-migrant households earlier had members who 
migrated but returned because either they developed health problems or faced 
exploitation and abuse at the destination places. The latter reason was particularly 
true for some of the most disadvantaged households, such as Bansfors and 
Mushhars (Box 7.1 and Figure 7.1 to 7.6). Many had no networks and depended on 
the work agents/contractors to change their fortunes. The way agents recruited 
men from these lower castes was to provide an advance sum of a few thousand 
rupees to the cash-starved poor families. Although this advance amount varied from 
one village to another and, within the village, from one household to another, it 
ranged between Rs. 3000 (US$60) and Rs. 8000 (US$160). As per the verbal contract 
and commitment by the agents, it was meant to be the payment worth one month 
 227 
of work. However, in interviews, many return migrants told me that this amount 
was all that was paid for the duration of work ranging between 6 to 8 months, in 
addition to the weekly sum of a few hundred rupees for their food expenses. High 
levels of exploitation at the destinations also often including long working hours, 
and less than promised pay, and sometimes no pay at all reduced the benefits of 
migration for these households. To quote one such return migrant, Teja Bansfor 
(first name changed):  
I am a poor and illiterate man. When it came to settling my account towards 
the end of the working period, my contractor would show me a huge paper 
and tell me that instead I owed him money which I must return. Upon 
hearing that, my heartbeat would stop. I worked with four different agents 
in Kolkata, Chennai, Guhawati and Cochin [Kochi] but this happened with 
me each time. So I am better-off living in the village. 
In a nutshell, the decisions of surveyed households to migrate as well as stay put 
were complex, and were also guided by a range of non-economic factors. However, 
it is pertinent to understand how migrant households fare vis-à-vis non-migrant 
household, an issue to which I now turn.  
Landholding patterns, nonfarm income diversification and income differentials 
between migrant and non-migrant households  
As noted in Chapter 5, in Siwan, landholdings are sub-economical. Out of the 392 
surveyed households, 32.4 percent of household had no land, 57.4 owned 
landholdings of less than an acre, and only 10.2 percent had land sizes of one acre 
or more (Figure 7.7). These landholding patterns implied that for a large majority of 
surveyed households the productive capacity of land to provide cash income was 
quite limited, though land was invariably valued highly by all households as a critical 
livelihood asset, a source of security, and a vital foundation for own provisioning of 
food security. The weak income-generating potential of land meant that cash 
incomes from nonfarm sources were important not only to supplement the gains of 
land-based livelihoods but also for maintaining and sustaining the small land parcels 
that most poor households owned. The small landholdings provided a strong 
incentive for migration. At the same time, as I discuss below, the connections 
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between non-local, migration incomes were rarely one-way and remittances were 
invested in household-owned land and agriculture.   
Box 7.1: Mushahars and Bansfors: a brief profile  
a brief profile  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Socio-economic conditions  
 
Officially recognised as the Scheduled Castes in the Indian constitution, Bansfors and 
Mushahars are mainly found in the two Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. My 
fieldwork in rural Siwan suggested that in a village structure, members from these lower 
caste communities formed the contingents of socially marginalised, economically and 
educationally backward and geographically isolated people. As outcasts, they lived on the 
village margins and were segregated from the main village habitations. Most families had 
sub-humane living conditions, dwelled in kutcha (mud/bamboo) houses, and had no land or 
any other productive resources. The incidence of hunger and food insecurity was extremely 
high among the Mushahars and Bansfors and most families were seldom able to eat three 
meals a day every day. Due to the lack of resources and networks, migration was very low 
among these caste groups, and most families depended on local income options.  
 
Livelihoods  
 
Also Known as “rat eaters”, Mushahars occupy the lowest rungs of caste hierarchy in India. 
The livelihoods of Mushahars are gender segregated. Most Mushaher men work in the local 
Brick Kilns for about five months a year (February to June). During my interviews with 
Mushahars in one of the study village (Jagarnathpur Village: Chapter 4), I was informed that 
they received Rs. 300 on every 1000 bricks they made. On an average, an adult man makes 
between 500 and 700 bricks every day, thus earning close to Rs. 150 as daily wages. During 
the peak agricultural season, women work as agricultural labourers in the fields of 
landowners at the daily wage rate of between Rs. 30 and Rs. 50 a day for 4-5 hours of work. 
In the slack period when the work is available under the NREGS, both men and women work 
under the scheme.   
The main livelihood activity of Bansfors is making bamboo-based small products by hand, 
such as baskets. ‘Bans’ is a Hindi word which means bamboo, and Bansfors are commonly 
known as bamboo workers. The whole family, including young children, is involved in 
making baskets, and a family can usually make between five and eight baskets a day. 
Depending on the size, type and quality, each basket is sold for anywhere between Rs. 10 
and Rs. 30. Like Mushahars, Bansfors women also work as agricultural labourers earning the 
similar daily wages of Rs. 30 and Rs. 50 a day. Some of the households I interviewed also 
informed me that oftentimes they beg for food from the neighbours in the village. 
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Figure 7.1: Settlement of Bansfor community in Gay Ghat village 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: A Bansfor family in Gay-Ghat village making baskets 
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Figure 7.3: A Bansfor woman in Chakmahmuda village making baskets. The 
neighbours’ children wanted to be in the frame too! 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Settlement of Mushahar community near a brick kiln in Rachhopali, a 
village adjacent to one of the study villages of Jagarnathpur, where Mushahars from 
both villages worked. 
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Figure 7.5: Mushahar men working in the brick kiln 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Mushahar kids who owned one pair of shirt each which their mothers 
had washed that day. 
 
 
Source: All pictures taken during fieldwork in Siwan.  
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Figure 7.7: Percentage distribution of surveyed households by land ownership 
status in Siwan 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
The survey data on income composition suggests that farm income constituted a 
very miniscule proportion of the overall income of surveyed households. On the 
other hand, nonfarm sources contributed more than three-quarters of households’ 
annual cash incomes. For migrant households the combined share of rural and 
urban nonfarm incomes accounted for more than 90 percent of the average annual 
income. In terms of income differentials by migration status, migrant households 
had higher incomes than their non-migrant counterparts, largely owing to the fact 
that wages and earnings in urban areas were higher than rural incomes. The annual 
per capita income of migrant households was 32 percent higher than of households 
without any migrant members (Table 7.2).    
It is apparent from the data in Table 7.2 that the surveyed households had their 
incomes spread across multiple sources. However, they varied in terms of the 
degree of dependence. Indeed the relative contribution of the source has important 
bearing in terms of explaining the income differential between the migrant and 
non-migrant households.  
32.4%
57.4%
10.2%
Landless Up to one acre More than one acre
n=392
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Table 7.2: Average percentage share of income by source among migrant and non-
migrant rural households in Siwan 
Source of income Migrant HHs (n=197) 
Non-migrant HH 
(n= 194)1 
Farm 1.5 7.7 
Livestock 1.6 4.3 
Rural nonfarm 17.4 76.2 
Off-farm 1.4 5.6 
Remittances 75.4 0.0 
Government benefits 1.9 4.0 
Others 0.8 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Average annual income (In Rs.) 60232 43507 
Average annual per capita income (In Rs.) 11629.0 7844.0 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
1Total non-migrant sample included 195 households but one of them did not share 
income details. 
Figure 7.8 shows the distribution of sample households across the MPCI tertiles 
(distribution of households into three equal parts based on their income) by their 
primary source of livelihood. The primary source of livelihood is defined here as the 
sector or occupation which accounted for 50 percent or more of total household 
income in the year 2011-12. This has been classified into three broad categories 
that include: a) agriculture and livestock (including off-farm wages from agriculture 
work and tending animals), b) rural nonfarm, and c) remittances. The logic of such 
classification was that together they accounted for 96 percent of average household 
income; the remaining 4 percent came from other sources such as income transfers 
from government (eg. old-age and disability pensions, scholarships). The cut-off 
points for MPCI tertiles obtained from the survey data include Rs. 485.12 and Rs. 
767.12. Using these cut-off points, the classification thus follows: 1) Low – Rs. 0 to 
485.12; 2) Medium – Rs. 485.13 to 767.12; 3) High – Rs. 767.13 and above. 
The data suggest that while a relatively small proportion of the overall sample (32 
households) depended on income from farm and livestock, most of these (62.5 
percent) were in the low-income tertile, suggesting the farm incomes were low. On 
the other hand, 46 percent of 157 households which depended primarily on 
remittances were in the high income tertile.  
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Figure 7.8: Percentage of households in MPCI tertiles by primary source of income 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
The effects of dependency on remittances as a primary source of income are 
reflected in the economically advantageous position of migrant vis-à-vis non-
migrant households. Figure 7.9 presents the distribution of surveyed households in 
the MPCI tertiles by migration status. As is apparent, the proportion of non-migrant 
households in the low-income category is almost double than for migrant 
households (34 percent and 66 percent respectively), and these percentages 
reverse in the high income tertile. Furthermore, comparing the migrants and non-
migrant households along the axis of castes also suggests that migration status 
exerts a positive role on household income. 
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Figure 7.9: Percentage of households in MPCI tertiles by migration status84 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Figure 7.10 presents the households in the high MPCI tertile in each of the broad 
caste categories by their migration status. As is evident, households who had one or 
more migrant members fared better than non-migrant households across all the 
caste categories. It is important to note that the proportion of households in the 
high income tertile relative to the total sample in each of the caste category did not 
show much variation; 34 percent of total sample Forward Caste households (10 out 
of 29 households), 36 percent of Backward Caste households (61 out of 171 
households), 31 percent of Extremely Backward Caste households (35 out of 112 
households), and 30 percent of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe households (24 
out of 80 households) were in the high MPCI tertile. In other words, the sample 
households in the high income tertiles were fairly equally spread across the 
different caste groups. Importantly, however, in each caste category a greater 
proportion of migrant households was in the high income category than non-
                                                        
84 The classification of migrant and non-migrant households in the MPCE tertiles also shows 
similar results. 
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migrant households, suggesting that migration exerted a positive role on household 
income.  
Figure 7.10: Percentage of migrant and non-migrant households in high MPCI tertile 
by caste 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12.  
 
Equally, while migrants came from all caste groups and there were no significant 
differences in the propensities to migrate, the extent to which migration benefited 
the households varied by caste. As shown in Figure 7.10, a larger proportion of 
migrant households in the high income tertile were from the Forward Castes, 
followed by Backward Castes, Extremely Backward Castes and Scheduled 
Castes/Scheduled Tribes. Although this caste structuring of income gains from 
migration is not entirely surprising, it is not easily explained by the survey data. For 
instance, data on the educational and occupational status of 280 migrants suggests 
almost no differences by caste; most migrants across the different castes had low 
levels of education and worked in the urban informal sector as unskilled workers. 
Notwithstanding the general precariousness of the urban occupations in which 
most migrants belonging to all castes were engaged, the combined proportion of 
migrants from the Extremely Backward Castes and Scheduled Castes/Scheduled 
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Tribes was slightly higher at the lower tail of the casual jobs categories (cleaning, 
sweeping, rickshaw pulling). (31 of the 47 migrants (65 percent) working in the very 
menial jobs, labelled as ‘other casual labourers’ in Table 7.4 below, were from these 
caste groups; the average incomes of these migrants were the lowest except for 
two agricultural workers.) Moreover, as noted earlier, by virtue of their weak social 
status, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Extremely Backward Castes are 
more vulnerable to social and economic discrimination. At the same time, a 
relatively larger proportion of non-migrant Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and 
Extremely Backward Castes households were in the high income tertile compared to 
the Forward Castes and Backward Castes. 
It is important to note the two-way interconnectedness between nonfarm 
livelihood pathways and migration. While the rural non-farm sector in Siwan 
remains underdeveloped, the potential of this sector to offer employment and 
income seemed to be connected, in part, to the flow of remittances into the district. 
This is unlike some other parts of India, such as Punjab, where agricultural growth 
provided the key stimulant to the growth and development of rural non-farm 
employment (for example, see Bhalla, 1993; Tripathy, 2009). In Siwan, the 
landholdings are small, and farm incomes constituted, on average, just 8 percent of 
the cash incomes of the non-migrant households and less than 2 percent for 
migrant households (Table 7.2).  
While much of the outmigration from the district tends to take place within the 
national boundaries (albeit mostly outside the state), the outflow of labour migrants 
working in the Gulf countries is significant as well. In some areas such as Chandpali 
village in Ziradei Block (the birthplace of first president of independent India, Dr. 
Rajendra Prasad), almost every household has at least one member working abroad. 
In many villages across the district with a high incidence of international migration, 
having a member abroad has become a social status symbol; families who do not 
have any members in bidesh, a common metaphor used by the locals to refer to 
countries outside India (though in the local Bhojpuri folklore, the term is also used 
loosely to refer to far-off destinations within the country as well: Chapter 8), are 
often looked down upon within the village. International remittances flows are 
significant, and are growing, which is reflected in the proliferation of ‘Western 
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Union Money Transfer’ centers that could be spotted throughout the district. My 
conservative estimate is that there are about 100 to 150 such centers in Siwan. The 
post-office of Siwan, where the first Western Union center was set up, was ranked 
as one of the richest post-offices in Bihar for three-consecutive years of 2009, 2010 
and 2011 receiving the highest number of international money orders in the state 
(Pandey, 2011). 
International remittances have had significantly positive impacts on living 
standards. In-depth personal histories of families with members abroad revealed 
that even though investment in migrants’ moving often required families to sell 
assets, such as jewellery and land, a trip of three years allowed many households to 
quickly achieve upward economic mobility, and most households were able not only 
to reclaim the assets sold to finance migration but also to accumulate additional 
ones. Remittances have allowed many households to become petty entrepreneurs, 
engaged in a range of trading and service business. For instance, some of the 
District Blocks such as Hasanpura and Hussainganj in south Siwan where the 
incidence of international migration is high, have as large markets and as much 
trading activity, if not more, as the urban Siwan market. Many households with 
members abroad have invested in housing which has generated some employment 
in the rural construction sector. Given the focus of this study was on the mobility 
within the national borders and its effects on rural lives and livelihoods, I shall not 
dwell more into issue of international migration.  
In any case, international migration however was not the option for all, and most 
poor households resorted to domestic migration. Given the high magnitude of these 
within-country flows, domestic remittances are perhaps several times more than 
international remittances. While remittances are playing an increasing diverse role 
in rural households’ lives and livelihoods, their effects on the food security, the 
main concern of this research, are perhaps the most discernable. In the next 
section, I therefore discuss the role of remittances in influencing household food 
security.  
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Remittances, rural-urban linkages and household food security  
Figure 7.11 presents the district-level data on the amount of money paid by the 
Siwan postal office in money orders for the period from 2002-03 to 2009-10. Postal 
money orders have long been a popular mode of income transfer used by migrants 
from the Western Bihar region to remit their earnings and savings in the home 
villages (Yang, 1989, pp. 197-198). These figures pertain to internal transfers to the 
district post-office from different parts of India, and do not include transfers from 
overseas (which, as noted above, are significant too). While not all transfers are 
remittances, the share of non-remittance transfers would presumably be not very 
high. Indeed because of the significance of this mode of remittance, Bihar is often 
described as the “money-order economy” (Deshingkar et al., 2009), although 
increasing penetration of rural banking in Bihar coupled with growing financial 
literacy among the rural populations of the state in recent years has diminished 
their overall importance and thus they are used by a relatively small proportion of 
migrants.  
Figure 7.11: Value of money orders paid by post offices in Siwan, 2002-03 to 2009-
10 
Source: Data obtained from the Head Post Office, Siwan, 2012 
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Trends in remittance flows in the district suggest that the amount of postal money 
orders paid by Siwan post-office has increased in absolute terms, from Rs. 396 
million in 2002-03 to Rs. 512 million in 2009-10. This represents approximately two 
percent of the district’s GDP for Siwan in 2009-10.85 However, as noted above, 
postal money order services are now used by a relatively small proportion of 
households and thus this represents a tiny fraction of the overall remittance flows 
in the district.  
The household survey data suggest that of the 280 migrants, 275 migrants from 192 
households remitted money home in the past year; among those who sent money, 
only 12 percent (33 migrants) used the postal money orders as against 34 percent 
(95 migrants) who used banks to transfer their incomes. An even greater proportion 
of migrants (36 percent) remitted money home through their friends and fellow 
villagers (Table 7.3). This latter mode of remittances has always been, and continues 
to be, the most important means of remittances transfer among Siwani migrants, 
and indeed is one reason why the precise magnitude of remittances is hard to arrive 
at.  
Table 7.3: Mode of remittance transfer used by the surveyed migrants 
Mode of remittance 
Number of 
migrants who 
remitted money 
% age of migrants 
who remitted 
money 
Friends/Relatives 101 36.1 
Bank account transfers 95 33.9 
Money orders 33 11.8 
Self 29 10.4 
Others 17 6.1 
Total migrants who remitted money1 275 98.2 
Total number of migrants (n) 280 100.0 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
1Five of the 197 migrant households reported receiving no remittances from their 
members; all five households had only one migrant member working outside the 
village.  
 
                                                        
85 The district GDP was arrived at by extrapolating Siwan’s per capita GDP of Rs. 8111 for the 
year 2009-10 (at 2004-05 prices) (Government of Bihar, 2013, p. 21) over district’s total 
population which in 2011 was 3.31 million (Registrar General of India, 2011c).   
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Nonetheless, if one were to combine the household survey data on the mode of 
remittances with the formal data on the postal money orders in the district, some 
guesstimates can be worked out. Thus, if the household survey figure of 12 percent 
percent of migrants who used postal money order services to remit money home 
were to be simply extrapolated on the total money order sum of Rs. 512 million in 
2009-10, it suggests that the inflow of remittance in the district is nearly eight times 
as much. Seen another way, the remittances potentially equal nearly 15-16 percent 
of the district’s GDP. While there are methodological issues in combining these two 
sources of data, my fieldwork reveals that the total magnitude of remittances is 
unlikely to be less (and quite likely to be more).  
Within this large remittance flow, the magnitude of informal channels warrants 
consideration. In Bihar, several informal networks of money-transfer agents 
operate. Originating around the late 1970s when migration from Bihar was directed 
to the Green Revolution belt states of Punjab and Haryana, these informal networks 
filled the void created by the virtual absence of rural banking in Bihar at that time 
(though rural banking still remains quite patchy in many places in Bihar). These 
networks still operate, and deliver huge sums of money to migrants’ families. 
Indeed, in one conversation with a person who was earlier part of one such network 
in Siwan, I was informed that three-years ago he was one of the 30 persons in Siwan 
district, each of whom distributed between Rs. two and three lakhs (US$ 4000-
6000) everyday as remittances sent by the migrants to their families.  
Rural households’ increased reliance on migration incomes notwithstanding, 
migrants’ connections with origin still remain strong in Siwan. Most of the surveyed 
migrant households had members who worked in the informal sector where they 
earned low wages and lacked employment security. The precarious jobs in the 
informal sector prohibited, in large part, more permanent form of migration from 
the district (Breman, 1985, 1996, 2010), though various socio-cultural reasons, such 
as restrictions on the mobility of women, also coalesced with economic reasons to 
produce this form of migration. For example, when I asked a migrant respondent, 
who got married two years ago and spent eight to nine months away from the 
village, if it was financially feasible for him to take his wife along in the city and 
maintain his family, he replied:  
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Of course I am capable to take my wife in the city and start a life there. I do 
feel lonely after work and I miss my wife. But I would not ever take her 
there. I would rather like her to stay in the village. The culture in the city is 
not as good as the one we have in the village. In the village people have 
respect for each other, but in the city the conversations are filled with 
abuses. I do not want my wife to pick up on those bad things. 
Not all migrants, however, were suitably placed to maintain their families at their 
place of work, and economic reasons often outweighed social and cultural 
considerations (Chapter 8). The low average wages earned from informal sector 
jobs coupled with increased urban unaffordability did not allow most migrants to 
bring their families to the cities, and settle there on more permanent basis (on this, 
also see Kundu, 2003). In turn the left-behind families in the rural hinterlands 
augmented circular mobility. To several migrants, the city provided a livelihood 
avenue but the village was where life belonged. It is important to note that even 
migrants who successfully trudged the stern demands of work life in urban areas, 
and were able to achieve upward economic mobility, showed a strong leaning 
towards the rural way of life. In an interview with Abdul (name changed), a migrant 
who worked his way up from the manual labourer in his first migration to an 
‘Assistant Manager’ in an export garment factory in Panipat, Haryana (where I 
interviewed him) and who now had 30 persons working directly under his watch, he 
suggested: “No matter how much we suffer in the village, it is still better. I have my 
family and friends there… Sitting under the tree in the village is better than the air-
conditioned office here.”  
While most migrants worked in low-paying jobs in the urban informal sector, 
migration nonetheless provided a crucial livelihood strategy to cope with 
employment deficits in the origin villages. Importantly, most migrants sent nearly 
half of their monthly income home. Even for the very poorest households, 
remittances as low as Rs. 1000 per month often helped them to stave off hunger 
and illness at the very least.  
Table 7.4 presents the income earned and remittances sent by the migrants to their 
families by occupation. The migrant members of the surveyed households worked 
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across diverse casual and semi-casual occupational categories, except 12 migrants 
who held permanent government jobs (mainly in the army and police). This 
occupational diversity allowed the comparison of income and quantum of 
remittances by occupation. As noted in Chapter 5, all, except two migrants who 
were agricultural workers, worked in the urban areas. The urban construction sector 
provided the single largest occupational category, absorbing 40 percent of the 
surveyed migrants, followed by various forms of salaried employment in small and 
medium private firms (eg. export garment factories in National Capital Region) 
accounting for a quarter of all migrants, and a similar proportion worked as casual 
labourers (eg. watchman) and drivers.86  
While the average monthly income of migrants working in casual and semi-casual 
jobs may appear to not vary much across occupations, ranging from Rs. 4000 (US$ 
80) for agricultural laborers to Rs. 6100 (US$ 120) for drivers, they often made huge 
differences for the recipient households. The difference of Rs. 2000 often allowed 
the households to invest in land and agriculture (buy inputs, lease-in land etc.).  
Table 7.4: Occupation, income and remittances of migrants 
Occupation 
Number 
of 
migrants 
(n=280) 
Average 
monthly 
income            
(In Rs.) 
Average 
remittances 
per month  
(In Rs.) 
%age of 
monthly 
income 
remitted 
Government employee 12 14750 7292 49 
Salaried employment in private firm1 71 5528 2688 49 
Self-employed in petty business 14 4964 2263 46 
Construction worker 114 5925 2546 43 
Driver 20 6100 3254 53 
Other causal labourer 47 4715 2169 46 
Agricultural labourer 2 4000 625 16 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
1Salaried employment in a private firm were those with fixed monthly income and 
fixed over-time rates, though they lack the tenure security. 
 
                                                        
86 In addition to agricultural labourers, construction workers and drivers who are also casual 
workers in many respects, sample migrants were found to be performing a number of other 
causal jobs such as sweeping and cleaning, night watchmen in an urban society etc. Since they 
were widely spread across occupations, they have been grouped into this single category for 
analytical purpose.  
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Importantly, most of the migrants remitted nearly half the share of their income 
home. It must be added that migrants’ incomes were reported by their households 
in rural areas, and thus it is likely that they represent an underestimation of the 
total earnings of the migrants as well as the remittances. Indeed in the 10 
interviews with migrants at the destination (and many more at the origin), all of 
them reported incomes which were between 1.5 to 2 times more than what was 
reported by their rural counterparts. Given most were single-minded about earning 
and saving more money, many of them often worked overtime and made extra 
incomes; the pressures to save and send money home also meant that many cut 
down on their own expenditure even on the most basic needs such as food. Most 
migrants also brought little hoards of cash when they came home. Another point 
that deserves a mention is that these are income and remittances by individual 
migrants but many households had more than one migrant member and thus the 
collective remittances for such households were significantly higher.  
Figure 7.12: Average annual remittance income of migrant households by number 
of migrants (In Rs.) 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
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This is reflected in Figure 7.12.  While most of the surveyed migrant households had 
one member working outside, the average annual income of migrant households 
from remittances increases in a progressive fashion with the number of migrants in 
the household. Households with two migrant members received an average amount 
of Rs. 58,789 which was nearly 40 percent more than the remittances received by 
households with one migrant member, while remittances received by households 
with 3 or more migrants was more than double as that of one-migrant households. 
The extent of remittances also varied by duration spent working outside the village. 
Figure 7.13 presents the mean annual remittances received by migrant households 
by the number of months spent outside the village during the year preceding the 
survey (between April 2011-March 2012) per migrant member. While most (90 
percent) of the remittance-receiving migrant households had members who spent 
more than half of the year at their destinations, with 70 percent (135 out of 192) 
among them having members who spent 10 months or more in the destinations, 
the remaining 10 percent of households with shorter migration durations of 2 to 6 
months had invariably lower remittance incomes. Indeed the average yearly 
remittances received by these households were almost three times less than those 
who spent more than 6 months away.87  
This is not surprising as migrants who worked for longer durations outside the 
village were inevitably better-positioned to remit more. When the data on 
remittances by number of migrants and duration spent outside the village is viewed 
in conjunction with each other, this implies that having more migrants in the 
household does not necessarily mean higher remittance incomes. Other things 
being equal, the household with three migrant members with each spending two 
months outside the village would fare worse than the household with one migrant 
member who spent seven months or more. 
 While most migrants spent the major part of the year outside the village for work, 
as the data suggest, my interviews with migrants revealed that many also made 
                                                        
87 The differences between the households with migration months of 7 to 9 months and 10 
months or more are very small, because in the former 28 out of 38 households had per capita 
migrant duration of 9 months whereas in the latter the distribution was more concentrated (102 
households) in 10 and 11 months.  
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needs-based, short trips to the cities. For example, a migrant I interviewed at a 
construction work site in Noida who reported that his length of stay outside the 
village never exceeded more than 5 months in a year in the 7 years since he first 
migrated, told me:  
I work here for as long as required. If I feel I have earned enough to get my 
family by for the whole year, I go back to my village. Why stay away from 
the family when one can be with them. I come back again here when I need 
money. And this goes on.  
Figure 7.13: Average annual remittances received by the household by number of 
migration months per migrant member (In Rs.) 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Indeed, despite the higher average returns of longer-duration migration, some of 
the very poorest migrants spent considerably less time in the cities. For the 
remainder of the period, they often worked as wage labourers in village agriculture 
during harvesting for in-kind wages of a few kilos of the crop they helped harvest, 
and picked up other odd jobs, such as construction, outside peak farm seasons. This 
kept them in poverty however. Importantly, the generally unpredictable availability 
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of local employment and poor wages meant that the remittances still accounted for 
more than half of the total income of many households, even though absolute 
incomes were low. The survey data suggest that of the 18 households with per 
capita migration months between 2 and 6 months, the share of remittance in total 
household income was 50 percent or higher for 11 households.  
These differences in remittances notwithstanding, almost all migrant households 
received remittances from their members. The survey data suggest that of the 197 
migrant households, 192 households reported receiving remittances in the past 
year. The migrants’ earnings were used by the recipient households to meet various 
short-term and long-term goals. It is important to note that, although the uses of 
remittances varied markedly from one household to another, depending upon the 
needs and background circumstances of households and the amount of money 
received, most households reported utilising the money on basic livelihood needs of 
food, health and education. Out of the 192 households, almost all (188 households) 
used remittances on food, 85 percent (162 household) spent remittances to finance 
health care expenses, and two-thirds (133 households) spent on education of 
household members, mainly children. A break-down of the households by income 
level suggests that a large proportion of resource poor household tended to spend 
remittances on these basic heads. (There were 41 migrant households in the 
poorest MPCI tertile, of which 98 percent of households spent on food, 71 percent 
on health care, and 66 percent on children’s education.) This allowed them not only 
to stave off the exigencies of starvation and ill-health but also to invest in future 
livelihood assets (eg. children’s education). According to the survey data, migrant 
households spent more on children’s education than non-migrant households. The 
average annual expenses on the education of children aged between 6 and 18 years 
among migrant and non-migrant household was Rs. 1570 and Rs. 907, respectively.  
The other uses of remittances included, buying durables such as kitchen utensils, 
radio, bicycles, spending on marriage and other ceremonies (eg. funerals, religious 
functions), renovating and/or building houses, saving money for the future and 
buying agricultural land (Figure 7.14).   
As noted earlier, nearly 98 percent of the remittance-receiving households used the 
money on food. Indeed remittances provided the most crucial means of food 
 248 
security for households across socio-economic categories. While the poorest 
households without any land or financial assets spent a larger share of their cash 
receipts on food (indeed, food insecurity was one of the key drivers of migration 
among these households) compared to relatively better-off households, the latter 
also spent part of the remittances on food, often to improve their diets such as 
eating meat or fish more often in a week. Migration income-induced changes in 
diets were also often guided more by taste than the nutritional considerations 
Figure 7.14: Uses of remittances among the migrant households 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Additionally, migrants’ income also allowed many of the households to invest 
money in land and agriculture. Seen this way, the relationship between migration 
and land and agriculture was a two-way one – land poverty and lack of adequate 
farm incomes provided a crucial prompt for migration and migrants’ earnings were 
recycled into own-account agriculture. Indeed, in many cases, migrants’ remittances 
were crucial for the maintaining and sustaining the little parcels that surveyed 
households owned. In cases where remittances were significant, they also allowed 
households to buy and accumulate more land and derive better gains from farm 
work.  
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Figure 7.15: Percentage of migrant households with land who reported investing 
remittances to boost agriculture production 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Figure 7.15 presents the surveyed migrant households with land who reported 
investing part of their remittances on own-account agriculture to boost farm 
production. Out of the total 128 migrant households who owned some land and 
received remittances, more than half (56 percent) households reported that they 
invested money to boost household agriculture.88 However, because of the small 
landholdings, the investments were also very small. Most households spent money 
to buy agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and pesticides, and to pay the 
rents for hiring water pumps for irrigation for the paddy crop in times when 
monsoon was weak and bleak; remittances were also used by some households, 
often the very poor, to lease in land for sharecropping farming (see below). Some of 
the migrant households with no young males to tend household agriculture also 
reported hiring labour, though such cases were very few. With the men now 
spending more time working outside the village, the women participated in 
                                                        
88 Out of the sample of 197 migrant households, 192 reported receiving remittances and 132 
owned land. Four of the 132 migrant households with land did not receive any remittances, 
hence this question applied to 128 households.  
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 250 
household farm work much more actively (Chapter 8). While these investments did 
not necessarily make all the households completely food secure, they nonetheless 
improved their own-provisioning of food.  
Though landholding patterns did not vary significantly by the migration status of the 
households, higher incomes among migrant households enhanced their investment 
capabilities. The average annual investment in own-agriculture reported by the 
migrant and non-migrant households with land was Rs. 8454 and Rs. 7615, 
respectively. However, within migrant households the investment capacities 
differed by the number of migrants in the household; the households with more 
migrants had higher average incomes and this was reflected in the amount of 
money allocated to agriculture.  
Figure 7.16: Average annual investment in agriculture among migrant households 
with land by number of migrants (In Rs.) 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
As the data in the Figure 7.16 shows, households that had three or more members 
working outside the village, while constituting a very small proportion of the 
migrant sample, invested, on average, three-times as much as the household with 
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one migrant. Indeed this in turn was positively associated with household food 
security outcomes – households with three migrant members and more agricultural 
investment invariably had a low incidence of food insecurity (see below). 
In addition to the role of urban incomes in allowing households to maintain their 
land parcels in the origin villages, remittances also enabled some households to 
(marginally) increase the size of their landholdings. The cross-sectional nature of the 
survey presents a caveat to the quantitative assessment of the consolidation of 
landholding. However, the personal histories of rural households and their migrant 
members provide strong evidence in this regard. At the same time, although urban 
incomes were higher than rural earnings, enabling some households’ to save, these 
savings were small, and as a result, it took painfully long for the household to 
enhance the size of their landholdings. For instance, Raghuram Sah (name changed), 
a 45-year old migrant from the Scheduled Tribe who was working in Faridabad 
when I interviewed him, told me that after two-decades of recurring work trips 
outside the village, he had been able to buy two-acres of land. The data presented 
in Figure 7.14 above on the uses of remittances shows that only four households 
reported buying agricultural land. However, the survey recorded the households’ 
utilisation of remittances in the past year (April 2011-March 2012) which means 
that land bought by the households before the survey reference period, when the 
savings so allowed, was not recorded and thus, the number of households who 
made land purchases through savings from migration income will likely be higher 
than four households.  
A great degree of differentiation in savings existed within migrant households. In 
particular, households with two or more members working outside the village were 
able to save more and quicker than those with only one migrant member. 
Furthermore the information on the landholding status of remittance-receiving 
migrant households suggests that the former had a relatively lower incidence of 
landlessness and bigger landholdings than the latter. The data in Figure 7.17 suggest 
that, with the increase in the number of migrants the percentage of landless 
households declines, whereas the percentage of households with less than an acre 
and an acre and above increases.  
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Figure 7.17: Size of agricultural landholding among migrant households who 
received remittances by number of migrant members 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the survey, it is, of course, not methodologically 
feasible to attribute these differences in landholding status as arising from savings 
from urban incomes over the period. At the same time, this relationship – 
households with more migrants having relatively better land status – is hardly 
surprising. Evidence from other parts of India also suggests that the poor migrants 
often invest the money to save and consolidate their existing landholdings. In his 
study in South Gujarat, for instance, Breman (1985) found that migration incomes 
were indispensable for small-cultivator households to prevent them from sliding 
down into landlessness. Breman (1985, p. xvii) notes:  
The income earned outside during their temporary absence from home 
becomes indispensable for the consolidation of the small peasant holdings 
which have reached the level of semi-proletarianization; while the 
departure itself, either temporary or permanent, quite frequently helps to 
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mask the transition to a completely landless existence among those already 
vulnerable.  
Figure 7.18: Average annual income of remittance-receiving migrant households by 
source and number of migrants (In Rs.) 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
In Siwan, households with higher urban incomes did not stop pursuing farming; on 
the contrary, the survey data suggest that the higher urban incomes were 
associated with their increasing cash incomes from agriculture. This is clearly 
reflected in the data in Figure 7.18 that shows the average annual incomes of 
remittance-receiving households from income source and the number of migrant 
members. Indeed, given the generally smaller landholdings across the survey 
sample, much of the investment in land and agriculture was for households’ own 
consumption. However, households who were favourably positioned in terms of 
number of migrants were also able to derive higher incomes from own-account 
agriculture. The data in Figure 7.18 suggest that while the amount of remittances 
increases with the number of migrant members, the farm income also increases. 
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Figure 7.19: Average annual percentage share of income of remittance-receiving 
migrant households by source and number of migrants  
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Importantly, while farm income was twice as much among households with two 
migrants as compared to households with one migrant, the households with three 
or more migrants had significantly higher agriculture incomes. It is also important to 
note that while the categorisation of farm incomes included income from off-farm 
labour, no household with 3+ migrants engaged into manual agricultural labour and 
thus its share in the total farm income was zero for these households. In other 
words, all the farm income came from selling the agricultural produce grown on the 
land owned by the households. Another important dynamic that emerges from 
these data is that the degree of dependence on rural nonfarm incomes also 
decreased slightly among the households with three or more migrants, both in 
absolute and proportional terms (Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19). Thus, higher 
remittances did not result into households’ withdrawing from land and farm-based 
livelihoods; contrarily they allowed households to engage with agriculture much 
more actively and derive better income gains. This is an important finding. It points 
to the fact that the dynamics of rural livelihoods often involve these backward-
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forward linkages between farm and nonfarm sector and they need to be 
understood much more holistically than the “deagrarianisation” thesis allows.  
The effects of remittances played out quite differently on the food security of the 
households, depending on the total amount of money received, size of land owned 
(and acquired), and money invested in land and agriculture. However, in general, 
remittances improved the purchasing power of the households which in turn was 
associated with better household food security.  
Table 7.5: Household food security by migration status  
 
Migrant 
HHs  
(%) 
Non-
migrant 
HHs 
(%) 
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations)   
Household ate meals without vegetables 41.1 53.8 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS 36.6 39.4 
Household members consumed single meal a day 13.7 21.0 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, vegetables) 
were not available 41.6 53.3 
If household members got less food than the amount to satiate 
hunger 35.5 44.6 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations)   
Household borrowed money from friends and/or relatives to 
buy food 15.2 24.6 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money lenders 
or lifted ration on credit 28.9 33.3 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy food 0.5 2.6 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than usual) 39.6 51.8 
Total number of households (n) 197 195 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
 
Table 7.5 compares the migrant and non-migrant households on the self-reported 
parameters of food security. As noted in Chapter 6, the surveyed households were 
asked a series of questions to assess if at any time during the year preceding the 
survey (April 2011-March 2012) they experienced food insecurity and food 
shortages. The data in Table 7.5 refers to the percentage of households who 
reported having experienced food inadequacy and food unavailability at least once 
in the survey reference period. As the data suggest, on most food security indicators 
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the proportion of non-migrant households is nearly 10 percent higher than the 
migrant households.  
Food security also varied by landholding status of the household: a greater 
proportion of landless households reported having faced food insecurity as 
compared to households with some land. And within the landed category, the 
incidence of food insecurity differed by land size. Land provided an important 
source of own-provisioning of food security as households with more land were 
better able to avoid the food shortages. However, the positive effects of 
landholding on food security were much more evident among migrant than the 
non-migrant households.  
Table 7.6 shows the household food security by migration status across the 
different landholding categories. It is apparent that land ownership generally exerts 
a positive role on household food security, with the proportion of households 
declining on all parameters of food insecurity as we move from landless households 
to the ones with more than an acre of agricultural land. At the same time, migrant 
households fared better than their non-migrant counterparts across all the 
landholding categories. Thus no migrant households with land size of one acre or 
more reported consuming ‘single meal a day’ and having to ‘borrow money to buy 
food’ whereas the proportion of non-migrant households for the same land size 
group was 11 percent and 18 percent respectively.  
Through the household survey, information was also collected on the composition 
of diets to assess whether migration correlated with dietary diversity. My survey 
results and field observations revealed that diets of household across all socio-
economic strata lacked the requisite diversity, and that non-economic factors, such 
as cultural habits around food consumption, determined what food is to be eaten. 
But given that migrant households had higher incomes, it provided them an edge 
over non-migrant households. 
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Table 7.6: Household food security by migration status across the different landholding categories  
 
Landless HHs 
(%age) 
Upto 1 acre 
(%age) 
More than 1 acre 
(%age) 
 Migrant    Non-migrant Migrant  Non-migrant  Migrant Non-migrant 
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations) 
Household ate meals without vegetables 64.6 72.6 33.6 48.7 9.1 22.2 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS1 26.2 35.5 10.0 17.4 9.1 5.6 
Household members consumed single meal a day 13.8 25.8 16.4 20.0 0.0 11.1 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, vegetables) 
were not available 61.5 71.0 35.5 48.7 13.6 22.2 
If household members got less food than the amount to 
satiate hunger 47.7 59.7 33.6 40.9 9.1 16.7 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations) 
Household borrowed money from friends and/or relatives to 
buy food 18.5 22.6 16.4 27.0 0.0 16.7 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money 
lenders or lifted ration on credit 44.6 53.2 22.7 26.1 13.6 11.1 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy food 1.5 3.2 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than usual) 58.5 72.7 33.6 45.2 0.0 0.0 
Total number of households (n) 65 62 110 115 22 18 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
1A total number of 115 migrant households (32 in landless category, 68 with land size upto one acre and 15 with land size of more than an acre) and 
86 non-migrant households (19 in landless category, 56 with land size upto one acre and 11 with land size of more than an acre) had either APL card 
or no ration card.  
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Using a Principal Component Analysis of 30 food items that households consumed 
during the week before the survey, Figure 7.20 ranks the migrant and non-migrant 
households on the food diversity tertiles. These food items comprised the diverse 
food groups such as cereals, pulses and legumes, vegetables and fruits, meat and 
fish (Appendix 6). Comparison of households by migration status on this measure 
also suggests that proportion of migrant HHs increases from low to high food 
diversity whereas the opposite is the case for non-migrant HHs. 
Figure 7.20: Food diversity by migration status  
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Migration, changing agrarian relations and household food security 
Another important dimension of the relationship between migration and food 
security that deserves attention is the system of sharecropping farming in Siwan. 
The land and agrarian relations in the district (and indeed in Bihar as a whole) have 
traditionally involved a widespread prevalence of various forms of land-leasing and 
tenancy contracts, and the system of sharecropping, known locally as “Bataidari”, is 
one of the most common forms. Traditionally, sharecropping arrangements have 
involved landless and land-poor households from the lower castes leasing in land for 
cultivating purpose from the landowning communities, usually the upper caste 
Hindus belonging to Brahmins, Bhumihars, and Kshatriyas. In return for the right to 
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cultivate land, sharecropper farmers pay a certain percentage of the total crop 
produce to the landowners as rent, though cash as a form of rent is also practised in 
many places, and is becoming increasingly popular. The input costs of production, 
including labour, are borne by the cultivating farmers and the ratio of crop shared 
with the landlords typically amounts to 50 percent of the total produce. Because 
much of the sharecropping happens on an informal basis, there are no data sources 
or studies that provide systematic estimates on the incidence of sharecropping. 
However the report of the Bihar Land Reform Commission 2006-08 estimated that 
nearly 35 percent of all cultivable land in Bihar is under sharecropping, and 15 to 20 
percent of all cultivating peasants are engaged in Bataidari (Bandyopadhyay, 2008, 
2009). The household survey data collected from Siwan for this study suggest an 
even higher incidence: of the 302 households who reported having been engaged in 
farming in 2011-12, nearly half of them (48.3 percent) had leased in part or whole of 
their land for cultivating (there were 37 landless households who had leased in all of 
the land cultivated). The ubiquity of sharecropping in Siwan suggests that it holds 
crucial significance in the livelihood and food security of the many rural households. 
How the dynamics of sharecropping arrangements play out to influence the food 
security outcomes of rural households, and how migration correlates with these 
rural production relations, are the key questions explored in this section.  
At the outset it is important to note that patterns of landholding and sharecropping 
arrangements have had a regressive impact on the agricultural growth in Siwan and 
Bihar, and indeed on the overall economic performance of the state. In 2012-13 
agriculture sector still accounted for nearly a quarter of the GDP of Bihar 
(Government of Bihar, 2014b). Under the present system neither the cultivating 
farmers nor the landlords have an incentive to improve the productive capacity of 
the land. Bihar’s agriculture sector is marked by a notable absence of innovation, 
and, despite the natural endowments of high soil fertility and abundance of water 
resources, the land productivity in the state remains among the lowest in the 
country (Government of India, 2008, pp. 18-19; Joshi et al., 2012). Additionally, in 
Bihar land is not just an economic asset but also a symbol of power and status, and 
sharecropping has often been used by the upper caste landowning communities as 
a means to maintain and assert their dominance without necessarily engaging in 
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primary production. In various pockets of the state, sharecropping arrangements 
have been highly exploitative, with landlords often placing extortionate rent 
demands on poor peasants, with little or no regard to the land and crop rights of 
tillers. These issues were appropriately raised by the Bihar Land Reform Commission 
2006-08. Headed by D Bandopadhaya (a retired civil servant who is credited with 
successful land reforms in the state of West Bengal), the Commission recommended 
wide-ranging reform measures. Important among them were recognising and 
protecting the land rights of sharecroppers, which, in the Commission’s view, will 
bring about wider efficiency gains in the sector, with overall positive impacts for the 
living standards in the state. However powerful lobbying by the landowning 
communities against the reforms means that Commission’s recommendations have 
not been implemented (Bandyopadhyay, 2008, 2009). This issue remains significant 
in the politics of contemporary Bihar.     
The potential of sharecropping reforms to improve the operational efficiency of 
agricultural economy notwithstanding, it is important to understand how these 
arrangements are inserted into the life worlds of the poor households. It is certainly 
the case that the existing arrangements need reform in order to provide the 
sharecropping families with adequate land rights and improve their bargaining 
position. At the same time, the lack of adequate livelihood options and the absence 
of effectively functioning safety nets, such as the PDS (Chapter 6), in the state 
makes it an obvious choice for many of landless and land-poor households. 
Although sharecropping arrangements largely favour the landlords, the fact that 
they have continued unabated is also because they offer the poor access to scarce 
land resources.  
My fieldwork in Siwan suggests that by allowing access to land, unprotected and 
vulnerable as it may be, sharecropping plays an important supplementary role in the 
food security of poor households, particularly those belonging to the socially and 
economically marginalised caste groups. Furthermore, although the cross-sectional 
nature of the household survey data does not allow me to quantitatively assess 
changes in the incidence of sharecropping in Siwan over the period, numerous 
interviews with households belonging to different socio-economic strata and village-
level observations suggests intensification of sharecropping arrangements across all 
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the 10 case study villages. Evidence from other parts of Bihar also suggests a similar 
situation (Sharma, 2005).  
The growing importance of sharecropping within the local livelihoods systems is 
primarily due to two mutually interlinked processes of increasing land 
fragmentation and migration: firstly, the progressive reductions of landholdings 
over the period has provided an impetus for an increasing number of rural 
households to migrate out of villages to earn cash income; secondly, at the same 
time, in many instances higher urban incomes are leading to households 
withdrawing themselves from direct farming. However there are important caste 
dynamics to sharecropping. Because of the overall high incidence of land poverty in 
the survey sample, my survey data do not adequately capture the caste basis of 
sharecropping relations as they also involve the land lease-in and lease out 
transactions outside the survey sample.89 However, my observations and qualitative 
interviews (key informant interviews, interviews with households with large 
landholdings outside the sample) suggest that it is mainly the upper castes who are 
increasingly disassociating themselves from direct farming; many of them are also 
selling their land to seek more permanent forms of mobility in the urban towns. The 
village-level studies from other parts of the state also support these observations. 
For example, a follow up study that traces changes in agrarian dynamics over the 
period of 18 years (between 1981-82 and 1999-2000) in 12 villages of Bihar suggests 
an increase in the phenomenon of non-agriculturalist households among the upper 
caste peasants, and with it, a rising tendency of land leasing during this period 
(Sharma, 2005, pp. 964-965). As noted earlier, land loss among the upper caste has 
been steeper, reaching a point where farming no longer provides a (viable) 
livelihood option for them. As Sharma (2005, p. 965) notes:  
The upper caste peasants, who have lost their land to the point where the 
land cannot produce a surplus, find themselves in a dilemma as a member 
of the upper caste. They can neither meet wage demands nor take to the 
plough for fear of caste opprobrium. However, in recent years, a significant 
trend towards ploughing and other menial agricultural activities on the part 
                                                        
89 The present study was a sample survey involving interviews with 40 households from each of 
the 10 study villages, and not the village census with complete enumeration. 
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of poor upper caste males appears to be emerging (although the upper 
caste women even from very poor families do not venture to work outside 
the home in their own fields, leave aside in those of others for wages). 
Hence, they opt for renting out land and migrate.  
Figure 7.21: Landholding status by caste 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Additionally, some of the upper-caste landowner households I interviewed (most of 
which were outside the survey sample) perceived risks to the own-account 
agriculture in terms of investment to return ratio being very high; much of the 
farming in Siwan is rain-fed and depends on the mercy of monsoon. Many 
households who faced crop failures in the past considered it better to transfers the 
risks while sharing the rewards in the form of half the produce via the mechanism of 
sharecropping. For instance, Rajpal Singh (name changed), a well-to-do Brahmin by 
caste – with his son working with the IBM corporation in Delhi, and daughter-in-law 
being the democratically-elected judicial head of the local GP (though she lived with 
her husband in Delhi and Rajpal acted on her behalf) – who had earlier cultivated 
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four of the six acres of land owned (with hired labour), but had now leased out four 
acres to six different poor families (One Scheduled Tribe ‘Gond’ household and five 
Brahmin families), remarked: “Agriculture is like gambling, except that in gambling 
there is a degree of excitement. The amount of hopelessness is the same in both.”  
Figure 7.22: Average size of landholding owned (in acre) by caste 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
It is important to note that in some villages I found that sharecropping had a strong 
caste element embedded in it in that members of one caste often preferred to lease 
out their land to land-poor families belonging to the same caste (eg. Brahmins 
obliging fellow castemen such as Rajpal), and resource- and land-poor families from 
upper caste Hindus and Muslims also engaged in sharecropping. However, a larger 
proportion of the households who engaged in Bataidari were from the Extremely 
Backward Castes and Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes because of their relatively 
weaker land position. This is reflected in the data presented in Figure 7.21 which 
shows the landholding status of the surveyed households by caste status. The small 
landholdings in Siwan notwithstanding, the data suggest a clear patterning of 
landownership by caste: while the percentage of Forward Caste and Backward Caste 
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households (the latter were able to appropriate land following the abolition of 
Zamindari and related land reforms: Chapter 5) increased from landless to more 
than an acre category, the proportion of Extremely Backward Caste and Scheduled 
Caste and Scheduled Tribe families progressed in the reverse fashion. Similarly, the 
data on average landholding size by caste also suggest the same (Figure 7.22).   
In terms of the how these landholding arrangements reflect the caste basis of 
sharecropping dynamics, my survey data suggest that the incidence of leasing in 
land is much higher among the Extremely Backward and Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe households, compared to the Forward Caste and Backward Caste 
households, and, conversely, the proportion of the former two caste groups leasing 
out land is much lower than the latter two. As is evident, the proportion of sample 
Forward Caste and Backward Caste households leasing out land respectively is five 
times and two times as much as the Extremely Backward and Scheduled 
Caste/Scheduled Tribe. It should also be noted that among the Backward Castes, the 
prominent sub-castes such as Kushwaha, Koeri have traditionally been the 
cultivators whose attachment to land remains strong which explains in part why, 
compared to upper caste households, a lower proportion of them leased out land 
and a higher percentage leased in, to increase their landholdings. In fact household 
survey data and related fieldwork suggest that some Backward Caste households 
with significant larger landholdings also leased in land for sharecropping (Table 7.7). 
Table 7.7: Sharecropping dynamics by caste  
 
 
Number 
of HHs 
%age of 
landless 
HHs 
%age of 
landed 
households 
who leased 
out land 
%age of 
households 
who leased 
in land 
Forward Caste 29 24.1 31.8 32.0 
Backward Caste 171 20.5 11.0 43.8 
Extremely Backward Caste 112 46.4 5.0 62.5 
Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled 
Tribe 80 41.2 6.4 49.2 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
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Insofar as the impact of sharecropping on household food security is concerned, the 
survey results suggest that the ability to access land and grow food enhanced the 
food security situation of households, though because the leased in landholdings 
were too small in most cases (less than an acre for all households) the impact of 
sharecropping alone in bringing about sustained improvements in the household 
food security was still quite limited. Thus, while sharecropping resulted in improved 
own-production entitlements from the land, its positive impact was much greater 
for households who were able to effectively combine the food grown on leased in 
land with other productive non-farm sources. Nonetheless, in overall terms, 
sharecropper households still fared much better than the landless non-cultivating 
households.  
Table 7.8 compares the self-reported indicators of food inadequacy and food 
unavailability among households who cultivated 50 percent or more land on a 
sharecropping basis with the non-cultivating landless. The logic of such comparison 
is that households who leased in half or more of the total cultivated land are land-
poor households, and in many respects, similar to landless HHs. Additionally, 
choosing households with 50 percent or more of total land cultivated being leased 
in reflects the sharecropper status of households better. The purpose was to 
understand whether access to land, in whatever small way, had an impact on the 
food security. The small agricultural holdings notwithstanding, the data suggest that 
the non-cultivating landless households fared worse than their sharecropper 
counterparts on all parameters of food security. The differences in some of these 
indicators are quite significant. For example, the proportion of households who ate 
meals without vegetables, those who had less food than needed to satiate hunger, 
and those who reported borrowing money from local traders/lenders is almost 20 
percent higher among the non-cultivator landless households than households who 
cultivated 50 percent or more leased-in land.  
It is also important to mention that the fieldwork for this study was conducted in 
early 2012, when food price inflation in India, and indeed around the world, was still 
at record levels. In particular, the non-agriculturalist poor households had a greater 
exposure to the risks posed by high food prices, as their complete reliance on 
market purchase of food meant they found their food budgets squeezed by the high 
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food prices. In other words, the same amount of money now bought less food (on 
the impacts of food prices inflation on non-agriculturist households in India, see 
Pritchard et al., 2014, pp. 97-102; for a wider review on the rural global South, see 
Pritchard, 2014).  
Table 7.8: Sharecropping and household food security (%age of households) 
 
Cultivator 
HHs with 
50% or 
more 
cultivated 
land 
leased in               
Non-
cultivator 
landless 
HHs  
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations) 
Household ate meals without vegetables 50.9 72.2 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS1 22.4 26.7 
Household members consumed single meal a day 17.2 18.9 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, vegetables) 
were not available 50.9 68.9 
If household members got less food than the amount to 
satiate hunger 37.9 56.7 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations) 
Household borrowed money from friends and/or relatives 
to buy food 18.1 23.3 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money 
lenders or lifted ration on credit 32.8 52.2 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy 
food 0.9 2.2 
Someone in the household out-migrated for work 17.2 17.8 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than usual) 46.6 67.8 
Total number of households (n) 116 90 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
146 sharecropper cultivator households with 50% or more land leased in and 42 
non-cultivator households had either an APL card or no PDS card.  
 
In such circumstances, sharecropping farming can be considered as providing a 
means for poor households to reduce their exposure to market purchases and in 
turn food insecurity. Indeed, my fieldwork suggested that sharecropping provided a 
useful buffer against food shocks and that household with access to land were 
relatively better able to cope up with the food price rises as compared to non-
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agriculturalist landless households. In the survey, households were asked whether 
they perceived that relative prices of food changed in the past year (April 2011-
March 2012). Analysis of this data by land and sharecropping status suggests some 
differences. Of the 116 households who leased in 50 percent of more of cultivated 
land, the proportion of households who perceived food prices “increased a lot” in 
the reference period was 66.4% for cereals and pulses, 73.3% for eggs, milk, ghee 
and meat, and 79.3% for fruits and vegetables; the corresponding proportions for 
90 non-cultivator landless households were 73.3% for cereals and pulses, 83.3% for 
eggs, milk, ghee and meat and 86.7 for fruits and vegetables.  
These differences were small, presumably because of the fact that land sizes leased 
in by the sharecropper households, although constituting half or more of the total 
cultivated land, were still small (less than an acre for all households, as noted 
earlier). In turn this meant that even these households were dependent on market 
for food purchases, with the degree of dependence varying in accordance with the 
land leased in and crops grown. Indeed it also explains why the food diversity 
outcomes of sharecropper and non-cultivator landless households did not differ 
much in the survey sample. Nonetheless they point to the role of access to land for 
the food security of the very poor (as data on the self-reported food security 
parameters in Table 7.8 also suggests). More research is needed, particularly in 
contexts with similar land dynamics but where the land sizes leased are relatively 
bigger, in order to understand more fully the impact of sharecropping on food 
security.  
Conclusion 
Using a livelihood-centred analysis that weaves together insights from the changing 
contours of economic and agrarian landscapes at the macro-level in India and the 
dynamic of household decision-making at the micro-level (though they are not 
mutually exclusive), the discussion in this Chapter points to the growing importance 
of migration and remittances for rural households’ income and food security in the 
case study district of Siwan. However the relationship between migration and food 
security is not straightforward – far from it. The processes of progressive 
fragmentation of agricultural land on the one hand, and the rising significance of 
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urban areas in the overall framework of economy and employment generation on 
the other, are leading to increased reliance among rural poor households on urban 
incomes. At the same time, the trajectory of economic growth in India, and a 
complex mix of individual choices and socio-cultural reasons, have prevented a 
complete shift away from rural-agrarian to urban-industrial mode of life and work, 
contrasting with the popular theses of “structural transformation” and 
“deagrarianisation”. The resultant effect of these processes is to create complex 
linkages between rural and urban economies which have much significance from 
the perspective of understanding food security among rural households, and the 
discussion in this Chapter has highlighted how these linkages play out to interact 
with household food security in rural Siwan.  
Firstly, the diminishing capacity of land-based livelihoods over the period (which is 
an important push for migration) has led to growing significance of remittances 
incomes in the lives and livelihoods of rural Siwani households. The most direct 
impact of remittances is to equip households with purchasing power to source food 
from the market. The survey data suggest that most migrant households used the 
remittances on food, and compared to their non-migrant counterparts fared better 
on income and all food security and food diversity outcomes.  
Secondly, the relationship between migration and land was rarely one-way. While 
landlessness and land-poverty prompted rural outmigration, urban remittances 
provided much needed cash incomes for own-account agriculture, prevented 
households to slide down into the state of complete landlessness, and, in some 
cases, they also allowed households to buy and accumulate more land, with the 
overall effects on household food security being positive. And while land provided a 
critical asset in the livelihood portfolios, and thus attachments to rural land were 
strong, the uncertain nature of urban jobs made holding on to land even more 
attractive. Indeed the economic security offered by land was unmatched by any 
other asset. My interviews with many respondents on the land question also 
indicated that land provided a means through which households reduced long-term 
livelihood and income risks. In the words of a respondent:  
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If you [so] want me to tell you what land means to us, I shall put it simply for 
you. I hope you are following the news about increasing border tensions 
with China [in the northeast India]. Suppose if China invades our country 
and changes the currency here all the money we have will be of no value. 
But no one can change the value of our land.  
Indeed, higher urban incomes did not stop households from pursuing farming. On 
the contrary, they allowed many rural households to maintain their peasant 
identities.  Far from discouraging rural households from farming, higher remittances 
only deepened their engagement in farm work, as reflected from the data on 
increased cash incomes from agriculture among households with three or more 
migrants. This finding assumes importance, and suggests that analysis of rural 
livelihoods must take into account these backward-forward linkages between farm 
and nonfarm incomes rather more than the inexorable deagrarianisation thesis 
allows. Findings of research conducted by Yaro (2006) in the three villages in 
Northern Ghana involving 600 household surveys (200 households from each 
village) also found these connections between farm and nonfarm income and 
flexibility of rural livelihoods. Thus, as Yaro (2006, p. 125) argues: 
“…deagrarianisation should be seen as a process embedded in social change, 
bearing in mind the reversibility between farm and non-farm livelihood strategies 
used by households (reagrarianisation?).” 
A third emergent dynamic of migration-land-food security relationship is the 
(growing) incidence of sharecropping farming in Siwan. Some households, 
particularly of erstwhile upper-caste landowners, are also increasingly detaching 
themselves from direct farming and leasing out land to the land-poor households, 
with important implications on the food security of the latter. The household survey 
data and other fieldwork suggests that by allowing landless and land-poor 
households’ access to land, temporary and precarious as it may be, sharecropping 
farming is associated with relatively lower incidence of food insecurity; compared to 
households who engaged in sharecropping, landless households reported a higher 
incidence of food insecurity. Furthermore sharecropping assumes particular 
significance in the wake of high food price inflation, for it strengthens the own-
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production food entitlements of the households and reduces, in a relative sense, 
households’ dependence on market purchases of food.  
The growing importance of non-local, migration incomes in rural livelihoods in many 
parts of India (Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009), and 
indeed in many developing countries in the global South (for instance, see Rigg, 
2006), mean that these findings may have significance beyond the immediate 
research settings of Siwan, and thus they warrant wider attention to understand the 
role of migration in influencing household food security in the rural areas. As the 
analysis in this Chapter has shown, migration and remittances structure and 
restructure economic and land relations in the origin village, with direct implications 
for food security of households who engage in migration as well as those who stay 
put (eg. through sharecropping). This inter-household comparison provides a useful 
way to delineate the impact of migration on food security. However the migration-
food security nexus also involves important intra-household dynamics of altered 
production and reproduction roles and responsibilities. In Siwan where migration is 
predominantly undertaken by men, this implies alteration in gender relations at the 
household level. The next Chapter discusses whether and how these intra-
household gender relations relate with household food security.  
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CHAPTER 8: OPENING THE ‘HOUSEHOLD BOX’: MALE MIGRATION, 
LEFT-BEHIND WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY  
Introduction 
In India, migration is highly gendered. Much of the long-distance work-related 
migration from rural areas continues to be predominantly undertaken by men while 
the women stay behind.90 Indeed, rural outmigration from the two large states of 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (the latter being the geographic focus of the present study), 
which account for a large bulk of migratory moves in the country, is almost 
exclusively a male-only phenomenon. In India the social and cultural attitudes and 
norms around the work participation of women remain highly rigid. Despite the 
sustained high economic growth of past two decades, and the fact that an 
increasing number of women is now receiving education in the country, India has 
among the lowest levels of female labour force participation in the world (ILO, 
2013). These low levels of work participation are considered to be an important 
cause of women’s weak bargaining position vis-à-vis men within and outside the 
household (inter alia, Bardhan, 1974; Boserup, 1970; Sen, 1987), and reflected in 
relative female disadvantage in many aspects of well-being (Sen, 1987, 1990, 
1992).91  
An understanding of intra-household power relations is particularly important for 
the analysis of the relationship between migration and food security. If social 
                                                        
90 It should be noted however that in India while the population census and large-scale national 
surveys severely underestimate the true extent of labour migration in general (Breman, 1996, 
2010; Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; Deshingkar & Start, 2003), women migrants are more likely to 
be underestimated because respondents are often asked to give one reason for migration and 
female migration is mostly associated with marriage. However many women work after 
marriage (Mazumdar, Neetha, & Agnihotri, 2013; Santhi, 2006). Secondly, “in the Indian cultural 
setting it is [considered] inappropriate for a woman to emphasise her economic role especially if 
the interviewer is a stranger and a male” (Santhi, 2006, p. 5). 
91 Gender inequalities in survival, health, education and income are more pervasive in India than 
most other countries in the world. For instance, on the United Nations Gender Inequality Index 
2014, India was placed at 127th position, a rank it shared with Pakistan. By comparison, Mali had 
the lowest rank of 148. It should also be noted that barring Afghanistan, India fared worse than 
all other countries in South Asia (UNDP, 2014, pp. 172-175). 
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arrangements determining the access to productive economic opportunities and 
control over household resources favour men over women, gender differentials in 
access to food and nutrition can follow (for studies that highlight the relative 
disadvantage of females vis-à-vis males in intra-household allocation of food in 
India, see, inter alia, Bardhan, 1974; Das Gupta, 1987; Miller, 1981; Sen & Sengupta, 
1983; for a review on South Asia, see Miller, 1997). However, migration has the 
potential to alter the power dynamics at the household level. The male-only pattern 
of migration often triggers fundamental changes in the gender roles within the 
household. As noted in Chapter 2, the available evidence suggests that male-
migration leads to rise in female autonomy, with women participating more 
proactively in the management of household affairs, including decisions regarding 
cash management (Gulati, 1987, 1993; Paris et al., 2005). These autonomy effects 
may prevail even after men’s return (Yabiku et al., 2010). There is now 
overwhelming evidence that women tend to use household resources in ways that 
better optimise household welfare for all members (Quisumbing & McClafferty, 
2006; UNICEF, 2006).92 In terms of food security, this implies women may use 
household food and cash resources (remittances sent by men) to improve their 
household’s food security outcomes. The male migration-gender-food security 
nexus is however highly complicated, and other factors, such as structure of the 
family, also mediate to produce varied household welfare (or illfare) outcomes. For 
example, women living in nuclear families are found to have greater autonomy over 
household affairs than the ones living in joint families with their father/mother-in 
laws (Desai & Banerji, 2008), though the latter form of familial arrangement may 
provide the left-behind women with enhanced support and care. Migration can also 
alter these familial structures, from joint to nuclear households and vice versa. As 
Hewage et al. (2011, p. 204) suggest, albeit in a different context: “migration 
separates and connects”. On the other hand, in cases where remittances are not 
enough, women from nuclear households often have to assume the role of 
breadwinner. Evidence from village-level studies in India also suggests that the 
absence of men can lead to women having to take over tasks in household 
                                                        
92 This is one of the important reasons why in recent years social protection schemes for poor 
household such as cash transfers have increasingly focused on making women as their target 
beneficiaries.  
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agriculture that were traditionally performed by men (Jetley, 1987; Paris et al., 
2005) which also carries potential implications for household food security.   
Against this background, the aim of this Chapter is to look into the ‘household box’ 
in order to gain broader insights on the relationship between migration and 
household food security in the case study district of Siwan. As already noted in 
Chapter 5, labour migration from Siwan (and Bihar more generally) is largely the 
preserve of men while the women stay behind. And this pattern of migration has 
remained virtually unchanged throughout the past century as reflected in the more 
feminine general sex ratio in the district which stands in sharp contrast to the all-
India pattern where males outnumber females (Table 5.5 in Chapter 5). My 
fieldwork suggests that while the cultural norms still guide the role of women within 
and outside the households, the long history of male-only pattern of migration from 
Siwan has significantly transformed gender relations, and the aim of this Chapter is 
to understand the bearing of these altered gender relations on household food 
security. In particular, I focus on the impacts of male-only migration on the role, 
responsibilities and position of left-behind women in the origin villages, and their 
implications of household food security. Drawing on the field research data, my aim 
is to suggest the possible pathways of linkages that exist.  
The structure of the Chapter is as follows. In the next section, I discuss the gendered 
nature of outmigration from rural Siwan and the factors underlying male-dominated 
pattern of migration. Secondly, I discuss the effects of male migration on intra-
household relations. In doing so, I dwell on the women’s roles and responsibilities in 
household affairs and explore the female autonomy versus responsibility aspects of 
male migration. I suggest that both outcomes can and often do exist, even within 
the same household and for the same women. The discussion in this section also 
highlights the impacts of migration in altering the traditional form of family 
organisation in Siwan. Finally, I discuss the relationship between male migration, 
gender and household food security. Given the focus of this chapter, the data 
presented mainly pertains to the sample migrant households.   
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Gendered livelihoods 
Labour migration from Siwan District (and Bihar as a whole) is almost exclusively a 
male-only activity. Women stay behind in the origin villages and rarely accompany 
the men. The analysis of Indian Census data for 2001 from 1438 villages in Siwan on 
the sex composition of population aged 6 years and above – used in this study as a 
proxy indicator for migration – suggests that although villages varied widely in the 
intensity of migration93, three-quarters (1061 villages) had sex ratios skewed in 
favour of females (at least 1000 females per 1000 males), suggesting male-
dominated pattern of outmigration. In some villages with high incidence of 
migration, such as one of the study villages Chakmahmuda in Maharajganj Block, it 
is difficult to sight young men of employable age, and many rural families now 
comprise of only females and children. It is only during the festivals, such as Chhath 
and Holi, when a large majority of the migrants return home and when the 
households’ sex and age compositions appear more balanced.  
This gender-based segregation of rural livelihoods finds vocal expressions in 
Bhojpuri (local language) folk tradition and culture. Folksong genres such as 
Bideshia, which translates as “foreigner” (and is an affectionate term used mainly 
for male members living in far-off destinations), and Birah, which means 
“separation” from the beloved, reverberate widely in the culture. Originating 
around the mid-nineteenth century when the migration from western Bihar began 
to gain momentum, these folksongs still remain hugely popular in the region and 
beyond.94 They depict the stay-behind women as celebrating the earnings of their 
husbands in bidesh (destination places), mourning the separation that follows their 
                                                        
93 For instance, Sadiha village in Bhagwanpur Block, with a total enumerated population of 1195 
persons living in 178 households in 2001, had 1500 females per 1000 males in the ages of 6 years 
and above. In contrast, Barsara village in Barharia Block which, in the same Census year, had a 
population of 1389 persons living in 184 households had 848 females per 1000 males (Registrar 
General of India, 2001c).  
94 One of the most influential Saran-born Bhojpuri singer, playwright and lyricist of all times, and 
in fact the one who is considered to be the originator of Bideshia folk and theatre is Bikhari 
Thakur. In 2012, London-based musical label EMI/Virgin records released a Bidhesia folk album 
of Thakur titled “The Legacy of Bikhari Thakur”, with Assamese Bhojpuri singer Kalpana Patowary 
as the lead vocal. This album was released by the vice Prime Minister of Mauritius (Borah, 2014), 
a country where many men from Bihar migrated as indentured labourers to work on the 
plantations and settled on more permanent basis. 
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men’s migration, expressing scepticism about their men’s sexual fidelity and loyalty 
towards them while they are away, and worrying about shielding their own 
modesty from other men in the origin villages (de Haan, 2002, p. 135; Jassal, 2012, 
p. 244).  
These Bhojpuri folklore genres developed around the time when the transport and 
communication infrastructure was weak which often meant that it took days of 
travel to reach work destinations, and while away, male migrants seldom made any 
contact with their families at the origin; many who went to the British colonies 
abroad never returned. 95 The huge advancements in infrastructure and 
communication networks in recent years however mean that this is no longer the 
case. Travel has become increasingly easier, and technology such as mobile phones 
– which my fieldwork suggested most rural Siwani households, including many of 
the very poor, possessed (Table 8.1) – have enabled the Siwani migrants and their 
families to keep in regular touch with each other. Mobile phones have fostered 
connectivity between migrants and their wives and have, to some extent, reduced 
the emotional, if not physical, distance between the places of origin and work. It is 
nonetheless not hard to imagine that the physical absence of men often results in a 
restructuring of family relations and realigning of households’ productive and 
reproductive roles and responsibilities, at least for the duration away. Indeed, with 
an increasing number of Siwani migrants now spending more time away from their 
place of origin (Figure 5.5 in Chapter 5), the issue of intra-household gender 
relations in the study of migration, and rural livelihoods more broadly, assumes 
even greater significance.  
In order to contextualise the impacts of male migration on intra-household gender 
relations, it is useful to first understand the factors underlying the male-dominated 
pattern of migration and the characteristics of women who stay behind. Table 8.1 
and Table 8.2 profile the household and individual characteristics, respectively, of 
144 wives of current migrants interviewed in the survey.  
                                                        
95 In the mid-nineteenth century, many people from Bihar migrated as indentured labourers to 
British colonies, such as Fiji, Mauritius, British Guiana (now Guyana), to work on the plantations 
(Gillion, 1956; Smith, 1959), and settled there. Indeed these countries now have significant 
presence of Bihari-origin people, and Bhojpuri is one of the national languages of Fiji and 
Guyana, and is spoken widely in Mauritius (on the last point, also see footnote 88).   
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Table 8.1: Household characteristics of the left-behind wives of migrants 
Household characteristics  Number of left behind women (%) 
Religion  
Hindu 104 (72.2%) 
Muslim 40 (27.8%) 
Caste  
Forward caste 9 (6.3%) 
Backward Caste 61 (42.4%) 
Extremely Backward Caste 44 (30.6%) 
Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe 30 (20.8%) 
Living arrangements and household headship  
Nuclear 73 (50.7%) 
Joint/Extended 71 (49.3%) 
De facto head of the household 67 (46.5%) 
Mobile phone ownership  
Women living in households with mobile phones 131 (91%) 
Land and livestock ownership  
Landless HH 49 (34.0%) 
Upto one acre 82 (56.9%) 
More than an acre 13 (9.0%) 
Households who own any livestock 88 (61.1%) 
Consumption expenditure and poverty  
Average MPCE (In Rs.) 938 
Household with MPCE below poverty line1 72 (50.0%) 
Total number of left-behind women (n) 144 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
1MPCE = Monthly Per Capita Expenditure. Same MPCE cut-off used to estimate 
consumption poverty as described in Table 6.2 and Table 6.6 above. 
Among the important household-level characteristics of the women include, first, 
close to half of the left-behind women lived in nuclear households, and almost all 
reported to the de facto household head in the absence of their husband. Secondly, 
most of these women lived in households that possessed a mobile phone. Thirdly, 
nearly two-thirds of women lived in households that owned livestock (61 percent) 
and some land (66 percent), and, finally, 50 percent lived in households with MPCE 
below the official poverty line (Table 8.1).  
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Table 8.2: Individual characteristics of the left-behind wives of migrants 
Individual characteristics Number of left behind women (%) 
Current age  
15-24 16 (11.1%) 
25-34 46 (31.9%) 
35-44 59 (41.0%) 
45+ 23 (16.0) 
Age at the time of marriage  
Below 15 23 (16.0) 
16-18 85 (59.0) 
19+ 36 (25.0) 
Husband's marital status at the time of first migration  
Never married 51 (35.4%) 
Married 93 (64.6%) 
Number of children  
No children 9 (6.3%) 
1 to 2 33 (22.9%) 
3 37 (25.7%) 
4 31 (21.5%) 
5+ 34 (23.6) 
Did husband visit home in the past year  
Yes 131 (91.0%) 
No 13 (9.0%) 
Duration of husband's stay in the village during last visit (n=131) 
Less than a month 62 (47.3%) 
1-2 months 50 (38.2%) 
More than 2 months 19 (14.5%) 
Total number of left-behind women (n) 144 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
The individual characteristics of the women presented in Table 8.2 show that 
although two-thirds of the women reported marrying at younger ages, on or before 
the legal age at marriage of 18 years, an equal proportion of them (75 percent) 
were, at the time of survey in 2012, in the age groups of between 25 and 44 years 
suggesting that they have been married and living at the husband’s place for a few 
years. Secondly, my fieldwork suggests that although some men, mainly from the 
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very poor households, made their first work trip outside the village as early as when 
they were 15 years old, and were unmarried96, a much greater proportion of men 
migrated after their marriage when they had to assume the financial responsibility 
of fending for and managing their own family. Many migrants informed me that 
marriage and subsequent expansion of family put the pressure on them to move 
out of the village to earn higher incomes. This is reflected in the survey data as well, 
with 65 percent of left-behind wives of migrants reporting that at the time of their 
husband’s first ever migration trip, they were married. The data on sample male 
migrants’ ‘age at first migration’ also suggest that only 15 percent (41 out of 280 
migrants) were in the ages between 14 and 20 years when they first migrated. 
Thirdly, the data also confirm the circular nature of migration, albeit men are now 
spending a large part of the year outside the village for work; 85 percent of women 
reported that their husband spent up to 2 months in the origin village in their last 
visit home, and only 15 percent reported they spent more than 2 months. 
In terms of the reasons for single-male/male-only pattern of migration from Siwan, 
my fieldwork revealed the primacy of two factors. First and foremost, the social and 
cultural norms posed the restrictions on the mobility and participation of women in 
the distant labour markets for cash incomes. As dutiful daughters, wives and 
mothers, women are expected to stay in the village, and manage the rural end of 
the household. Single-women migration for work is almost non-existent from Siwan, 
and the idea of married women joining their husbands on their departure is also 
considered socially unacceptable. Of the total 144 left-behind wives interviewed in 
the survey, 85 women (59 percent) reported that they had never visited their 
husband’s place of work (Figure 8.1).   
Secondly, my interviews with some long-term male migrants indicated that 
although years of migration to the cities has brought about attitudinal changes 
among them on the acceptability of their wives’ mobility, the nature of their    
                                                        
96 Child marriages are not uncommon in Siwan, and indeed in Bihar as a whole. However, most 
families follow the custom of “Gauna”. Also known as second marriage, Gauna is a ceremony 
following which the marriage is consummated. Gauna is usually performed when the parents 
think that groom and bride are adult enough to consummate the marriage. Before the Gauna, 
the bride stays at her natal place. The ‘unmarried’ male migrants here refer to the ones whose 
Gauna was not done.  
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Figure 8.1: Number of left-behind migrants’ wives who ever visited their husbands’ 
place of work  
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
informal sector jobs precluded realistic opportunities. Some of them informed me 
that they had earlier brought their wives at the destinations, but they returned to 
the villages after a few years, most of them after the birth of their first child. (Of the 
59 women who reported visiting their husband’s place of work at least once in the 
past, several of them had lived with their husbands at the destination.) High costs of 
living in the cities and the inability of many migrants to access the government-run 
free services of education and health in the destination places made it difficult for 
the migrants to bring and maintain their families in the cities. During the village 
surveys, a woman respondent who never visited her migrant husband remarked: 
“My husband tells me that in the city he even has to pay for water. Is not it a joke? 
Look at that government handpump over there; it is all free water.” Similarly, a 
migrant I interviewed in his rented room in Faridabad District of Haryana, 
approximately 30 kilometres south of Delhi, told me:  
In the village, we have our own house. Cooking fuel and water is also free. 
But here, expenses on these heads cost fortunes; the rent alone for this 
59
85
Yes No
41% 59%
n= 144
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shabby room costs me Rs. 1000 a month. It is simply not affordable for a 
single-earner like me to maintain a family of five people here [in the city].   
 
The pressure to save money meant that most migrants lived in cheap, shared 
accommodation with other labour migrants, with two-three migrants living in a 
single room. For migrants engaged in construction work (which employed a large 
number of surveyed migrants), uncertain job and wage schedules, and constant 
moving from one site to another added to the challenges of bringing the wives and 
children to the cities. The newly-wed migrants made recurrent trips to home 
villages to see their wives, but did not bring them to work destinations. One such 
migrant engaged in construction work told me: 
When I do not get my wages on time, I borrow money from my friends and 
fellow villagemen. But this cannot happen when my wife is around. I need to 
have sufficient money so that I do not have to worry about it… Besides, my 
job requires shifting from one place to another. I can just carry my bag and 
baggage and move, but not my wife.  
Table 8.3: Women respondents’ reasons of not ever visiting husband’s place of work  
Reason Number of left behind women (%) 
Financial problem 42 (49.4%) 
Housing problem at the destination 11 (12.9%) 
Domestic and child care responsibilities 10 (11.8%) 
Husband's mobile job 6 (7.1%) 
Need to look after family land 5 (5.9%) 
Husband says I must stay home 4 (4.7%) 
Others1 7 (8.2%) 
Total number of left-behind women (n) 85 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12.  
1 ‘Others’ combine responses with very low frequencies such as health reasons.  
These are reflected in the survey data in Table 8.3 on women respondents’ reasons 
for not ever visiting their husband’s place of work. Of the 85 women who reported 
never having visited their husbands’ places of work, 62 percent cited financial and 
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housing problems. Additionally, the rural land and resources needed to be looked 
after. In families with all the males working outside as migrants, women took up this 
job. Indeed, in many families, women carried out all the tasks related to household 
agriculture – from sowing to harvesting (more on which later).   
At the same time, I also found that some women also preferred to stay in the 
village. Of the 85 women who reported never visiting their husband’s place of work, 
71 women suggested that they would prefer to live with their husbands, while 14 
preferred to live in the village. However, because these factors often overlapped 
and coalesced with each other it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which each 
exerted influence. As an example, when I asked Salma Begum (name changed) 
whose husband spent 8-9 months in Nagpur, Maharashtra for work, if she would 
like to stay with her husband at his place of work, her response was: 
No, I am better here. If I leave the village house, it would soon turn into 
shambles. The money my husband makes is barely sufficient to manage the 
most basic expenses of food and clothing. Where would we find the income 
to build another house? 
On further probing when I asked her if she would move out of the village to live 
with her husband in Nagpur if he was able to buy his own house there, she replied:  
I do not mind going and staying with my husband for a month or two but I 
would not want to live there for the whole time he is there. This house and 
this village is where I belong and would like to live; this is where my world 
begins and ends. My children go to school here, and my father-in-law is frail 
and needs caring.  
Similarly, in my interviews with stay-behind wives some suggested that though they 
did miss their husbands while they were away they still preferred to live in the 
village to look after the household resources and take care of children and in-laws. 
It is certainly the case that cultural expectations about the gender roles guided such 
preferences, and oddly, though not surprisingly, there was an intergenerational 
aspect to it: younger women of the household were expected to take care of their 
in-laws, and they in turn expected their future daughter-in-laws to do the same. 
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Nonconformity to these expectations often led to intra-household tensions and also 
changes in the familial structure, from joint to nuclear (eg. Ahmad’s case described 
in Chapter 5). At the same time, it was also clear that some women derived their 
sense of self-worth from managing the rural side of the family. Some male migrants 
praised their wives for their contribution in the smooth functioning of the 
household in the origin, and also quite openly admitted that they would not be able 
to spend so much time away from home had their wives not shouldered the family 
responsibilities. For instance, to quote a migrant respondent:  
I spend nearly eight months a year here [in Delhi]. A few times my wife has 
asked me that she wants to come and stay with me. I can bring her here, 
and I would be happy to. But in the village my father is alone and there is no 
one to look after him. Sometimes my wife and I have arguments over this. 
But she is a very reasonable person so she understands my point. I do not 
know what I would do without her.  
Impacts of male migration on intra-household dynamics and gender relations  
The impacts of male migration on gender relations in Siwan can also be seen in an 
increased presence of women in the all spheres of rural life; the intra-village 
mobility of women has increased and a growing number of women are now 
proactively participating in village affairs.97 However, the effects of male migration 
are much more pronounced at the household level. Women’s participation in 
household decision-making has increased, with many women in migrant households 
acting as the household managers in the absence of men. On the other hand, this 
has also resulted in a greater burden of work for women in both the domestic and 
non-domestic spheres. In particular, women from the very poor households, and 
the ones who do not receive (adequate) remittances from men, are left saddled 
with managing households’ productive and reproductive functions. Additionally, 
migration and remittances are also causing intra-household conflicts over cash 
management. One major impact of this has been nuclearisation of families in rural 
                                                        
97 It should be noted that gender relations are also in flux because of recent policy reforms in 
Bihar including the reservation of 50 percent of the seats in GPs and promoting higher education 
among girls through incentives such as providing free bicycles to girls who attend Grade 9. 
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Siwan. All of these have implications for household food security. In the next 
section, I discuss these issues.  
Women’s participation in household decision-making 
My field research in 10 case study villages in Siwan suggested that in many families, 
women acted as the de facto household heads in the absence of men, hence 
somewhat dislodging the stronghold of patriarchal norms in this society. It is 
important to recognise that left-behind wives still regarded the men as the de jure 
household heads and consulted them before they took any major decisions, 
however they single-handedly managed the household for a large part of the year. 
Adopting a definition of “household head” as the person who was practically 
responsible for running the household, managing the family land and resources and 
looking after other dependent persons98, 52 percent of migrant households (102 of 
197 households) were reported to be headed by women whereas the 
corresponding figure among non-migrant households stood at a mere 7 percent (13 
of 195 households) (Figure 8.2). Of the 102 migrant households headed by women, 
67 households (66 percent) included families where the surveyed migrants’ wives 
directly acted as the de facto heads, and they were all nuclear families comprising of 
the migrants wives and children. The remaining 34 percent were headed by other 
senior women of the households, mainly the mother-in-laws, and in some cases, the 
elder sister-in-law.  
In the interviews conducted with left-behind wives of the male migrants, a few 
women were very vocal about their role within the household, and tended to 
emphasise that they headed their households in all broad senses. However, the 
degree of participation of women within the household varied by the type of 
familial arrangement, and to some extent, their economic status. In general, the 
left-behind women in nuclear households enjoyed greater autonomy and decision-
                                                        
98 The conceptual and practical application of this definition in the field was not without 
problems. At the conceptual level, the definition enumerated, by default, women as de facto 
heads even when they were, in reality, de jure heads such as non-migrant households headed by 
widows. At the practical level, for carrying out the household surveys I was assisted by two local 
field investigators at a time who initially had confusions about this definition. However, the daily 
debriefing sessions meant this was resolved fairly quickly. For a useful account of methodological 
problems in defining household headship, see Sandra (1989). 
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making vis-a-vis joint/extended families. Women from poor families had lesser 
restrictions on mobility and were more vocal than the ones in relatively richer 
households. For instance, on the question of how important women thought their 
role was within the household, a woman respondent belonging to an economically 
disadvantaged Muslim Rai caste, also known as Sabjifarosh (vegetable vendors), 
replied: “Our men only bring home money but we are the ones responsible for 
managing it, for spending it as wisely and stingily as possible. And besides, we have 
a whole lot more of other family responsibilities on our plate than men do.” On the 
other hand, women from Khushwaha caste, a cultivator caste with better income 
and landholdings but who also sold vegetables in the local market as a 
supplementary income source were, relatively speaking, less vocal.  
Figure 8.2: Percentage of female-headed households by migration status  
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
Table 8.4 shows the response of women on their involvement in the household 
decision-making among migrant and non-migrant households. In the survey, the 
most senior women of the sample households were asked about household 
decision-making processes on different aspects of their family lives.99 A simple 
                                                        
99 A total number of 180 and 173 women respondents among migrant and non-migrant 
households, respectively, answered these questions. 
51.8%
6.7%
Migrant HHs
(n=197)
Non-migrant HHs
(n=195)
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comparison of the degree of women’s involvement in decision-making by migration 
status suggests that among migrant households, women reported having been 
involved in household decision-making more than their counterparts in non-migrant 
households. In fact, among households with migrants, the proportion of women 
taking decisions alone on matters pertaining to their ‘own health care’, ‘large 
household purchases’, ‘management of money in the household’, and ‘visits to 
relatives and friends’ is twice as much as for women from non-migrant households.  
Table 8.4: Women's participation in household decision-making among migrant and 
non-migrant households  
 
Decision type 
Migrant households  
(n=180) 
Non-migrant households  
(n=173) 
Woman1 
alone 
Woman 
not 
involved2 
Joint HH 
decision3  
Woman 
alone 
Woman 
not 
involved2 
Joint HH 
decision3 
Own health care 62.8 15.0 22.2 34.7 28.9 36.4 
Visits to family & 
relatives 34.5 27.2 38.3 17.9 34.1 48.0 
What food to be 
cooked 82.8 9.4 7.8 71.0 14.5 14.5 
Daily HH purchases 68.3 12.8 18.9 42.2 22.0 35.8 
Large HH purchases 35.6 21.1 43.3 16.7 37.6 45.7 
Overall money 
management 24.4 23.3 52.3 12.1 33.5 54.4 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. All data in percentage terms.  
1‘Woman’ in the table refers to the most senior woman respondent interviewed 
from whom response to these questions were sought. 2This includes decisions taken 
by husband and/or in-laws which did not involve the women interviewed. 3This 
includes decisions taken by all household members including the women 
respondent.   
 
These differences notwithstanding, it is important to note that even among migrant 
households, the percentage of women reporting taking decisions on money matters 
is relatively lower compared to other aspects. Indeed it is one indicator on which 
more than half of the women in both migrant and non-migrant households reported 
that such decisions are taken jointly with their husbands. During my fieldwork I 
found that many left-behind wives of migrants living in joint families considered it 
culturally inappropriate to take household finances in their hand when the other 
males were present. In nuclear families, women did manage cash but called their 
husbands in the cities each time they made a big purchase. This they did, as many 
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women respondents informed me, to keep the relations with their husbands cordial 
and harmonious.  
Similarly, these questions were also administered separately to the survey sample 
of 144 migrants’ wives, although in this case the purpose was to understand 
whether, and to what extent, women’s autonomy in terms of their participation in 
household decision-making process varied in the presence and absence of their 
husbands, given the circular nature of migration. 100  Table 8.5 presents the 
percentage of migrants’ wives who reported their involvement in household 
decision-making at times when their husbands were ‘around’ and ‘away’.  
Table 8.5: Participation of migrants’ wives in household decision-making when their 
husbands are around and when they are away  
Decision type 
Husband around 
(n=144) 
Husband away 
(n=144) 
Woman 
alone 
Woman 
not 
involved1 
Joint HH 
decision2 
Woman 
alone 
Woman 
not 
involved1 
Joint HH 
decision2 
Own and children 
health  10.8 49.6 39.6 60.2 26.8 13.0 
Children education 16.5 40.6 42.9 54.1 23.3 22.6 
Visits to relatives and 
friends 11.2 44.4 44.4 30.3 36.6 33.1 
What food to be 
cooked 44.3 45.1 10.6 71.1 25.4 3.5 
Daily HH purchases 32.6 42.6 24.8 64.6 24.8 10.6 
Large HH purchases 5.7 50.3 44.0 37.6 31.9 30.5 
Overall money 
management 6.3 42.0 51.7 26.6 29.4 44.0 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. All data in percentage terms. 
1This includes decisions taken by husband and/or in-laws which did not involve the 
women interviewed. 2This includes decisions taken by all household members 
including the women respondent.   
 
                                                        
100 In nuclear families, the wives of migrants were also the most senior women of the household. 
Notwithstanding this overlapping of women respondents, the nature of questions varied and so 
did their interpretations. At the household level, the most senior women among migrant and 
non-migrant households were asked about their involvement in family decision-making. On the 
other hand, in the interviews with migrants’ wives an attempt was made to understand whether 
women’s role in family decision-making differed by the physical presence (or absence) of their 
husbands, and whether the effects of male migration on women autonomy were short-lived or 
here to stay.       
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The data indicate that across all parameters, a greater proportion of women 
reported taking decisions alone in the absence of their husbands compared to when 
they were in the origin village. Some of these differences were quite large, such as 
on decisions pertaining to ‘own and children’s health’, ‘children’s education’ and 
‘household finances’. While these data point to the fact that the effects of male 
migration on female autonomy and decision-making lasted as long as the men were 
away, my interviews also suggested that in some cases the effects prevailed even 
after the men’s return. More than 10 percent of women reported that they took 
decisions on their own and children’s health, children’s education and visits to 
family and relatives, with this percentage rising to 33 percent and 44 percent for 
food cooked in the household and daily household purchases respectively, when 
their husbands were in the village.  
However, cultural norms often mediated these outcomes. Many women 
respondents informed me that they do not lack the freedom to take decisions when 
their husbands come back, but they considered it culturally inappropriate to decide 
on things on their own when their husbands were around; and when they took 
independent decisions even on small, personal matters, such as going to the 
hospital in the Block or District to seek health care, they involved their husbands. 
For instance, Chandmukhi Devi (name changed), whose husband worked as a driver 
in Kolkata, told me that regardless of whether or not her husband is around, she 
takes all the decisions on her own and her children’s health matters. But when he is 
around, she would not go to the health facility without him. When I asked if she 
faced restrictions on her freedom, she replied: “Freedom is not an issue but I would 
not prefer to go by myself when my husband is around. It is our culture and that is 
the way it is.” Furthermore, as noted earlier, the exposure of migrants to the cities 
has brought about some attitudinal shifts among some men on women’s mobility. 
In my interview with Shyam (name changed), a return migrant in his late 30s, who 
earlier worked in Mumbai and Ahmedabad for a total of 12 years but had been 
working for the past five years as an ambulance driver in a private hospital in 
Basantpur Block, he told me:  
At first I was shocked to see how women in the cities, particularly in 
Mumbai, carried themselves. The women in the cities were so different 
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from the women in my village. But honestly speaking, I liked it. Given the 
societal norms, I may not allow my wife to be as modern as an urban 
women but I know that she is not supposed to be confined to the four walls 
of the house either.  
This is not to say that male migration has ushered in absolute freedom for women. 
The stronghold of patriarchal norms meant that many women still occupied a 
subjugated position vis-à-vis men within the household, and outside it, they 
continue to face considerable restrictions on their mobility. The spread of mobile 
phones has at once aided in enhancing the role of women in household decision-
making and provided a tool in the hands of men to control their women from far 
away. Thus, while many women informed me that when they faced difficulties 
performing their new role of household head while the men were away they 
phoned them to seek their advice (for instance, how to use the banking services to 
withdraw money that their husbands sent), mobile phones also meant that women 
hesitated taking independent decisions, particularly on major financial matters and 
consulted their husbands on whether and how they should spend money. In 
families where the male migrants did not share cordial relations with their in-laws, 
the wives called their husbands and sought permission beforehand each time they 
visited their natal places. Nonetheless, male migration has enhanced the role of 
women within and outside the household and contributed to the improved agency 
of women. 
Increasing work burden on women  
On the negative side, male migration has also brought about significant hardships 
for many rural women, particularly those from the very poor households. In 
addition to single-handedly managing the household affairs and caring for 
dependent children and elders while their husbands are away, left-behind women 
are required to perform increased tasks in household agriculture. Across all the 10 
case study villages studied, the participation of women in agriculture was 
significant, with some women reporting that managing the family farms is solely 
done by them. Given the generally high incidence of poverty in the survey sample, 
and the fact that most surveyed households possessed exceptionally small land 
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parcels, very few migrant households reported hiring labour for agricultural work.101 
In families, particularly belonging to lower Backward Caste groups, women 
performed all the tasks in family farming – from sowing to harvesting – on their 
own, and in some cases, with the help of their young children. As has already been 
noted, the survey data suggest that most male migrants spent a large part of the 
year outside their origin villages for employment. This meant that male labour for 
agricultural work was not available for much of the crop cycle.  
The survey did not collect quantitative data on whether male migration has had any 
impact on improving farm wages of women workers (in any case the cross-sectional 
nature of survey would not have allowed this assessment). However, informal 
conversations with women respondents from lower backward caste families, such 
as Mahadalits, who (also) worked as farm labourers suggested that not much has 
changed. Many of these women reported getting between Rs. 30 and Rs. 45 (less 
than US$ 1) for farm labour of 4-5 hours, with some also reported getting two kilos 
of wheat or rice. Given the shortages of men for local farm work has resulted in 
increase in women participation in agriculture which should ideally be associated 
with improvements in their wages, the reasons for why the wages of women 
workers have remained largely unchanged are hard to understand. In their 
longitudinal study of two villages in north Bihar, Datta et al. (2014, pp. 1202-03) also 
found that the gender differentials in the wages had not surprisingly narrowed 
down in the 30-year period. At the same time, the wages were not same across all 
the villages and for women from all castes. For instance, as already noted in Chapter 
7, in one of the study villages, a Mahadailt woman respondent informed me that 
during the peak agriculture season she worked in the nearby village where she 
earned Rs. 150 (US$ 3), three times more than the wages in her village.  
And while most men made at least one visit back to their origin villages during the 
year prior to the survey, and many timed the visit to coincide with the intensive 
tasks of Buwai (sowing) and Katai (threshing), working on the farm was not the 
main purpose of the visit for a large majority of migrants. Of the 239 migrants who 
were reported to have made at least one trip back home in the past year, only 34.7 
                                                        
101 The household survey data suggest that of the 132 migrant households who owned any land, 
only eight reported hiring the labour. 
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percent returned to help/work on the farm, whereas for the remaining 65.3 percent 
this was not the main purpose of visit. Instead, after a long work trip to the cities in 
which many migrants also worked overtime to earn and save more money, the 
home villages provided an escape from the hardship they endured in the cities. As 
Mahesh (name changed), a seasonal migrant to Hoshiarpur, Punjab where he 
worked as a ‘spinning operator’ in a cotton mill but whom I interviewed in his home 
village (Chakmahuda) when he was on a break, told me:   
My work is very demanding. My daily shift is of eight hours but I often work 
between 10 and 12 hours every day of the week to earn overtime money. 
Sometimes I do a double shift of 16 hours. And when I go home after work I 
do not have anyone to interact with. Besides, the seth (employer) that I 
work for keeps changing my work shifts. One day I find myself working in 
the morning shift and the next day I am asked to do the night shift. This 
constant changing of shifts disrupts my body rhythm and I feel tired all the 
time. When I feel too tired and lonely I come to my village to relax. But I 
cannot stay here forever because I need money to run my household. So I 
go back again. 
Similarly, a woman respondent grudgingly informed me:  
My husband’s job starts and ends at earning money but I am the one who 
has to do multiple jobs here including cooking, cleaning, washing, feeding 
kids, taking care of their education and health and managing the land and 
animals. Though he is out of the village for work for a major part of the year 
but even when he is around, he does not do anything.  
Table 8.6 summarises survey data on the amount of time they spent ‘before’ and 
‘after’ their husbands’ migration on household agriculture and domestic activities. 
Core household activities like cleaning, cooking etc. remained the same, but those 
activities in which husbands and wives were more likely to share responsibilities  
 
 
 293 
Table 8.6: Average minutes spent daily on different activities by migrants’ wives102   
Activity 
Average time spent daily  
(in mins) 
Before husband's 
migration  
After husband's 
migration 
Collecting water 27  27  
Cleaning and mopping the house 45 46 
Cooking 100 99 
Washing clothes1 62 62 
Collecting cooking fuel/wood 56 61 
Taking care of animals 80 84 
Child care 72 79 
Agriculture work2 120 148 
Leisure 165 157 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12.  
1The survey also included 17 Mahadailts households from the washerman caste, 
locally known as ‘Dhobi’, who washed clothes of the other families, mainly village 
elites, in return for cash or in-kind wages (usually a few kilos of wheat or rice). Thus, 
the average daily time spent on washing clothes is likely to have an upward bias. 
2Daily time spent on agriculture work is unlikely to be static throughout the crop 
cycle. Nonetheless, the household surveys for this study were conducted in April-
May 2012 which was also the time of wheat crop harvesting in some of the study 
villages. And thus the average time spent daily on agriculture by women is quite 
likely to be close to the reported one during the harvesting period, though the 
number of left-behind wives who reported that they did agriculture work was very 
less (an issue addressed below), which may have resulted in an overall downward 
bias in average time spent. 
 
                                                        
102 It should be noted that the total number of women (n) varied for each activity. This is because 
respondents either did not answer these questions or they were not applicable to them. For 
instance, many households had ‘handpumps’ installed in their premises which meant that they 
did not go out of the house to collect/fetch water. In fact, some women found this question 
rather silly and laughed at it. Pointing to the handpump in her house, one woman respondent 
giggled and asked me instead: “How long do you reckon it must take me to collect water from 
this kal [handpump]? In cities you have nals (water tabs), and in villages we have kals; not a lot of 
difference, you see!” The sample (n) for ‘before’ and ‘after’ husband migration categories also 
varied, and was somewhat higher in ‘after’ than ‘before’ as some women respondents reported 
taking on tasks, such as collecting fuel/wood for cooking, agriculture, that earlier their husbands 
performed. The number of women respondent (n) for ‘before’ and ‘after’ categories 
respectively, included: 85 and 86 for collecting water; 26 and 29 for animal care; 34 and 37 for 
agriculture work; 72 and 79 for child care; 35 and 47 for collecting fuel/wood for cooking; 116 
for cleaning in both; 114 for cooking in both; and 114 in washing clothes in both.   
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(like child care and, particularly, agriculture103) increased noticeably. Also, leisure 
time fell. 
These data, however, do not fully capture the participation of women in agriculture. 
That only 37 out of 144 migrants’ wives reported that after their husband migration 
they did agriculture work is a gross underestimation. My village-level observations 
and in-depth interviews suggested that, barring women from the Forward Castes, 
most women engaged and laboured, albeit in varying degree, in household own-
account agriculture (Figure 8.3).  
Figure 8.3: Women from Backward Caste household sorting out onions after 
threshing in Gayaspur village 
Source: Picture taken during fieldwork in Siwan 
 
                                                        
103 When left-behind wives were asked if there were any tasks their husbands performed before, 
46 of the 144 women answered in the affirmative. These women were then asked to list the 
three most important activities their husbands did in the descending order of amount of time 
spent - from high to low – and time spent on each of the activity. For the first activity on which 
they reported their husbands spent the most time included: 20 women for agriculture work; 18 
women for child care; 4 for livestock care; 3 for collecting food; and 1 for fetching water. The 
number of women who reported the second and third activity done by their husbands was 20 
and 7, respectively. Given the small number of observation, the second and third activity is not 
reported here.  For more information, see Section 23.13 in the Household Survey Questionnaire, 
attached as Appendix 4. 
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The source of this contradiction in survey data and qualitative insights may lie in the 
fact that most women in rural Siwan considered work in agriculture as rather 
ancillary, and often part of their domestic responsibilities. For instance, during my 
interview with a woman respondent who worked on family-owned land but did not 
think that it needed to be counted as separate from her domestic duties, she 
remarked: “I do tend to our agricultural land. But just like this house, that is our 
land too. So it is part and parcel of my domestic work. Is not it?” 
This is also reflected in the responses of women on their occupation. Of the 371 
women in the working age group of 15 to 59 years belonging to 197 surveyed 
migrant households, 75.7 percent (281 women) reported their “primary 
occupation” as ‘domestic work’, and only 3.5 percent (13 women) reported that 
‘agriculture labour in household-owned land’ as their primary occupation. Even the 
women reporting agriculture work in family-owned land as their “secondary 
occupation” was also a meagre 5.7 percent (21 women).104 This does not reconcile 
with the survey data on the sex composition of available household labour. The data 
show that of 526 individuals among migrant households in the prime working age 
groups of 15 and 59 years (excluding migrants), there were 371 women and 155 
men. In other words, there was an average of 2.4 women per man in each migrant 
household. (A comparison with non-migrant households suggests that of the 582 
individuals in the same age group, the number of women equaled men i.e. 291 
women and 291 men). Indeed, in all the 10 case study villages there was some 
degree of “feminisation of agriculture”.  
However, participation of women in agriculture varied by familial structure, caste, 
economic class, and age. Across all caste groups, young women in joint families 
largely remained indoors and rarely stepped out to work in the fields. And usually 
women from relatively richer higher caste families, such as Rajput or Brahmins, did 
not do agricultural work, and instead the family land was leased out to the lower 
caste families in the same village. It was mainly the women from the lower 
                                                        
104 Women among non-migrant households also reported ‘unpaid domestic work’ as their main 
occupation. Of the 662 women aged 15 to 59 years belonging to 392 surveyed households, 74.2 
percent (491 women) reported their primary occupation as ‘unpaid domestic work’. 
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backward castes, such as Harijan and Mahadalits, who worked on owned land as 
well as being agricultural labourers and sharecropper farmers. The participation in 
farm work of women from the cultivator caste groups of Koeri and Kushwahas 
(Backward Castes) was no less significant, and many among the non-migrant 
households also worked alongside their husbands in the fields. However, unlike the 
Mahadalit women, they did not work on the others’ land as labourers though they 
also worked as tenant farmers on leased in land.  
And while male migrants tended to send their earnings home, this was not 
universal. Among the most important reason was migrants’ spending on alcohol, 
which left little money to remit. In a few cases, migrants’ wives also alluded that 
their husbands lived with other women at the destinations. Women in such non-
remittance receiving households had an added burden of feeding their families in 
the villages. This was difficult given the relatively scarce employment opportunities 
outside of agriculture. In the survey, 26 out of the 144 migrants’ wives reported 
working in wage labour activities outside of their owned land for cash or in-kind 
incomes (a few kilos of the rice or wheat), though 20 of these women worked in 
agriculture as either farm labourers (17 women) or sharecroppers (3 women). Some 
women borrowed money from relatives and neighbors to keep the household 
going. Despite the hardships, rarely did these women talk foul of their husbands, 
and instead wished for their wellbeing. For instance, during my interview in Baguani 
village with Ruksana (name changed), whose husband worked as a construction 
migrant worker, and who alluded to the fact that her husband now lived with 
another woman in the city (her neighbours confirmed it), when I asked her how 
much money does her migrant husband send every month, she burst into tears and 
replied:  
My husband has been ill for last three months and thus has not been able to 
work. But even when he is working, he hardly sends any money home. He 
uses all his earnings on alcohol and has little left to send. I always have to 
borrow money from neighbours, relatives, friends which keeps us alive. But 
all I want at this moment is for him to get better.  
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Box 8.1: More autonomy or more responsibility: understanding the different 
impacts of male migration through the tale of two women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Meena Devi  
Meena Devi (name changed) is a 32-year-old married woman from Chakmahmuda village in 
Maharajganj Block. She was born in an upper caste Rajput family, and is married to the man 
from the same caste. Her husband, Rajbinder Singh (first name changed), is a migrant. 
Rajbinder’s first migrated for work to Delhi after the marriage. He spent six years in Delhi and 
Meena lived with him for the most part (Rajbinder and Meena were 18 and 16 years old 
respectively when they got married). However, two years after the couple had their first 
child, a daughter, they moved back to the village; they now have four children (three 
daughters and one son). Rajbinder inherited two acres of agricultural land from his father, 
and savings from six years of migration allowed him to add another half an acre. The family 
lived off from the cash income from the agricultural land. However, Meena told me that 
Rajbinder did not like farming, and for the past three years he has been working in a cellular 
company in Patna while she and children stay in the village. Being from the Rajput caste, 
Meena does not work on farms, and the agricultural land has been leased out to three 
different lower caste families for sharecropping farming. The family gets half of the total 
produce in return. 
Patna is approximately 150 kilometers south of Chakmahmuda. Given the short distance, 
Rajbinder comes to the village at least once in two months. In fact his decision to work in 
Patna was so that he could be close to his wife and children as they are no other elder 
members in the family. However, his visits are short, lasting only for a few days; he mostly 
visits on the weekends. In the absence of her husband, Meena manages the household. She 
does not work on the farms and in any other cash income activities but she told me that she 
felt more independent now than before. She now goes to the village market to make 
purchases for the house which she would not do earlier when her husband was living in the 
village. She also takes major family decisions on matters, such as children’s education, 
household finances, though she calls her husband and takes his opinion. She told me that 
though her husband is very supportive of her decisions, she keeps him in loop to keep the 
relations cordial and harmonious. Speaking in Hindi, she told me: Do aadmi mein agar rai ho 
jaye toh behtar hai (It’s always better if the two of us discuss and decide on things jointly).  
Meena is also a GP Ward Member (member of the Village Council), and she also participates 
in Panchayat activities and meetings. Meena told me that her husband is looking for a house 
in Patna and their long-term plan is to move and settle there. They intend to sell part of their 
agricultural land to buy a house in Patna, and keep some land for the dowry of their 
daughters’ wedding.       Contd… 
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II. Noorjahan Begum  
Noorjahan Begum (name changed), a 45-year-old woman, is also from Chakmahmuda 
village. She belongs to the Mahadalit caste of Muslim-Dhobi (washerman), a socially and 
economically backward caste and occupational group. Her current family includes her 
partially disabled husband, three daughters and two sons. The family of seven has hand-
to-mouth existence, and they live in their kuctha bamboo hut. Following her marriage, 
Noorjahan’s life has been full of economic hardship. Her husband was a migrant 
construction worker but a few years ago he met an accident at the work site. The accident 
caused severe injuries to one of his legs, and he has been in the village ever since. He is 
also an alcohol-addict and even when he earned money, he spent most of it on drinking 
and seldom sent money home. He has recently been diagnosed with a damaged liver. Two 
months ago, Noorjahan sent her 20-year-old son to Delhi for work. But he has not yet 
started remitting money. 
Noorjahan alone has the responsibility of feeding seven members on her shoulders. As a 
sole breadwinner, she single-handedly does multiple on-farm and non-farm jobs. She 
farms five katthas (0.1 acre) of family-owned land, sharecrops same-sized tiny land parcel 
that she has leased in from the Rajput family in the village, works as an agricultural 
labourer at the wage rate of Rs. 30 a day (for 4-5 hours), and being from the washerman 
caste, also washes the clothes of families in the village (her daughters help her in washing 
work). Despite all the work, rarely does Noorjahan’s family have days when they eat three 
meals a day, and there are days when they do not eat any food at all. The family has a BPL 
ration card which allows them access to the subsidised foodgrains. However, food ration 
are never regularly distributed.  
Noorjahan’s bigger concern however is the dowry money for the wedding of her three 
daughters. She told me that her caste Muslims earlier had the practice of ‘mehar’ 
(brideprice) in which the bride side received the money. This, however, has changed in 
recent times. Initially started by the wealthy Muslim families who considered dowry as 
‘gift’ to their daughters, the practice has now tricked down to the poor families. 
Noorjahan’s only hope is her son who has recently migrated to Delhi. She wishes that he 
does not follow the footsteps of his father. Despite all these difficulties, Noorjahan wore a 
smile. At the end of the interview, she told me: “I feel defeated but crying does not help. 
So I try to make peace with my situation which I know will probably not change anyway.”  
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Thus, the outcomes of male migration were not uniform – far from it. The individual 
experiences of women differed widely, and whether migration of men brought 
about greater freedom in decision-making or more work was guided by several 
intersecting variables such as social caste and economic class (see Box 8.1).  
Changes in family structure 
It is also important to point out that the dynamics of migration, gender and family 
relations were also highly complex. An emergent dynamic of the effects of 
migration from Siwan that deserves particular attention here is that migration is 
also leading to changes in familial structure and living arrangements due to intra-
family tensions over cash incomes. Migration of young male members was still 
largely undertaken within the broader context of the joint family structure and 
remittances (and local incomes) were jointly shared by all household members. This 
is however no longer always the case. I also found a marked reluctance among 
migrants and their wives to share the remittances with the economically less 
productive or unproductive members of the households such as migrants’ brothers 
and their families. This was particularly the case among the poor families that had 
no land or other resources in the origin, and thus sharing of remittances did not 
bring any benefits to the immediate family. The household survey data also 
provides some insights on this issue. Figure 8.4 shows the type of family by the 
landholding status of the surveyed migrant households. The data suggest that 
whereas 65 percent of households with no land were nuclear entities, the 
proportion of nuclear households among the households with land size of an acre or 
more was only 14 percent. Indeed there is some consistent relationship between 
family type and landholding status: the percentage of nuclear households decreases 
and joint households increase in a progressive fashion as we move from the 
categories of landless to households with an acre or more land.105 
The cross-sectional nature of the household survey means that the quantitative 
data is not adequate to infer the long-term changes in the family organisation. 
However, detailed personal histories of several households provide evidence in this 
                                                        
105My fieldwork also suggested that some of the poor households also separated in order to avail 
themselves of the separate BPL/AAY cards and the benefits, such as subsidised ration, under the 
PDS scheme that accompanied it. 
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Figure 8.4: Family type among migrant households by landholding status 
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
regard (see below). Moreover, findings of longitudinal studies conducted in other 
parts of India also suggest that the emergence of disparate incomes and divergent 
economic interests are associated with changes in family type and living 
arrangements. In her longitudinal ethnographic study of the two villages of Dalena 
and Mangala in Mysore District in the southern Indian state of Karnataka, carried 
out at the interval of 15-year period (1955 and 1970), Epstein (1973) found the 
same. Reporting her findings, she noted:  
Landless families and those with insignificant size landholdings have for the 
most part remained elementary units. On the other hand, growing cash 
income has increased the tensions within joint families in the middle range. 
A considerable proportion of families which during the last fifteen years 
have extended to three generations have either already been partitioned or 
are on the verge, or in the process, of breaking up.  
      (Epstein, 1973, p. 201) 
My fieldwork suggested that these changes in the family structure – from 
joint/extended to nuclear – also occurred among households where all the young 
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males, brothers in this context, were earning migrants in the cities but where there 
were differences in their earnings. These households typically included the ones 
without the old male patriarch. For instance, in my interview with Kanti Devi (name 
changed), a 60-year old widow who had three sons who all worked outside the 
village (eldest one in a textile mill in Kolhapur, Maharashtra; middle son as a truck 
driver with base in Delhi; and youngest one as a tempo driver in Ranchi, Jharkhand), 
she told me her middle son made the most money and contributed the most to the 
family which was not acceptable to his wife. Kanti’s daughter-in-law wanted the 
extra money to be spent on her children’s education instead of contributing to the 
family pool that had to be equally distributed among all members. This led to family 
squabbles, and all the brothers separated later.106  
The story of Bhola Prasad’s (name changed) family is another case of intra-
household conflicts over incomes. An old man in his early 60s from cultivator 
‘Kushwaha’ caste (Backward Caste in contemporary Bihar), Prasad owns four 
Beegha land (roughly 2.5 acres). His three married sons are all seasonal migrants. 
While two of the sons (and their wives and children) live with him as part of the 
joint family and help him on family farms, the youngest son, who spends most time 
in the city and earns more than the other two brothers, separated from the joint 
family a few years ago. The wife and children of this son now live with his in-laws, 
and whenever he returns to the village, he also stays there. Prasad told me that all 
was well in the family until his wife fell ill. For his wife’s treatment (who later died), 
Prasad had to mortgage 11 Katthas of land (0.4 acre)107 to take a cash loan from the 
local moneylender which he has not been able to repay. While the family earns 
some cash income from the agricultural produce from the owned land, it is not 
enough to repay the loan. (Over the years, the family size has also increased (his 
grandsons) which means that more of the agricultural produce is used for their own 
                                                        
106 Kanti did not reveal any of this in the first hour of my interview. In the beginning she 
appeared content with her family and situation but when I was able to build some rapport, she 
burst into tears and narrated this story of her family break-up. Individual interviews with two of 
her three daughter-in-laws (the third one was not present at the time of interview) also 
suggested the primacy of money matters as the cause of changes in the family structure, though, 
unlike Kanti, they expressed happiness over this change.   
107 Kattha is a local land measurement unit in Siwan. 27 Katthas equal to one acre.   
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consumption.) From the remittances his three sons sent (two of them still do), 
Prasad was saving money to get the family land back. However, his youngest 
daughter-in-law asked her husband to not contribute anything to the joint 
household income pool over which the tensions erupted. His youngest son now 
sends remittances to his wife at her natal place. The youngest son has now also 
started asking for his share of land from the joint property. Prasad however thinks 
that after what his son did, he is not bound to give him any land. His decision to not 
give his son any land, however, it appeared, was an effort to save the household 
from being broken down further as this would mean that he would then have to 
give his other two sons their shares of land. Prasad told me that this is inevitable 
after he is no more but he does not want that to happen as long as he is alive.  
Similarly, the story of a joint family of Sahs (Backward Caste), a relatively wealthier 
household which stood on the verge of break-up, is another example. The Sah 
household comprises of three brothers and their families, who at the time of 
fieldwork in 2012, all lived under the same roof, had a shared kitchen, and joint 
income and expenditure. Two of the elder brothers live in the village with their 
families and mind the family farm land of 10 acres. The youngest one is a labour 
migrant in Saudi Arabia, but his wife and one son live in the same joint household. 
He remits money home to his eldest brother (who narrated his family’s story to me), 
who is the head of the household, and also some of his earnings to his wife. 
However, his wife’s spending patterns and money management has caused 
suspicion that the migrant brother sends more money to his wife than to his 
brother for the joint household pool. As an example, I was told that whenever her 
son catches cold or fever, she takes him to the State Capital of Patna (160 
kilometers south of Siwan) to seek treatment, whereas the children of her two 
brother-in-laws see the doctor in the Block hospital for the same health conditions. 
This has bubbled tensions in the family, and I was told, after the migrant brother 
returns, they will divide the shared land and property and split. There were 
numerous other stories of families splitting up due to rising tensions over cash 
management. As one respondent in one of the survey villages summed up:  
The number of families in the village increases almost every day. How do 
you think that happens? These are not the new families who are settling in 
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the village from the outside (who would come here to live!) but the old ones 
who are splitting among themselves. And money is the biggest evil. 
It is important to note that separation did not mean that families moved away from 
the house they previously lived in. While a few migrants with money and 
homestead land elsewhere moved out of the house and some also moved to their 
in-laws places (eg. Prasad’s son, as noted above), most of the them dwelled in the 
same house, albeit each family now managed their own finances and had separate 
kitchens. These new forms of familial relations in rural Siwan could be most aptly 
characterised as the ones in which the roof is shared but income and financial 
responsibilities are separated (Figure 8.5).   
Figure 8.5: Emerging familial arrangement in Siwan: a dwelling inhabiting three 
brothers and their families who all had different kitchens    
Source: Picture taken during field surveys in Siwan 
Male migration, left-behind women and household food security   
Thus far, I have said little about whether and how these alterations in intra-family 
relations and gender roles as a result of male migration have a bearing on 
household food security outcomes. In this final major section of this Chapter, I 
therefore attempt to engage with this question directly. In particular, my focus here 
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will be to highlight the ways in which the phenomenon of left-behind women and 
women-headed (de facto) households relate to household food security.  
There is growing interest in the academic and policy circles on the relationship 
between the gender of the household head and household food security. However, 
the extant literature on the relationship between the two is rather mixed and 
contradictory. On the one hand, there is much literature that suggests that because 
of widespread gender discrimination in access to social and economic resources and 
opportunities, households headed by women fall disproportionately among the 
poorest sections of the society (Buvinić & Rao Gupta, 1997)108 and thus are more 
prone to food insecurity (Kassie, Ndiritu, & Stage, 2014). On the other hand, 
empirical evidence also suggests that when income factors are taken account of, 
female headship has positive impacts on the food and nutrition outcomes of the 
individual members, largely because of different consumption behaviors of men and 
women. When women control household income and resources, they tend to utilise 
them better than men in order to maximise the household welfare outcomes 
(Quisumbing & McClafferty, 2006; UNICEF, 2006), with these effects more 
pronounced among poorer households (Kennedy, 1989; Kennedy & Peters, 1992; 
von Braun, de Haen, & Blanken, 1991; von Braun, Puetz, & Webb, 1989; for a useful 
review article, see Buvinić & Rao Gupta, 1997). 
The survey data gathered for the present study suggests that the effects of transfer 
of household headship to women and gender of household head on food security 
are not direct and play out through numerous intervening factors. Given the 
heterogeneity of the surveyed sample of left-behind women and female-headed 
                                                        
108 Buvinić and Rao Gupta (1997) carried out a review of 65 studies, 61 of which examined the 
association between female-headship and household poverty across different countries and 
using different poverty measures (such as households’ per capita income and consumption 
expenditure, ownership of land and assets, access to services). The authors found that 38 of the 
61 studies (58 percent) suggested that households headed by women were overrepresented 
among the poor (p. 263). Indeed, their own assessment of female-headed households in Chile 
revealed the same findings. However, the evidence on higher incidence of poverty among 
female-headed households is rather ambiguous because of the methodological issues involved in 
defining the family headship and wide heterogeneity within the female-headed households 
(Chant, 2003; Sandra, 1989). 
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households along the lines of caste, income, amount of remittances received, 
control over household finances, and indeed the experience of migrants themselves 
in the cities, it is difficult to decompose the relative effects of each of them here. 
Nonetheless, the effects of three mutually inter-linked factors through which 
gender of the household head mediate food security outcomes deserve mention. 
These include: i) income/economic status of the household; ii) size of landholdings 
owned by the household; and iii) family structure. The discussion below attempts to 
highlight the influence of each of these variables on food security outcomes.  
Interactions of income and gender  
Research findings of a number of studies indicate that as compared to men, women 
tend to spend a greater share of their income on food (inter alia, Engle, 1988; 
Guyer, 1980). However, this is often a reflection of overall higher incidence of 
poverty among female-headed households. Generally, poor households tend to 
spend a larger proportion of their income on food, and cross-country evidence 
suggests that the income elasticity of demand for food declines with increase in 
income and expenditure (Alderman, 1986). 
In order to understand how the gender and income of households interact with the 
food expenditure patterns of the surveyed migrant households, Table 8.7 presents 
the data on i) average total MPCE, ii) average MPCE on food and, iii) average share 
of food expenditure in total MPCE, by the sex of the household head across the 
MPCI tertiles of low, medium and high. As already noted in Chapter 7, the MPCI 
tertiles here are used as a proxy for household economic status i.e. households in 
the lowest economic tertile are relatively poorer than the households in the 
medium category, who in turn are poorer than their counterparts in the high MPCI 
tertile. The cut-off points for MPCI tertiles obtained from the survey data include Rs. 
485.12 and Rs. 767.12. 
The survey data confirms a decline in the proportional share of food expenditure 
with a rise in income. As is evident from the data in Table 8.7, for both male-headed 
and female-headed households the average percentage share of expenditure on 
food declines from low to high income tertiles. At the same time the food 
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expenditure increases in absolute terms from the low to high income categories, 
which is a product of income. 
Importantly for this study, the data show that the gender of the household head 
appears to significantly affect food expenditure in the highest tertile, but not for the 
lowest and middle tertiles. Female-headed households in the top tertile had 
average MPCE on food which was 20 percent (Rs. 79) higher than the male-headed 
households.109  
Table 8.7: Average food expenditure among migrant households by MPCI tertiles 
and gender of household head  
 
Male-headed households 
(n=95)1 
Women-headed households 
(n=102)2 
MPCI 
tertiles 
Total 
average 
MPCE 
(In Rs.) 
Average 
MPCE on 
food 
(In Rs.) 
Average 
share of 
food in 
total 
MPCE  
(%) 
Total 
average 
MPCE 
(In Rs.) 
Average 
MPCE on 
food 
(In Rs.) 
Average 
share of 
food in 
total 
MPCE 
 (%) 
Low 587 265 45 511 231 45 
Medium 743 274 37 792 293 37 
High 1473 400 27 1380 479 35 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. MPCI = Monthly Per Capita 
Income; MPCE = Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure. 
1The number of male-headed households in low, medium and high MPCI tertiles 
was 45, 37 and 27 households, respectively. 2The corresponding number of 
households headed by women was 16, 37 and 49 households in low, medium and 
high income tertiles.   
 
Based on my fieldwork and available literature, there would appear to be at least 
two explanations for these expenditure differentials. Firstly, the effects of women 
spending on food only are realised only in households that are economically better-
off because women in these households had less pressure to use and save money 
for non-food items or future needs, such as daughters’ wedding, as compared to 
                                                        
109 It is worth noting, however, the number of households in low, medium and high tertiles varies 
by the gender of the household head (Note 1 and 2 in Table 8.7). Also, the average expenditure 
may hide the variations across the households, though because of the small observations the 
differences are not going to be large; also there were not many extreme income values in each 
of the MPCI so as to distort the average. 
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women from poor households. This is clearly reflected in the individual cases of two 
stay-behind wives of migrants in Box 8.1. Thus, while Meena from the landowning, 
Rajput caste informed me that they intended to sell part of their land for their 
daughter’s wedding, Noorjahan, a woman from the lower-backward caste, had no 
such option (5 Katthas of land would be just enough for the dowry of one of her 
daughters and that would make the family even more prone to food insecurity).   
Secondly, many women with migrant husbands reported that their husbands spent 
money on alcohol whereas because of the social-cultural norms women did not 
drink and thus their expenditure on this head was nil. The only exceptions included 
women from the Bansfor and Mushahar communities; however, as already noted in 
Chapter 7, the propensity of migration among these social groups was not very high. 
(All the four households in the survey sample belonging to these castes were non-
migrant households). The most common alcoholic beverage consumed by the local 
is the traditional palm wine, locally known as Tadi (see Figure 8.6). (Most men in 
Siwan also consumed chewing tobacco.) 
Figure 8.6: A Tadi-seller in Chakmahmuda village with his patron 
Source: Picture taken during field surveys in Siwan 
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The survey did not collect expenditure data on alcohol and thus it is not possible 
here to provide the statistics on the amount and share of expenses incurred on 
alcohol. In any case, the surveys were conducted with rural households and 
spending of individual migrants at the destinations, where they spent a major part 
of the year, was not possible to capture. However, a number of studies conducted 
in different parts of the world provide strong evidence in this regard. Analyzing the 
intra-household resource allocation and consumption choices made by farm 
households in rural Cote d’Ivoire, a country where men and women farm separate 
land plots, Duflo and Udry (2004) found that rainfall shocks that increased the 
output of crop (yam) cultivated by women individually was associated with a shift in 
the expenditure on food, while for shocks that increased the output of yam crops 
cultivated by men had no effect on the food purchase; and a greater proportion of 
men’s income was used on alcohol compared to women’s. In Malawi, detailed 
analysis of the households’ expenditure patterns revealed that while most female-
headed households spent a larger share of household budget on food, they spent 
25-50 percent less on alcoholic beverages as compared to male-headed households 
(Peters, Herrera, & Randolph, 1989). In the case of India, a recent study by the 
World Health Organisation revealed that whereas 90 percent of Indian women 
abstain from alcohol throughout their lives, this percentage is 60 percent for Indian 
men. Furthermore, on average a male drinker aged 15 and above drinks three times 
as much alcohol a year (33 liters) as women of the corresponding ages (Sinha, 
2014).  
My fieldwork also revealed that in households where women had some control over 
money, spending on food and children’s education was prioritised (Table 8.8 and 
Figure 8.7). Spending on children’s education was guided by their desire that 
education will enable them to break the shackles of poverty and misery that they 
have witnessed throughout their lives. And although across the survey sample there 
was a much greater preference for the education of sons, because of cultural 
norms, interviews with some women also suggested that they wanted to educate 
their daughters. However they were mainly better-off, upper caste households. For 
instance, Meena Devi (mentioned above in Box 8.1), whose eldest daughter was in 
9th standard, told me:  
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Jab mein bazzar mein jaati hai or waha par aurat daroga ko dekhti hu, mein 
bus yehi sochti hu ki meri betiya bhi pad-likh kar badi afsar ban jaaye (When 
I see women cops in the market, I wish that my daughters also study well 
and occupy the positions of power).  
Table 8.8: Average food expenditure among migrant households by women’s 
control over money  
 
HHs where women 
managed the 
money 
independently  
HHs where women 
did not manage 
the money 
independently  
Total average MPCE (In Rs.) 1022 933 
Average MPCE on food (In Rs.) 396 338 
Average share of food in total MPCE (%) 39 36 
Total number of households (n) 38 106 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
Note that this table has been computed based on the responses of left-behind 
women on the overall money management of money in the household when their 
husbands were away (see Table 8.5 above). In the survey, left-behind women were 
asked who decided what to do with the money in the household when their 
husbands were around and when they were away. In households where women 
respondents replied they alone took the decisions are considered to be the 
households where women managed the money independently. Figure 8.7 below 
also follows the similar categorisation   
 
Some women, mainly from the better-off households, informed me that when their 
husbands were outside the village, they went to local markets to buy fresh/seasonal 
vegetables. But they did not venture out of the house much when their husbands 
were around, including to the markets. I do not have quantitative data on whether 
and how this may have a bearing on food expenditure and household food security, 
however, a study of 204 rural households in three districts of Northern Ghana found 
that female-headed households spent 1.19 Ghanian cedi (roughly 50 US cents) more 
per week on fresh vegetables than the male-headed households (Meng, Florkowski, 
& Kolavalli, 2012).  
Puzzlingly, however, the fact that female-headed households in the high income 
tertile spent a greater share and amount of money on food, this did not necessarily 
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translate into better food security among the female-headed household vis-à-vis 
their male headed counterparts.  
Figure 8.7: Average annual expenditure on education of per child aged between 6 
and 18 years among migrant households by women’s control over money  
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
As is evident in Table 8.9, the effects of better economic status of the household on 
food security are quite discernable. Irrespective of the gender of household head, 
the proportion of households declines on all parameters of self-reported food 
inadequacy and food unavailability, except the one on affordability to consume 
food only through subsidised food rations from PDS (for this discrepancy, see the 
discussion below and footnote 20). However, a comparison of food security 
situation by gender of household-headship suggests that on all indicators and across 
all the MPCI tertiles, a greater proportion of female-headed households reported 
facing food inadequacy and food unavailability.  
Similarly, analysis of household food diversity by the gender of the household head 
also suggests that male-headed households fared better than female-headed 
households. Based on a Principal Component Analysis of 30 food items that 
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Table 8.9: Household food security among migrant households by gender of household head and MPCI tertiles  
 MPCI tertiles 
 Low  Medium  High  
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations) Male- headed  
Female-
headed  
Male- 
headed 
Female-
headed 
Male- 
headed 
Female-
headed 
Household ate meals without vegetables 46.4 93.8 50.0 54.1 17.1 26.5 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS1 14.3 18.8 23.1 18.9 14.6 8.2 
Household members consumed single meal a day 32.1 18.8 11.5 18.9 4.9 6.1 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, vegetables) were not available 53.6 87.5 46.2 56.8 14.6 28.6 
If household members got less food than the amount to satiate hunger 53.6 68.8 42.3 48.6 14.6 18.4 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations)       
Household borrowed money from friends and/or relatives to buy food 17.9 37.5 19.2 21.6 4.9 8.2 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money lenders or lifted ration on 
credit 39.3 43.8 38.5 40.5 12.2 18.4 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy food 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than usual) 60.7 81.3 46.2 51.4 14.6 22.4 
Total number of households (n) 28 16 26 37 41 49 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. All data in percentage terms.  
1 See footnote 105.                 
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surveyed households reported consuming during the week before the survey, Figure 
8.8 shows the migrant households that were in the high MPCI category (MPCI of Rs. 
767.13 or more) in the food diversity tertiles. The data in Figure 8.8 shows that the 
proportion of female-headed households is greater in the low food diversity 
category and lower in high food diversity tertile as compared to households headed 
my men. 
Figure 8.8: Food diversity among migrant households in the high MPCI tertile by the 
gender of the household head  
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12. 
Although at face value these data on differentials in household food security by the 
gender of the household head do not reconcile with qualitative data on women 
prioritising spending on food, buying fresh vegetables etc., this is not entirely 
surprising. Indeed, findings of a recent study based on the primary household 
survey data of 605 farm households spread across 88 villages in Kenya found that a 
much greater proportion of surveyed female-headed households were food 
insecure than their male-headed counterparts. Furthermore, the study revealed a 
shocking, though not entirely surprising, finding that if the female-headed 
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households were to remain the same but had one male member, the fact alone 
would reduce their food insecurity by an average of 3 percent (Kassie et al., 2014).  
One important reason for greater food insecurity among female-headed households 
is relative disadvantages of women in accessing the government-run welfare 
services such as food rations. A total number of 64 female-headed migrant 
households did not have BPL and AAY ration-card, and 51 migrant households 
headed by men were without these ration cards.110 As already noted in Chapter 6, in 
the absence of men, many women found it hard to press their claims on BPL cards 
and PDS rations, and those who did were often unheard and manipulated.  
Effects of familial structure and living arrangements   
The structure of family has complex interactions with household food security. My 
fieldwork and survey data suggest in general women in nuclear families enjoyed 
greater autonomy and had a greater role in household decision-making compared 
with joint/extended families where other males were present. Also, the average per 
capita monthly food expenditure among 75 female-headed nuclear households was 
Rs. 388, which was higher than women-headed joint households (Rs. 331; n=27). It 
was also greater than both the nuclear (Rs. 309; n=18) and joint households (Rs. 
330; n=77) headed by men. However, the food security outcomes were better 
among joint and extended households.  
Table 8.10 shows the different self-reported food security indicators for female-
headed migrant households by the type of living arrangements. As is evident, 
although nearly three-quarters of all female-headed migrant households were 
nuclear units, the female-headed joint/extended families fared better than the 
nuclear households on all parameters of food security (except the one on PDS 
because of the reason explained above).  
                                                        
110 A break-up by MPCI tertiles of households without BPL/AAY cards or no cards at all included 
18, 8 and 25 households in low, medium and high tertiles, respectively, among male-headed 
households and 12, 25 and 27 households in low, medium and high category, respectively, 
headed by women did not have these ration cards. This may also explain the discrepancy in 
Table 8.9 that shows the relative advantage of female-headed household vis-à-vis male headed 
ones in medium and high MPCI tertile, because of the lower number of observations.  
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Based on survey data and fieldwork observations, there are at least three 
explanations for why this may be the case. Firstly, as already noted earlier, the joint 
families fared better than the nuclear families in terms of land size (Figure 8.4 
above, and Table 7.6 in Chapter 7). Secondly, the nuclearisation of rural households 
in Siwan over income tensions notwithstanding, the joint household structure 
seemed to provide a greater buffer against income and food shocks. Of the 27 
female-headed joint households, one-third had two or more male migrants; the 
corresponding percentage for female-headed joint households was 13 percent. 
From the perspective of household food insecurity, this meant that if one person 
was not able to remit money home in a month, the income of the other provided a 
cushion.  
Table 8.10: Household food security among female-headed migrant households by 
type of living arrangements 
 
Nuclear 
HHs  
(%) 
Joint 
 HHs  
(%) 
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations)   
Household ate meals without vegetables 52.0 33.3 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS1 13.3 14.8 
Household members consumed single meal a day 16.0 3.7 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, vegetables) 
were not available 50.7 40.7 
If household members got less food than the amount to 
satiate hunger 42.7 22.2 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations) 38.7 37.0 
Household borrowed money from friends and/or relatives to 
buy food 21.3 7.4 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money 
lenders or lifted ration on credit 30.7 29.6 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy 
food 1.3 0.0 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than usual) 45.3 33.3 
Total number of households (n) 75 27 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
147 of the joint female-headed migrant households had either APL card or no ration 
card, and this number was 17 for nuclear female-headed migrant households.  
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Thirdly, and this is important, in nuclear households it was the wives of migrants 
who acted as the de facto household head, whereas in joint female-headed 
households it was mainly the mother-in-laws. The age and seniority of the women 
mattered insofar as the participation in affairs outside was concerned. For instance 
while women in general faced greater difficulties to avail ration cards and 
subsidised rations compared with men, due to socio-cultural reasons the younger 
wives found it even harder compared with older women to access these benefits. 
Also, as noted earlier, many young women did not work outside the home in any 
income-generating activities or on their owned land, which may affect the food 
security negatively. For instance, the survey data suggest that of the 26 women who 
reported working in cash-income earning activities, only three were below the age 
of 35 years though it should be noted that the households these women belonged 
to were invariably among the poorest, an issue to which I now turn.  
Women’s work participation and food security  
Finally, it is useful to address the question of how participation of women in non-
domestic spheres of agriculture work relate to household food security. Using the 
nationally-representative data from India’s NFHS, Headey et al. (2011) examined, 
among other things, the links between occupation and women nutritional status 
and found that women agriculture workers had the worst nutritional outcomes in 
terms of BMI compared to women who worked in other occupations, including 
unskilled manual labour. It was difficult to shed light on this phenomenon in the 
present study because even though most women worked in agriculture, very few 
women reported it as either their ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ occupation. Nonetheless, 
as mentioned earlier, in the survey 26 of the 144 migrants’ wives reported working 
in income-generating activities outside of own-account agriculture, though most 
worked as agricultural labourers. It is, therefore, useful to see how the households 
these women belong to fare in terms of food security vis-à-vis the households 
where migrants’ wives did not work in any income-generating activities other than 
household agriculture.  
Table 8.11 presents food security among female-headed migrant households by 
women’s involvement in income-generating activities. As is evident, the households 
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where women reported working had invariably higher incidence of food insecurity 
than the ones where women did not work.  
Table 8.11: Household food security among female-headed migrant households by 
women’s involvement in income-earning activities  
 
HHs where 
wives did 
not work in 
income 
earning 
activities 
(%) 
HHs where 
wives 
worked in 
income 
activities 
(%) 
Food was not enough (defined by the following situations) 
Household ate meals without vegetables 39.8 61.5 
Household could only afford to consume food from PDS1 13.6 15.4 
Household members consumed single meal a day 13.6 19.2 
If all three main food categories (cereals, pulses, 
vegetables) were not available 39.8 69.2 
If household members got less food than the amount to 
satiate hunger 32.2 57.7 
Food was not available (defined by the following situations) 
Household borrowed money from friends and/or 
relatives to buy food 13.6 30.8 
Household borrowed money from local traders, money 
lenders or lifted ration on credit 27.1 46.2 
Household sold jewellery or other personal assets to buy 
food 0.0 0.0 
Consumption rationing (members ate less food than 
usual) 38.1 61.5 
Total number of households (n) 118 26 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
1Among the households where migrant wives worked, 74 had either APL card or no 
card and this number was 16 households among those where women worked. 
 
A comparison of these female-headed migrant households on dietary diversity also 
suggests the same. Figure 8.9 shows that whereas the proportion of female-headed 
migrant households where the women reported not working increases from the low 
to high tertile, the percentage of households declines from low to high food 
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diversity categories among those where women reported having been involved in 
income-earning activities. 
Figure 8.9: Food diversity among female-headed migrant households by women’s 
involvement in income-earning activities outside of household agriculture  
 
Source: Primary household survey data, 2011-12 
Looking at these figures in conjunction with other data reveal that the households 
where women had to work were invariably among the poorest households. For 
instance, barring one household from a Forward Caste, all of them were from the 
lower-backward caste groups, with 58 percent (15 households) from Scheduled 
Castes/Tribes and Extremely Backward Castes. It is not that these households did 
not receive remittances from their migrant members; 24 of these 26 household 
reported receiving remittances. However, the remittances received by these 
households were inadequate which forced women to also supplement the 
household income. The survey data suggest that among the households where 
women took up work other than own agriculture, the average monthly remittances 
amount was Rs. 2474. In comparison, the households where women did not work 
outside of own agriculture received an average amount of Rs. 4326 per month, 75 
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percent more than the former; and the average monthly per capita remittances 
(which accounts for the household size) among the latter was 60 percent higher 
than the former – Rs. 830 and Rs. 518, respectively. This evidence corroborates the 
findings of other village-level studies in India on the impact of male-migration on 
left-behind women that suggests that when remittances are not adequate, women 
often have to take on the roles of income earners to fend for the families at the 
origin (Jetley, 1987; Paris et al., 2005).  
Conclusion 
By opening the ‘household box’ to understand the impacts of migration, this 
Chapter has discussed the ways in which male-only migration restructures and 
realigns gender dynamics and power relations at the household level. In terms of 
the key themes, the discussion in this Chapter has shown that two major, and in 
many ways simultaneous, impacts of male-migration from rural Siwan include the 
increased participation of women in household affairs and decision-making and, an 
accompanying increase in the work burden of left-behind females. Another 
important, and much less explored, issue highlighted in this Chapter is the impact 
on migration in changing the traditional family form – from joint to nuclear 
households – as a result of increasing tensions over cash incomes from migration. 
Although this latter outcome is not explicitly the result of male migration, the cases 
of the households presented above reflect that stay-behind women appear to 
negotiate with other family members the control over their husband’s earnings, and 
the ways they should or should not be spent.  
Through the lens of gender, the discussion in this Chapter has also attempted to 
establish the linkages of these impacts on household food security. The field-
research and survey findings presented however highlight that the connections 
between male migration, gender and household food security are highly complex. 
Thus, while greater female autonomy and their enhanced involvement in household 
affairs as a result of male migration are associated with the increased household 
food expenditure among female-headed household compared to male-headed 
households, the effects of gender of the household head on food expenditure are 
discernable only in the high income category; for the households at the lower end 
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of the income, no clear relationship emerges from the survey data. This finding 
notwithstanding, across the income categories the female-headed household fare 
worse than the male-headed households on food security and food diversity 
indicators, a finding I attribute to the added challenge of being a woman, 
particularly in the society, such as Siwan, where the hold of patriarchal norms 
remains significant.  
Secondly, the structure of the family also appears to have a contradictory 
relationship with food security. Thus, while women living in nuclear households 
enjoyed greater financial autonomy than their counterparts in the joint/extended 
households, and the evidence also suggests that women who controlled household 
finances spent a greater share of money, both in proportion and absolute terms, on 
food, the food security outcomes of female-headed migrant households are better 
among joint than nuclear households, perhaps because the ‘buffer’ that joint family 
provides in times of income shocks. Extrapolating these findings to draw their 
implications on the changing family organisation in Siwan, it appears that 
nuclearisation of families in the district, although reflective of the ‘agency’ of 
women in many ways, is perhaps not always a healthy development.  
Finally, and this is important, the discussion also highlights that female-headed 
households were heterogeneous, and the migration-gender-food-security nexus 
was influenced by a range of intervening variables such as caste, landholdings, type 
of family, and the amount of remittances received by the household. In regards to 
the latter, the women who did not receive adequate remittances had to work to 
supplement their household income. However, because in Siwan employment 
opportunities are rather scarce and wages low, this makes it even more difficult for 
the left-behind women. And their work participation does not appear to positively 
influence the household food security, and these households fare worse than those 
where women do not have to work. Importantly, this also highlights the crucial role 
of remittances in the lives of rural Siwani households. Whether or not the lack of 
decent jobs and income locally will dislodge the restrictions on women’s mobility 
and propel women migration among poor households remains to be seen.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that despite the obvious connections between migration and 
household food security, little attention, and scarce direct evidence, has been 
marshalled towards the linkages between them in development policy research and 
practice. In the preceding eight chapters, I have attempted to highlight these 
connections and, using primary data from the case-study district of Siwan in 
western Bihar, India, provided empirical evidence on how the relationship between 
the two plays out. The findings reveal that food insecurity is both a critical driver of 
rural households’ migration decisions and the act of migration in turn influences 
their food security outcomes. In other words, there is a two-way relationship 
between migration and household food security. However, these connections are 
not straightforward – far from it. They manifest at various levels, as the primary 
research findings presented in the three empirical chapters establish. These include: 
i) interactions of wider institutional and policy environment with rural households’ 
food security status and migration decisions; ii) the effects of migrants’ remittances 
on household food security and inter-household differences among migrant and 
non-migrant households in income, assets and food security; and iii) within-
household dynamics of migration and food security. 
The primary research findings from the rural hinterlands of Bihar provide important 
insights of national and international significance that need attention. Therefore, in 
this final Chapter, I bring together the main insights of this research, identify the key 
findings that may have wider policy significance, and comment on the direction of 
future research. As a way of introduction, I first revisit the main research premise 
and rationale, and also summarise the narratives told in the previous chapters.  
Returning to the beginning 
In the brief ‘research synopsis’ presented at the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 1), 
I asked what role does internal migration play as a livelihood strategy in influencing 
food security outcomes among rural households in India. The broad rationale for 
this research is provided by the disconnect that currently exists in the academic and 
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policy discussions on migration and food security. Migration has become a key 
component of livelihood strategies for an increasing number of rural households 
across the developing world. During the recent years, academics and prominent 
global policy-making bodies have increasingly argued about the need to integrate 
migration in the future development agenda (DFID, 2007; IOM, 2013c; UNDP, 2009; 
World Bank, 2009). And, despite food insecurity being a growing global concern, 
barring a few notable exceptions (Crush, 2013; Zezza et al., 2011), there appears to 
be virtually no discussion on the potential role migration plays in allowing rural 
households’ to meet their food security needs. In part this neglect emanates from 
invariably more focus devoted in recent development policy and research practice 
to international migration and remittances, and consequently, the discussions have 
tended to center around their wider development impacts (Crush, 2013). At the 
level of food policy, the tendency to treat rural households as homogenous groups 
engaged in farming is also an important reason for this disregard. Using a case-study 
approach, involving interviews with a strategically selected and statistically 
representative sample of 392 rural households belonging to the high outmigration 
district of Siwan in western Bihar, India, in this thesis I have sought to contextualise 
this less-investigated relationship.  
In alignment with the main objective of this research, the previous eight chapters 
have been developed with a view to generating a holistic understanding of the links 
between migration and food security. To briefly recap, Chapter 1 established the 
global significance of India as an appropriate research setting to study this 
relationship. Despite the abundant food availability at the national level and rapid 
increase in nation’s overall wealth following the economic reforms, chronic food 
insecurity and hunger remains pervasive, the burden of which is disproportionately 
shared by country’s rural masses. Looking through the headline national statistics 
on agricultural production and economic growth in India, it clearly emerges that the 
issue of food insecurity in India is intimately related to the wider set of livelihood 
circumstances of country’s food insecure populations (Pritchard et al., 2014). In 
turn, this necessitates an understanding of those livelihood contexts. More recent 
evidence points to growing significance of migration, particularly to urban areas, in 
the rural livelihood systems in India (Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; Deshingkar & 
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Anderson, 2004; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005; 
Deshingkar & Start, 2003). However, pre-existing research on whether and how 
migration influences household food security in India is virtually non-existent.  
Chapter 2 contextualised the links between migration and food security in a broader 
context. I argued that the relationship between migration and food security is best 
understood through the prisms of “entitlement” and “livelihoods”. These provide 
people-centered perspectives on how and why differently placed individuals and 
households choose the means and (livelihood) strategies they do (Chambers & 
Convoy, 1991; Scoones, 1998; Sen, 1981b) and how, in turn, they connect people 
with food in their plate (or lack thereof). With a focus on migration as a livelihood 
strategy, I highlighted the potential pathways of linkages between migration and 
food security that deserve empirical scrutiny. 
Chapter 3 set the scene for the field-based evidence by addressing the broad 
dynamics of food insecurity, migration and urbanisation in India. In this Chapter, I 
assessed India’s progress on MDG goal on hunger and undernourishment, and 
discussed their various socio-spatial dimensions. The Chapter illustrated how the 
perilous performance of India on meeting its MDG goal targets is, in many ways, 
intimately related to failure of economic growth to strengthen the food 
entitlements of disadvantaged population groups. As discussed in the Chapter, the 
problem of food insecurity in India is predominantly rural in nature. Moreover, 
rising demographic pressures on land, expressed through progressive reductions in 
the average landholding sizes in rural areas, are weakening the capacity of land-
based livelihoods to allow the rural households to meet their income and food 
needs. The evaluation of these trends in the India’s economic and employment 
landscape suggests non-farm, non-local, urban incomes are becoming increasingly 
crucial for rural households’ incomes and food security.  
These broad national-level trends, however, need contextualising in their place-
based settings. In order to understand how these macro-level changes are shaping 
rural households’ livelihood pathways (migration decisions in particular) and food 
security at the local level, this thesis has focused on 392 rural households residing in 
10 villages in the Siwan district in western Bihar. In Chapter 4, I provided a detailed 
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description of the key strategic and statistical considerations that informed the 
selection of Siwan district, villages with the district and households within the 
villages. It is important to reiterate that rural livelihoods in Siwan (and Bihar more 
generally) have traditionally involved a frequent engagement of rural households in 
distant labour markets, and food (in)security has often acted as one of the critical 
drivers of migration, considerations that crucially informed the selection of Siwan.   
Chapter 5 has dealt with these issues in greater detail. I have showed that for over 
200 years, Bihar has remained a “geography of deprivation” on the Indian map of 
development. While much of the rural outmigration from Bihar has been, and 
continues to be, distress-induced, income-pull factors have also been, and are 
becoming increasingly more, significant. With a focus on Siwan, and the western 
region of Bihar more generally, I have showed that mobility has been more much 
pronounced than often assumed, and both push-pull factors have been equally 
significant. Indeed, migration has become an integral feature of local livelihoods. A 
close examination of the colonial records and district gazetteers points to a “culture 
of migration” from Siwan (Gupta, 1923; O'Malley, 1930; Yang, 1979, 1989) which 
contrasts with the “static peasant” image that has dominantly been used in 
academic and policy discourses to characterise the rural populations of the 
developing countries. Strikingly, however, core dimensions of mobility from Siwan 
have been highly static over the years. These include, i) circular migration, and ii) 
male-dominated pattern of mobility. These patterns notwithstanding, my fieldwork 
suggests that in recent years the importance of migration among Siwani dwellers 
has increased, and migration is also occurring for longer duration, which, in turn, 
has increased the importance of remittances for household food security.  
Following on, the next three chapters provided empirical insights on the three key 
conceptual pathways of linkages between migration and food security, as set out in 
Chapter 2, namely, i) interactions of institutional arrangements with rural 
households’ food entitlements and migration decisions; ii) role of migrants’ 
remittances in influencing food security at the origin; and iii) given the male-
dominated migration, the effects of gender on household food security.  
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Focusing on first of these pathways, in Chapter 6, I assessed the three important 
food-based safety nets of PDS, NREGS and ICDS in their grounded contexts in order 
to understand whether and how these institutional arrangements relate to rural 
households’ food security status and their migration decisions. Following the 
election of new state government in 2005, and the governance reforms initiated by 
the new Chief Minister, important initiatives have been taken to improve the 
government-run food-based safety nets. That there is a political will to change the 
status quo cannot be denied, and indeed, deserves much appreciation. At the same 
time, assessment of these schemes points to widespread institutional failures. 
These programmes remain plagued with massive corruption and maladministration 
which, as things stand, have not meaningfully improved the food entitlements of 
rural populations of the state. Given the high incidence of poverty and general lack 
of gainful employment opportunities all-year round in the case-study villages, the 
widespread operational inefficiencies in these schemes mean that they do not 
provide an effective substitute to migration. It is in these contexts that (inter-state) 
labour migration remains an important strategy of rural Siwani households to meet 
their income and food needs.  
Chapter 7 then examined the role of migration and remittances in household food 
security in Siwan. The discussion pointed out that sub-economical landholding and 
lack of adequate employment in the local non-farm sector means that remittances 
now form a significant component of rural migrants’ household overall income 
portfolios. At the same time, precarious nature of urban informal jobs, migrants’ 
attachment to origin villages, and socio-cultural norms have prohibited permanent 
mobility. Thus, the nature of migration involves circular moves. In turn, from the 
perspective of food security of origin members, circular migration has created 
complex rural-urban linkages. To most households, migrants’ remittances provided 
the cash income to buy food. In other cases, sending of a member in the city 
prevented the households to slide down to a state of absolute landlessness. A few 
households were able to also increase their landholdings over the period from the 
savings accumulated from the urban incomes. Moreover, those households with 
relatively large landholdings, and with more members working in the cities, invested 
their remittances in own-account agriculture and were able to derive better income 
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gains from land and agriculture. While the usage of remittances varied depending 
on the background circumstances of the households, its positive impact on food 
security of members at the origin were highly discernable. Households that had one 
or more migrant members were invariably more food secure than those without 
migrants, though the incidence of poverty and food insecurity across the survey 
sample was high still. The primary evidence suggests that without access to 
remittances, the income and food security of most households would have been 
even worse, and for some households migration encouraged an upward spiral of 
land acquisition and livelihood enhancement.  
Chapter 8 finally took the debate on these issues within the household itself. The 
Chapter showed that migration of men has created the space for women to 
participate more proactively in household decision-making when their husbands are 
not around, and improved their autonomy. In terms of food security, in households 
where women received adequate and regular remittances and controlled them, 
food expenditure was generally higher compared to households where women had 
less autonomy. However, despite this, women-headed households did not have 
better food security status as compared to households headed by men, a finding 
which points to the added disadvantage that comes from being a woman in a 
patriarchal setting such as Siwan. Indeed, while their men were away, women faced 
numerous challenges in accessing the government food-based safety nets. Male 
migration has also brought significant hardship for women, and those who did not 
receive adequate remittances fared even worse as, in addition to the domestic 
duties, they also had to find work and employment to make ends meet. 
Additionally, migration incomes are also leading to disputes over cash within the 
families, with the resultant effect being evidenced in the breaking up of joint 
households into nuclear units. Importantly, it is the left-behind wives of migrants 
who are increasingly seeking to stake claims on their migrant husband’s earnings. 
This is reflective of women exercising their agency. At the same time, this also 
means erosion of traditional support for the left-behind women which, given the 
generally high incidence of poverty, is not necessarily a healthy development. In 
overall terms, the positive effects of gender on household food security are highly 
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contingent on the flow of migrants’ remittances, and their interaction with 
household arrangements. 
Key findings, policy relevance and future research  
The empirical findings of this research point to a number of issues of broad policy 
significance. Below I identify five of these.     
First, attention needs to be given to the empirical insights of this research on how 
institutional arrangements on social protection relate to household food security 
and migration. The survey data from the villages in western Bihar shows that 
although households’ decisions to migrate were not always guided by their inability 
to access social protection, it nonetheless aggravated their vulnerability further to 
food insecurity. It is important to emphasise that the issue of food-based safety nets 
is of contemporary significance in India. As noted in Chapter 1, in 2013 the 
Government of India passed the right to food legislation (NFSA 2013) to address the 
problem of chronic food insecurity among the poor and vulnerable populations. One 
of most important features of the NFSA is that it establishes a constitutional right of 
67 percent of country’s population to subsidised food through the existing PDS. 
However, the past history of leakages in PDS means that different Indian states are 
experimenting in various ways to improve its operational efficiency. Indeed, some 
influential commentators in India have argued that efficiency gains would be 
optimised if the PDS was replaced with coupons and cash transfers (Basu, 2011; 
Gangopadhyay, Lensink, & Yadav, 2013; Kotwal, Ramaswami, & Murugkar, 2011). In 
these contexts, this study has assessed the coupon reforms in the context of Bihar. 
As the discussion in Chapter 6 has highlighted, a rather confounding finding that 
emerges from the survey data is that incidence of pilferage in foodgrains is higher 
than the kerosene despite the fact that latter is more profitable item to pilfer. An 
important difference is that while the subsidised foodgrains are only available to 
BPL and Antyodaya households, the kerosene is available to all households. These 
difference suggests that a perhaps the universality of the latter helps induce a local 
politics of the PDS in which there is a less scope to suppress rights of the 
disadvantaged populations. In recent debates around the NFSA, Drèze and Sen 
(2011), drawing from the Tamil Nadu case, argued that universality in PDS 
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entitlements, despite its obvious higher initial costs, ultimately generated budgetary 
and public efficiencies because of its role in eliminating the potential for inclusion 
and exclusion errors. The evidence in this study reinforces these arguments by 
calling attention to the capacity for universality to help instigate a local politics in 
which improved PDS delivery is an issue of common concern across class and caste 
constituencies. The improved PDS, and indeed, all food-based safety nets, can act as 
effective supplements, if not substitutes to migration, in supporting the local 
livelihood systems over the long run and vulnerable households’ efforts to improve 
their lot.  
Second, it is clear that further decreasing returns from land-based livelihoods are 
leading to remittances becoming increasing crucial to rural households’ income 
portfolios. As noted in Chapter 3, the estimates derived from India’s large-scale 
National Sample Survey by Tumbe (2011) show that between 1993 and 2007-08, 
rural households’ dependency on remittances has grown considerably in the 
country. In terms of impact of remittances on food security, the evidence presented 
in Chapter 7 clearly shows that migrants’ remittances had a generally positive 
impact on the food security of the household members in Siwan. Indeed, the food 
security of surveyed migrant households was highly dependent on remittances from 
the migrant members. Remittances equipped most households with the purchasing 
power to source food needs from the markets. Across the different categories of 
land size, assets, caste and class, the households with migrant members had 
invariably better food security and food diversity outcomes than the non-migrant 
households. This finding is further corroborated by a recent World Bank’s study in 
rural Bangladesh that found remittances to be significant predictor of rural 
household food security (World Bank, 2015). Indeed, in the wake of recent evidence 
on rising levels of rural outmigration in many developing countries (Deshingkar & 
Grimm, 2005), these findings suggest that the aim of the development policy must 
be to recognise that remittances can, and indeed do, play a potentially important 
role in improving the food access among vulnerable rural households.   
Third, beyond the immediate impact of remittances in providing cash to rural 
households to meet their food needs, the evidence in this study also suggests that 
they allowed several rural households to invest in land and agriculture at their 
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places of origin.  Seen this way, the relationship between migration and landholding 
was mutually reinforcing. Remittances allowed the households to maintain, and in a 
few cases improve, their landholdings at the place of origin, and provided the 
money to pursue farming, with the overall effect being that it strengthened the 
own-production food entitlements of households. Importantly, the rising 
significance of non-local, migration incomes notwithstanding, rural households’ 
attachments with land remain strong. And the precarious jobs in the urban informal 
sector only increased the importance of land in rural lives and most viewed it as a 
long-term safety net. Furthermore, and this is important, higher urban incomes 
were purposely recycled by some households into land and agriculture to derive 
better income gains from farming. The wider significance of these findings is that 
they suggest that the dynamics of rural livelihoods often involve these backward-
forward linkages between farm and non-farm sectors, and in turn, they warrant the 
need for rural livelihood analysis to take into account these linkages rather than 
what the simple thesis of deagrarianisation permits.  
Fourth, the primary research findings also point to the intensification of 
sharecropping arrangements in the study villages in Siwan, which have important 
caste dynamics. Some households, particularly the Forward Caste landlords, are 
increasingly withdrawing from direct farming and leasing out land to the landless 
and land-poor families, particularly belonging to the historically disadvantaged 
communities of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. These have important 
implications for the food security of the latter groups. The field evidence suggest 
that although their access to land remains precarious and sharecropping 
arrangements are exploitative, it nonetheless provides these vulnerable rural 
households important supplementary means to meet part of their food needs. 
Moreover, these arrangements have particular relevance in the wake of high food 
price inflation that has characterised the global food system in the recent past. 
There is ample evidence in the survey and related fieldwork that sharecropping 
farming reduced, in a relative sense, the landless and land-poor households’ 
dependence on market purchases on food and, in turn, their vulnerability to food 
shocks. However, because the average size of land leased in was small for most 
households, they needed additional supplementary income streams. These findings 
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call for more research on these dynamics, particularly in rural settings with similar 
land and caste dynamics but where the landholdings are relatively bigger in size (eg. 
other rural regions in India and Nepal) in order to evaluate the bearing of these 
arrangements on disadvantaged rural populations’ food security.  
The fifth key finding pertains to mediating effects of gender on household food 
security. The stronghold of traditional gender norms that place restrictions on the 
mobility of women in many parts of India, and, indeed, in much of South Asia, 
means that migration is predominantly undertaken by men while women stay 
behind to look after the family and resources. This phenomenon of left-behind 
women has important implications for household food security. The evidence 
presented in this study demonstrates migration of men has significantly 
transformed gender relations, and contributed to increased presence of women 
both within and outside the household. In the absence of men, women are now 
proactively participating in household affairs, including controlling the household 
finances. While the evidence suggests that women prioritise expenses on food and 
improved female autonomy is associated with increased household food 
expenditure, the widespread gender discrimination means that the positive effects 
of increased women autonomy are not fully realised. Indeed, as has been noted in 
Chapter 8, many poor women face an uphill battle to avail the benefits of various 
government welfare programmes, such as the PDS. Importantly, the left-behind 
women are becoming increasing more vocal about wanting to control their 
husband’s earnings. In turn, this is leading to households becoming more 
nuclearised. The effect of this on household food security is not very clear. 
However, given the urban earnings of their husbands are precarious still (significant 
though) and gender discrimination widespread, the erosion of economic and social 
support provided by the joint families will probably have negative implications for 
the food security of left-behind women and their children. More in-depth research 
is needed on this phenomenon.  
As a final set of observations, the relationship between household food security and 
migration will assume much greater significance in the context of climate change. 
Climate change will likely exert further negative effects on the local livelihoods 
because of heightened flood risks and forecasted higher incidence of temperature 
333 
 
spikes which will affect the already fragile farm-dependent livelihoods. In turn, this 
will exacerbate the vulnerability of poor populations to food insecurity.  
Climate change has immediate relevance for the state of Bihar. Within India, Bihar is 
an epicenter of vulnerability to climate change due to its vulnerability to floods 
(Pritchard & Thielemans, 2014). A recent study by Ericksen et al. (2011) that maps 
the hotspots of food insecurity in global tropics finds that Bihar has “high exposure” 
to climate change and “low capacity” to cope with its effects. In these contexts, 
migration will likely emerge as a crucial adaptive strategy of the poor populations of 
Bihar.  
Indeed, the significance of migration-food security relationship in the wake of 
climate change extends beyond Bihar. As Ericksen et al. (2011, p. 7) note: “Reliable 
crop growing days [will] decrease to critical levels, below which cropping might 
become too risky to pursue as a major livelihood strategy in a larger number of 
places across the global tropics, including West Africa, East Africa, and the Indo-
Gangetic Plains.” The climatic stress on farm dependent livelihoods will increase the 
importance of migration within rural livelihood systems. The limited evidence 
available from micro-level studies on the migration-climate nexus also suggests the 
same. For instance, recent studies by Dun (2011, 2014) have investigated the 
relationship between environmental change (flooding or salinisation) and migration 
among rural households engaged in rice farming (Dun, 2011) and shrimp 
aquaculture (Dun, 2014) in the Mekong River delta, Vietnam. The study on flooding 
and migration showed that for those with agriculture dependent livelihoods (rice 
farmers), successive flooding events that lead to repeated destruction of crops was 
found to prompt household members to migrate to urban areas in search of work 
(Dun, 2011). Dun’s (2014) study found that although household migration decisions 
were guided by several factors, declining incomes from shrimp farming combined 
with an inability to grow other types of food due to environmental factors 
(especially soil salinity) resulted in households migrating elsewhere within Vietnam 
in search of alternative incomes. In India, Julich’s (2011) study about villages facing 
drought in eastern state of Orissa showed that household members able to migrate 
for labour would leave their village during times of stress if they were unable to 
receive loans or help from relatives. In the context of changing climate, migration 
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will likely emerge as a crucial food security strategy of the poor populations across 
the developing world. This warrants more research on the trilogy of climate change-
migration-food security.  
These findings warrant the pressing policy need to better integrate migration in 
future food policy research and practice. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1- Methods and materials (Chapter 4)  
Key definitions used 
Household 
This study used the most common definition of household, adopted by Indian 
Census based on the common kitchen. According to Census definition:  
A household is usually a group of persons who normally live together and 
take their meals from a common kitchen unless the exigencies of work 
prevent any of them from doing so. The persons in a household may be 
related or unrelated or a mix of both. However, if a group of unrelated 
persons live in a Census house but do not take their meals from the 
common kitchen, then they will not collectively constitute a household. 
Each such person should be treated as a separate household. The important 
link in finding out whether it is a household or not is a common kitchen” 
     (Registrar General of India, 2011a)  
Migrants and non-migrants households 
A key conceptual issue lies in defining the migrant households. Different criteria 
based on place of birth, place of last residence, reference time period etc. are 
applied in determining the status of individuals as migrants or non-migrants. In 
India, population Census and National Sample Survey are two important sources of 
migration data at the national level. However, there exist marked differences in the 
definition of migrants. The Indian Census provides data on migrants based on place 
of birth and place of last residence. By Census definition, “if the place of birth or 
place of last residence is different from the place of enumeration, a person is 
defined as a migrant. And if the place of birth and place enumeration is the same, 
the person is a non-migrant” (Bhagat, 2005, p. 3, italics in original). On the other 
hand, National Sample Survey adopts the concept of last usual place of residence, 
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which is defined as a place (village/town) where the person had stayed continuously 
for a period of six months or more. Accordingly, a migrant is defined as a person 
who had stayed continuously for at least six months or more in a place 
(village/town) other than the village/town where she/he was enumerated (National 
Sample Survey, 2010, p. 11). Short-term or seasonal migration in India constitutes a 
large chunk of migratory movements and critics point to the under-estimation of 
these flows in the national level migration data collected by both agencies (Breman, 
2010; Deshingkar & Akhter, 2009; Deshingkar & Start, 2003). As a result, the recent 
rounds of National Sample Survey have included questions to capture short-term 
migration. In the 55th round (1999-2000) of the National Sample Survey, the migrant 
was defined as a person who had stayed away from home for 60 days or more 
during the last 365 days for employment reasons. In the 64th round conducted in 
2007-08, this duration was shortened to a period between 30 days to 6 months 
(National Sample Survey, 2001, 2010). The definitional difference between Census 
and National Sample Survey shows that by stipulating the shorter time reference, 
the latter holds advantageous position over the former in capturing the seasonal or 
circular mobility.  
Given the importance of short-term seasonal and circular migration for rural 
households, the 60-day duration criteria seemed pertinent and thus this study 
adopted this criteria to define migrant and non-migrant households. It must 
however be noted that the duration of migration was recorded for each individual 
which not only facilitated the classification of migrants as short-term and long term 
migrants but also helped assess the varying impacts by duration, if any.  
Given this, a migrant household was defined as the one with at least one migrant 
member who has stayed away from his usual place of residence for the period of 60 
days or more during the last 365 days for employment reasons. On the other hand, 
non-migrant household included the one without any member staying away from 
the place of usual residence.  
Defining and measuring household food security  
As noted in Chapter 2, food security is a multidimensional concept that 
encompasses issues of food availability (which refers to the overall food production 
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levels and/or supply side of food), food access (involves the distributional aspects of 
the food produced and is associated with assets or income of the 
individuals/households) and food utilisation (the extent to which food consumed 
converts into the body to allow normal bodily functions). A holistic analysis of food 
security, or insecurity, therefore, requires an appreciation of inter-play of these 
three factors.  
However, the focus of this study is on the access aspect of food. This is because the 
problem of food insecurity is India is not a problem of food production per se but is 
more immediately related to the distributional aspect of food. As for the analysis of 
the food security outcomes in terms of food utilisation, the assessment of this 
component of food security involves assessment through the anthropometric 
measures of weight and height. The collection of these biomarkers renders the 
inquiry a medical nature and thus requires some medical expertise. I neither had 
the technical training nor the means to gather such information. And therefore the 
indicators reported here are mainly the access indicators related to food 
consumption. There are mainly two types of indicators through which household 
food security outcomes were assessed.  
The first is a set of self-reported indicators of “food inadequacy” and “food 
unavailability” at the household level, with the latter expressed in terms of 
strategies employed by households to deal with the situations when the food was 
not available (eg. borrowing money, reducing food consumption). These indicators 
have a reference period of one year i.e. households were asked if at any time during 
the year preceding the survey they faced these situations of food shortages. In 
other words, these indicators presented in the analysis must be interpreted as 
households who reported facing the situation at least once in past one year. 
The second indicator is a composite index of food diversity, with a shorter reference 
period of seven days. The surveyed households were administered a dietary 
diversity calendar that included 46 individual food items, and the responses of 
participant households were recorded on whether or not (“yes” or “no”) they 
consumed each of those items in the past week. The analysis of these items 
suggested that there were 16 food items that had frequencies of 10 households or 
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less. The remaining 30 food items that were analysed and, a composite measure of 
“food diversity index” was computed using the Principal Component Analysis of the 
food items. Depending on the number of food items consumed by the household, 
rank scores were generated and households were divided into three equal rank 
tertiles of low, medium and high (for a complete list of food items on which the 
data was collected, see Part 10 in the Household Survey Questionnaire, attached as 
Appendix 4; and for the list of the 30 items used for computing food diversity index, 
see Appendix 6).  
Additionally, I have also presented data on household food expenditure to measure 
household food security. 
Reference period for the study 
Since the household surveys were conducted during April-May 2012, the reference 
period of 365 days in this study included April 2011 to March 2012. This reference 
period was used not just for defining migrant households but also for many 
variables, such as food production in the last year, total income earned in the last 
year etc.  
Focus of the study 
Internal migration can be analyzed at three broad levels of spatial aggregation that 
includes,  
I. Intra-district migration – movement away from place of birth/usual 
residence within the district  
II. Inter-district migration – migration from one district to another 
within the state 
III. Inter-state migration – movement from one state to another within 
the country 
Since this study looked at rural out-migration, the spatial focus thus was on all the 
flows from rural areas to any other rural or urban regions within or across the state 
boundaries. However, barring a few cases, most of the migration from Siwan was 
from rural to urban areas.  
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Fieldwork challenges  
Although the fieldwork for this study was conducted smoothly, some issues did 
arise during the course of field research at both rural origin and urban destination 
places which deserve mention.  
How to define a migrant household? 
As noted above, this study defined a migrant household as one where “one or more 
members stayed away for work for 60 days or more in the past 365 days”. However, 
given the complex nature of migration there were cases where the application of 
this definition was virtually impossible. For instance, during the field-work in the 
villages in Siwan I came across a household where one of the male members had 
left home five years earlier following an argument with his family. He secretly left 
for Punjab to work there and all this while, he never made any contact with his 
family. After trying hard to locate him, the family had thought that he had perhaps 
died and thus lost hope. Consequently, during the house-listing the household 
registered itself as non-migrant household. However, when I visited the same 
household a month after the listing for the household survey, the member returned 
home to attend his brother’s wedding which he had learned about from a friend in 
the village whom he had called after five years to inquire about his family. 
Moreover, when he returned he did give his family some money from his savings to 
meet marriage expenses. Given that not only the member was back to being the 
part of the household but also contributed economically, the status of the 
household had now changed to that of migrant household. To define such a 
household as either migrant or non-migrant seemed conceptually wrong. Thus, 
households such as this that did not fit into the definitional categories (there were a 
few more) were not surveyed.  
Problem of over response 
An issue that was frequently encountered during the rural surveys was that whereas 
a sample of 40 selected households was drawn for the survey, many other 
households in the study villages seemed to want to participate in the survey. This 
apparent inclination was due to the perception among the households that the 
366 
 
surveyors were government officials and the surveyed families will later be 
rewarded with welfare benefits. This was a dangerous perception with implications 
for the quality of survey data. However, it was clarified that this survey was an 
academic exercise with no links to government benefits whatsoever. In particular, 
sample households were informed wholly the nature and objectives of the survey in 
order to get accurate answers.  
Tracing migrants for interviews  
In the cities (destination places), tracking the migrants for the interviews proved to 
be an onerous task. The mobile numbers of the migrants obtained from their 
families in the villages were the only vital information to track them. However, in 
many instances, the mobile phones of the migrants who had agreed to be 
interviewed in the first call could not be reached. Secondly, most migrants worked 
long hours all seven days a week and thus had difficulties scheduling interviews. 
Hence, only 10 migrants could be interviewed, though these interviews provided 
important insights. 
Ethics approval  
The research methods and procedures reported in this thesis received the approval 
of the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) via the 
protocol number 14348. The HREC’s approval letter is attached as Appendix 7. Note 
that this study was conceptualised in 2011, and the tentative title proposed that 
time was ‘Does Migration Impact Household Food and Nutrition Security Outcomes: 
Empirical Insights from Rural India’. The HREC’s approval letter (and other fieldwork 
documents such as survey questionnaire: Appendix 4) also bears the same project 
title. 
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Appendix 2 – Segmentation form 
Particulars of segmentation 
District Name: SIWAN     Block Name__________________  
  
Village Name_________________  Date (DD/MM/YY) ________________  
 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS CREATED______________ 
 
SEGMEN
T  
NUMBER  
NAME OF SEGMENT 
NUMBER OF  
HOUSEHOLDS  
IN SEGMENT 
CUMULATIVE 
NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS  
SELECTED  
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
 
I (Interval) = (TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE VILLAGE)/2 = __________ 
R (Random start) = _______________ (Use random number table) 
R + I = __________________________ 
 
Serial number (and name) of selected segments:  
 
A:__________________________________ 
                                                                                                                         
     B:__________________________________ 
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Appendix  3 –Household listing form 
District Name: SIWAN   Block Name__________________   Village Name: _________________  Date (DD/MM/YY) 
__________  
Name of the Mapper________________________    Name of the Lister_________________________ 
 
 
   
      ASK ONLY IF 6 = YES  
SERIAL 
NUMBER 
OF 
STRUCTUR
E 
ADDRESS/ 
LOCATION/ 
DESCRIPTION 
OF  
STRUCTURE 
RESIDENC
E 
(YES/NO) 
SERIAL 
NUMBER 
OF 
HOUSEHOL
D IN 
STRUCTUR
E 
NAME OF THE HEAD 
OF HOUSEHOLD 
DOES THIS 
HOUSEHOLD HAVE 
ANY MEMBER WHO 
HAS STAYED AWAY 
FROM THE 
VILLAGE FOR 
MORE THAN 60 
DAYS DURING PAST 
365 DAYS FOR 
EMPLOYMENT 
(YES/NO) 
 
 
HOW MANY MEMBERS 
HAVE STAYED AWAY 
FROM THE VILLAGE 
FOR MORE THAN 60 
DAYS DURING PAST 
365 DAYS FOR 
EMPLOYMENT 
(RECORD NUMBER) 
 
 
WHETHER THE 
HOUSEHOLD MEMBER(S) 
MIGRATED WITHIN THE 
COUNTRY OR OUTSIDE 
THE COUNTRY 
(INTERNAL/INTERNATION
AL) 
OBSERVATIONS 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
FOR OFFICE USE 
WHETHER 
HOUSEHOLD  
IS SELECTED 
FOR 
INTERVIEW  
(Yes/No) 
HOUSEHOLD  
NUMBER 
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Appendix 4 – Survey questionnaires 
 
DOES MIGRATION IMPACT HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES: EMPIRICAL 
INSIGHTS FROM RURAL INDIA 
[PRIMARY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PhD RESEARCH] 
 
  
Questionnaire No.  
CONFIDENTIAL 
For research purposes only 
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Interview Schedule I- Household Questionnaire 
To be administered to the head of the household or any other household member aged 18 years and above who is knowledgeable of the 
household, in the presence of other household members with inputs from all. One schedule to be administered per household. 
INTERVIEW DATE: (YY/MM/DD) 
      
INTERVIEW STATUS 
(Record relevant code, only 
after the interview) 
01 = Completed 
02 = No One at home 
94 = Refused 
96 =Other (Specify________________) 
TIME OF START OF INTERVIEW (Hours:Mins) 
    
 
INTERVIEWER  
 
Name_________________ 
 
Signature ______________ 
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PART 1: IDENTIFICATION PARTICULARS  
    
1.1. District name  
 
SIWAN 
 
 
1.10. Religion of household 
01 = Hindu 
02 = Muslim 
96 =Other (specify____________) 
1.2. Block Name & ID  
 
Name______________ 
ID _______________ 
1.11. Caste/tribe of household 
 (record verbatim) 
01 = Caste_______________ 
02 = Tribe_______________ 
03 = No Caste/Tribe 
98 = Don’t know 
1.3. Village Name and ID  
 
Name_______________
_____ ID 
____________________
__  
1.12. Category of caste/tribe 01 = General 
02 = SC 
03 = ST 
04 = OBC  
05 = Maha Dalit 
94 = Refused to answer 
96=Other (specify____________) 
98 = Don’t know 
 
1.4. Gram Panchayat 
 
____________________
________ 
1.13. Mother tounge of 
household  (record verbatim)  
01 = Hindi 
02 = Bhojpuri 
03 = Urdu  
96 =Other (specify_________) 
 
1.5. Listing number of household 
 
____________________
_____ 
1.14. Type of household  01 = Nuclear 
02 = Joint 
03 = Extended 
96 =Other (specify___________) 
 
1.6. Address of household 
 
 
 
 
 
1.7. Name of head of household    
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PART 2: Individuals in the Household 
 
(Record household members who usually live in the household)  
 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 
ID CODE NAME  RELATION TO HEAD AGE INFANTS SEX MARITAL STATUS  
01   01      
02        
03        
04        
05        
06        
07        
08        
09        
10        
11       
12       
13       
14       
 
Codes 
 
2.2 –  01 =Head   02 =Wife/Husband 03 =Son/Daughter  04 =Son-in-law/Daughter-in-law 05 =Grandchild 
 06 =Parent   07 =Parent-in-law 08 =Brother/Sister  09 =Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law 10 =Niece/Nephew 
 11=Adopted/Foster/Stepchild 12=Domestic servant 96=Other (Specify__________) 
 
2.3 – Age in completed years. 2 digit code, so 1 is “01 =”, if less than 1, write “00”. 
 
2.4 – If 2.3 = ‘00’, then age of infant in complemented months. 
 
2.5 –01 = Male, 02 =Female 
 
2.6 –01 =Never married  02 =Currently married 03 =Widowed 04 =Divorced/Separated 
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Table 2 continued…  
   Ask to only those who are 4 to 25 years Ask to those above 4 years 
 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 
ID 
CODE LITERACY 
YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING  
IS S/HE CURRENTLY STUDYING?  
(If 01 =, Go to 2.11) 
REASONS FOR NOT 
STUDYING 
PRIMARY 
OCCUPATION 
SECONDARY 
OCCUPATION 
01        
02        
03       
04        
05        
06        
07        
08        
09        
10        
11       
12       
13       
14       
Codes – 2.7 – 00 =Illiterate    01=Literate without schooling (Can sign only) 02 =Literate    03 =Child below 4 years of age 
 
2.8 – 00=No education    01 =Primary (up to 5th class)   02 =Middle (from6th to 8th class)  03 = High (9th and 10th class) 
 04 =Higher Secondary (11thand 12th Class) 05 =Graduate    06 =Postgraduate & above   96=Other (Specify)  
 98 ==Don’t know 
 
2.9 – 00=No     01 = Yes  
 
2.10 –  01 =School too far away   02 =Transport not available   03 =Further education not considered necessary    
 04 =Required for household work  05 =Required for work on farm/family business 06 =Required for outside work for payment in cash or materials  
 07 =Cost too much    08 =No proper school facilities for girls  09 =Not safe to send girls      
 10 =Required for care of siblings  11=Not interested in studies   12=Repeated failures      
 13=Got married    14=Employment over education   96= Other (Specify................) 
 
2.11 –  01 =Government employee   02 =Salaried employment in private firm 03 =Own business       
 04 =Unpaid family work   05 =Agricultural labour in own land  06 = Agricultural labourin others land     
 07 =Labour in non-agricultural Sector  08 =Student    09 =Job seeker       
 10 =Pensioner    96=Others(Specify)     
2.12 –  Record codes from 2.11   
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PART 3: HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WHO HAVE STAYED AWAY FOR ‘NON ECONOMIC REASONS’ DURING THE PAST 365 DAYS  
 
(Record members belonging to the family who have lived elsewhere for reasons other than employment such as studies, health care etc.) 
 3.1. 3.2. 3.3 3.4 3.5 
ID CODE NAME  RELATION TO HEAD AGE SEX MARITAL STATUS 
01      
02      
03      
04      
05      
 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 
ID CODE LITERACY YEARS OF SCHOOLING CURRENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE 
DURATION OF STAY AT CURRENT PLACE 
OF RESIDENCE IN PAST 365 DAYS MIGRATION REASON  
   Village/City State   
01     _____Years _____Months  
02     _____Years _____Months  
03     _____Years _____Months  
04     _____Years _____Months  
05     _____Years _____Months  
Codes  - 3.2. –   
(Only include direct descendents of head of household (sons, daughters, grandsons, granddaughters; daughter-in-law, etc.) 
01=Wife/Husband 02=Son/Daughter   03=Grandson/Granddaughter 04=Daughter-in-law  05=Parent   96=Other (Specify) 
3.3 – Age in completed years. 2 digit code, so 1 year is “01”, if less than 1, write “00”. 
3.4 – 01= Male    02 = Female 
3.5 – 01=Never married  02=Currently married    03=Widowed   04=Divorced/separated 
3.6 –  00 =Illiterate   01=Literate without schooling (Can sign only) 02 =Literate   03 =Child below 4 years of age 
3.7 – 00=No education   01=Primary (up to 5th class) 02=Middle (from 6th to 8th class) 03 = High (9th and 10th class)  
 04=Higher Sec (11thand 12thClass) 05=Graduate   06=Postgraduate & above  
 96=Other (Specify)  98=Don’t know 
3.8 –  Record verbatim and write both, village/city and state  3.9 –  Record verbatim. 
3.10 –  01= Education   02 = Health care  96=Other (Specify)  
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PART 4: SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
 
4.1 Type of house which the household is now 
occupying? Interviewer should fill this by 
observing the house himself. 
 
Kutcha (Mud walls, mud floor & thatched roof) 
Semi-Pucca (Brick walls, cement floor, tin or 
asbestos roof) 
Pucca (Brick walls, cement floor & roof) 
 
 
 
 
01 = Kutcha 
02 = Semi-Pucca 
03 = Pucca 
 
 
4.2 
 
The house in which you are presently living, is this 
your own house, someone else or rented?  
If rented, how much rent per month do you pay? 
 
01 = Own 
02 = Someone else 
 
03 = Rent (Rs._______) 
 
 
4.3 Does any member of this household own any other 
house here or anywhere else?  
00 = No 
01 = Yes 
 
4.4 Can you please tell me, in total how many rooms 
including kitchen are there in this house? 
 
Number________ 
 
 
4.5 Do you have separate room for cooking in your 
house? 
00 =No 
01= Yes 
 
4.6 What is the main source of lighting in your house?  
 
01 = Electricity 
02 = LPG  
03 = Kerosene Laltain 
04 = Gas Laltain 
05 = Solar Energy  
96 = Others (_______) 
                               Specify 
4. 7 What type of fuel is used for 
cooking?  
 
01 = LPG 
02 = Coal/Charcoal 
03 = Kerosene 
04 = Wood 
05 = Dung Cakes 
06 = Crop Residue 
96 = Others (_________) 
                        Specify 
 
4.8 
 
What is the main source of drinking 
water in your house?  
 
 
01 = Handpump (Own)      Go to 4.10 
02 = Handpump (Shared) 
03 = Handpump (Public) 
04 = Well 
96 = Others (_________) 
                         Specify 
 
4.9 
 
What is the distance between your 
house and source of drinking water?  
 
Km_________ 
4.10 
 
How deep is the owned handpump 
dug up in the ground? 
Feet_________ 
 
4.11  
 
What is the type of toilet facility do 
you use?  
 
01 = Own flush toilet 
02 = Own pit toilet 
03 = Shared toilet 
04 = Open air defecation 
96 = Others (_________) 
                         Specify 
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PART 5: AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES 
5.1. Did any members of the household own or cultivate crops on any land in the past one year (Not including a ‘kitchen garden’)? 
   00 = No  01 = Yes 
(if ‘00’, go directly to 5.10) 
 
Q. 
No. All information below relates to the past 365 days 
Cultivated 
(In Kattha) 
Fallow  
(In Kattha) 
5.2 What is the total agricultural land that members of the household own (including the land leased out)? 
  
5.3 Out of this total agricultural land, how much was leased out? (If ‘none’, write NA)   
5.4 What is the total agricultural land leased in? (If ‘none’, write NA)   
5.5 What is the area of your cultivated land (owned and leased in) that is irrigated?   
5.6 List the crops grown, costs incurred, amount of crop used for household consumption, amount of crop sold and total amount received from sale of crops 
  Ask only if Column 4 is less than Column 3, otherwise leave blank 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6  
 5 Major Crops 
Input cost 
(Seeds, fertilizer, wages etc.)  
(In Rs.) 
Total production 
(In Quintal) 
 
Amount of crop used 
for HH consumption 
(In Quintal) 
Amount of crop sold 
(In Quintal) 
Total Amount 
received from sale 
of crop  
(In Rs.) 
5.6a       
5.6b       
5.6c       
5.6d       
5.6e       
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5.7. Had there been a shift in the crops grown in the last 5 years?  
   00 = No  01 = Yes  
 (if 00, go directly to 5.9) 
 
5.8. Has any decision to change the crops grown been motivated by any 
of the following Government Policies?  
    00 = No 
 01 = Yes 
Elaboration 
5.8a Change in Minimum Support 
Price 
  
5.8b Subsidies for seeds, tractors, 
electricity 
  
5.8c. Extension services  
(credit, insurance, market) 
  
5.8d. Loan waivers   
5.8e. Other (specify)___________   
 
5.9 Does this household own any of the following farm assets? 
5.10 Does this household own any livestock such as cows, buffaloes,  
goats, chicken etc.? 
              00 = No 01 =Yes      
              (If ‘00’, go directly to Part 6) 
If ‘yes’, list the Livestock owned by the household 
 Livestock 00 = No 01 = Yes 
If yes, number of 
animals 
5.10a Cows   
5.10b Buffaloes   
5.10c Goats   
5.10d Sheep   
5.10e Chicken/Ducks   
5.10f Any other________ (Specify) 
  
5.11 Did you sell any livestock products in the past 365 days? 
 00 = No 01 =Yes            
             (If ‘00’, go directly to 5.13) 
5.12 How much money did you make selling livestock 
products such as milk, eggs, chicken and livestock in 
the past 365 days? 
             5.12a Milk and eggs    (Rs._____________) 
5.12b. Chicken and other livestock  (Rs._____________) 
5.12c. Any other_________                  (Rs._____________) 
                                        (Specify) 
5.13 What was the money value of feeding and maintaining the animals 
(includes, value of both, home grown and purchased grains, crop residue 
etc.)                   (Rs._______)
  
00 = No 
01 = Yes 
Number 
(If 01 =, record 
number) 
5.9a Tractor   
5.9b Ploughing implements   
5.9c Cart   
5.9d Thresher   
5.9e Fodder cutting machine   
5.9f Generator/Pump for 
irrigation   
5.9g Other (specify)_________   
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PART 6: HOUSEHOLD CASH INCOME  
(Income from farm, non-farm, government schemes and migration to be recorded) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Q. No. Source of Income  
During the last 365 days, did the 
household receive income from this 
source? 
How much? 
(In Rs.) 
How Important was 
this source for 
household livelihood? 
6.1 Family-owned enterprises   
 
6.1a Farm – sale of crops (including horticulture)   
6.1b Farm – Sale of milk, eggs, livestock   
6.1c Fishing   
6.1d Non-agri enterprise shop, tailoretc   
6.2 Wage income   
 6.2a From agri employment   6.2b From non-agri employment: salaried   
6.2c From non-agri employment: casual labour   
6.3 Other sources   
 
6.3a Remittances from family elsewhere   
6.3b Rent   
6.3c 
Monetary benefits from social protection  
schemes (example, Indira Awaas, Old-
age/widow pension/educational scholarships for 
girl-child/SC/ST children) 
 
 
6.3d Pensions (retirement benefits)   
6.3e NTFB (non-timber forest produce)   
6.3f Other (specify)   
Total Household Income (6.1+6.2+6.3) = Rs______________________ (Interviewer to sum and record)  
Column 2: 00 = No  01 = Yes  94 == Refused to answer  98 ==Don’t know 
Column 4: 01 = Most important  02 =Supplementary   03 = Minor   04 =Not received 
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PART 7: HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE  
What is the money value of the amount purchased or received in-kind by your household for the following food and non-food items? 
S. No. Items Money spent (In Rs.) 
Last 30 days Last 365 days 
7.1 Food items (includes cereals, vegetables, pulses, fruits, milk, eggs, chicken, mutton, fish, cooking oil, dry fruits, tea, coffee, sugar, spices etc.)   
7.2 Fuel and Light (includes electricity, wood, cow dung cakes, kerosene oil, coal/charcoal, cylinder gas, matches, candles, lighters, lanterns etc.)   
7.3 Personal care and toilet articles & other sundry articles (include spectacles, torch, umbrella, lighter, toothpaste, brush, powder, washing soap, hair oil, shampoo, perfume, shaving blade, electric bulb, tube light, glassware, bucket, agarbatti (incense) and insecticide etc)   
7.4 Consumer services (includes grinding, tailoring, pet animal porter charges, wages paid to servants, mali, chowkidar and other similar expenses)   
7.5 Transportation(includes diesel and petrol in own vehicle(s), school bus/van fare, train/bus fare, taxi charges and other similar expenses)   
7.6 Entertainment and recreation (includes cinema, picnic, sports, club fees, video cassettes, cable charges etc.)   
7.7 Newspapers and books   
7.8 Rent (includes house rent and rent for agricultural land as well as water charges)   
7.9 Medical Expenses (non-institutional) (include cost of medicines, doctors fee, diagnostic fee etc.)   
7.10 Any Other (Specify___________________________)   
7.11 Sub-total (item 7.1 to 7.10)   
7.12 Medical (institutional)   
7.13 Clothing, bedding and foot wear   
7.14 Durable goods (include expenses for purchase of utensils, fan, cooker, furniture item & similar HH durables)   
7.15 Remittances sent to other households / individuals   
7.16 Litigation and legal expenses   
7.17 Religious expenses (money spent on any religious ceremony)   
7.18 Social expenses (weddings, deaths, rites)   
7.19 Education of family members   
7.20 Taxes (house tax, tax on agricultural land etc.)   
7.21 Sub-total (item 7.12 to 7.20)   
7.22 Average monthly expenditure for items 7.12 to 7.20 = [7.21 X (30/365)]   
7.23 Monthly household consumer expenditure (7.11 +7.22)   
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PART 8: HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND ASSETS
8.1 Does household have a bank account or post office account? 
 00 = No          01 = Yes                                (If no, Go to 8.3) 
 
 
8.2 By whose name does the household have bank/post office account?  
     (Write the relation of the person to the household head) 
 
RECORD ALL MENTIONED 
 
 Name______________________ Relation to Head _________ 
 
 Name______________________Relation to Head _________ 
 
Codes for Relation in 8.2  
01 =Wife/Husband  02 =Son/Daughter 03 =Grandson/Granddaughter 
04 =Daughter-in-law  05 =Parent   96=Other (Specify) 
 
8.3 Does household have taken loan from any source?  (Probe: whether loan taken from SHG) 
 00 = No          01 = Yes                                 (If no, Go to 8.4)  
 
 (8.3.a) (8.3.b) (8.3.c) (8.3.d) (8.3.e) 
S. No. Nature of loan  
Source 
 
Purpose 
 
Loan paid 
00=No  
01=Yes 
If 8.3.d = “00” then ask: Amount 
outstanding including interest on date 
of survey 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
8.3.a Nature of loan – 01 =Hereditary loan   02 =Loan contracted in cash  03 =Loan contracted in kind  04=Loan contracted partly in cash and partly in kind   
96 = Others (Specify) 
8.3.b Source –  01 =Co-operative society 02 =Bank    03 =-Employer/landlord  04=Agriculture/professional money lender 05 =Shop-keeper/trader  
06 =Relatives/friends   07 =Private money lender  96 = Others (Specify) 
8.3.c Purpose –  01 = For food   02 = Medical expenses  03 = Educational expenses  04 = Legal expenses   05 = Other consumption expenses  
06 = Marriage and other ceremonial expenses  07 = Purchase of land/construction of building  08 = Productive purpose  09 = Repayment of debt  
 10 = Agricultural purpose  96 = Others (Specify) 
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8.4 Does the household own the following household asset?  
 
 
S. No. Household assets No = 00 Yes = 01 If yes, record number 
    
8.4.a Motor Car   
8.4.b Taxi/Truck/Lorry   
8.4.c Motor cycle/Scooter   
8.4.d Cycle   
8.4.e Telephone/Mobile   
8.4.f Sewing Machine   
8.4.g Television   
8.4.h MP3/DVD/CD   
8.4.i Refrigerator   
8.4.j Computer/Laptop   
8.4.k Sofa Set   
8.4.l Mattress   
8.4.m Table   
8.4.n Chair   
8.4.o Cot/Bed/Khatia   
8.4.p Clock/Watch   
8.4.q Electric Fan   
8.4.r Dish Antenna   
8.4.s Radio/Transistor/Tape   
8.4.t Camera   
8.4.u Heater   
8.4.v Other______________              (Specify)   
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PART 9: HOUSEHOLD SAVING AND INVESTMENT 
 
9.1: Household Savings 
S.No Particulars Household savings 
If yes, amount saved 
(In Rs.) 
00 = No    01 = Yes Last month Last year 
9.1a Saving account in bank    
9.1b Fixed deposits (FD)    
9.1c SHGs    
9.1d PF installment, LIC premium etc    
9.1e Post office account    
9.1f Kisanpatra    
9.1g Others (Specify_____________)    
9.1h All savings (Total 9.1a to 9.1g)    
 
9.2: Investments during last 2 years  
S.No Particulars 
Investment during last 
two years 
If yes, amount 
invested 
(In Rs.) 00 = No      01 = Yes 
9.2a. Land (For agricultural purpose)   
9.2b House (land purchase, construction, renovation etc.)   
9.2c Other construction (gaushala etc.)   
9.2d Small enterprise   
9.2e Shares, debentures etc   
9.2f Car/Scooter/Taxi etc   
9.2g Others (Specify______________________)   
9.2h All Investments (Total 9.1a to 9.1h)   
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PART I0: FOOD SECURITY  
 
 
How have food prices changed in the past 12 
months for the items described below: 
 
10.1 Items in the PDS store 
 
 Items Code 
10.1a Rice  
10.1b Wheat  
10.1c Kerosene  
10.1d Other_________________  
                    (Specify) 
 
 
 
 
10.2. Rice, wheat, atta and pulses in local shops or the  
local market 
 
 
10.3. Eggs, milk, ghee and meat in local shops or the  
local market 
 
10.4. Fruits and vegetables in local shops or the local market 
 
Codes for 10.1.to 10.4. 
01 = Increased a lot   02 = Increased a little  
03 = Stayed about the same  04 = Decreased 
98 = Don’t know/ no opinion 
 
 
10.5. Interviewer to ask for specific details (example, onions, channa etc.) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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10.6 During the past one month, describe the regularity of eating, for each household member 
ID CODE HH MEMBER 
(This must be according to the 
individual information collected in 
HH roaster in Part 2)  
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
ATE THREE 
MEALS/DAY 
EVERDAY 
ON SOME DAYS, ONLY 
ATE TWO MEALS/DAY 
ON MOST DAYS, ONLY 
ATE TWO MEALS/DAY 
ON SOME DAYS, ATE 
LESS THAN TWO 
MEALS/DAY 
01     
02     
03     
04     
05     
06     
07     
08     
09     
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
From column 1 to column 4, record either of the following codes:  
00 = No  01 = Yes 
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At any time during the last 12 months did any of the following 
situations apply to your household: 
 
10.7. Food was not enough, defined as any of the following situations: 
         (Fill relevant code in the box for each of the questions below) 
          
10.7a.Household ate meals without vegetables 
10.7b.They could only afford to consume food 
from the Public Distribution outlet (PDS) 
   
10.7c.If they consumed only a single meal in a day 
10.7d.If all three main food categories (cereal, 
pulses and vegetables) were not available 
 
10.7e.If everybody got less than the amount to 
satiate their hunger 
 
10.8. Food was not available (“there was a need to borrow money to 
buy food or to mortgage land or jewelry or to ask friends or neighbours 
or for some members of the household to migrate out of the village or 
household reduced food consumption”) 
 
Fill relevant code in the box 
10.9 If answering ‘yes’ to either questions 10.7 and 10.8, which of the 
following actions were taken (Record more than one, if appropriate): 
 
10.9a.Borrowed money from friends or family 
10.9b.Borrowed money from local traders, money  
lenders or a shop 
10.9c.Borrowed money from a Self Help Group 
10.9d.Mortgaged land 
10.9e.Sold jewelry or other personal assets 
10.9f.Someone in the household migrated out of the village 
10.9g.Accessed grain banks 
10.9h.HH members consumed less food than usual   
10.9i.Any other (specify_____________________) 
10.10 If answered ‘yes’ for any of the questions above (from 
10.9a. to 10.9i, list up to 3 most important actions taken by the 
household in order of their importance) 
(Record the codes from 10.9a. to 10.9i)
 
  
 
Codes for 10.7, 10.8 and 10.9 – 00=No   01=Yes  98=Don’t know 
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10.11.Yearly calendar of food security 
For households answering ‘yes’ to either 10.7 or 10.8, please nominate the periods this occurred (tick the relevant months). 
 
  Apr 
2012 
Mar 
2012 
Feb 
2012 
Jan 
2012 
Dec 
2011 
Nov 
2011 
Oct 
2011 
Sep 
2011 
Aug 
2011 
Jul 
2011 
Jun 
2011 
May 
2011  
10.11a Food was not enough   
           
10.11b Food was not available   
           
10.11c 
Which months did your 
household consume food 
grown from your farm or 
kitchen garden? 
            
10.11d 
Which months did any 
member of your 
household consume food 
procured from the PDS? 
            
10.11e 
Which months did any 
member of your 
household consume food 
procured from the ICDS? 
            
10.11f 
Which months did any 
person in this household 
obtain work through 
NREGA? 
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10.12: Household Food Diversity Calendar 
 
10.12a 10.12b 10.12c 10.12d 10.12e 10.12f 
Have you consumed this food 
during the past week? 
(If ‘yes’, answer Q 10.12b to 
10.12f) 
 
In the past week, 
how often was 
this food eaten? 
HOME PRODUCTION 
 
In the past week, how 
much of this food did 
your household consume? 
FOOD PURCHASES 
FROM SHOPS OR 
MARKETS 
In the past week, how 
much of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM PUBLIC 
DISTRIBUTION 
SERVICE 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM OTHER 
SOURCES 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
 00 = NO 01 = YES  QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES 
Cereals           
Rice           
Wheat           
Corn            
Any other cereal           
Pulses/legumes           
Channa           
Lentils           
Pigeon peas           
Black gram           
Green gram           
Bengal gram           
Cowpeas           
Toordal           
Arhardal           
Urad dal           
Masoor Dal           
Other (specify)           
Codes for 10.12b: 01 = Daily 02 =Thrice a week 03 = Twice a week 04 = Once in four/five days 05 = Weekly   
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Table, continued 
10.12a 10.12b 10.12c 10.12d 10.12e 10.12f 
Have you consumed this food 
during the past week? 
(If ‘yes’, answer Q 10.12b to 
10.12f) 
In the past week, 
how often was 
this food eaten? 
HOME PRODUCTION 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD PURCHASES 
FROM SHOPS OR 
MARKETS 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM PUBLIC 
DISTRIBUTION 
SERVICE 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM OTHER 
SOURCES 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
 00 = NO 01 = YES  QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES 
Vegetables           
Onion           
Garlic           
Chilli           
Tomatoes           
Gourds 
(Bitter, Ash, 
Melon) 
          
Drumstick           
Lady finger           
Carrot           
Spinach           
Green beans           
Potato           
Any other           
Codes for 10.12b: 01 = Daily 02 =Thrice a week 03 = Twice a week 04 = Once in four/five days 05 = Weekly  
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Table, continued 
10.12a 10.12b 10.12c 10.12d 10.12e 10.12f 
Have you consumed this food 
during the past week? 
(If ‘yes’, answer Q 10.12b to 
10.12f) 
In the past 
week, how 
often was this 
food eaten? 
HOME PRODUCTION 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD PURCHASES 
FROM SHOPS OR 
MARKETS 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM PUBLIC 
DISTRIBUTION 
SERVICE 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM OTHER 
SOURCES 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
 00 = NO 01 = YES  QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES 
Fruits           
Banana           
Mango           
Jackfruit           
Pineapple           
Coconut           
Any other           
Livestock 
products 
          
Milk**           
Eggs**           
Mutton           
Chicken           
Fish           
Any other           
Codes for 10.12b: 01 = Daily 02 =Thrice a week 03 = Twice a week 04 = Once in four/five days 05 = Weekly  
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Table, continued 
10.12a 10.12b 10.12c 10.12d 10.12e 10.12f 
Have you consumed this food 
during the past week? 
(If ‘yes’, answer Q 10.12b to 
10.12f) 
In the past 
week, how 
often was this 
food eaten? 
HOME PRODUCTION 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD PURCHASES 
FROM SHOPS OR 
MARKETS 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM PUBLIC 
DISTRIBUTION 
SERVICE 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
FOOD FROM OTHER 
SOURCES 
 
In the past week, how much 
of this food did your 
household consume? 
 00 = NO 01 = YES  QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES QUANTITY RUPEES 
Miscellaneou
s 
          
Biscuits**           
Tea           
Sugar           
Jaggery           
Salt           
Coffee           
Pickles           
Ghee           
Cooking oil           
Cashewnuts           
Spices           
Dry fruits           
Any other           
Codes for 10.12b: 01 = Daily 02 =Thrice a week 03 = Twice a week 04 = Once in four/five days 05 = Weekly  
 
** Biscuits to be recorded in terms of number of packets consumed.   
 391 
 
PART 11: OPERATION OF PDS 
(Interviewer to keep card samples)
11.1a.  Does your household have a Ration  card/Ration coupons? 
(Interviewer to see the card/coupons) 
  00 = No   01 = Yes                   
[If ‘01’ go to 11.2. If ‘00’, ask only 11.1b and then go directly to Part 12] 
 
11.1b. If household does not show card/ coupons, specify why? 
 
 
11.2.  If ‘yes’, what type of card/coupons (Interviewer to be shown 
card/coupons):  
01 = Antyodaya         [go directly to 11.5] 
02 = BPL 
03 = APL 
 
11.3.  Do you think this card/these coupons reflect your true eligibility? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
11.4.  If ‘00’ in the question 11.3 above, why? (Interviewer to ask without 
prompting one of the responses below, and then fill the appropriate code in the 
box) 
 
   01 = We have been told by a Government official we are BPL/Antyodaya 
eligible, but didn’t receive the card/coupons  
02 = Our household situation has changed for the worse since cards/coupons 
were issued (because of not getting the right card/coupons – that is, eligible 
for Antyodaya, but  given BPL/APL card/coupons). 
03 = Other households in this village in a similar situation to us have a 
Antyodaya/BPL card/coupons, but we don’t 
96 = Other reason (specify____________________________) 
11.5. Could you please tell your monthly quantity entitlements according to 
your card/coupon(s)? 
 Item 
Quantity  
(In 
Kg/Liter) 
What price you 
pay per Kg/Liter  
(In Rs.) 
11.5a Rice   
11.5b Wheat   
11.5c Kerosene   
11.5d Other (__________)                          Specify 
  
 
11.6.  During the past three months, did your household obtain food through 
the PDS?  
00 = No  01 = Yes                 [  If ‘00’, go to 11.9)  
 
11.7.  Could you tell me what quantity of ration did you obtain during the 
last three months from the PDS store? (If any of the items below not 
obtained during any of the last three months, leave that column 
‘blank’.  
  Quantity (In Kg/Liter) 
  
1 month 
preceding 
the survey 
2 months 
preceding 
the survey 
3 months 
preceding 
the survey 
11.7a Rice    
11.7b Wheat    
11.7c Kerosene    
11.7d Other (________)            Specify 
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11.8.  Which person in your household most recently visited the PDS store 
to buy food? (Record the appropriate code). 
01 = Male head of household 
02 = Female head of household 
03 = Other male in household 
04 = Other female in household 
 
11.9. Reason for not obtaining food through the PDS during the past three 
months 
  
Record relevant 
code for each of 
the options   
11.9a The ration not distributed in the last three months  
11.9b Did not need PDS provisions  
11.9c Difficult to access location of PDS shop  
11.9d PDS shop opening hours prevent use  
11.9e PDS shop not sufficiently stocked  
11.9f Quality of grains at PDS store is not good  
11.9g PDS dealer never gives the full quota  
11.9h Misplaced card/coupons  
11.9i Did not have enough money to buy ration   
11.9j Card or coupons mortgaged/sold  
11.9k 
PDS shop only allows to buy monthly 
entitlements in one go and we usually 
don’t have that much money at a point of 
time  
 
11.9l Other reason (_______) (Specify)  
00 = No  01 = Yes  
 
11.10. Users’ attitudes towards PDS store 
  Strongly 
agree Agree 
No 
opinion Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
11.10a. Commodities in the 
PDS store are 
reasonable in quality 
     
11.10b. Commodities in the 
PDS store are 
reasonable in quantity 
     
11.10c. The PDS store’s 
opening hours make it 
easy to use on a regular 
basis 
     
11.10d. The PDS store’s 
location makes it easy to 
use on a regular basis 
     
11.10e The PDS store 
distributes the quantity 
as per the monthly 
entitlement  
     
 
 
11.11. Overall, how would you rate the importance of ration from the PDS for 
your household?  
 
01 = Very important 
02 = Important 
03 = Not important  
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PDS Coupons 
 
11.12 Do you use your ‘ration card’ or the monthly ‘ration coupons’ for 
obtaining the PDS ration/grains? 
01 = Ration Card 
02 = Coupons           [If 01, go directly to 11.26] 
 
11.13From where do you obtain your monthly coupons?  
 
01 = Gram Panchayat Office (GP) 
02 = Block Development Office (BDO) 
03 = Camps organized jointly by GP & BDO 
96 = Any other (specify)_______________________ 
 
11.14 Is there a particular month of the year, in which you get your monthly 
coupons for the whole year?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes  [If no, go to 11.16] 
 
11.15 Which month of the year do you usually get your monthly ‘ration 
coupons’ for the whole year? 
 
Month________________ 
 
11.16 Which month of the year did you get your monthly coupons for the last 
year i.e. 2011-2012?  
 
Month________________ 
 
11.17 Do you get information beforehand about when or which month and 
where the coupons will be distributed? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes  [If no, go to 11.19] 
 
11.18 From where do you get information about when and where the coupons 
will be distributed?  
01 = Gram Panchayat Office 
02 = Block Development Office 
03 = Relatives/Neighbours in the village 
04 = Other (specify)__________________ 
 
11.19 During the last year i.e. 2011-2012, did or could you utilize all your 
monthly PDS coupons to obtain ration?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes      [If yes, go to 11.22] 
 
11.20 Could you please tell me how many coupons you did not or could not 
utilize in the last year (interviewer to check the ‘coupon booklet’ for 
unutilized coupons)? 
11.20a Number of unutilized coupons for Wheat________ 
11.20b Number of unutilized coupons for Rice________ 
11.20c Number of unutilized coupons for Kerosene________ 
 
11.21 Could you please tell me why you did not or could not utilize the 
coupons (record the most appropriate code)? 
01 = Did not need PDS ration/provision(s) during those months 
02 = Coupons were distributed after their validity ended 
03 = The PDS shop was not sufficiently stocked to distribute ration 
04 = The household members were not in the village 
96 = Any other (specify___________________________) 
 
11.22 Has the village PDS dealer ever asked you for coupons for more than a 
month in exchange for ration for a month?  
00 = No  01 = Yes   [If no. go to 11.25]   
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11.23 Last time when you obtained the ration (whether or not obtained ration 
in last 3 months), how many coupons did you have to give to the PDS dealer 
for obtaining a month’s ration for each of the following items? 
 
11.23a  Number of coupons for Wheat____________   
11.23b Number of coupons for Rice______________ 
11.23c  Number of coupons for Kerosene__________ 
 
11.24How often do you have to give more coupons, to obtain your monthly 
entitlements from the PDS store? 
 
01 = Always  02 = Often  03 = Sometimes 
      
11.25 In your opinion, is there any improvement in the following aspects of 
PDS system after the coupon system was introduced?  
   
[Record relevant code for each of the options] 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes   
 
11.25a Ration distribution has become more regular 
11.25b More quantity of ration/grain is distributed 
11.25c Quality of ration/grains has improved 
11.25d Increase in PDS shop’s opening hours 
11.25e More transparency in PDS functioning    
11.25f Any other (specify________________)  
 
Perceptions about Cash Transfers 
(Interviewer to read out the statement below and make sure that the 
respondent has understood it clearly) 
 
The Government is now considering providing cash to the beneficiary 
households to buy entitled quantities of monthly ration (wheat, rice, kerosene 
etc.) from the open market (such as local grocery shops/kirana stores), instead 
of providing the ration from the PDS outlets. Under the proposed system, 
money will be transferred to your bank or post-office account every month 
and you can withdraw the money to buy food items. In case your household 
does not have an account in the bank or post-office, the government will open 
an account for you and you do not have to pay any money for the same. I must 
inform you that the amount of cash money will be indexed to inflation, that is 
to say, this money will always correspond to the market value of the food 
commodities. In other words, if the food prices rise, your cash entitlements 
will also be increased by the same proportion, which means increase in food 
prices will, in no way, affect your monthly ration entitlements.  
 
11.26. Have you heard of this proposed change?  
 
00 = No 01 = Yes   [If no, go to 11.28] 
 
11.27. If yes, from where/whom did you first come to hear/learn about it? 
 
01= Gram Panchayat Office   02 = Aaganwadi center   
03=Village school staff   04 = Neighbors/friends 
05= PDS dealer    06= Newspaper/Television 
96 = Other (specify__________________) 
  
 395 
 
11.28. Can you tell me whether or not there is a bank in this village?  
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
11.29. What is the distance of the nearest bank (whether or not in the village) 
from your house? 
01 = Less than 1Km 02 = 1 to 2Km 03 = 2 to 3Km  
04 = 3 to 4 Km  05 = More than 4 km 
 
11.30. Can you tell me whether or not there is a post-office in this village?  
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
11.31. What is the distance of the nearest post-office (whether or not in the 
village) from your house? 
01 = Less than 1Km 02 = 1 to 2Km 03 = 2 to 3Km  
04 = 3 to 4 Km  05 = More than 4 km 
 
11.32. Can you tell me whether or not there is a fair-price shop (ration shop) 
in this village?  
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
11.33. What is the distance of the nearest fair-price shop (whether or not in the 
village) from your house? 
 
01 = Less than 1Km  02 = 1 to 2Km  03 = 2 to 3Km 04 
= 3 to 4 Km  05 = More than 4 km 
 
Now, I would like to know your perceptions on this proposed change.  
 
11.34. Would you prefer to continue to buy ration from the PDS shop or 
prefer cash instead and buy food from local grocery stores/kirana shops?  
 
01 = Ration from the PDS store     [go to 11.35]  
02 = Cash to buy ration        [go to 11.36] 
For questions 11.35 and 11.36, interviewer to ask without prompting one of the 
responses below, and then record the relevant code for each of the following 
options. 
 
11.35 If 11.34 = 01, would you please tell me the reasons for choosing ration 
from the PDS store?  
Q. No. Question Code 
11.35a Cash will be spent on non-food items   
11.35b Food prices at ration shops are always lower than the prices in the 
open market  
 
11.35c Ration shops are more flexible in the sense that any member of the 
household can easily avail ration from the shop, whereas only 
account holder can withdraw money from the bank/post-office 
 
11.35d Accessibility – PDS shop is nearer than the bank and/or post-
office (interviewer to cross-check with the questions above) 
 
11.35e More difficult to deal with bank/post-office  
11.35f Unsure of timely transfer of money in the bank account   
11.35g Other (specify__________________)  
 
11.36 If 11.34= 02, would you please tell me the reason for choosing cash 
over food  
Q. No. Question Code 
11.36a Quantity of ration provided by the PDS dealer is less than our 
entitled quota 
 
11.36b Quality of grains/other PDS commodities is not good  
11.36c Irregularity in the functioning of ration shop (opening and closing 
days/hours not fixed)  
 
11.36d Cash provides more choice on what to eat   
11.36e Cash could be utilized on other households needs, if the need be  
11.36f Other (specify__________________)  
Codes for 11.35 and 11.36 –––––  00 = No 01 = Yes   
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PART 12: : OPERATION OF MGNREGS 
12.1. Do you or any member of the household have a job card?   00 = No   01 = Yes   
      [If ‘00’, ask only 12.2 and then go directly to Part 13.  If ‘01’, go to 12.3] 
 
12.2 If no, could you tell me the reasons for not having a job card? 
(Interviewer to read out all options and record the most appropriate code) 
             01 = We are better-off and don’t need the job-card                      02 = People from our caste don’t do the kind of work offered by MGNREGS  
             03 = Applied for the job card but haven’t yet been given one      96 = Other (Specify_________________________) 
 
12.3 Did anyone in this household work under MGNREGS during the past 12 months?   00 = No   01 = Yes   
[If  no, ask only 12.4 and 12.5 and then go directly to Part 13. If yes, ask all questions from 12.5 to 12.13] 
 
12.4 Could you tell me the reasons for not working under MGNREGS? 
(Interviewer to read out all options and record the most appropriate code) 
01 = We were given a job card, even though we didn’t need it  02 = MGNREGS wages are lower than market wages hence didn’t apply for work   
03 = Didn’t need the work during past 12 months    04 = Timing of MGNREGS employment coincided with peak agriculture season  
05 = Sought work but didn’t get it      96 = Other (specify________________) 
 
12.5 Did it ever happen anytime in the past that any member of this household who was working outside this village, returned to work in NREGA?  
00 = No 01 = Yes  
 
12.6 Complete the following table listing all details for every household member who worked under MGNREGS 
 12.6a 12.6b 12.6c 12.6d 12.6e 
ID Code of any household member 
(same as Part 2) 
Description of work 
 
How many days employed? 
(write number) Mode of payment Schedule of payment Daily Wage (In Rs.) 
      
      
      
      
Codes    
Column 12.6a:  01 = Plantation work   02 = Construction    96 = Any other (Specify) 
Column 12.6c:  01 = Cash     02 = Through bank account   03 = Through post office account 
Column 12.6d:              01= Weekly                             02 = Fortnightly     96 = Any other (Specify)   
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12.7 Attitudes towards MGNREGS 
  Strongly 
agree Agree 
No 
opinion Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
12.7a. Got work when 
wanted; worked for 
number of days 
they wanted; work 
they got to do was 
according to what 
they wanted 
     
12.7b The way of 
selecting people for 
MGNREGS jobs 
was fair 
     
12. 7c Able to access 
MGNREGS money 
from the bank/post-
office without any 
problems 
     
12.7d The MGNREGS 
projects were 
needed, 
recommended and 
selected by the 
Gramsabha 
     
12. 7e In MGNREGS 
projects, women, 
destitute and 
physically 
challenged people 
were treated fairly 
     
12.7f MGNREGS has 
reduced the rate of 
outmigration from 
the village 
     
12.8 Which of the following three statements best describes the role of 
MGNREGS for this household: 
01 = Without the cash income from MGNREGS, we wouldn’t have  
         had enough food to eat 
02 = Without the cash income from MGNREGS we would have had  
         enough food to eat, but it has made life easier for us 
03 = Neither of these two statements really describes the situation     
 
12.9 Do you agree that the food component in the MGNREGS wage 
structure should have been retained? 
00 = No 01 = Yes  
 
12.10 How did the daily wage rate for MGNREGS compare to any 
other manual labour being undertaken by members of this 
household? 
01 =Higher 02 =About the same 03 =Lower 
12.11  What is the daily rate for manual labour earned by members of 
this household (other than MGNREGS)? 
Men (Rs.___________)  Women (Rs._________) 
12.12 If you have grievances against MGNREGS, are they being 
addressed? 
00 = No 01 = Yes 
12. 13.Please discuss any additional issues/suggestions about MGNREGS  
  Respondent’s comments 
12.13a Grievances/redressal  
12.13b  Food component  
12.13c Unemployment allowance  
12.13d Facilities availability  
12.13e Any other (specify)  
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PART 13: OPERATION OF ICDS/AAGANWADI  
 
13.1. Did any member in your household get benefit from any Integrated 
Child Development Scheme during the past 12 months? 
 
00 = No 01 =Yes 02 = Not applicable 
[If ‘00’ go to 13.3. If ‘02’, go directly to Part 14] 
 
13.2 If yes, who were the beneficiaries of ICDS in your household (tick 
more than one box if relevant): 
13.2a. Child under six years of age 
13.2b  Nursing mother 
13.2c Pregnant family member  
         (wife, daughter, daughter-in-law) 
13.2d Adolescent girl-child 
 
 
 
 
13.3 If no, what was the reason? 
 
01 = There was no anganwadi in the neighborhood 
 
02 = The anganwadi is not operating regularly, and  
         the household is not benefiting 
 
96 = Any other reasons (please specify) 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
13.4. If 13.1= ‘01 =’, complete the following, giving details of benefits received by members of the household from ICDS: 
 13.4a. 13.4b. 13.4c. 13.4d. 
ID Code of 
household 
member 
(same as Part B) 
Benefit obtained 
from ICDS 
Description of benefit received 
(write details) 
Duration of the benefit received 
(mention duration in terms of 
number of months/years) 
Period when the benefit was received 
(mention the name of the months/period 
during which benefited) 
     
     
     
     
     
Codes13.4a: 
 01 =Supplementary nutrition  02 = Growth monitoring   03 = Nutrition and health education  04 = Immunization  
05 = Referral and pre-school education 06 =Any other (Specify___) 94 = No response    98 = = Don’t know  
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     13.5. If the household has children aged between 3 and 6 years, then ask the following:  
  Ask If 13.5a = ‘01’, Ask if 13.5c = ‘01’ Ask if 13.5a=’00’ 
 13.5a 13.5b. 13.5c. 13.5d. 13.5e.  
ID Code of 
children 
aged 
between 3 
& 6 years  
(see Part 
2) 
Does this child 
go to 
‘aaganwadi 
center’? 
00 = No  
 01 = Yes 
If ‘00’, go to 
13.5e. 
How often does 
the child go to 
‘aaganwadi 
center’ in a 
week? (write the 
no. of days) 
Does the child 
get any food at 
the ‘aaganwdi 
center’? 
00 = No  
 01 = Yes 
Whether or not the child got food last week? The reasons for not sending child to the 
Aaganwadi center (write the appropriate code 
for each child, even if same)? 
01 = No ‘aaganwadi’ in the neighbourhood 
02 = ‘Aaganwadi’ is not operating regularly 
03 = We don’t need ‘aaganwadi’ benefits 
96 = Other (specify___________)  
Day 
Breakfast 
(Biscuits/Seasonal 
Fruit/Bhuja) 
Lunch 
(Khidi/Rasiyav/ 
Halwa/Pulav) 
 00 = No 01= Yes 
00 = No 
01= Yes 
  
 
Days______ 
 Yesterday    
2 days before   
3 days before   
4 days before   
5 days before   
6 days before   
7 days before   
  
Days______ 
 Yesterday    
2 days before   
3 days before   
4 days before   
5 days before   
6 days before   
7 days before   
  
Days______ 
 Yesterday    
2 days before   
3 days before   
4 days before   
5 days before   
6 days before   
7 days before   
  
 400 
 
PART 14: : OPERATION OF OTHER BENEFIT SCHEMES
 
14.1. Did any person in this household receive a pension or other 
benefit during the past 12 months? 
 
 00 = No         01 = Yes                      [If no, go to 14.3] 
 
 
14.2. Did the household receive any of the following  
payments during the past 12 months  (record the 
appropriate code for each)?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
14.2a = Old age pension 
14.2b = Disability pension  
14.2c = Widow pension 
14.2d = Accidental death benefits 
14.2e = Freedom fighter pension  
14.2f = Army pension/related compensation  
14.2g = Employment-related pensions,   
14.2h = Drought /Flood relief  
14.2i = Other Natural calamities relief 
14.2j = Other (specify)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.3. Did the household receive any of the following subsidy  
payments during the past 12 months  (record the appropriate code for each)?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
 
14.3a =Drinking water connection subsidy 
14.3b =Gas connection subsidy 
14.3c =Farming subsidy for seeds, tractor purchase etc 
14.3d =Access to a farming credit card (Kissan etc.) 
14.3e =Total sanitation campaign subsidy 
14.3f =Any other (Specify_______________) 
 
14.4.  14.4  Did this household receive any other benefit payment relating for 
medical or death reasons (including health or life insurance)? 
00 = No  01 = Yes                [If no, go to Part 15] 
 
14.5  Please provide details. 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
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PART 15: SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
15.1. Is any person in this household an elected member of the Gram 
Panchayat? 
 
 00 = No  01 = Yes  
 
15.2. Is any person in this household an official in the Gram Panchayat 
(example: secretary, bill collector, water man, office assistant)? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
15.3. Is any person in this household a member of one of the  
following types of organization (record the appropriate code for  each)?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
15.3a. Farming/producer marketing group 
15.3b Water users’ group 
15.3c Forest conservation group 
15.3d Any other (specify_________________) 
 
15.4. Is any person in this household a member of a Self Help  
         Group? 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
[If no, go directly to Part 16] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.5. What is the monthly contribution made to the Group (Write 00, if no 
contribution? 
 
Amount (Rs____________) 
 
15.6. During the past 12 months, has any person in this household accessed 
credit through the Self-Help Group? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
[If no, go directly to Part 16] 
 
15.7. What was the amount of credit received? 
 
Amount (Rs____________) 
 
15.8. What has this credit been used for (list more than one if appropriate)? 
 
 
 
Codes 15.8: 
15.8a = Food     
15.8b = Medical purposes 
15.8c = Household asset purchases  
15.8d = Weddings or ceremonies  
15.8e = Farming purposes  
15.8f = Petty or household business  
15.8g = Other (specify________________) 
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PART 16: SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
These questions are to be asked to the head of household, or a senior adult present, and are designed to represent the view of the household.) 
 
Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step), stand the POOR people in your village, and on the highest step (the sixth 
step), stand the richest people.  
 
Poorest         Middle        Richest 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1    2    3    4    5    6 
 
 
16.1. On which step is the household on today? 
16.2. On what step was the household two years ago? 
16.3. On what step was the household five years ago? 
(If “Don’t know”, record 98 ) 
16.4. In this Village, do you think that during the past five 
years, peoples’ abilities to adequately feed themselves, and 
clothe themselves have improved?  
 
  00 = No 
  01 = Yes 
  98 =  Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
16.5. Do you think the next generation of people in this Village will 
have more opportunities and a better lifestyle than the situation at 
present? 
 
 00 = No 
 01 = Yes 
 98 =  Don’t know 
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PART 17: ROLE OF FEMALES IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
 
All questions in this part must be addressed to the wife of the household head, or if not present, the identified most senior adult female in the household. 
Questions must be asked without adult males present.
Q. No Questions Code 
17.1. Who has the final say on matters relating to the 
respondent’s own health care?  
17.2. Who has the final say on large household purchases?  
17.3. Who has the final say on daily household purchases?  
17.4. Who has the final say on visits to family or relatives?  
17.5. Who has the final say on what food is to be cooked?  
17.6. Who has the final say on deciding what to do with money in the household?  
00 =No female able to be interviewed 01 =Respondent alone 
02 =Husband/partner alone   03 =Respondent & husband  
04 =Father/mother in law   05 =Joint HH decision
 94 =Refused to answer or cannot answer  96 =Other (Specify_____) 
 
 
[From Q. 17.1 to 17.6, record the most appropriate code for each]  
 
 
 
  
 
 
17.7. Involvement of women in the PDS system (Tick the appropriate answer) 
  Strongly 
agree Agree 
No 
opinion Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
17.7a. 
PDS cards are equitably 
provided to female-headed 
households in this GP. 
     
17.7b. Female-headed households can access the PDS shop easily      
17.7c. 
The PDS system would be 
improved if women SHGs 
operated PDS shops 
     
 
 
17.8. Involvement of women in the ICDS system (record the appropriate code 
for each) 
00= No  01 = Yes    
     17.8a A woman in this household is on a mothers’  
committee of the Anganwadi centre 
 
      17. 8b A woman in this household is a member of MahilaMandal 
 Self-help group responsible for preparing food for the centre 
 
      17.8c A woman in this household works at the Anganwadi centre 
  
17.9. Are you involved in income-generating activities?  
00= No  01 = Yes 
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Interview Schedule 2- Migrant Household Questionnaire 
All questions in this part must be addressed to the households having one of more members who have stayed away from the village for 60 days or 
more in the last 365 days (April 2011 to March 2012) for employment purpose. 
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PART 18: HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WHO HAVE STAYED AWAY FOR EMPLOYMENT REASONS DURING THE PAST 365 DAYS  
(Record members belonging to the family who have lived elsewhere for 60 days or more in past 365 days for employment reasons. In addition to those household members 
presently staying away for work, also record the members who have lived outside the village for work for 60 days or more in last 365 days and who have now returned and 
are residing with the household) 
 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 
ID CODE NAME RELATION TO HEAD AGE SEX MARITAL STATUS LITERACY 
01       
02       
03       
04       
05       
     Ask only if 18.10 = 01 Ask only if 18.10 = 00 
 18.7 18.8 18.9 18.10 18.11 18.12 
ID CODE 
YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING 
AGE AT FIRST 
MIGRATION 
TOTAL DURATION OF 
STAY OUTSIDE VILLAGE 
SINCE S/HE 
OUTMIGRATED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME (YEARS) 
IS S/HE 
CURENTLY 
STAYING WITH 
THE HOUSEHOLD 
PLACE AND DURATION OF STAY 
DURING THE MOST RECENT 
LAST MOVE IN PAST 365 DAYS 
CURRENT PLACE 
OF RESIDENCE 
(City/State) PLACE 
(City/State) DURATION 
01   _______________Years     
02   _______________Years     
03   _______________Years     
04   _______________Years     
05   _______________Years     
Codes – 18.2 – (Only include direct descendents of head of household (sons, daughters, grandsons, granddaughters; daughter-in-law, etc.) 
01=Wife/Husband   02=Son/Daughter  03=Grandson/Granddaughter  04=Daughter-in-law  05=Parent  96=Other (Specify) 
18.3 –  Age in completed years. 2 digit code, so 1 is “01”.    
18.4 –  01= Male, 02 = Female;     18.5 –  01=Never married       02=Currently married 03=Widowed 04=Divorced/separated 
18.6 –  00=Illiterate  01=Literate (Without schooling)  02 = Literate  
18.7 –  00=No education 01=Primary (up to 5th class) 02=Middle (from 6th to 8th class) 03 = High (9th and 10th class)        04=Higher Secondary (11th  and 12th)              
          05=Graduate 06=Postgraduate & above  96=Other (Specify_________) 98=Don’t know 
18.8 – Age in completed years. 2 digit code, so 1 is “01”.                   
18.9 – Record verbatim. For example, 1 year 7 months. If less than a year, write ‘00’ and then write number of months.  
18.10 – 00 = No        01=Yes;  
18.11 (Place) – Record verbatim. (Duration) – Record in months (for example 01 for 1 month, 02 for 2 months and so on. If less than one month, write ‘00’ and then write number of days) 
18.12 – Record verbatim  
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Table continued  
 Ask only if 18.10 = 00  Ask only if 18.14 = ‘01’  Ask only if 18.16 = ‘01’ 
 18.13 18.14 18.15 18.16 18.17 18.18 18.19 
ID CODE 
DURATION OF STAY AT 
THE CURRENT PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE  
 
DID S/HE OUTMIGRATED 
ELSEWHERE IN 
ADDITION TO LOCATION 
AT LAST 
MOVE/CURRENT 
LOCATION IN PAST 365 
DAYS 
NUMBER OF MOVES 
IN PAST 365 DAYS 
DID S/HE VISIT HOME 
IN PAST 365 DAYS 
HOW MANY 
TIMES VISITED 
HOME IN PAST 365 
DAYS  
TOTAL 
DURATION 
STAYED HOME 
IN PAST 365 
DAYS 
WAS THE PURPOSE 
OF ANY VISIT HOME 
IN PAST 365 DAYS TO 
HELP/WORK ON 
HOUSEHOLD FARMS   
01 ____Years ____Months       
02 ____Years ____Months       
03 ____Years ____Months       
04 ____Years ____Months       
05 ____Years ____Months       
     Ask only if 18.23 = ‘01’ 
 18.20 18.21 18.22 18.23 18.24 18.25 18.26 
ID CODE 
REASON FOR 
MIGRATION 
OCCUPATION DURING 
LAST MOVE/AT 
CURRENT PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE 
INCOME PER MONTH 
OF THE OUTMIGRANT 
DURING LAST 
MOVE/AT THE PLACE 
OF RESIDENCE  
(In Rs.) 
WHETHER 
REMITTANCE SENT 
DURING LAST 365 
DAYS 
NUMBER OF 
TIMES 
REMITTANCE 
SENT DURING 
LAST 365 DAYS 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF 
REMITTANCE 
SENT DURING 
LAST 365 DAYS 
(In Rs.) 
MODE OF 
REMITTANCE 
01        
02        
03        
04        
05        
Codes – 18.13 - For example, 1 year 7 months. If less than a year, write only number of months.     18.14 – 00 = No 01=Yes     
18.15 – 01 = 1 move 02 = 2 moves 03 = 3 moves 04 = 4 moves and more    18.16 – 00 = No 01=Yes      
18.17 – 01 = 1 time  02 = 2 times 03 = 3 times 04 = 4 times and more 
18.18 – Record verbatim in months (for example 01 for 1 month, 02 for 2 months and so on. If less than one month, write ‘00’ and then write number of days) 18.19 – 00 = No 01=Yes 
18.20 – 01 = Landless household  02=Income from agriculture not enough 03 = Crop failure 04=Money needed to boost agricultural production  05 = Repayment of loan 
06=Unemployment/irregular employment in the village  07 =Better employment  08 = Low wage rate in the village 09=Dowry for daughter/other girls in the household        96 = Other (specify)   
18.21 – 01=Government Employee  02 = Salaried employment in private firm    03=Own business     04= Agricultural labourer  05 = Construction worker        06 = Domestic help     
              07 = Driver    08= Security services (watchman)                  09 =Rickshaw puller      10 = Street vendor/Push cart vendor  11 = Shoe shiner/Cobbler  96 = Other (specify)    
18.22 – Record verbatim.   18.23 – 00 = No 01=Yes    
18.24 – 01 = 1 time  02 = 2 times 03 = 3 times 04 = 4 times and more;    18.25 – Record verbatim. 
18.26 – 01 = Bank account transfer   02 = Money order   03 = Friend/Relatives  04 = Self  
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PART 19: REMITTANCES
 
19.1. Did out-migrant send remittances during the last 365 days 
(interviewer to record this from question 18.23 above?    
00= No  01= Yes  [If no, go directly to Part 20] 
 
19.2 Would you please tell me whether or not household used the 
remittance money for any of the following in the past 365 days (Record 
the appropriate code for each of the following options)? 
                         Codes for 19.2 
00= No 01= Yes 
 
19.2a = Food    
19.2b = Education of household members  
19.2c = Health care   
19.2d = Buying household durables   
19.2e = Building pukka house/renovating house  
19.2f = Building toilet   
19.2g = Buying agricultural land  
19.2h = Debt repayment   
19.2i = Marriage and other ceremonies  
19.2j = Initiating new entrepreneurial activity  
19.2k = Saving     
19.2l = Any other (specify__________________) 
 
19.3 Would you please tell me the 3 most important uses of remittance 
as well as the money spent on each 3 of them in order of amount of 
money spent (Record the upto 3 codes from 19.2a to 19.2l and money 
spent on each, in descending order of the money value, from highest to 
lowest)?  
 
Codes   
 
Amount                   Rs________   Rs_________ Rs________ 
 
19.4. Apart from these uses, did household utilize remittances to boost 
agricultural production in the past 365 days (Ask only, if household 
owned or cultivated crops in the past one year i.e. 5.1 = ‘01’)? 
 
00= No  01= Yes       [If no, go to 19.8] 
 
19.5 Could you please tell me whether the household used money for 
any of the following and how much?  
Q. No Particulars 
Investment 
during last 365 
days 
Amount 
invested 
(In Rs.) 00=No 01 = Yes 
9.5a Fertilizer/pesticides   
19.5b Improved seed varieties   
19.5c Purchase of farm machinery   
19.5d Renting farm machinery for agriculture   
19.5e Any other (Specify_______)   
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19.6 As a result of investment of remittances, do you feel that there is 
an increase in household agricultural production in the past 365 days?  
 
01 = Increased  02 = Same   
 
 
[If same, go to 19.8] 
 
19.7 Is the increased production used for household own consumption 
or sold?  
 
01 = Household consumption  
02 = Sold 
 
19.8  Overall, how important are the remittance for this household? 
 
01 = Very important   
02 = Important      
03 = Not important      
98 = Don’t know/can’t say  
 
19.9 How do you compare the following aspects of household status at 
present with family member(s) earning outside, with the past when 
none of the family members had migrated out of this village for work? 
 
Codes from 19.9a to 19.9f.  
 
01 = Better  02 = Same  03 = Worse 
 
19.9a   Income/Financial status of household 
19.9b  Social status of the household 
19.9c  Educational Status of household members 
19.9d  Health status of household members 
19.9e  Food security of household members 
19.9f  Child health and educational outcomes 
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PART 20: HOUSEHOLD LABOUR 
 
 
20.1 Has out-migration by family member(s) reduced the pressure on 
the household resources? 
 
00= No 01= Yes 
 
20.2 Has out-migration by family member(s) resulted into availability 
of more food per person? 
 
00= No 01= Yes 
 
20.3 Has out-migration by family member(s) resulted into increase in 
the workload for left-behind family members?  
 
00= No 01= Yes 
 
(Ask the following questions only if household owned or cultivated 
crops in the past one year i.e. 5.1 = ‘01’)? 
 
20.4. Has out-migration by family member(s) resulted into availability 
of less labour for household own agriculture or has it helped to use 
household labour more efficiently for better economic returns? 
01 = Shortage of Labour  
02 = Efficient utilization of labour    
 
[If ‘02’, go directly to 20.9] 
 
20.5 What measures did the household take to compensate for the 
labour of out-migrant(s)? 
 
00 = Did not do anything    [go directly to Part 21] 
01 = Hired outside labour   [go to 20.6] 
02 = HH members worked    [go to 20.7] 
        for more number of hours    
03 = Both – ‘01’ and ‘02’ above        [ask both, 20.6 and 20.7] 
 
20.6 Could you please tell me number of outside labour hired and 
amount of money paid for each of the following agricultural activities 
(if ‘no labour hired’ for a particular activity, leave blank) 
 
Activity 
Number of 
Labour 
Hired 
Amount 
Paid 
(In Rs.) 
20.6a Plowing (Hal Chalana)   
20.6b Manuring (Khad Dalna)   
20.6c Sowing (Buwai)   
20.6d Harvesting (Nirayi/Gudai)   
20.6e Threshing (Katai)   
20.6f Other (Specify_____________)   
 Total    
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20.7 Would you please tell me whether the increase in the number of 
hours is more for male or female members of the households? 
            01 = Male members    
02 = Female members    
03 = Both     
98 = Don’t know   
[If ‘02’, go to 20.8, otherwise go directly to part 21] 
 
 
20.8 With female members of the household spending more  
time on household agriculture, has it resulted into less time for child 
care by female members of the household? 
 
00= No  
01= Yes 
02 = Not Applicable (No children) 
 
 
 
20.9 In what ways do you think outmigration has resulted into efficient 
utilization of the household labour? 
 
01 = Bigger family size so enough members  
                    for own agriculture 
02 = Small landholding/agricultural income  
                    inadequate to meet household needs    
03 = Migration during agriculturally lean  
                    season provides extra income 
96 = Any other (specify__________________) 
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Interview Schedule 3: Questionnaire for Left-Behind Wife of the Out-migrant 
 
All questions must be addressed to the ‘Left-behind Wife of an Out-migrant’ only. In case of more than one left-behind wives, please interview the 
youngest female, provided she is 18 years or older. Questions must be asked without adult males present. 
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PART 21: BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEFT-BEHIND WIFE AND THE OUTMIGRANT HUSBAND
 
 21.1 Is the wife of any out-migrant from the family present? 
  00 = No   
01 = Yes 
02 = Not applicable (the out-migrant(s) is/are unmarried) 
  
(If 21.1 = no, go directly to Part 29. If 21.9 = yes, ask all questions from Part 
21 to Part 28) 
 
21.2 Respondent Name and ID (See, Part 2)    
   Name__________________        
           ID ____________________ 
 
21.3 Respondent’s Husband Name and ID (See, Part 18)   
  Name__________________        
          ID ____________________ 
 
21.4 Age of respondent   
(Age in completed years)  ____________________Years 
21.5 Can you read and write? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes  [If no, go to 21.7] 
 
 
21.6 Year of schooling ___________Completed grade 
 
[If no formal education, write 00] 
 
21.7 What was your age at the time of your marriage? 
(Age in completed years)  
____________________Years 
 
21.8 Do you have any children? 
 
00 = No 01 = Yes     
   [If no, go to 21.10] 
21.9 How many children you have? 
 
No. of daughters ________________________ 
No. of sons  ________________________ 
21.10 How long has it been since your husband migrated out for the first time 
or what was his age at first migration (record from 18.9 above)? 
Duration of stay since 1st move  _________Years 
                          Or 
Age at first move  _________Years 
(Age in completed years) 
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21.11 What was your husband’s marital status at the time of first move? 
01 = Never married 
02 =.Married 
96 = Other (specify_________________) 
98 = Don’t know 
 
21.12 Where is he staying currently (record from 18.12 above. If staying in the 
village at the time of survey, leave black)? 
 
Village/city  __________________________ 
State    __________________________ 
 
21.13 In total, for how long has he been staying at the current place of 
residence or where he last moved? 
_________Years _________Months 
[If less than a year, write only number of months] 
 
21.14 Did he visit home in last 365 days (record from 18.16 above)? 
 
00 = No 01 = Yes         [If yes, go to 21.16] 
 
21.15 How long has it been since he last visited home?  
 
__________________Years 
   _________________Months 
21.16 For how long (total duration of stay) did he stay in the village when he 
visited home last time? 
_________Months_________Days 
[If less than a month, write only number of days] 
21.17 Does your husband send remittances (record from 18.23 above)?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes       [If no, go to 21.22] 
 
21. 18 Who does your husband send remittances to? 
01 = You   [go to 21.20]   
02 = Father/Mother-in-law 
03 = Brother-in-law        
96 = Other (specify____________________) 
 
21.19 Does he also send money to you? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
21.20 Do you have any conflict with any member(s) of the household with 
regards to sharing of remittances?  
 
00 = No  01 = Yes    
[If no, go to 21.22] 
 
21.21 Who do you usually have conflict with? 
01 = Father/Mother-in-law 
02 = Brother-in-law        
96 = Other (specify____________________) 
 
21.22 Normally, when your husband is in the home/village, who does he 
spend most of his time with? 
 
01 = You   02 = Children 
03 = Parents   04 = Friends/Neighbours 
96 = Other (specify____________________) 
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21.23 Have you ever visited your husband’s place of work (current or any 
other place where he worked in the past)? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes           
 
[If no, ask questions 21.24 and 21.25. If yes, ask questions 21.26 and 21.27]  
 
21.24 Could you tell me the reasons for not ever visiting your husband’s place 
of work (interviewer to probe and record the most appropriate code)?  
 
01 = Own choice 
02 = Financial problems 
03 = Health problems 
04 = Housing problems at husband’s place of work 
05 = Nature of job of husband (always mobile, such as driver) 
06 = Husband says ‘I must stay home’ 
07 = Need to look after agriculture in his absence 
08 = Other domestic and child care responsibilities   
96 = Other (specify_______________________) 
 
21.25 If given a chance would you like to live with your husband at the place 
he is working? 
 
00 = No 01 = Yes 
 
21.26 In total, how many times have you visited your husband’s place of 
work? 
 
 
No. of times___________________ 
 
21.27 How long has it been since the last time you visited your husband’s 
place of work?  
__________________Years 
   _________________Months 
 
[If less than a year, write only number of months] 
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PART 22: MIGRATION HISTORY OF HUSBAND 
Now, I would like to ask you few questions about your husband’s migration history. Starting from the most recent move or where he is staying currently, could you 
please recall and tell me the following information about upto 5 migratory moves of your husband, if he has changed his place of destination more than once, that is 
to say, if he has worked in more than one village/city or state since his first migration? 
 
Instructions for interviewer – The information is to be recorded for different places of destination, not for the different moves at the same destination. For example, if the 
migrant has changed his destination place only once, record the information for that place only.     
    Ask if 22.3 = 01  Ask if 22.5 = 02, 03 or 04 Ask if 22.6 = 01 
 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 22.7 
 
Place of 
destination 
 
Was the decision 
to move was of 
your husband’s 
own or someone 
else’s 
Did anyone help 
your husband to 
choose the work 
destination 
Who helped your 
husband to 
choose the work 
destination? 
From where did your 
husband manage the 
money to finance the 
initial expenses such as 
train/bus fare, 
accommodation 
charges, food etc 
Did he pay any 
interest on this 
money? 
Total interest 
paid 
(In Rs.) 
Recent move        
4th Move        
3rd Move        
2nd Move        
1st Move        
Codes 
22.1 –  Record verbatim (village/city or state). 
22.2 –   01 = Husband  02 = Husband and respondent  03 = Head of the household 04 = Joint household decision  96 = Other (specify) 
22.3 –  00 = No   01 = Yes 
22.4 –  01 = Work agent   02 = Relative   03=Friend  04 = Neighbours   96= Other (specify)  
22.5 –   01 = Managed by self/household   02 = Loan from money lender    03 = Loan from relative/friend    
04 = Advance given by the work agent   96 = Other (specify)  
22.6 – 00 = No  01 = Yes    
22.7 –  Record verbatim   
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 PART 23: Gender Roles
 
23.1 Are you involved in any income-generating activities, other than 
household agriculture? 
  
00 = No 01 = Yes   
[If ‘00’, go to 23.13] 
 
23.2 What type of work you mainly do? 
01 = Agricultural labourer  
02 = Share-cropper 
03 = Non-agricultural labourer 
04 = Own business (for e.g. basket-making) 
05 = Domestic worker (e.g. cleaning, moping, washing clothes) 
96 = Other (Specify__________________) 
 
23.3 For how many months do you usually do this work in a year? 
No. of months___________ 
 
23.4 For how many days, do you usually do this work in a month? 
No. of days___________ 
 
23.5 How many hours do you do this work in a usual day? 
No. of hours___________ 
 
23.6 Do you receive income in cash or kind, for this work?  
01 = Income in-kind  
02 = Cash income     [If ‘02’, go to 23.9] 
 
23.7 What do you receive as part of in-kind income?  
01 = Cooked food/meals  
02 = Certain quantity of crop 
96 = Other (Specify___________)    
[Ask 23.8 only if 23.7 = ‘02’. Otherwise go to to 23.10] 
 
23.8 Could you tell me what would be approximate value of this in-
kind income (portion of crop) that you get as daily wage?                                   
Rs________________ 
 
23.9 How much do you earn a day/what is your wage per day?                            
Rs________________ 
 
23.10 When you are working outside, who usually takes care of 
household affairs? 
01 = Daughter   02 = Mother-in-law 
03 = Sister-in-law  96 = Other (Specify________) 
 
23.11 After your husband’s migration, would you say your workload 
as: 
01 = Increased a lot                   02 = Increased a little      
03 = Stayed about the same      04 = Decreased       
98 = Don’t know/ no opinion 
 
23.12 Do you think it has resulted into you spending less time for child 
care?        00 = No      01 = Yes   
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23.13 Would you please tell me amount of time spent on each of the following domestic activities before and after your husband outmigration?  
 
Activities 
Time spent daily on each activity 
Before husband’s outmigration After husband’s outmigration 
NA Hours Minutes 
Do you take 
rest after each 
activity? 
00 = No 
01 = Yes 
NA Hours Minutes 
Do you take rest 
after each 
activity? 
00 = No 
01 = Yes 
23.13a Collecting drinking water         
23.13b Cleaning and mopping 
house 
        
23.13c Cooking         
23.13d Washing clothes         
23.13e Collecting fuel/wood         
23.13f Milking animals         
23.13g Taking care of animals          
23.13h Agriculture related work 
like weeding, harvesting 
and threshing on own farm 
        
23.13i Child care         
23.13j Leisure         
NA = Not Applicable 
 
23.14 Is any of the activities listed above was earlier done by your husband?   
00 = No  01 = Yes   [If no, go to Part 24] 
 
23.15 Could you please tell me 3 most important activities done by your husband earlier in order of amount of time spent (interviewer to record in descending order 
of time spent (from high to low)? 
Activity code (e.g. 23.13a)    
Time spent (Hours:Mins)                
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PART 24: DECISION MAKING  
 
In times when husband is around and others when he is away, could you please 
tell me who has the final say on each of the following?  
 
  
Code 
Husband 
around 
Husband 
away 
24.1 Your own and your children health care  
 
24.2 Children’s education   
24.3 Large household purchases   
24.4 Daily household purchases   
24.5 Visits to family or relatives   
24.6 What food is to be cooked   
24.7 What to do with money in the household  
 
Codes for questions from 24.1 to 24.7  
01 = Respondent alone  
02 = Husband/partner alone   
03 = Respondent and husband  
04 = Father/mother-in-law  
05 = Joint household decision   
96 = Other (specify)  
98 = Refused to answer/cannot answer 
PART 25: LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 
25.1 At present whom do you live with: do you live alone, with in-laws, with 
parents or do you have any other living arrangement (interviewer to observe and 
record on her own)? 
01 = Nuclear  02 = With in-laws  
03 = With parents 96 = Others (Specify________) 
 
25.2 Have you changed the type of living arrangement after your husband 
migration?  
00 = No  01 = Yes   [if no, go to 25.4] 
 
25.3 Please mention with whom did you live before? 
01 = Nuclear   02 = With in-laws  
03 = With parents 96 = Others (Specify________) 
 
25.4 Since how many years you have been staying in the present living 
arrangement?  ____________Years 
 
25.5 Can you please mention whose decision it was to stay in the present living 
arrangement? 
01 = Self  02=Son/Daughter  03 = Husband  
04=Father-/Mother-in-law 05 = Father/Mother  96=Others (Specify)  
 
25.6 Are you comfortable with the present living arrangement? 
00 = No  01 = Yes   [if yes, go to 25.8] 
 
25.7 Could you please tell me the reason, why (interviewer to probe and record 
verbatim)?__________________________________________ 
 
25.8 After Your husband’s migration, do you think your relations with your 
parents/in-laws family have changed? 
00 = No  01 = Yes [if no, go directly to Part 26] 
25.9 Have they changed for better or worse?   
01 = Better 02 = Worse   
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PART 26: FAMILIAL SUPPORT
26.1 Support from In-laws 
 
Financial Support 
26.1a Education expenses of children 
26.1b Health care expenses of children 
26.1c Health care expenses of yourself 
26.1d Providing you money when you need it 
Physical Support 
26.1e Taking children to school 
26.1f Taking children to doctor 
26.1g Taking you to doctor 
26.1h Accompanying for household puchase 
26.1i Going with you to bank or post office 
26.1j Helping you with household chores 
26.1k Doing household chores when you are away 
Emotional Support 
26.1l Sharing your talks 
26.1m Giving suggestion when you are down  
Others (Specify below) 
26.1n_________________________________ 
26.1o_________________________________ 
 
Codes for questions 26.1 and 26.2 – 00 = Don’t need help/NA  01 = Always 
02 = Often 03 = Sometimes    04 = Never  
26.2 Support from Parents 
 
Financial Support 
26.2a Education expenses of children 
26.2b Health care expenses of children 
26.2c Health care expenses of yourself 
26.2d Providing you money when you need it 
Physical Support 
26.2e Taking children to school 
26.2f Taking children to doctor 
26.2g Taking you to doctor 
26.2h Accompanying for household purchase 
26.2i Going with you to bank or post office 
26.2j Helping you with household chores 
26.2k Doing household chores when you are away 
Emotional Support 
26.2l Sharing your talks 
26.2m Giving suggestion when you are down  
Others (Specify below) 
26.2n_________________________________ 
26.2o_________________________________ 
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PART 27: OTHER ISSUES 
 
27.1 After your husband’s outmigration, have you faced any of the problems described below (interviewer to read out each option and record the 
appropriate code for each of the following)? 
Codes for 27.1 –  01 = Always  02 = Often  03 = Sometimes 04 = Never
 
Workload 
27.1a More responsibility 
27.1b Insufficient time for  recreational activities 
27.1c Insufficient time to rest 
27.1d Neglect responsibilities 
Mental/Emotional Health 
27.1e Feel worried due to communication gap with husband 
 
27.1f Inability to visit parents house or relatives due to lack of time 
 
27.1g Feel lonely or isolated 
27.1h Lack of peace of mind  
27.1i Feel depressed or unhappy 
27.1j Think that husband should not have out-migrated for a job 
 
27.1k Not able to maintain social relations 
 
27.1l Feel insecure 
27.1m Cannot sleep properly 
27.1n Not able to concentrate in work 
27.1o Feeling of incompetence 
27.1p Attempt of suicide 
27.1q Irritable on petty issues 
27.1r Think negative  
27.1s Feel worried 
27.1t Feel tired 
27.1u Feel like crying 
Children (If no children, go to 27.2) 
27.1v Not able to teach children 
27.1w Difficulty in upbringing of children 
27.1x Less time for child care  
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27.2 Do you take decisions related to the money in your household? 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes  
[If no, go to 27.4] 
 
27.3 After your husband’s migration, have you faced any of the problems 
described below (interviewer to read out each option and record the appropriate 
code for each of the following)? 
 
Codes for 27.3  
01 = Always 02 = Often 03 = Sometimes  04 = Never 
 
27.3a Difficulty in dealing with financial responsibilities 
 
27.3b Difficulty in managing resource demands at the time of emergency 
 
27.3c Difficulty in taking right decisions at the time of emergency 
 
27.3d Available money is insufficient to run household affairs 
 
27.3e Difficulty in receiving or obtaining money from husband 
 
27.4 After your husband’s outmigration, do you think that there has been 
improvement in the following (interviewer to read out each option and record the 
appropriate code for each of the following)? 
 
Codes for 27.4 
 
00 = No  01 = Yes 
 
27.4a Your children and yours health  
27.4b Children’s education 
27.4c Your self-respect 
27.4d Your decision-making power 
27.4e Family relations 
27.4f Other (Specify___________________) 
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PART 28: PERCEPTION ABOUT OUTMIGRATION
 
28.1 Do you prefer to be a wife of an out-migrant or stay put?  
01 = Wife of an out-migrant    
02 = Wife of a stay-put  
     [If ‘01’, go to 28.3] 
 
28.2 Could you please tell me the reasons why do you prefer that your 
husband should stay put in the village (interviewer to probe and record 
the response)? 
 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________ 
 
28.3 Do you think that the out-migrants have better job opportunities 
than non-migrants? 
 
00 = No 01 = Yes 
 
Ask question 28.4 to 28.6, irrespective of whether the respondent 
has son or not 
 
28.4 Will you allow your son if he decides to migrate elsewhere for 
work? 
 00 = No 01 = Yes 
[If no, go to 28.6] 
 
28.5 Will you allow your son to migrate elsewhere for work if he 
decides to leave his wife behind in the village?  
 
00 = No 01 = Yes         
[If 01, go to 28.7] 
 
28.6 Will you allow your son to migrate elsewhere for work if he 
decides to take his wife to the place of work? 
 
00 = No 01 = Yes         
 
Ask question 28.7 and 28.8, irrespective of whether the respondent 
has daughter or not 
 
28.7 Will you marry your daughter to an out-migrant, knowing that 
after marriage she has to stay in the village while her husband is away? 
 
 00 = No 01 = Yes 
[If no, go to 28.9. Otherwise, go directly to Part 29] 
 
28.8 Will you marry your daughter to an out-migrant knowing that after 
marriage she will stay with her husband at the place of his work? 
 
00 = No 01 = Yes 
 
  
 423 
 
PART 29: INFORMATION ABOUT THE ‘MIGRANT MEMBER(S)’ OF THE HOUSEHOLD FOR FOLLOW-UP 
SURVEY 
We thank you for participating in this survey. The information you have provided will be used in Chetan Choithnai’s PhD thesis at the 
University of Sydney, academic journal publications and conference presentations. As a follow-up to this household survey, this study involves 
interviews with a set of migrant members of the select households at their current place of residence. We would like to remind you that by 
migrant member, we mean any male or female member of this household who has lived outside this village for 60 days or more during 
last 365 days for employment reasons. Could you please provide us with some information about such migrant members that will help us 
contact them. 
 
 
Record the information about upto 2 migrants  
Migrant 1 
Name of the migrant  
Village/Town/City of current 
residence  
 
Village_____________________  
Town______________________ 
City_______________________   
State/Union Territory  State/UT__________________ 
Full Postal Address   
PIN  
Telephone number (with area code)  
Mobile Number  
Name of a friend/relative at the 
current residence  
 
Telephone or mobile number of that 
friend/relative  
 
 
Migrant 2 
Name of the migrant  
Village/Town/City of current 
residence  
 
Village_____________________  
Town______________________ 
City_______________________   
State/Union Territory  State/UT__________________ 
Full Postal Address   
PIN  
Telephone number (with area code)  
Mobile Number  
Name of a friend/relative at the 
current residence  
 
Telephone or mobile number of that 
friend/relative  
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Appendix 5 - Interview guide/aid memoir for unstructured/in-depth interviews 
with migrants with the list of indicative topics 
Below given is the list of indicative themes for the unstructured in-depth interviews 
with the migrant members of the select households. It is important to note that in-
depth interviews have no predetermined patterns, structures or contents. The aim 
of the in-depth interview is to obtain informants’ perspectives on the research 
problem and thus the list of topics below consists of potential themes and it is not 
an exhaustive list. While an attempt will be made to obtain information on each of 
the following aspects, informants’ narratives on other aspects relevant from the 
perspective of this research will also be recorded to add value to the research 
context. 
Background information   
Although this information was also collected through the ‘Household Interview 
Schedule’, the repetition of this basic set of questions is considered useful for 
starting a conversation with the migrant respondents. Moreover, this information 
will also provide a means to double-check the information with the one provided by 
household.  
- Name 
- Sex 
- Current age 
- Age at first migration 
- Duration of stay outside the village since first migration 
- Duration of stay at the current place of residence  
- Marital Status 
- If married, number of children 
- Highest educational attainment 
 
Migration history  
- Number of migratory movements made by the respondents from the first 
migration onwards. 
- Nature/pattern of migration, 1) seasonal, 2) circular, 3) permanent, and the 
factors that guide these patterns. 
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- A set of social, economic, demographic, cultural, political factors that caused 
migration.  
- Any particular event or episode that influenced the migratory behaviour of 
the respondent 
 
Social networks of migrants  
This section will seek to understand the importance of social network in guiding the 
migration behaviour of the respondent. The information that will be sought 
includes:  
- Whether migrant had any pre-existing social networks at the migration 
destination and the role of these social networks in guiding the migration 
behaviour of the respondent.  
- Whether and how these network are structured around the hierarchies of 
social class, caste/tribe and gender.  
- Whether these social networks guide the patterns of social relations at the 
workplace destinations i.e. how does one social group (people from one 
caste, tribe) interact with other.   
 
Living and Working conditions   
This section is intended to understand the living and working conditions of the 
migrants at the destination place. The questions include:  
- Number of working hours  
- Whether work related safety protocols are in place or not   
- Whether the nature of work involve any health hazards 
- Health status of migrants 
- Availability or safe drinking water, toilet facility, recreational facilities etc. 
 
Standard of living  
This section will attempt to assess the standard of living and well-being of the 
migrants and how they compare with their life in the origin village(s). This will 
include questions pertaining to: 
- Type of housing 
- Source of drinking water 
- Type of toilet facility 
- Monthly income and consumption patters  
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Income and Remittances  
This part will cover questions such as, 
- Daily/Weekly/Monthly income of the migrants 
- Whether the income earned is adequate enough to live decently 
- Saving patterns of migrants 
- Whether migrants send remittances at the place of origin 
- If yes, how frequently they send remittances at the place of origin 
- Nature of remittances – cash or kind 
- The amount of money remitted home 
 
Food consumption patterns of migrants  
An attempt will also be made to understand the food consumptions of the migrants 
at the destination places. The aim is to learn whether and how migration play out 
on the food security of migrant members and whether there were any qualitative 
differences between the food security outcomes of resident and non-resident 
groups of the same household. 
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Appendix 6: Food items used in Principal Component Analysis for computing 
food diversity tertiles 
Following is the list of 30 food items that were used in the Principal Component 
Analysis for computing household food diversity tertiles. The household dietary 
diversity calendar in the survey questionnaire included 46 individual food items, and 
households were asked to report the food items they consumed in the month 
preceding the survey. However, there were 16 food items with frequencies of 10 
households or less which rendered them unsuitable for Principal Component 
Analysis analysis. Hence these 30 items were finally used for the dietary diversity 
tertiles  
S. No. Food item 
 Cereals and pulses 
1 Corn 
2 Chole 
3 Moong 
4 Chana 
5 Arhardal 
6 Masoor Dal 
7 Other (specify________) 
 Vegetables 
8 Onion 
9 Garlic 
10 Tomatoes 
11 Gourds (Bitter, Ash, Melon) 
12 Drumstick 
13 Lady finger 
14 Spinach 
15 Any other 
16 Banana 
17 Mango 
18 Jackfruit 
19 Other (specify________) 
20 Milk 
21 Eggs 
 Meat protein  
22 Mutton 
23 Chicken 
24 Fish 
 Others  
25 Biscuits 
26 Tea 
27 Sugar 
28 Jaggery 
29 Pickles 
30 Ghee 
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